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Abstract
The dissertation investigates group decision-making from a linguistic perspect-
ive, which means that the linguistic interaction in group decision-making is put 
in focus, but also that linguistic methods are used to perform the investigation. 
The main research questions are i) what are group decisions, ii) how are group 
decisions made, linguistically, and iii) how does group decision-making relate to 
other social activities?
The dissertation has five main parts. The first is a survey of previous research on 
group decision-making, including work done in social-psychology, communica-
tion research, linguistics and argumentation analysis. The second part of the dis-
sertation is an analysis of the concept of decision, where dictionaries, thesauri 
and corpora are used as empirical input. The third part is a study of argumenta-
tion in group decision-making, where one well-established theory of argumenta-
tion analysis, pragma-dialectics, is discussed critically, and merged with a modern 
theory of language. The fourth main part of the dissertation concerns interac-
tional patterns – a corpus of decision-making conversations is scrutinized, and 
patterns are extracted and discussed. The fifth and last of the main parts is a 
study of word frequencies in the group decision-making corpus, where methodo-
logical problems are discussed, and a number of measures based on word fre-
quencies are presented. 
The results of the dissertation include the survey of previous research on group 
decision-making, a concept analysis of decision, as well as a new model for argu-
mentation analysis. Some more specific results are that there is considerable vari-
ation among the groups as regards the way decisions are made, although group 
decisions always are oriented around proposing-accepting. In addition it was 
found that the language in group decision-making is often quite advanced and 
that arguing is an integral part of group decision-making.
Keywords: group decision-making, argumentation in conversation, arguing, deci-
sion, interactional patterns, word frequencies, corpus linguistics, concept analys-
is, concept determination
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1. Introduction
1.1 Group decision-making
The phrase group decision-making may sound very formal, important, and almost 
ominous. Men in dark suits meet around mahogany tables to make decisions 
about the future for thousands of people. Heads nod slowly, stern faces turn, a 
heavy gavel strikes. 
However, group decision-making is really about arranging to do things with oth-
er people. Two friends who meet on the street and decide to go for a pint later in 
the evening, a married couple choosing wall-paper for their living room, or a 
small football team making a decision not to participate in a regional tournament 
300 km away. Of course, the example of the men meeting around the mahogany 
table is also a case of group decision-making, but the point is that group deci-
sion-making is something that we all do, most every day – we use language to 
make decisions with other people. 
One may ask if group decision-making is not in itself more interesting than the 
language and communication of group decision-making, but the way I see it, 
there is no real conflict. Language is the primary expression for, and means 
through which we make group decisions, and we need to understand communic-
ation in group decision-making in order to understand group decision-making.
1.2 The aim of this study
In this study, I will investigate and describe group decision-making from a lin-
guistic viewpoint. This means that the language used in group decision-making 
will be investigated and described, and also that linguistic methods and theories 
will be used to study group decision-making as a whole. Group decisions are part 
of the social microstructure that forms the basis of the macrostructure of soci-
ety, and studying social microstructure is closely linked to studying language and 
communication. In this thesis, I shall use linguistic methods to investigate the so-
cial microstructure, and more specifically I shall investigate group decision-mak-
ing by studying the language used in group decision-making. The following ques-
tions describe the research focus of this study.
• What are group decisions?
• How are group decisions made, linguistically?
• How does group decision-making relate to other social activities?
Group decision-making can be assumed to be quite different in different cul-
tures, but in this investigation I shall not attempt a cross-cultural comparison, 
but limit the study to Swedish culture. I expect many of the findings to be valid 
for other cultures as well, but comparison with other (future) studies will be ne-
cessary to find out precisely where the cultural borders of group decision-making 
lie. However, despite the monocultural approach of this study, it may still be of 
interest for intercultural research on group decision-making. Since much of the 
previous research done on group decision-making is made on US American 
groups, this study is interesting because it is done on Swedish groups. Further, 
the linguistic approach used in this work is well suited for intercultural comparis-
ons, and it could thus be used as a basis for comparison in later studies of group 
decision-making in other cultures.
(This aim is described in more detail in section 2.6, p. 39 ff. and 3.5.3, p. 108 ff.)
1.3 Rationale
Group decision-making is very common, people engage in it all the time, primar-
ily through linguistic interaction. At the same time, many of the most important 
social structures around us are controlled by group decisions (at least in western 
democracies) – laws are made, taxes are set, and people get hired and fired; just 
to mention a few things that can be decided by groups. Group decisions are 
therefore of general interest. 
It is also interesting to see how group decision-making is done linguistically. Lan-
guage is the primary tool for communication, and studying the linguistic commu-
nication in decision-making groups should lead to increased understanding of 
group decision-making. Apart from the direct goal of better understanding of a 
specific human activity, this could in turn help people avoid or solve problems 
involved in group decision-making, i.e. potentially improving decisions and 
groups.
Finally, my own personal interest in group decision-making has a very functional 
and normative background – why do people sometimes get stuck in group deci-
sions? Even unimportant decisions like where to go for a beer on a Wednesday 
night can take ages. From this arises a general curiosity about group decisions. 
What are they? How are they performed?
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1.4 Outline
The present investigation of group decision-making starts in chapter 2 with a 
survey of previous research. It provides an overview of the existing research on 
group decision-making, as it is being done in social psychology, (speech) com-
munication research and argumentation analysis. It also contains a description of 
the relevant linguistic theories used in this dissertation. At the end, I describe a 
model of group decision-making that relates the different varieties of previous 
research on group decision-making to each other, and explains how the parts of 
this study relate to this.
After the background chapter the concept of decision will be analyzed, in 
chapter 3. This is intended to clarify what group decisions are, and how the 
concept is related to other, neighboring concepts. 
As the model of group decision-making at the end of the background chapter 
will show, a group decision may be preceded by argumentation. Chapter 4 dis-
cusses a linguistic approach to argumentation analysis. An existing and well-es-
tablished model for argumentation analysis, pragma-dialectics, is examined critic-
ally, and combined with the linguistic and communication-oriented theory of 
activity-based communication analysis. The resulting model is used to analyze an 
example conversation containing argumentation.
The actual decision-making is also worth some attention, and chapter 5, titled In-
teractional patterns, deals with this. A corpus of transcribed recordings of conversa-
tions where people make group decisions is used as the empirical basis, and in-
teractional patterns are extracted.
The final study, chapter 6, investigates the language of group decision-making 
using word frequencies. The measures and word lists are generated from the cor-
pus used in chapter 5, and these are compared to two other activity types. 
In chapter 7 the different parts of the dissertation are discussed together, and 
general conclusions are drawn.
1.5 Translation
This work contains a lot of examples and excerpts from Swedish corpora, all of 
which are translated into English. Translations are always tricky, and since much 
of the material is spoken language, the translations are often more difficult than 
usual – colloquial and interactive language can be very difficult to understand 
even before it has been translated, and important cues may be lost in translation. 
I have tried to make the translations easy to understand, which sometimes has 
lead to translations that deviate somewhat from the literal meaning of the origin-
als. The focus has always been to clearly show the point of the example or 
excerpt.
For people with no knowledge of any Scandinavian language, appendix 8 con-
tains a brief introduction to the Swedish language.
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2. Previous research
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I shall give an overview of the previous research done on group 
decision-making and its language. Group decision-making has been studied in 
several academic disciplines, and as a whole it can be considered a fairly well-es-
tablished research field. Among social psychologists it is studied as a sub field of the 
more general small group research, and among communication scholars as one type of 
group communication. These scientific disciplines are rather young, since invest-
igations directly focusing on face-to-face interaction between human individuals 
did not start until the early 20th century. However, less explicitly, group deci-
sion-making is studied in argumentation analysis and rhetoric, with a much longer 
history, dating back about as far as scientific records goes, to early Greek 
antiquity. 
Other relevant research has been done by linguists interested in group commun-
ication in general. The present work subscribes to the view that group decision-
making is a part of the social microstructure that constitutes the foundation of 
the macro structure of society, and the sociological/linguistic research direction 
of ethnomethodological conversation analysis studies how this micro structure is created 
and upheld. Other researchers have approached spoken, face-to-face interaction 
with somewhat different theoretical frameworks, e.g. Jens Allwood (Activity-
based Communication Analysis), and several researchers connected to Associa-
tion Theory, such as Henri Tajfel, Howard Giles and Nikolas Coupland (Thana-
soulas 1999). Erving Goffman, though primarily a sociologist, developed theor-
ies that have become widely used among linguists (Lemert and Branaman 1997).
This chapter presents work done on group decision-making in these scientific 
fields. The main reason for this is to give an overview of a field that is scattered 
over several academic disciplines, and to show the background to which this dis-
sertation connects. The presentation starts with a description of the explicit re-
search on group decision-making made in social psychology (2.2), in which we 
find the first cases of modern group decision-making research. Somewhat later, 
communication scholars started to show an interest in the subject, and their re-
search is presented in the subsequent section (2.3). Linguistic theories and 
studies relevant for communication in group decision-making are presented after 
that (2.4), and in 2.5, relevant research in argumentation analysis is described1. 
Finally, section 2.6 provides a comparison between the research in all of the 
above academic fields.
2.2 Group decision-making in social psychology
2.2.1 Roots
The research done on group decision-making in social psychology, as we shall 
see, is not directly concerned with the communication in group decision-making, 
but social psychologists were the first ones to study group decision-making expli-
citly, and the foundation they lay have influenced most of the later research in 
this field. The study of human interaction in a very general sense has, of course, 
a long history in rhetoric, sociology, political philosophy and other disciplines, 
but investigations focusing directly on face-to-face interaction between human 
individuals did not start until the early 20th century. At that time, social psycho-
logists in the US started posing questions and seeking answers to why certain 
groups worked “better” than others. Dashiell (1935) reviews several studies un-
der the heading “The Effect of Group Discussion on the Individual’s Work”, 
the earliest from 1914. One important factor fueling these studies was a discus-
sion in the US about the efficiency and reliability of the jury system. The discus-
sion emphasized normative questions such as what kind of groups produced the 
best results. Another factor seems to have been an urge to show that democratic 
systems were better than authoritarian/fascist ones (Dashiell 1935:1132; Frey 
1996:22; Davis and Verlin 1982:2). 
These early studies were done as experimental (social) psychology, and were typ-
ically based on people’s estimation of the length between two taps on a table, the 
number of beans in a jar, or something similar. The correctness of their estima-
tions could be measured before and after discussions. Some efforts were made 
to create more naturalistic experiments (Dashiell 1935:134), but on the whole 
these studies used rather artificial settings.
During the 1940’s and 1950’s, theories were developed that tried to explain the 
results of these studies. Four of the more influential ones, field theory, social systems 
theory, social exchange theory and interaction theory, are presented below.
2.2.2 Field theory
The first theory attempting to explain group decision-making was Kurt Lewin’s 
field theory. It was not designed to study decision making specifically, but rather it 
1. Decision theory may sound like a field of great relevance for the present project, but 
decision theory is a framework for prescribing which decisions to make in 
difficult choice situations. It has very little to do with interaction in groups.
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was a general psychological theory expanded to work on group dynamics. In 
field theory, the relevant factors for understanding an individual’s behavior are 
captured in the concept of the life space of an individual, i.e. ‘the relevant physical 
and social facts in [the individual’s] surroundings (...) represented in the way [the 
individual] perceives them’. (Lewin 1952:196). When two or more individuals in-
teract, their life spaces become interdependent, and the sum of the life spaces is 
the life space of the group.
In practice, it is often impossible to model each individual of a group, and so the 
life space of a group is modeled directly, as a social field. Lewin explains the idea 
of a social field in the following way: ‘this means that the social happening is 
viewed as occurring in, and being the result of, a totality of coexisting social 
entities, such as groups, subgroups, members, barriers, channels of communica-
tion, etc’ (Lewin 1952:200). Any event within such a field is seen as a result of 
forces in that field. Lewin gives an example from investigating the level of ag-
gressiveness in a group of boys. A force working towards more aggressiveness 
could be a wild game the boys are playing, and a force working against aggress-
iveness could be friendship between members.
The theory is highly abstract and does not specify which factors are relevant for 
understanding a group or an individual, nor how different factors affect each 
other, and field theory did not catch on very well. However, somewhat later, 
Lewin’s work spawned research that perhaps was not directly connected to field 
theory. One such “spin-off” came from the claim made in field theory that the 
degree of interdependence between the life spaces of the members in a group 
depends on group cohesion, i.e. how much the members commit themselves to 
the group and the group task. Research on group cohesion took place in the 1950’s 
and 60’s (Frey 1996:23). 
Another claim made by field theory was that one of the factors involved in the 
creation of group cohesion was the requirements that the environment put on 
the group. This led to research on communication networks, that is, how and with 
whom members of a group communicate. Frey (1996:23) writes, ‘Although some 
differences in group problem solving were found among the networks, later 
studies showed that with practice each network was as effective as the others’. 
The third important influence of field theory was on leadership research. The theory 
argued that the actions made by and in a group “locomote” the group towards or 
away from its goal, and leadership research started investigating how the leader 
of a group “locomoted” the group (Frey 1996:23-24). 
2.2.3 Social systems theory
The second theory on group interaction to develop was social systems theory, 
and the most influential version of this was developed by Talcot Parsons (Ridge-
way 1983:37 ff). Similar to field theory, social systems theory viewed groups as 
holistic units based on interdependence among members. The basic idea of the 
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theory was that groups must satisfy certain functional prerequisites, or they break 
down. Ridgeway identifies four such basic needs in her presentation of the 
theory:
• Pattern maintenance
The cultural and behavioral patterns that give the group its distinctive character must be 
maintained. In small groups, this means that the individuals must share a commitment 
to maintaining the groups distinctive identity.
• Adaptation
A group must successfully relate to its environment (both social and physical), overcom-
ing environmental threats and obtaining from the environment needed resources.
• Integration
The group must develop rules for coordinating the activities of its various parts and 
achieving a certain sense of cohesiveness.
• Goal attainment
Groups have to develop a sufficient organization and control over their behavior to at 
least minimally accomplish the tasks of goals for which the members have joined 
together.
(Ridgeway 1983:44-45)
The prerequisites listed here clearly overlap with each other: keeping a distinctive 
character for the group (pattern maintenance) must be relative to the environ-
ment, and thus overlap with the goal of adaptation, and the goals of integration 
and goal attainment overlap in that they both concern organization of the parts 
of the group. Further, integration may be a part of or a means for achieving pat-
tern maintenance, since a certain sense of cohesiveness ought to be necessary to 
“maintain a distinctive character” for the group. Similarly, it may be necessary to 
“develop rules for coordinating activities” in order to “successfully relate to the 
groups environment”, which means that integration is a means to achieve adapt-
ation. The fourth item, goal attainment, also seems to be a very general purpose 
for the group, an end for which the first three items are means. This failure to 
keep the prerequisites separated analytically may be one of the reasons the theory 
did not survive in this form1.
However, according to Parsons, different groups will develop different patterns 
of interaction and social structures in order to fulfill these four needs, but once 
they have developed a set of such interactions and structures, they will be unwill-
ing to change it. This is called an equilibrium state. Social systems that develop 
1. It is possible that the blame for this should be put on Ridgeway rather than on 
Parsons, since Ridgeway is the main source of information about Parsons theory 
here. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find an overview of Parsons’ theory 
written by Parsons himself.
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mechanisms for maintaining their equilibrium when events affecting the balance 
occur, are the ones that survive. 
Social systems theory has been criticized on several accounts (overlapping pre-
requisites being only one criticism), but several of its ideas have survived, primar-
ily through Bales’ interaction theory, which can be seen as a version of social sys-
tems theory. Bales’ work will be presented below, but first we shall turn to a 
slightly peculiar theory that was developed during these early years.
2.2.4 Social exchange theory
A somewhat odd bird among these early theories is social exchange theory. Ac-
cording to Gouran (1994), this theory developed when some researchers in the 
1950’s and 60’s tried to explain group interaction in what can be called economic 
terms, in line with reinforcement theories of behaviorist psychology. In contrast 
to field theory and social systems theory (above), they did not view groups as 
holistic units, but rather as a number of interacting individuals. The theory 
claimed that group participants were profit-seekers, i.e. they tried to maximize re-
wards and minimize costs. Rewards were simply things that individuals found 
pleasurable, and costs were things that individuals found painful. According to 
the reinforcement theories, the more rewarding a certain behavior is, the more 
likely the actor is to repeat that behavior (until a satiation point is reached, where 
the actor tires of the behavior). In a group context, this meant that interactions 
that are rewarding, giving the actor something she values, are more likely to be 
repeated than interactions that are painful. The fact that interaction always in-
volves at least two actors makes things a bit more complicated: other people will 
not participate in the interaction unless they find it rewarding too. Because of 
this, an actor who finds a certain interaction rewarding and wants to repeat it will 
have to give rewards as well as receive them, even if this requires some painful 
behavior (provided the reward is greater than the cost). Examples of works in 
this school are (Thibaut and Kelley 1959) and (Homans 1961). (Homans also 
participated in the development of social systems theory somewhat earlier).
Social exchange theory is most interesting when compared to the other main the-
ories, since it does not treat the group as a whole, but tries to reduce the behavi-
or of the group to the behavior of the individuals. This stands in stark contrast 
to the other theories, primarily social systems theory.
Ridgeway (1983:40) claims that social exchange theory was very influential in 
psychological studies of leadership emergence, member satisfaction, social influ-
ence, and the like. However, I have found very few traces of this theory in later 
research on group decision-making. Gouran et al. (1994) admits that social ex-
change theory had very little direct influence on communication research on 
groups, but identifies three more general contributions that it had to the general 
body of small group research: i) the recognition that any contribution of group 
interaction is part of a chain of responses and evocations (or stimuli, as they 
would probably phrase it), ii) the emphasis on communication being important 
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for shaping of developments in groups, and iii) the reinforcement of ‘the view 
that human behavior is law-governed and no different in that sense from the be-
havior of other animate and inanimate objects’ (Gouran et al. 1994:247). 
2.2.5 Interaction theory
Returning to the main path of the root system of modern research on group 
decision-making, we shall now have a look at the works of Robert Freed Bales. 
He was influenced by field theory, but his work was more directly a form of so-
cial systems theory. He argued that groups constantly try to balance external 
forces (arising from task issues) and internal forces (arising from social-emotion-
al issues), and that successful groups in this respect develop what he called a dyn-
amic equilibrium (Gouran et al. 1994:248; Frey 1996:24; Bales and Strodtbeck 
1951). This differed from the equilibrium state of social systems theory in that a 
basic antagonism between task demands and social-emotional demands was as-
sumed by Bales. In a dynamic equilibrium the group constantly switches between 
task and social-emotional problems. 
In order to study the creation and maintenance of this equilibrium, Bales de-
veloped Interaction Process Analysis (IPA), a method for studying small groups in-
cluding a speech act taxonomy (‘an observational scheme for coding behaviors 
enacted during group discussion’ (Frey 1996:24)).
The IPA speech act taxonomy has been widely used in small group research, and 
is worth some special attention, see figure 2-1.
The theoretical basis of the taxonomy consists of two parameters, the mode of ori-
entation and the sequence of problem solving. There are three different modes of orient-
ation: cognitive (perception, memory and recall, observation of and inference 
about an object, and communication with social objects, etc.), affective (emotional 
and optative reactions to, and evaluations of, an object) and conative (decisions 
about an object and active, overt attempts to withdraw from, adapt to, manipu-
late or some other way manage an object) (Bales 1950:52). These modes should 
be understood as aspects of all actions, but they can be more or less focused.
The sequence of problem solving is a way to capture the intuition that some acts 
are more dependent on the previous act than others. Initial acts are rather inde-
pendent acts, signaling a difficulty or a need, or being primarily expressive. When 
another participant reacts to an initial act, for example by trying to help with a 
difficulty, that is a medial act. The first participant then evaluates whether the me-
dial act was successful or not in solving the problem, and reports the evaluation 
in a terminal act. An example of this sequence is someone asking a question (ini-
tial), another participant answering (medial), and the first person responding with 
a new question, not being entirely happy with the answer. This last step is ter-
minal for one sequence, as well as being initial for the next sequence of problem 
solving.
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Figure 2-1: The IPA speech act taxonomy (Bales 1950:9). 
Shows solidarity, raises other’s 
status, gives help, reward.
1
Shows tension release , jokes, 
laughs, shows satisfaction.
2
Agrees, shows passive 
acceptance, understands, 
concurs, complies.
3
Gives suggestion , direction, 
implying autonomy for others.
4
Gives opinion, evaluation, 
analysis, expresses feeling, wish.
5
Gives orientation , information, 
repeats, clarifies, confirms.
6
Asks for orientation , 
information, repetition, 
confirmation.
7
Asks for opinion, evaluation, 
analysis, expression of feeling.
8
Asks for suggestion , direction, 
possible ways of action.
9
Disagrees, shows passive 
rejection, formality, withholds 
help.
10
Shows tension , asks for help, 
withdraws out of field.
11
Shows antagonism, deflates 
other’s status, defends or asserts 
self.
12
a b c d e
f
T a s k
A r e a :
Neutral
S o c i a l
Emotional
A r e a :
Positive
S o c i a l
Emotional
A r e a :
Negative
KEY:
a  Problems of 
    Communication
b  Problems of 
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c  Problems of 
    Control
d  Problems of 
    Decision
e  Problems of 
    Tension Reduction
f   Problems of 
    Reintegration
A  Positive 
    Reactions
B  Attempted 
    Answers
C  Questions
D  Negative 
    Reactions
A
B
C
D
Since terminal acts can be either positive or negative, the sequence of problem 
solving generates four categories of acts. These four categories combined with 
the three categories of mode of orientation yields the twelve categories in figure 
1 above1. This theoretical description gives the impression that having twelve 
categories is “natural”, but Bales says explicitly that he experimented with many 
more categories, and that the main reason for choosing twelve was that the com-
puter punch cards used at the time was limited to twelve elements.
1. Bales does not point out exactly how the twelve categories relate to the underlying 
parameters, but the way I understand it, 9, 4, 3 and 10 are conative acts (initial, 
medial, positive final and negative final); 7, 6, 2 and 11 are cognitive acts; and 8, 5, 
1 and 12 are affective acts. 
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Bales also groups categories 1-3 with 10-12 into a social-emotional cluster, to be 
distinguished from task-oriented categories. This grouping is claimed to be made, 
‘not according to the type of functional problem with which [the categories] deal, 
but according to their implication, positive or negative, for the solution of these 
types of problems’ (Bales and Strodtbeck 1951:488). It was mentioned initially 
that the basis of Bales’ theory is the understanding that external forces (task de-
mands) must be balanced with the internal forces (social-emotional demands), 
and this grouping is where that theoretical basis enters the coding scheme. It is a 
fundamental conceptual pair in Bales’ work, and one that is very much a part of 
present day research. However, one immediate problem with this distinction is 
that social-emotional issues may be the task of a group. Let’s say a small com-
pany with only seven co-workers has decided to throw a party, in order to get 
people to know each other better and improve the social-emotional atmosphere. 
All seven co-workers gather to organize the party. How can social-emotional 
tasks be distinguished from task-demands in such a group?
Subsequent small group research has been heavily influenced by Bales’ method: 
acts are identified, categorized and then analyzed statistically. It is a standard 
method among outcome oriented communications scholars (see 2.3.2 below, p. 
17ff.), but the precise coding schemes may differ considerably. Salazar (1997) 
uses a modified version of a scheme originating from Hirokawa (1990), and Beck 
& Fisch (2000) uses what is called Conference Coding System developed by Fisch 
(1998), to mention two schemes; a longer list can be found in (Frey 1996:29).
Studying task-solving groups using IPA, Bales identified phases that all, or at 
least all ideal, groups go through (Bales and Strodtbeck 1951). In the first phase 
the group emphasizes problems of orientation, in the second phase evaluation, and 
in the third phase the emphasis is on control (Bales and Strodtbeck 1951:485). The 
study spawned a significant subfield of small group research about development-
al processes in group decision-making, and a number of models have been sug-
gested. The model proposed by Bales and Strodtbeck is classified as a unitary se-
quential phase model by Poole & Baldwin (1996:216 ff). Poole (1981; 1983a) 
argues rather convincingly against the unitary model, proposing a model of mul-
tiple sequential phases instead. In such a model, different groups may follow differ-
ent sequences through different phases, including returning to previous phases 
and iterations. One advantage of this is that it is not necessary to rule out groups 
that are not ideal as ‘non-full-fledged’, as Bales and Strodtbeck did. 
Another type of models for developmental processes in group decision is critical 
event models, which attempt to identify key events in the decision process, see for 
example (Gersick 1988). This perspective is more in line with how group mem-
bers tend to describe a decision-making process they have been through (Poole 
and Baldwin 1996:221). 
A third type of model is called continuous models, which is the kind that Poole ulti-
mately reaches in (Poole 1983b). Scheidel and Crowell (1964) developed a con-
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tinuous model some two decades earlier, based on a kind of trial-and-error tech-
nique: one member presents an idea, and then the group discusses and possibly 
adjusts the idea, before it is accepted or rejected. The result is a spiraling process 
of introducing an idea, elaborating on it, and evaluating the result. 
Poole & Baldwin (1996) also identify a fourth type of model for group decision 
development, social construction models, but admit that this category is not incom-
patible with the other categories. Rather, social construction models focus on the 
micro-level development of decisions, without denying the possibility of patterns 
on a more abstract level. One example of this attitude is found in (Schwartzman 
1989).
Bales’ work has had a profound influence on small group research, the most im-
portant perhaps being that it shifted the interest of researchers from external 
factors to internal processes (Frey 1996:26). 
2.2.6 Recent research on group decision-making in social psychology
Bales’ work has been very influential; more recent research on group decision-
making in social psychology can be seen as a continuation of Bales’ research. The 
general term for the field is now small group research, and group decision-making is 
only one of the many subfields studied under this heading. Some other fields of 
small group research are leadership, power, status systems, norms, cohesion and 
social dilemmas.
The term group decision-making is sometimes used in a very general sense concern-
ing almost any work performed by groups, which can be somewhat confusing. 
Under that heading a wide range of issues are investigated. For example, group 
problem solving, choice shifts, group polarization, and bargaining (negotiation) 
are included in the volume named Group Decision Making by Brandstätter et al. 
(1982). 
One important approach to group decision-making among social psychologists 
has been that of social decision schemes, SDS. This comes in different versions, but 
the best known is the one that was constructed by Davis (1973). The model is a 
rather straight-forward way of predicting/estimating the decision of a group 
based on the preferences of the individual members and on the social decision 
scheme used. A social decision scheme is simply the rule for how the group deci-
sion is determined from the individuals’ preferences, such as the majority rule 
(which must be extended to handle situations where there is no majority). In this 
approach, group decision-making is a “black box”, for which only input and out-
put are considered. This is not to say that group discussion is ignored, since the 
social decision scheme may include parameters for how much the participants 
have spoken to each other etc. This approach does not, however, try to analyze 
the details of the group members’ interaction.
One of the more stable findings from this research is that the opinion that is 
held by a majority/plurality of the individuals at the start of the discussion tend 
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to define the final outcome, and that this is particularly true for situations where 
no demonstrably correct alternative is found (Kameda et al. 2003:464). It is 
worth noting that for people outside this academic field the word consensus may 
mean approximately that a solution is found that everybody is happy with and 
that everybody has been allowed to express his or her opinion. In the context of 
social psychological research on group decision-making, the term is usually used 
for groups that are allowed to discuss before decision is made, as distinguished 
from situations where individuals are polled for their opinion without any group 
discussion, such as a public election. 
The study of manipulability of group decisions and group polarization can be seen as 
spin-offs from research on social decision schemes, and are described here 
briefly: When three or more alternatives exist, cyclical majorities can exist, i.e. 
member A may rank the alternatives y>x>z, member B x>z>y, and member C 
z>y>x. If the vote first is called between y and z, B and C will form a majority in 
favor of z. In the second vote, between z and x, A and B will form a majority in 
favor of x. If, however, the first vote is called between x and y, A and C will 
form a majority in favor of y, and x will disappear. The member who is able to 
control the ordering of the voting can thus manipulate the outcome. See e.g. 
(Mueller 1989) for further discussion of manipulability of group decisions.
One important finding in this field is the discovery of so-called choice shifts or 
group polarization, first reported by Stoner (1961) and Wallach et al. (1962). These 
studies showed that the average group was more likely to decide for a risky alter-
native than its average member was. Because of the nature of the first studies it 
was initially called the risky shift, but later studies revealed that the shift could go 
the other way as well (the cautious shift) (Stoner 1968). Seibold et al. (1996) exam-
ines three major explanations to choice shift/group polarization, Social Comparis-
on Theory, Persuasive Arguments Theory, and Social Identity Theory:
• Social Comparison Theory (SCT) 
This theory assumes that group members possess a drive to reevaluate 
their own preferences when hearing and thinking about other members’ 
preferences, and that they feel either external or internal pressure to con-
form. Group discussion affects the group decision since it exposes mem-
bers to the preferences of the other members. Choice shifts occur when 
external or internal pressure pushes the dynamic process of conforming in 
a risky or cautious direction. This bare-bones version of the theory does 
not explain more than that the function of the group discussion is to dis-
tribute information about the members’ opinions in the group.
• Persuasive Arguments Theory (PAT) 
PAT claims that people hold the views they do because the arguments 
they have access to point to that particular view. Since not all members of 
a group have access to the same set of arguments, group discussion can 
change the set for the individual member, and thus affect the group deci-
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sion outcome. If many members have different sets of arguments, but all 
these sets favor the same alternative, the group discussion will result in 
each member having more arguments for that alternative than before the 
discussion. This leads to a more risky/cautious decision than the individu-
al would have made without the discussion.
• Social Identity Theory (SIT) 
This theory puts group membership at the center for predicting individu-
als’ preferences. As a first step, the individual perceives/defines distinct 
social groups, and places herself and others in these groups. The second 
step is to attribute representative qualities to the groups, something which 
will cause the described groups to be rather extreme, since their attribu-
tions have to be characteristic. The third and final step of the individual in 
this social identification process is to adopt the perceived characteristics of 
the in-group. Group discussion is then an opportunity for the members of 
a group to investigate how similar or dissimilar they are to the other mem-
bers, and to adjust the categorizations accordingly. The second and third 
steps are performed as categories are updated. Because of the drive for dif-
ferences between the social groups inherent in this process, group discus-
sion may lead to more extreme groups, and thus to more extreme (risky/
cautious) decisions.
Choice shift is related to the problem of groupthink. The term was coined by Janis 
(1972), and is explained as ‘a mode of thinking that people engage in when they 
are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for un-
animity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of 
action’ (Janis 1982a:9). Some historical case studies classified by Janis (Janis 
1982b:479) as examples of groupthink are
• British Prime Minister Chamberlain and his advisors supported the policy 
of appeasement of Hitler in 1937-38, despite repeated warnings and indic-
ations that it would have adverse consequences.
• US American Admiral Kimmel’s group of Naval Commanders ignored 
warnings received in the autumn of 1941 that Japan was planning an attack 
on Pearl Harbor.
• US President Kennedy’s advisory group had reliable indication that 
launching the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba would a) fail and b) damage 
US relations’ with other countries, but despite that, supported the 
decision.
One interesting thing about this is that it is one of the few issues in the social 
psychological branch of small group research that typically has used naturally oc-
curring groups and situations in studies, as opposed to laboratory experiments.
Another area of interest has been that of unshared information, how information 
that is not available to all members at the start of a discussion affects decision 
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outcome. Tindale et al. (2003) describes this research in some detail, and reports 
that several studies have shown that the likelihood of a piece of information 
popping up during a group discussion is a function of the number of members 
having that information.
At the risk of over-simplifying, both social psychologists and communication 
scholars can be said to try to predict and explain group output (decisions). How-
ever, where social psychologists do this by investigating input, i.e. the psycholo-
gical state of members prior to the group discussion, communication scholars do 
it by studying the communication that takes place in the group (discussed be-
low). Thus, most of the work done in social psychology does not concern itself 
so much with intra-group communication, and is of peripheral interest in the 
present work.
2.3 Group decision-making in (speech) 
communications
2.3.1 Roots
Research on group decision-making by communication scholars naturally fo-
cuses more on communication than the corresponding work done by social psy-
chologists, and, for that reasons, it is connected more directly to the topic of this 
dissertation. Speech communication showed an interest in group decision-mak-
ing very early, albeit implicitly. It was parallel to the first studies by social psycho-
logists on group communication that speech communication scholars adapted 
the philosopher John Dewey’s (1910) ideas on critical thinking for group discus-
sion (Frey 1996:21; Gouran et al. 1994:253). Dewey proposed a model for ideal 
‘reflective’ thinking, a five step process: 
(i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of possible solution; 
(iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (v) further observation and 
experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief
(Dewey 1910:72)
Textbook authors adapted this model to group discussions, but no serious at-
tempts were made at providing empirical evidence for its validity until the 1960’s. 
By 1970, this branch of speech communication, influenced by social psycholo-
gical work and methods, had developed into what Gouran et al. (1994:251) calls 
the outcome oriented thrust of group communication research. Outcome oriented 
researchers tried to find connections between the communication occurring in a 
group and the decisions produced by the group. Decisions were viewed as ‘final 
choices among sets of alternatives’ (Gouran et al. 1994:251), and these choices 
could be good or bad, in different ways. 
The other main thrust of research within this field that Gouran et al. identifies is 
called development oriented. These researchers, sometimes sociologists but more of-
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ten communication scholars, were more interested in the process by which deci-
sions were created, and decisions were viewed as ideas that were modified during 
discussions. Since the primary interest was to understand how ideas developed 
into decisions, development oriented researchers were rather unconcerned with 
whether the decisions were good or bad in any way.
The division into these two directions seems valid for present day research on 
group communication as well; discussion follows in separate sections below.
2.3.2 Outcome oriented research
The research on group communication and group decision-making emphasizing 
the outcome of the communication is in spirit directly descended from Robert 
Bales’ work. Moreover, studies using modified versions of his IPA coding 
scheme are not rare (Salazar 1997; Innami 1994). One theory that has been de-
veloped in this field is functional theory, with Randy Y. Hirokawa and Dennis S. 
Gouran as the main champions (Hirokawa 1988; Gouran and Hirokawa 1996). 
The theory can be seen as a fusion of social psychology and speech communica-
tion research on group decision-making. The interest and focus on communica-
tion between group members come from researchers in the communication 
community, while the interest and focus on outcomes and quality of decisions 
come from social psychology (although it must be said that the theory now be-
longs entirely to the communications field). The basic idea of the functional the-
ory (or perspective, as it is sometimes called) is that there are certain tasks that 
members of a group need to perform in order to make a “good” decision. Gour-
an & Hirokawa (1996:56-57) cites (Gouran et al. 1993) and presents the follow-
ing list of tasks to be performed by a group in order to make a good decision:
1. to show correct understanding of the issues to be resolved;
2. to determine the minimal characteristics any alternative, to be acceptable, must 
possess;
3. to identify a relevant and realistic set of alternatives;
4. to examine carefully the alternatives in relationship to each previously agreed-upon 
characteristic of an acceptable choice; and
5. to select the alternative that analysis reveals to be the most likely to have desired 
characteristics.
(Gouran et al. 1993)
The influence of Dewey’s model of reflective thinking (see p. 17 above) is clear. 
There have been quite a few investigations trying to provide empirical support 
for the functional theory; (Gouran and Hirokawa 1996) cites 16 such studies. An 
ambitious example is (Hirokawa 1988), where a series of three studies were made 
with the overt purpose of testing the functional perspective. There have also 
been a number of studies of failed decision-making (or low quality decisions) 
that support the functional perspective in the way that a failure can be explained 
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in terms of the group not having performed the necessary functions (Gouran 
1984; Gouran 1987; Gouran 1990). 
The heritage from Bales in outcome oriented research is most clearly visible in 
the abundant use of coding schemes such as IPA (p. 11 above). Typically, tran-
scriptions of recorded group discussions are annotated according to a scheme, 
and then statistical analyzes are made on the basis of these annotations. An ex-
ample is (Innami 1994), which is also representative in the way the unit of coding 
is handled: the idea of a ‘thought-unit’ is taken adopted from (Scheidel and 
Crowell 1964), defined as ‘the smallest ideational contribution’. They introduce 
this concept after criticizing Bales’ (1950) system for being too crude, asserting 
that Bales only talks about ‘single acts’, without specifying how an act is 
identified.
From a linguistic viewpoint, it is surprising that the concept of though-unit is not 
discussed more. It is far from obvious what ‘the smallest ideational contribution’ 
is. For example, in a noun phrase like ‘a big brown bear’, is there no ideational 
contribution in ‘brown’? The entire treatment of acts in this area does indeed 
come across as quite naïve. Linguists working in the field of pragmatics have 
long been aware of the complexity of acts and the concept of action, and there is 
a substantial amount of literature on the subject. I find it quite strange that the 
people working in the outcome oriented branch of small group research have 
managed to stay ignorant of this.
Without going into too much detail on this topic, it should be pointed out that i) 
a contribution can serve more than one purpose at the same time (parallel multi-
functionality), ii) several acts can be performed after each other in a single contri-
bution (sequential multifunctionality), and iii) a single act can span several contri-
butions, even across speakers. Parallel multi-functionality is illustrated here:
A: Mummy, I want ice cream!
B: Do you want me to get angry?
Here B’s contribution is a question at the same time as it is a threat. 
Sequential multi-functionality is perhaps more obvious, as in the following 
example:
A: Would you like some more tea?
B: Yes, thank you, but only half a cup, please.
Here B’s contribution consists of first a feedback, then a thanking, and finally a 
request.
A final example will illustrate how a single act can span several contributions:
A: How many pots do you need?
B: The plastic ones?
C: No, the paper pots.
B: About twenty.
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Here A, B and C collaborate to create the question that B finally answers. (It can 
be divided into sub acts.)
A further discussion of communicative acts can be found in (Allwood 1978) and 
(Allwood 1996a). 
Hirokawa (1994:543) lists three problems that have been facing researchers in 
the functional school: ‘(a) defining what a function is, (b) identifying the “true 
functions” of communicative utterances and acts, and (c) linking the functions of 
utterances causally to group performance and other group-level outcomes’. Sim-
ilar claims are made in (Gouran and Hirokawa 1996), while Gouran (1999:16) re-
duces the issue to a matter of validity: how do we know that certain utterances 
serve the specified function, as opposed to being correlated to it? Again, the fun-
ctional school seems to be unaware of the work done in linguistic pragmatics, 
where the functions of utterances and acts have been discussed at great length. 
2.3.3 Development oriented research
The development-oriented branch of group communication research is domin-
ated by Structuration Theory (ST), a social theory developed by Anthony Giddens 
(1984). ST seems to be the foremost theory among communication scholars in-
terested in small group research. While functional theory has its roots in psycho-
logy, ST comes from sociology.
Through ST, Giddens tries to find a middle ground between the sociological tra-
ditions that try to describe objective properties of society on the one hand (Gid-
dens calls these traditions structuralist and functionalist), and the sociological tra-
ditions that try to describe society from a subjective, interpretative angle on the 
other hand (called hermeneutic by Giddens) (Giddens 1984:2). He places human 
acts in the center of the theory, implying that these are the junction between the 
hermeneutic, individual, subjective perspective and the functional, societal, ob-
jective perspective. Human acts are performed by motivated agents, and can be 
described and understood from their subjective viewpoint. But the acts are per-
formed in social systems, using structures, that can be described and understood “ob-
jectively”. Any kind of social entity that can be understood as a unit is a social 
system. The social entity is typically a group. More precisely, the social system is 
the activities of the members of such a group, while the rules and resources that 
are used to perform these activities, are structures. Structuration, finally, is how 
structures are used in systems. 
This is all rather abstract, and Giddens also explains the concepts with Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s conceptual pair syntagm and paradigm, terms which may be more fa-
miliar to a linguist. Giddens calls systems syntagmatic, situated in time-space, 
while structures are called paradigmatic, ‘the properties which make it possible 
for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and 
space and which lend them systemic form’ (Giddens 1984:17). Poole et al. 
(1996:117) describes structuration in a more easy-to-grasp way as “the process by 
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which systems are produced and reproduced through members’ use of rules and 
resources”. 
Again, linguists may be more used to the term conventions, as well as more familiar 
with how conventions are strengthened by use. For example, it may be the case 
that a meeting of a bible discussion group usually starts with prayer. For each 
meeting where this is the case, it becomes easier for the members to follow the 
convention and start with prayer, and doing so the convention is strengthened, 
making it even easier to start with prayer the next time, and more difficult to de-
part from the convention. In ST terms, the bible discussion group is a system, 
and the rule to start each meeting with a prayer is a structure that is employed 
and reproduced each time it is used. 
An actual example of how ST is used to investigate group dynamics is found in 
(Barley 1986). The paper reports a study of how work practices developed in two 
different hospitals when a new kind of technology was brought in, computer 
tomography scanners. Although the preconditions in terms of previous experi-
ence and available resources on the two sites were quite similar, quite different 
patterns of cooperation between physicians (radiologists) and technology assist-
ants (radiological technologists) developed. In one hospital, the expert physicians 
who started to use the scanners had little interest in explaining the reasons be-
hind the different types of scanning and tests that the technologists were asked 
to perform, which made it impossible for the technologists to form a more co-
herent view of how scannings should be done. The result was a pattern of co-
operation where the technologists were reduced more or less to being typists, en-
tering computer commands at the request of physicians. This was not very 
efficient, and after some organizational turbulence, physicians inexperienced with 
CT scanners were set to work with the technologists that were considered ‘least 
incompetent’. In that setting the passive role of the technologists that the establ-
ished pattern of cooperation included left the inexperienced physicians in charge 
of the scanning, at the same time as the acknowledged inexperience of the physi-
cians made them willing to consult the technologists on technical matters, who 
were more competent in that area. The result was greater confidence for the 
technologists and a pattern of cooperation where the physicians and technolo-
gists worked closely and continuously switched roles as teachers/learners.
At the other hospital, the initial expert radiologist usually explained the reasons 
behind his instructions to the technologists, which made them i) more compet-
ent and ii) expect such explanations. After some time, routine scannings were left 
to the technologists by the radiologist, a degree of independence that was un-
heard of in other departments. When inexperienced physicians replaced the ex-
pert, they had difficulties upholding the authority that their position in the hos-
pital hierarchy prescribed due to their incompetence with the technology relative 
to the technologists. This lack of authority was uncomfortable to technologists 
as well as to physicians; to avoid the discomfort the physicians left more and 
more of the work to the technologists. Thus, a pattern of cooperation arose 
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where the physicians were not present at all in the scanning room, and images 
were delivered to the physician’s office. 
Barley’s main method for the study was direct observation of examinations, dur-
ing which the researcher sometimes taped conversations and always took notes. 
Sometimes separate interviews with participants were performed, where their in-
terpretations of the events were recorded directly or immediately after. 
One kind of information that was taken down in the field notes were the occur-
rence of scripts. This is a concept taken from (Goffman 1959; Goffman 1967), 
and it occurs in slightly different versions under the names schema, frame and pos-
sibly others (Allwood 1986). A script is a pattern of interaction that displays the 
essence of the participants’ roles (Barley 1986:83). An example taken from (Bar-
ley 1986:93) is called ‘blaming the technologist’, and consists of three steps: i) the 
physician states or questions a perceived problem, ii) the physician insinuates or 
claims that the problem is the technologist’s fault, iii) the technologist claims that 
the problem lies with the technology, and iv) the physician rejects that claim. The 
following exchange is an example of an instance of ‘blaming the technologist’:
Excerpt 2-1. From (Barley 1986:93).
Rad = radiologist = physician, Tech = Technologist.
1 Rad: (Brusquely) This is pretty bad. The films on the last patient are pretty 
dark. Can you do anything about it?
2 Tech: I don’t know.
3 Rad: What do you mean you don’t know?
4 Tech: The problem is either in the processor or the camera there. I don’t 
know how to set them. Dr. X. knows how to set the camera. Maybe we 
should get him to come over and set the camera and I’ll rematrix them.
5 Rad: (Pointing to diagonal lines though the basal portion of the brain in a 
head scan) Is this all artifact here?
6 Tech: Yes. There’s nothing you can do about it.
7 Rad: Why not? You mean there’s nothing you can do about it?
8 Tech: I believe it’s all bone artifact.
Barley counted occurrences of this kind of scripts in his field notes, and used 
these as a basis for some statistical analyzes supporting the otherwise rather sub-
jective description of the processes taking place at the two hospitals.
The example given here on research based on ST is representative of the way ST 
research often stays on an abstract level, discussing models for describing how 
structures affect each other. If low-level scrutiny of the actual communication in 
a group is done, it starts with coding the communication with a predefined set of 
categories, often speech acts, but as the Barley example shows, larger units can 
be coded as well. This coding is seldom problematized in any other way than dis-
cussing inter-coder reliability.
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2.3.4 Bona fide groups and the naturalistic paradigm
During the 1990’s the experimental heritage from social psychology was chal-
lenged by the notion of Bona Fide Groups and the Naturalistic Paradigm. The 
Bona Fide Groups perspective was proposed by Linda Putnam and Cynthia 
Stohl (1990). According to this perspective, groups should be studied and ana-
lyzed in their context. The two main underlying characteristics are that real 
groups have ‘permeable and fluid boundaries’, and are ‘interdependent with their 
context’ (Putnam and Stohl 1996:149). These characteristics are developments of 
two initial observations:
• Individuals are members of more than one group at a time
The membership of one group can affect the membership of another 
group. For example, a person is likely to be treated differently in the local 
housing committee when it is discovered by other members that she is an 
elected official in the current government. Or, a person who is member of 
a peace organization may feel uncomfortable when the executive board of 
the company she is also a member of decides to cooperate with the na-
tional defense. Sometimes this multiple membership can be more directly 
used, e.g. when an young member of a political party committee is asked 
by the other members of the committee how young people would react to 
the idea that is being discussed. 
• Groups work with other groups and people
What goes on in a group is not strictly the business of the members of that 
group. In a larger organization, many groups cooperate to reach an overall 
goal, and tasks, responsibilities and authority are negotiated continuously. 
The members of one group are members of other groups, or have been 
members of other groups, or will be members of other groups, or know 
members of other groups, and communication takes place between mem-
bers of different groups continuously.
Moreover, Putnam and Stohl (1996:149) indicates group identity as being an im-
portant factor to include in analysis. To a varying degree, members have a sense 
of belongingness, loyalty and commitment to the groups to which they belong. 
This affects the other factors (the items above), and it is a dynamic phenomen-
on, changing character and strength. Furthermore, members of groups view and 
understand groups and their relationships in different ways, and may interpret 
these in conflicting ways, which also may affect the workings of the groups.
Somewhat later, Lawrence Frey (1994) put forward the Naturalistic Paradigm, in 
the same spirit as Putnam & Stohl’s Bona Fide Groups perspective. Frey argued 
against the traditional methods with investigations such as laboratory studies of 
“zero history” groups: 
• Research should be performed in real world settings (in situ).
• Researchers should use the inter-subjectivist view on truth: assume that 
phenomena in the world are, or are experienced, in the same way for/by 
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different people, and that true propositions are such that can be accepted/
verified by several people, ideally anyone.
• Real groups should be studied, not groups created artificially for a given 
study.
• The focus of the research should not only be on how decisions are made 
and problems are solved, but also on how group identity is created and 
sustained, how new members are socialized, how social support is 
provided, how high quality interpersonal relationships are developed, and 
how changes in group process are made.
• Groups should be studied using phenomenologically oriented case studies 
employing qualitative methods.
• Researchers play a role in the groups they study, and this must be 
recognized.
(Adapted from (Gouran 1999:20).)
Gouran (1999:20) claims that these views set the stage for many subsequent 
studies in the 1990’s, without giving any direct references. This interest for 
studying naturally occurring groups is perhaps strengthened by influence from 
studies in the ethnomethodological tradition (see section 2.4.1 below, p. 23 ff.).
2.4 Linguistic research on group communication
Linguists have not been very concerned with group decision-making; this work is 
indeed an attempt to bring linguistics into this field. However, linguistics has 
been concerned with group communication in general, and it is from that branch 
of linguistics that I will try to build a bridge to group decision-making. I shall 
therefore give a brief introduction to the kind of linguistics that is most relevant 
for research on group decision-making, including what little linguistic research 
on group decision-making that actually has been done. 
2.4.1 Conversation Analysis
Background
In the 1960’s, sociologist Harold Garfinkel, a student of Talcot Parsons, de-
veloped a framework for studying human interaction, and named it ethnomethodo-
logy (Garfinkel 1967; Garfinkel 1972). This was further developed, and given a 
slightly new direction, during the 1970’s by Harvey Sacks, Emanuel A. Schegloff 
and Gail Jefferson into a type of conversation research often referred to as Con-
versation Analysis, CA (Sacks et al. 1974). It should be noted that not only linguists 
engage in CA, but also researchers from other disciplines, with agendas outside 
of linguistics. The term Conversation Analysis is somewhat unfortunate, since con-
versation is analyzed and studied by linguists outside CA, but this usage is quite 
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established by now. Apart from using the acronym CA, initial capitals will be 
used for the term in this work to signal its name-like character. 
Ethnomethodology came about as a reaction to the type of sociology that was 
prevalent in the 1930’s, -40’s and -50’s, represented by Parsons’ social systems 
theory (see 2.2.3 above, p. 7 ff.), with what Heritage (1989:36) calls ‘premature 
imposition of inadequate theoretical categories and frameworks on complex em-
pirical data’. Whether this characterization is a fair criticism or not I cannot say, 
but it does explain the aversion towards theory that still prevails in CA, and the 
difficulty finding general theoretical statements in the writings of Harold 
Garfinkel, who prefers to give examples of analyzes. It also explains the strong 
emphasis on empirical data within CA, and the ideal of letting data “speak for 
itself”. 
However, key concepts of Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology are commonsense know-
ledge and practical reasoning. Members of society continuously create, recreate and 
maintain social structures, through and in everyday interaction. In CA, this is 
taken up and adjusted somewhat, with a few other ideas added. Heritage 
(1989:22) describes CA by giving a four item list of fundamental assumptions:
• Interaction is structurally organized.
Everyday interaction may seem unstructured and accidental, but CA as-
sumes that this is an illusion, and that all social structure in fact starts in 
everyday interaction. A prime example of this is the study of turn-taking 
done by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974).
• Contributions to interaction are both context-shaped and context-renewing.
Contributions to an interaction cannot be understood outside of their con-
text; the immediate linguistic context as well as the more general activity to 
which the contributions belong. At the same time, a contribution immedi-
ately becomes part of the context of neighboring contributions, and part 
of any larger, more general structure. 
• These two properties inhere in the details of interaction so that no order of detail in con-
versational interaction can be dismissed a priori as disorderly, accidental or interaction-
ally irrelevant.
As a part of the focus on empirical data, CA researchers have been unwill-
ing to remove data on theoretical grounds; rather, they want to be open to 
all details being part of the structured interaction. Thus, the careful scru-
tiny of interaction is done through recording conversations (audio or 
video), and then producing a detailed transcription of it, including not only 
uttered words, but also pauses, laughter, prosody, or anything else that is 
considered part of the interaction.
• The study of social interaction in its details is best approached through the analysis of 
naturally occurring data.
Since potentially anything and everything can influence interaction, only 
naturally occurring conversation suffices when trying to understand 
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everyday interaction. Experimental or role-play settings will necessarily be 
different from ordinary conversation in many ways that may affect the 
interaction.
CA research on group decision-making
CA researchers have done little work in the field of group decision-making, al-
though it has not been left completely untouched, see for example (Firth 1995), 
(Boden 1994) or (Anderson et al. 1987). Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson have ap-
plied CA methods in argumentation analysis, described below (2.5.5 p. 37 ff.). 
The clearest case of CA researchers entering the field of group decision-making 
is that of Marjan Huisman (2001), who applies CA methods and thinking to 
group decision-making in an overt attempt to bring these ideas into ‘the “main-
stream” thinking about decision making’ (Huisman 2001:84).
Huisman stresses three issues about group decisions. Firstly, she argues that 
group decisions are not clear-cut and well defined events, but that participants 
‘recursively formulate situations, events and actions (i.e. states of affairs)’ (Huis-
man 2001:83), and implicitly or explicitly assess these states of affairs. A group 
decision is then, according to Huisman, ‘a formulated future state of affairs that 
is positively assessed by relevant participants’. A natural question is then how 
participants ever know that a decision has been made. In other words: how 
much positive assessment is needed and from which participants? Huisman’s 
second point in her description of group decisions is that different groups use di-
fferent norms for establishing the existence of a decision. The third thing 
stressed by Huisman is that formulations of future states of affairs are subjective, 
depend on situated interactions and are open for interpretation. This means that 
there is considerable room for skilled participants to phrase descriptions of fu-
ture states of affairs in a way that generates more support from other members. 
This is hardly surprising, but it is a topic that has been avoided by communica-
tion scholars and social psychologists. Huisman’s work is discussed further in 
section 5.7.
CA research in fields adjoined to group decision-making
Although research on group decision-making with CA methods has been limited, 
many CA researchers have done work in neighboring fields. Negotiation and 
workplace interaction are two such fields. For example, Wasson (2000) investig-
ated politeness in some US American business meetings and how this was re-
lated to consensus, and Candlin et al. (1999) studied the discourse of enterprise 
bargaining in relation to institutional structure. Boden (1994) is cited frequently 
as a pioneering work in the area of work-place conversations, while Firth edited 
a volume in 1995 (Firth 1995) in which a number of CA studies on negotiation 
were collected. I consider these works as peripheral to the present topic, since 
they do not show any particular interest in group decision-making. 
Linguistic research on group communication 25
2.4.2 Activity-based Communication Analysis
As mentioned in the previous section, conversation and conversational language 
can be studied without using the particular theoretical and methodological 
framework of Conversation Analysis. The linguistic theory that will be used in 
this work is called Activity-based Communication Analysis, ACA. It was de-
veloped by Jens Allwood, who, working from a linguistic perspective, built a the-
ory of communication in general, not group decision communication in particu-
lar. In a way similar to Giddens Structuration Theory, Allwood emphasizes 
action, complementing it with cooperation, as the basis for understanding 
communication.
Allwood first laid out his framework for linguistic analysis in his doctoral thesis 
Linguistic Communication as Action and Cooperation (Allwood 1976), and has sub-
sequently developed the theory in several publications, see (Allwood 1984; All-
wood 1993a; Allwood 2000; Allwood 2004). At the heart of the theory lies the 
observation that linguistic communication always occurs in an activity with a 
specific purpose, and that linguistic communication cannot be understood unless 
it is seen as a means to fulfill the activity ends. However, social activity is, ac-
cording to Allwood, not the only factor that influences communication, and it 
can be placed in a broader framework. In (Allwood 2004:6) five such factors are 
listed:
i) Communicators are human beings
The notion that that human communication is performed by human be-
ings is tautological, but it is still forgotten at times. Humans are physical, 
biological and psychological creatures, and some aspects of our commun-
ication depend on this. For example, if a noisy environment forces a 
speaker to speak louder, that is dependent on our biological construction 
with ears and hearing. Human beings are (partially) causally driven, but 
must also be considered rational, motivated agents, and when communic-
ating with each other we cooperate at least to an extent that allows us to 
understand each other1. For readers familiar with the writings of Herbert 
Paul Grice (1975), it may be useful to compare Grice’s theory with All-
wood’s. Allwood does not rely solely on rationality and cooperation to ex-
plain communicative behavior, but agency and motivation are equally im-
portant factors. Grice’s maxims of conversation, and the cooperative 
principle, are to a large extent consequences of these assumptions2: it is 
1. The term rational means ‘goal efficient’ here, and there is no conflict between 
emotional and rational. For example, if a person is in love with somebody, then it 
may be rational for that person to do almost anything to be close to her object of 
infatuation.
2. Although Allwood prefers a different set of maxims than Grice’s original 
(Allwood 1976:43 ff).
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not rational to be insincere about what you mean when trying to make an-
other person understand what you mean (the maxim of quality), nor to 
provide more or less information than necessary (the maxim of quantity) 
or to obfuscate the information in disorderly or unclear wording (the max-
im of manner). Allwood points out that a motivated agent always has a 
purpose with her communication1, thus, each contribution is related to 
that goal (which corresponds to Grice’s maxim of relevance). When com-
municators choose to cooperate, the agency, motivation and rationality as-
sumptions lead to the consequence that the communicators must take 
each other into cognitive consideration, i.e. they must try to adjust their 
communication to the limitations and possibilities of their partner’s cogni-
tion. For example, informing somebody about her legal rights in a lan-
guage she does not understand, would in most cases be rather 
meaningless.
Further, if participants in communication take each other into ethical con-
sideration and trust each other on this (which is the normal case), coopera-
tion works even better; many inferences can be made by listeners based on 
this assumption, making communication more helpful. For example, even 
though it may be rational to lie to another person, it is (usually) considered 
unethical, and thus avoided. Grice’s maxim of quality is thus not only ex-
plained by the communicators’ rationality, but also by their being ethical.
ii) Communicators are community members
Human beings are also social creatures; we belong to a culture (national, 
regional, or other), and we speak a language. This can affect some parts of 
communication, for example, when a person thanks her host for a dinner 
she has just been served, a phenomenon common in some cultures, and 
rare in others.
iii) Communicators are members of social institutions and organizations
The sometimes very complex societies communicators live in provide 
them with different roles, such as plumbers, husbands, citizens, football referees, 
etc. Some aspects of communication depend on this. For example, when a 
plural you is used in an informal invitation to a party to signal that the 
spouse of the invited person is also invited.
iv) Communicators participate in an activity
As mentioned above, activity is central to Allwood’s theory. The roles as-
signed to communicators by the current activity, for example lecturer, goal 
keeper or customer, influences the communication. For example, when a 
teacher asks a student which city is the capital of France, it is typically un-
1. At least the intentional communication is purposeful. Communicators may give 
off information unintentionally (for example when being observed unknowingly).
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derstood and reacted to as a way to check the student’s knowledge, not as 
a lack of information on behalf of the teacher.
v) Communicators communicate
The micro-level communication also assigns roles to the participants, such 
as sender or receiver, and this affects communication as well. 
In personal communication, Allwood also adds a sixth factor:
vi) Communicators perform communicative actions
Communicators make statements, requests and ask questions, and this 
gives them communicative act dependent roles. A person who answers a 
question is an answerer, someone who accepts an invitation is an accepter, 
etc.
Categories ii-vi can be placed on different levels. Culture, language, social institu-
tion and organization belong to the macro-level, while the social activity belongs 
to the meso-level. On the micro-level we find phenomena such as turn-taking, 
feedback, morphemes, communicative acts, etc. 
Communicative acts
As the name of his doctoral thesis suggests, Allwood does not make any sharp 
distinction between communicative acts1 and other acts, rather, he wants to clas-
sify communicative acts and other acts according to the same principles. Some 
types of communicative acts happen to have received labels in everyday language 
(some English examples being promise, assertion, and question), but there is no reas-
on to assume that this spontaneous classification fulfills the criteria of a good 
taxonomy (homogeneous basis for classification, mutually exclusive categories, 
complete, economic, lucid, and useful). Instead, Allwood suggests that the four 
components intention, behavior, effect and context can be used as the basis for a 
taxonomy of communicative acts. At a sufficient level of detail, there is no limit 
in practice to the number of different types of intentions, behaviors, effects and 
contexts that can occur in natural communication. As a result, the number of 
possible communicative acts is incalculable. Thus, any taxonomy of communic-
ative acts must be limited to the aspects of action that are relevant to the pur-
pose of the analysis for which the taxonomy is used. For example, if communic-
ative acts are to be identified and classified in an auction, the taxonomy should 
be a taxonomy aimed at auctions. 
Social activities
In many cases, a prominent feature of any act will be the intention(s) behind it. 
Since the intention of an act in most cases is linked to the overall activity the act 
1. The term speech act excludes gestures and other non-speech contributions, and so 
communicative act is used instead.
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occurs in, it is impossible in many cases to understand naturally occurring lan-
guage without taking into account the activity type that the language occurs in. For 
example, to understand the language of an auction, one has to understand the 
activity type auction. Allwood (1993a) elaborates on this, and describes in detail 
what is meant by social activity, providing us with the following definition: a so-
cial activity is said to occur if: i) two or more individuals ii) perform mental acts, 
exhibit behavior or engage in action iii) in a coordinated way iv) which collect-
ively has some purpose or function (Allwood 1993a). This definition may seem a 
bit too broad, since anything from one person opening a door for another per-
son to the development of the EU will fit the definition. However, when the 
criteria above are fulfilled, it is likely to affect communication (and other behavi-
or), and it becomes relevant when explaining this communication. Still, the im-
pact of social activity on language and behavior becomes stronger as the social 
activity is institutionalized. Usually the most interesting social activities have re-
ceived linguistic labels, and conventional procedures and roles.
Social activity is not the only factor that affects language. As mentioned above, 
Allwood also lists physical, biological and psychological factors (Allwood 2000). 
We cannot see through walls, we need to breathe, we may be angry or have diffi-
culty understanding lines of reasoning, and such factors affect our communica-
tion continuously. Social factors other than activity are culture, social institution, 
language and communication: the fact that a conversation takes place in a 
Swedish cultural context or that it is held in a university context affects the con-
versation. On a more detailed and obvious level the choice of language (Swedish, 
English, ...) will be visible, as well as communication management phenomena 
like feedback and turn-taking. Another important kind of influence comes from 
the individual backgrounds of the participants in a conversation. Beliefs, desires, 
values, emotions and attitudes of each participant quite naturally affect 
communication.
Even so, social activity is one of the most interesting factors, and Allwood has 
developed a template for describing a given activity type, by providing the fol-
lowing parameters (Allwood 2004:7):
• Purpose, function, procedure
All activities have a purpose, though sometimes the term function is more 
natural. In some cases the activity includes certain procedures that should 
or could be followed, each step in the procedure having a purpose/
function.
• Roles: rights, obligations and competence
Many activity types have a set of participant roles, each of which can be 
described in terms of obligations, rights and required competence.
• Artifacts, instruments, tools and media
Some activity types depend on certain artifacts, instruments, tools or 
media.
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• Environment: social, physical
An activity type typically puts some minimal requirements on the physical 
environment, such as reasonable light and temperature conditions, and 
some activities may have more specific requirements on the physical envir-
onment. Fishing, for example, is hard to perform far from the sea, a lake, 
river, etc.
Furthermore, the socio-cultural environment may affect an activity. A 
Swedish auction and an Australian one may differ somewhat, for example.
As an example, the activity type Auction can be described briefly using this 
template:
• Purpose and procedures
The purpose of an auction is to sell a number of items. The procedure for 
this is that each item is presented, one at a time, and the person prepared 
to pay the highest price gets to buy the item. For each presented item, the 
auctioneer suggests a first price, and invites anybody to bid. When the first 
bid is made, the auctioneer calls for anybody else to offer a higher price, 
and so on, until the highest price is found. The person who made the last 
bid gets to buy the item.
• Roles
There is an auctioneer, who has to accept any bid higher than the one last 
given. She also has to have good knowledge of the procedures of the auc-
tion, and keep track of the bids. The auctioneer has a right to speak, and 
to decide when the highest price has been found. There are also customers, 
who have the obligation to let the auctioneer speak, and to respect the 
procedures of the auction (e.g. to actually buy the item if their bid turns 
out to be the highest). They have to have at least a rudimentary under-
standing of the procedures of an auction.
• Artifacts, instruments, tools and media
The auctioneer typically uses some kind of gavel or other instrument to 
mark the end of the bidding for each item. A number of items to sell are 
necessary, and there may be a loud-speaker system, a registry and other 
equipment to help administration of the auction.
• Environment
The auction may be held outdoors or indoors, and the area has to be suffi-
ciently isolated from other major activities that may disturb the auction. 
On the social side, auctions are restricted to societies with at least a min-
imal degree of market economy. The precise procedures may vary between 
different countries and regions, different kinds of sold objects (e.g. a cattle 
auction may be different from an art auction), and different institutional 
settings. 
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The template is quite clear and constitutes a good tool for analyzing an activity 
type. It is quite general, however, and different activity types may be described 
rather differently under each of these headings.
In summary, Allwood has developed a general theory for human communica-
tion, which also covers the special case of communication in group decision-
making. The theory puts social activity in focus, but allows other influencing 
factors, such as culture, social institution and individual preferences, to be con-
sidered when analyzing communication.
2.5 Argumentation analysis and rhetoric
2.5.1 Roots
When a group is about to make a decision that is of importance to its members, 
it seems natural that individual members try to persuade the other members that 
“their” solution is the right one. Rhetoric studies persuasion; in that sense it is 
the oldest form of study of group decision-making, dating back as far as ancient 
Greece. Many of the ideas from these early days are still used in modern rhetoric 
and argumentation analysis1,2. 
One concept that has survived since Aristotle is the distinction between logic, dia-
lectic and rhetoric. Logic concerns relationships between propositions, regardless of 
any context. An example is that of the classical syllogism:
• All humans are mortal (major premise)
• All Greeks are human (minor premise)
• Therefore, all Greeks are mortal (conclusion)
The great attraction of the syllogism is that if the two premises are accepted, 
there seems be no way to deny the conclusion.
Originally, the term dialectic was used for a specific argumentation technique, 
today usually called indirect proof. A proposition is assumed, and then the debater 
deduces a conclusion that stands in conflict with the original assumption; on the 
basis of this conflict the debater rejects the proposition. (Aristotle used the term 
in a more general sense: reasoning with premises that are not evidently true.) Al-
though primarily designed for debating, dialectic is a useful method for personal 
reasoning, according to Aristotle. Finding and investigating arguments for and 
1. The historical outline of classical rhetorics and modern argumentation analysis 
can be found in many texts. The source for this section has been (van Eemeren et 
al. 1996), unless otherwise stated.
2. Persuasion can also be used in other contexts than group decision-making, for 
example when a sales person tries to persuade a customer to buy a product. It is 
obvious, however, that persuasion often is used in group decision-making.
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against a certain view helps people understand the problem better. In that sense, 
dialectic is about arguing for and against.
Rhetoric, finally, is concerned with how one convinces people that some beliefs 
are better than others. Aristotle separated three different kinds of rhetorical 
speeches (argumentation situations): arguing in courtroom, for or against a par-
ticular judgment; arguing in a political debate, for or against some political ac-
tion; and finally festive speeches, when a person is praised or condemned.
The classical tradition was more or less unchallenged for many centuries; it was 
not until the 20th century that ideas turned up that developed that tradition sig-
nificantly (van Eemeren et al. 1996:51 ff). Although many thinkers participated 
in this process, two names stand out: Stephen Toulmin and Chaïm Perelman, to 
whom we shall now turn our focus.
2.5.2 Toulmin
Somewhat simplified, the three-fold distinction between rhetoric, dialectic and 
logic can be summarized in the following way: logic deals with the truth, dia-
lectics with the probable truth, and rhetoric with the claimed truth. Such a sim-
plification has the advantage of showing the obvious relation between the three 
fields. By the 1950’s the study of argumentation was based primarily on classical 
rhetoric, with influences from logic. Toulmin broke with this, and made his argu-
mentation analysis into something closer to dialectic. 
Toulmin started out with an attack on the dominant paradigm for the study of 
logic by criticizing its conception of validity. An argument of classic syllogistic 
type, ‘All men are mortal, all Greeks are men, therefore all Greeks are mortal,’ is 
held valid because of its form. Toulmin calls this kind of validity geometrical or 
formal, and says that logicians accept only formally valid arguments as being valid 
(van Eemeren et al. 1996:132). This conception of validity is, according to Toul-
min, bad and he claims that a wider view on it is necessary. Most arguments out-
side mathematics and logics textbooks are not formally valid, yet the argumenta-
tion may be sound. An example is that of the sun rising tomorrow. It has risen 
every other day that we know of, moreover, we have an elaborate model for 
what it means that the sun rises. Even so, the only way to find out if the sun ac-
tually rises tomorrow is to wait and see. There is no formally valid way of reach-
ing that knowledge by reasoning. To Toulmin, it would be absurd to dismiss the 
reasoning about the sun’s rising tomorrow as invalid. He claims that ‘validity is 
an intra-field, not inter-field notion’ (Toulmin 2003), i.e. what counts as a valid 
argument depends on the subject. A claim about the weather must be evaluated 
by standards developed in meteorology, a claim about legal matters must be eval-
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uated by jurisprudential standards, etc. This brings argumentation analysis1 closer 
to epistemology, where the essential question is ‘How do you know?’.
Logicians and philosophers have heavily criticized this conception of validity, but 
it shows Toulmin’s focus clearly – argumentation analysis should be centered on 
argumentation in everyday life and in academic research.
Continuing his quest to make argumentation analysis relevant for everyday argu-
mentation, Toulmin holds that argumentation is about justifying one or more 
statements. The justification may look very different depending on the situation: 
a doctor explaining her diagnosis to a patient, a pupil meeting accusations of 
cheating on a test, or a politician arguing for a certain political action, to mention 
some examples. Toulmin compares these different situations to different kinds 
of judicial cases. The kinds of evidence will be rather different in a murder case 
than in an environment pollution crime case. However, the legal procedures for 
the cases will be very similar. In the same way, different kinds of argumentation 
situations will have some things in common and some things that are particular. 
Toulmin calls the former field-invariant and the latter field-dependent. An example 
that Toulmin gives is that of modal terms. A modal term such as can’t is used in 
rather different senses:
• You can’t lift a ton
• You can’t get 100 000 people into Albert Hall.
• You can’t talk about a horses ”feet”.
• You can’t have an aunt of the male sex.
• You can’t give him that small a tip – it’s not done.
• You can’t put the cat out in this rain.
 (van Eemeren et al. 1996:138)
In i) can’t means ‘incapable’, in ii) ‘impossible’, in iii) that one ought not, etc. At 
the same time there is a common element to all these uses that ‘rules out some-
thing-or-other’ (Toulmin 2003:27). That common part is field-invariant, while 
the criteria for whether the term is appropriate or not are field-dependent. In the 
same way, argumentation situations have field-invariant parts and field-depend-
ent parts. The attentive reader may object to the example and say that the ruling 
out comes from the negation not, but Toulmin does not seem to have observed 
this, rather, he treats can’t as an undivided whole. Unfortunately, he does not give 
any other example that could make his idea of field dependency clearer. 
The attentive reader will also notice that there is an inconsistency in the use of 
the term field here, and that inconsistency is present in Toulmin’s writing too. 
1. Toulmin does not speak of argumentation analysis but rather about logic, and 
wants logic to become more epistemological and ‘practical’.
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Sometimes field (of argument) seems to be synonymous with ‘discipline’ or ‘top-
ic’, and sometimes with ‘logical type’, i.e. whether it is a moral judgment, a fact 
about the world, an aesthetic statement etc. This ambiguity has been the target of 
heavy criticism. Still the idea that the evaluation of argumentation depends on 
the field has been inspiring to many later writers in argumentation theory (van 
Eemeren et al. 1996:160).
2.5.3 Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca published their theory of argumentation in 
French in 1958, La Nouvelle Rhétorique: Traité de l’Argumentation, but it took until 
1969 before it was published in English, reaching a far greater audience under 
the name The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Similar to Toulmin, Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca starts with trying to chisel out what “good argument-
ation” is all about. During the 1940’s Perelman belonged to the philosophical 
school of logical empiricism (Wikipedia 2006). According to this school, value 
judgments cannot be tested empirically, and should therefore be regarded as un-
founded and unjustified. Consequently, argumentation based on value judgments 
is not rational. Perelman could not accept this, since reserving the concepts of 
reasonableness and rationality for statements capable of being verified by empir-
ical observation or logical deduction would leave formal law without rational 
basis. Lawyers, like other language users, rarely give logically valid proofs for 
claims they make, but rather try to justify the claims. Perelman meant that such 
attempts of justification very well can be rational.
A crucial and central idea of the New Rhetoric is that of different audiences. It is 
held that justification of claims, argumentation, is always made for somebody. Ar-
guments that may be considered justified by a congregation of orthodox Jews in 
Israel may be considered completely irrelevant by a company of avant-garde per-
formance artists in Norway. What one person considers justification may be re-
jected by another person. This thinking could lead to a kind of relativism that 
would restrict The New Rhetoric to the traditional realm of persuasion, render-
ing it irrelevant for other kinds of argumentation. However, in The New Rhetor-
ic there is an elegant solution for avoiding this: the ideal audience. A scientist ar-
guing for his theses may do so with an audience in mind that is indistinguishable 
from “the concept of rationality” or an imagined “global community of scient-
ists”, if that is preferable. 
In this way The New Rhetoric can be seen as a framework for analyzing any kind 
of argumentation, be it scientific critical discourse, political debate or school yard 
quarreling. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss two major types of audiences, 
namely particular ones, consisting of a particular person or group of persons, and 
the universal audience, consisting ‘of the whole of mankind, or at least, of all nor-
mal, adult persons’ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:30). Argumentation 
that is considered justified by the universal audience is called convincing in The 
New Rhetoric, while argumentation that is considered justified only by a particu-
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lar audience is called persuasive. Since the universal audience never can be queried, 
it will always be difficult establishing which argumentation is convincing and 
which is merely persuasive, but that is an epistemological difficulty that The New 
Rhetoric does not try to solve. 
The New Rhetoric has been very influential in modern argumentation analysis, 
although it has in no way been left unchallenged.
2.5.4 Argumentation and speech communication
Within the field of communication, rhetoric and argumentation analysis have not 
been studied as much as one would expect. This is somewhat surprising consid-
ering that Edwin Benjamin Black opened the connection as early as 1955 (Black 
1955). He audited a number of classroom discussions, collecting passages that 
‘made no discernible contribution to group understanding or to the co-operative 
deliberation of a problem’ (Black 1955:15). These passages, nineteen altogether, 
were considered breakdowns of the discussions, and were studied in search of 
causes for the breakdown. The result of the study was a set of hypotheses that 
Black pointed out should be tested more thoroughly at a later stage. Black gener-
ated three hypotheses from the material:
• An individual contribution which ends on a level of communication less abstract than 
the level on which the discussion had been proceeding is likely to cause a breakdown.
In all the cases where the breakdown consisted of digression, the break-
down was preceded by a discussant descending from the general to the 
particular without returning to the general. This might happen without be-
ing followed by a digression, but it seems to be a “dangerous” situation. 
Black does not give any examples of this in his brief paper, but describes 
the digressions as the members becoming involved in particulars and 
spending time on things that obscured the ultimate aims of the discussion.
• The absence in a discussion of a commonly accepted and sufficiently inclusive term to de-
note a relevant abstract process or complex ideological structure is likely to cause a 
breakdown.
Another pattern found among the digressive breakdowns were that the 
lack of a term, or perhaps concept, that would capture some central issue, 
could cause the discussion to move in circles. Black’s example is a group 
that tried to find the best means to correct inflation. They brought up 
many factors involved in the process, such as dollar value, government 
spending, taxes, etc., but did not have a word denoting the entire process. 
According to Black, this general term was the key to the problem: ‘[I]t is 
the peculiar nature of an economic process that no single element in it can 
be understood apart from its function in the process as a whole. The alter-
ation of any of the variables affects the process and all other variables 
within the process.’ Since the discussants had no term for this process, 
they had to discuss dollar value and government spending as two disparate 
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variables. As a result, they focused on the details, ‘to the detriment of the 
discussion’ (Black 1955:17).
• The failure to explicate the major premise of an enthymeme when the premise is not per-
ceived to be a value of the discussants is likely to cause a breakdown.
An enthymeme is the rhetorical counterpart to a logical deductive 
syllogism: 
Syllogism:
All men are mortal (major premise)
All Greeks are men (minor premise)
therefore, all Greeks are mortal (conclusion)
Enthymeme:
All Greeks are men, therefore, all Greeks are mortal.
There seems to be some disagreement on the precise difference between 
an enthymeme and a syllogism, but a rough characterization of it is that an 
enthymeme is a syllogism that lacks something to be formally valid, typic-
ally the major premise. In actual discussion, complete and formally valid 
syllogisms are rare (Black did not find any at all), and enthymemes are ac-
cording to Black prone to misunderstanding (compared to syllogisms). 
Black discovered that when the major premise, which characteristically 
stated a value, was left out in the enthymeme while not being accepted or 
understood by the listeners, breakdown occurred in the form of misunder-
standings and ambiguity.
Interesting and inspiring findings as it may have presented, Black’s article has not 
generated very much research on the connections between rhetoric and group 
decision. 
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, Jackson & Jacobs investigated argumentation 
in conversation (their work is described in more detail in section 2.5.5, p. 37 ff.), 
and this was picked up by Seibold et al. (1981) and made into another effort to 
open mainstream decision-making for argumentation research, this time some-
what more successfully. Seibold et al. (1981) evaluated three modern argumenta-
tion theories, among them those of Toulmin and Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 
mentioned above. Their method was to record discussions between university 
students in approximately forty groups of four students each, and then transcribe 
the discussions, and finally annotating the speech acts of the transcriptions ac-
cording to the three theories. The authors constructed the coding schemes them-
selves, following the writings of the theorists as closely as possible. 
The study was a preliminary test of applicability of the argumentation theories, 
with the explicit intention of performing more detailed studies later (within 
Structuration Theory) of argumentation in group decision. Because of this it is 
not surprising that the results were somewhat vague, but the authors concluded 
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that all three theories stood up well to practical application, and that they all had 
their respective strengths and weaknesses. 
Several studies followed where argument and argumentation were placed in the 
framework of Structuration Theory; see for example (Canary et al. 1987) and 
(Meyers and Seibold 1990). The latter study includes a rather thorough explana-
tion of how the authors see argumentation in structurational terms, but unfortu-
nately their model remains unclear. The main reason for this lack of clarity, as I 
see it, is the inability to separate arguing, the activity performed by group mem-
bers as part of a discussion, from argument, the argumentative propositions (or 
sets of them) traditionally studied in rhetoric1. The term used is argument, de-
scribed as both system and structure, in line with the Structuration Theory. 
However, this seems to refer to the activity of arguing at times. For example, it is 
described as a ‘social practice’ (p. 285), an example is given of a ‘group leader 
who insists on free and unrestrained argument’ (p. 285), and it is claimed that 
‘group argument is the production of interactive messages by social arguers in 
group discussion’ (p. 287). In other places, the term seems to refer to the argu-
mentative propositions, for example when it is said that ‘actors [may] report why 
they think one argument is more rational or logical than another’ (p. 285), or that 
‘[i]ntroduction of an argument in group discussion (...) reflects and reproduces’ 
norms ‘about legitimate and appropriate arguments’ (p. 285), or when the struc-
turational view of argument is compared with “PAT’s conception of argument as 
members’ cognitive responses” (p. 286). More problematically, the term is used 
when it could have any of the two meanings.
However, it seems more reasonable that the authors primarily have the activity 
of arguing in mind, as well as making more sense in structurational terms. Ar-
guing is an activity that members of society have knowledge about, and expecta-
tions about how it should be performed. This knowledge and these expectations 
would be arguing-as-structure, that make members conceive of an instance of ar-
guing as a unit (arguing-as-system). At the same time as arguing-as-structure 
shapes and delimits arguing-as-system, it reproduces itself, strengthening the ex-
pectations on what arguing is each time it is used. 
2.5.5 Argumentation and conversation analysis
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s,2 Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson used Conver-
sation Analytical methods and theory to investigate ‘conversational argumenta-
tion’, argumentation in everyday conversations (Jacobs and Jackson 1982). They 
refer to their approach as discourse analytic, which seems to imply a rather inde-
1. (O'Keefe 1977) used argument1 and argument2 to make the distinction; see page 
128.
2. I have not found any publications on argumentation by Jacobs and Jackson later 
than 1980’s.
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pendent selection of philosophical underpinnings (they subscribe primarily to 
Mead, Austin and Wittgenstein (Jacobs and Jackson 1982:207)), combined with 
methods and concepts from CA.
Jacobs and Jacksons view of argument is somewhat different from traditional ar-
gumentation analysis, and is based on disagreement. To understand this view, we 
have to start with what they call ‘a primary analytic unit for discourse analysis’, 
the speech act. They use Austin’s (1962) and Searle’s (1969) theory of speech acts, 
where speech acts are defined by their felicity conditions, i.e. prerequisites to the 
proper or valid performance of a speech act. Felicity conditions can be used to 
analyze relations between speech acts, in particular because they specify what be-
liefs a speaker is committed to by performing a certain speech act. A speech act 
performed with the words ‘what time is it’ could for example commit the speak-
er to having a wish to know what time it is, and a speech act performed with the 
words ‘it’s half past nine’ could commit the speaker to be able to show evidence 
for the claim that the time is half past nine’. Thus two speech acts can be related 
through interconnected felicity conditions.
Jacobs and Jackson (1982) write that certain speech acts become conventionally 
paired into adjacency pairs, a concept introduced by Sacks and Schegloff (1974). 
Familiar examples of such pairs are question-answer, offer-accept/decline, and request-
grant/refuse. (The concept can be criticized for its claim that the pairing is conven-
tional rather than a consequence of other factors (Allwood 2001a). However, 
Jacobs’ and Jacksons’ works do not rely on this conventionality, but rather on 
the pairing.) The second part of an adjacency pair typically comes in (at least) 
two variants, and in any given situation one of these is preferred to the other. 
For example, after an invitation an accept is usually preferred to a refusal (see for 
example (Levinson 1983) for details of preference). When dispreferred second 
parts are used, they are often expanded, i.e. another adjacency pair is added be-
fore, inside or after the main adjacency pair, as in the following example from 
(Jacobs and Jackson 1982:222):
Figure 2-2: Adjacency pair with expanded, dispreferred second.
1 A: Would you come here and clean up this milk I spilled?
2 B: Can’t you get it?
3 A: I’ve gotta peel these carrots.
4 B: Okay.
Here the request-acceptance pair on lines 1 and 4 are separated by the question-
answer pair on lines 2 and 3. 
Jacobs and Jackson call conversational argument disagreement relevant expansion, i.e. 
expansions of adjacency pairs that are used to handle disagreement. 
Conversational arguments are, first and foremost, disagreement-relevant speech events. 
They are characterized by the projection, production, suppression, or resolution of 
38 Chapter 2: Previous research
disagreement, so that they function not only to manage cases of expressed disagreement, 
but also to regulate the occurrence of disagreeable speech acts.
(Jacobs and Jackson 1982:224)
Through presuppositions and implicatures that are created by felicity conditions, 
any speech act can, according to Jacobs and Jackson, be disagreed with. Conver-
sational argument is therefore a much wider term than argument in traditional 
argumentation analysis. The subject of the research of Jacobs and Jackson can 
therefore be described as disagreement management rather than argumentation 
in the more traditional sense.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 A simple model of group decision-making
In order to understand the relationships between research done on group deci-
sion-making within different disciplines, and how the present study relates to 
that, a model of group decision-making is needed, such as the following:
Decision-making groups consist of human beings who communicate interact-
ively, attempting to reach a shared view concerning one or more future actions. 
Part of this interactive communication may consist of arguing. Based on the 
shared view, a group decision is made, i.e. the members choose one of the avail-
able alternatives and create an obligation for themselves or others to act accord-
ing to this choice. The chosen action is intended to produce a certain result, and 
typically, the members of the group have public and shared intentions for this. 
This intended result may or may not coincide with the actually produced result.
To understand the communication in a given group, one must acknowledge that 
groups exist in a social structure, and constitute a social structure for the mem-
bers. Cultures, habits, status hierarchies and other relations exist between group 
members, partly inherited from the social structure outside the group, and partly 
developed within the group. Further, groups exist for a reason: they perform 
activities. These things affect communication.
The model described here will now be used as a backdrop for a comparison of 
the previous research done on group decision-making.
2.6.2 Comparison
As described in this chapter, research on group decision-making is done in sev-
eral academic disciplines, with little contact between them. The research done in 
social psychology and in speech communication are descendants of the same 
roots (Bales, Lewin), but contact between the two is rare, although it does exist. 
This separation is, at least in part, due to differences in interests. Social psycholo-
gists have mostly been interested in studying group members and their individual 
preferences and understanding, in order to try to predict outcomes, in a general 
behaviorist tradition. Outcome oriented communication scholars have also been 
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interested in final group decisions, but they have focused on the interaction in 
the group and how that can be managed to ensure “good” decisions. Develop-
ment oriented communication scholars set out with the same interest as their 
outcome oriented colleagues, but they focus on how the interaction shapes the 
social structure of the group and the shared view. CA research on group deci-
sion-making is in its early stages, and seems to connect primarily with the establ-
ished communication research, in particular the development oriented branch 
and the interest in social structure that is prevalent there. CA researchers come 
from a rather different research tradition, being more descriptive and linguistic-
ally interested, but as sociologists, their over-all goal is to understand and de-
scribe how sociological macro structure arises from the micro structure of 
everyday interaction. Argumentation analysis, finally, has focused on the argu-
mentative content of the communication (and not only in decision-making 
groups). 
However, the theoretical parallels between the different camps are considerable. 
The CA perspective is very close to that of Structuration Theory in the commu-
nications camp, which also has its roots in sociology. Furthermore, the recent 
additions to communication research of Bona Fide Groups and the Naturalistic 
Paradigm go very well with CA traditions, and one cannot help wondering if it is 
mere chance that they have appeared approximately at the same time that CA 
entered the arena. In any way, these two developments of group decision-making 
research are likely to strengthen each other.
Methodologically as well as theoretically, outcome oriented research in commu-
nications has inherited much from social psychology, and independent theory 
development has been slow. The scientific differences between these two camps 
seems to be rather small, mainly resulting from slightly different research ques-
tions, as mentioned above.
As a result of these relations, the different classes of theories set up in different 
disciplines are not mutually exclusive, as a whole. Structuration Theory can very 
well be combined with CA and the Naturalistic Paradigm, and most of the work 
done in social psychology seem to be compatible with the Functional Paradigm.
The only odd bird in this overview is argumentation analysis, which has not re-
ceived much attention from the other disciplines, and which has not been inter-
ested in the work of the other disciplines (Jacobs and Jackson being a notable ex-
ception in that they combine argumentation analysis and CA). The theories of 
argumentation analysis are also closer to philosophical theories. On one hand, 
this makes them less interesting to the other disciplines, but on the other hand, it 
makes it easier to incorporate them. There have been some attempts from com-
munication scholars to include argumentation analysis in their research, but 
without much effect.
In summary, research on group decision-making can be divided into three types 
based on the main interest:
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• Researchers of the first type are social psychologists and outcome-oriented 
communication scholars, who are interested in finding out how groups be-
have as a whole, and finding what parameters are important for predicting 
the actual decisions made by groups.
• The second type of research is done by development-oriented communic-
ation scholars, together with CA researchers. They try to understand and 
describe the interaction going on within groups, and are considerably less 
interested in predicting decision outcomes.
• The last type of research is done mainly by argumentation analysts, who 
try to figure out precisely how communication is used in groups to affect 
decisions. The interaction coding schemes of primarily outcome-oriented 
communication scholars are concerned with communication content in a 
similar way. Thus it is not surprising that some connections between argu-
mentation analysis and other group decision-making research are found 
there.
My own interest, finally, lies in how communicative content and interaction, in a 
social context, create a shared view and a group decision among group members. 
More specifically, I would like to investigate how group decisions are constituted 
linguistically (in interaction), and how they come about (i.e. what the preceding 
group discussion consists of, particularly any arguing). Understanding the social 
structure is essential for understanding communication, and indeed a description 
of the communication has to integrate a description of the social structure. 
It is quite clear that the research done in the different academic disciplines could 
benefit from each other, and as pointed out above, there are already plenty of 
connections between the different research communities. However, a better 
awareness of the work done in other disciplines would surely improve under-
standing of group dynamics in general and group decision-making in particular. 
My hope is that the present work shall be of interest for several of the different 
fractions, and bring them closer together. 
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3. Concept determination
3.1 Introduction
In order to gain a proper understanding of what group decision-making is, I shall 
now make an investigation of the concept of decision. I shall start with a short 
discussion of what concepts are and how concepts can be investigated (3.2), be-
fore starting the actual concept determination (3.3 and 3.4). In the last section I 
shall discuss the results of the investigation, and set up a definition of decision. 
Based on this I shall further specify the aim of this dissertation.
3.2 Theory
3.2.1 Introduction
What are concepts?
Concepts have been discussed for a long time in philosophy, at least since the 
days of Plato. Allwood (1989) identifies three different kinds of theories of con-
cepts: realism, conceptualism, and nominalism.
In realistic theories concepts exist independently of humans, and can only be dis-
covered by us, not created. Plato imagined a world of ideas/concepts/forms, 
parallel to our own empirical world, and that idea world was not only as real as 
the empirical world, it had a higher degree of reality (Cooper 1996). That is a 
rather extreme version of realism. More moderate realists point at some concepts, 
like those of integers, and claim that they must exist independently of humans.
Conceptualistic theories claim that concepts are some kind of mental entities, cre-
ated by humans in their minds. This is perhaps the most intuitive view, and it is 
common in linguistics. Aristotle’s writings express a conceptualistic view (All-
wood 1989:3; Rodgers 1993:12).
Nominalistic theories, finally, exclude concepts altogether. There are linguistic ex-
pressions and things in the world that these expressions refer to, and that is all. 
This might seem a bit strange, but it is clearly an advantage of these theories that 
they manage without such notoriously elusive elements as concepts, which 
cannot be observed (at least not directly). The medieval philosopher William of 
Occam is a well-known representative of nominalism (Allwood 1989:3). 
Rodgers (1993) makes another division of concept theories, into entity and disposi-
tional theories. Entity theories conceive of concepts precisely as entities, or things, 
typically corresponding to some real-world entity. In dispositional theories, con-
cepts are ‘habits or capacities for certain behaviors’ (Rodgers 1993:11). For ex-
ample, a nurse will not be able to perform a technique ‘aseptically’ without un-
derstanding the concept of asepsis. Rodgers (1993:11) mentions the British 20th 
century philosopher Gilbert Ryle as a representative of this view.
Comparing Allwood’s and Rodger’s systems of classification, it seems like dis-
positional theories match with nominalistic ones, and entity theories correspond 
to realistic and conceptualistic ones (although combinations like dispositional 
conceptualistic theories are conceivable). Both dispositional and nominalistic 
theories are characterized by an attempt to avoid classical concepts in the sense 
of unobservable phenomena, and instead try to base their explanation of humans 
on strictly observable grounds. 
Describing concepts
Allwood (1989; Allwood 1999) presents five ways of describing concepts: neces-
sary and sufficient conditions, component analysis, prototypes, semantic fields and meaning 
potentials.
The classical way of describing concepts is to specify the combined conditions 
that are both necessary and sufficient for the concept, often abbreviated into the 
phrase if and only if (iff). For example the concept of a bird may be defined like 
this: something is a bird iff it is an animal with feathers. The pitfalls with these kinds of 
concept descriptions are that either the conditions are necessary but not quite 
sufficient, resulting in the definition being too broad, or they are sufficient but 
not quite necessary, resulting in the definition being too narrow. An example of 
too broad a definition is: something is a bird iff it is an animal with wings, since it 
would include for example bats. An example of a too narrow definition is: some-
thing is a bird iff it is an animal that has a beak and can fly, since it excludes for ex-
ample penguins. The definition of group decision given below (section 3.5.1, 
p. 100 ff.) is an attempt to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
concept.
In component analysis concepts are described using a predefined set of features or 
components (Allwood 1989). For example, the concept boy could be described in 
the following way:
boy +human
+masculine
-adult
The values of the features may, as in the example, be binary (present or absent), but 
other values are possible, such as optional or common. One could also use values 
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along a scale, such as a weight interval or a number of limbs. The difficulty with 
this method lies of course in finding an appropriate set of features.
A third way to describe concepts is to provide examples. Rosch (1975) de-
veloped a theory where concepts are thought of as prototype examples, and where 
things belong to concepts by virtue of their similarity to these prototypes. The 
prototype can be the first instance of the concept that one remembers, but it 
may also be a more abstract generalization of all instances that one has come 
across. In the latter case the description of this generalized prototype may come 
very close to component analysis, since it will be a description of the typical fea-
tures of the concept.
A fourth way of describing concepts is to describe their relation to each other, in 
a semantic field. 
Figure 3-1: Example of a semantic field.
same sex
same sex
same sex
same sex
is a is a
is offspring to
is a is a
daughter son
child
woman
mother
parent
man
father
Semantic fields have great similarities with component analysis, since the selec-
tion of relevant relations (for semantic fields) corresponds to the selection of rel-
evant features (in component analysis): 
Figure 3-2: Example of describing a semantic field using component analysis.
male female unspecified
ancestor father mother parent
descendant son daughter child
unspecified man woman -
Rather than use one of these four traditional models, Allwood suggests that con-
cepts should be described as meaning potentials, that is, sets of particular meanings 
tied to a linguistic expression. There is a strong linguistic root in this model, and 
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indeed, there is no strict separation between word meaning and concept in it. “A 
meaning potential is basically a person’s memory of the previous uses of a partic-
ular [linguistic] expression” (Allwood 19991). When the actual meaning of a lin-
guistic expression is to be determined, cognitive operations are used to single out 
the relevant meaning from all the potential meanings associated with the expres-
sion. Thus, a concept can be described by describing its meaning potential and 
the cognitive operations that apply to it. This notion is examined further below 
(see 3.2.3).
Investigating concepts
Compared to the enormous ongoing discussion in western science concerning 
the nature of concepts and how to describe them, methods for how concepts 
should be investigated have hardly been discussed at all. There seems to be a much 
greater consensus on that topic, and the methods of concept analysis are taken 
for granted by scientists. It is perhaps symptomatic that all the published literat-
ure I have found on the topic originates from a textbook, written for high-school 
students (Wilson 1963). I shall present Wilson’s work here, and then proceed to 
go through Allwood’s ideas on this subject.
3.2.2 Wilson
Introduction
John Wilson’s book Thinking with Concepts (1963) was specifically designed for US 
Americans preparing for entrance tests for university studies, and so it must be 
considered a textbook, and not a scientific publication in a strict sense. In the 
preface Wilson writes that the method he presents was established some thirty 
years ago (i.e. in the 1930’s), and it, ‘has suffered from being tied too tightly to 
the apron-strings of certain schools of modern philosophy’. Unfortunately, he 
does not give any references to these schools of philosophy, and I have not been 
able to identify them myself. Wilson writes that “a man’s language is only a 
symptom of his conceptual equipment”, and emphasizes that by ‘conceptual 
equipment’ he does not only mean language. This conceptual equipment is not 
some kind of Kantian, innate capabilities of the human cognition, but rather 
some kind of basic experiences and desires:
Many of our interpretations are, no doubt, in some sense forced upon us. We grow up 
into a world in which, for the sake of survival, we are forced to attach a certain weight to 
food, warmth, physical objects, and so on: and thereby we uncritically create and accept a 
framework of interpretation which, for the most part, stays with us for the rest of our 
lives.
(Wilson 1963:131)
The framework is described in more detail, how it includes values and attitudes, 
and that it is this framework that is our conceptual equipment.
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Wilson’s view of concept is clearly conceptualistic, in Allwood’s taxonomy, he 
writes that when he talks about ‘the concept of a thing’, he refers to all the dif-
ferent concepts that individual humans have, and the extent to which these con-
cepts coincide. He also writes that children start forming concepts based on their 
ability to discriminate and see similarity; these concepts are then adjusted and re-
created in linguistic interaction with adults. Although Wilson is not very explicit 
when describing his view on the nature of concepts, it also seems that his view is 
an entity theory, in Rodger’s taxonomy, since concepts according to Wilson can 
coincide, be formed, they can resemble each other, and people can have them. 
Here is a quotation:
Thus we can talk about ‘the’ concept of justice entertained by the ancient Romans; but 
also we can talk about your concept of justice, or my concept, or Cicero’s concept, just as 
we often say ‘His idea of justice is so-and-so’. We must not, in any case, imagine that 
‘the’ concept of a thing is a separate entity on its own.
(Wilson 1963:54)
Here it seems that although the concept of justice is a generalization which is not 
an entity, all the individual concepts of justice are entities.
Wilson’s focus, however, is on how concepts should be analyzed, or perhaps 
handled. As one might expect from a high-school textbook, his method for 
concept analysis is rather straight forward, consisting of eleven steps, to which I 
now turn my attention.
Steps in concept analysis
1. Isolating questions of concept
Wilson starts by pointing out that questions of concepts show up among oth-
er kinds of questions, and he divides research questions into questions of fact, 
questions of value and questions of concept. One of his examples is this:
i) Is Communism likely to spread all over the world?
ii) Is Communism a desirable system of government?
iii) Is Communism compatible with democracy?
Question i) is a question of fact, according to Wilson, ii) is one of value, and 
iii) is a question of concept. Of course all three questions depend of the defin-
ition of Communism (and in principle the other words in the sentences too), 
and iii) includes an element of fact as well, but we must remember that Wilson 
writes a textbook for high school students. Question i) is primarily a question 
of fact, etc. He also points out that questions may be ‘mixed’, i.e. they contain 
elements of two or more of the categories above.
2. ‘Right answers’
This step is a little strange, and its purpose is not all clear. The way I under-
stand it, however, it is about setting the expectations for the kind of answer 
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one is about to produce. Wilson emphasizes that questions of concept often 
do not have simple right or wrong answers. Different people may understand 
a concept in different ways, and there is not necessarily a good way of telling 
which way is the correct one. At the same time, concepts are not entirely relat-
ive, but there is a wide-spread core, a stereotype in Allwood’s terminology (All-
wood 1989:22). 
3. Model cases
The primary method for Wilson is to consider examples, or ‘cases that are or 
are not instances of the concept’, to use his own terminology. The first case to 
consider should be a model case, a case of which one can say, “Well, if that 
isn’t an example of so-and-so, then nothing is”. By reflecting over several 
model cases, and what it is that makes them model cases, essential features 
can be separated from non-essential ones. (Cf. Allwood’s prototypes, p. 63.)
4. Contrary cases
As a complement to the model cases, one should consider contrary cases, that 
is, cases of which one can say, “Well, whatever so-and-so is, that certainly isn’t 
an instance of it”. This could become a bit silly if the selected case is made 
completely different from the model case. For example, if one is interested in 
the concept of justice and uses a fish as a contrary case, little is gained. Wilson 
obviously has cases in mind that in some sense could have been instances of 
the concept, but are not. In his example of justice, he provides a model case 
for injustice as a contrary case of justice. In the terminology of traditional 
philosophy, he is looking for contrary opposites, not contradictory ones. 
5. Related cases
Wilson writes that it is sometimes necessary to investigate related cases in or-
der to gain an understanding of the analyzed concept. In the example with the 
concept justice, he writes that the concept of deserving may have to be investig-
ated as well, since justice can hardly be understood without understanding de-
serving. This seems to be Wilson’s popular way of saying that the entire se-
mantic field that the concept belongs to needs to be considered.
6. Borderline cases
The fourth kind of case that Wilson uses in his model is the borderline case, 
i.e. cases that one is unsure as to whether they are instances of the concept or 
not. Such cases in some way or another strike us as odd or queer, and by con-
sidering what it is that makes them odd or queer, one can discover what the 
central criteria for the concept really are (Wilson 1963:31).
7. Invented cases
The fifth case type, invented cases, comes as a bit of a surprise, since all the 
previous cases seem to have been invented as well. At least Wilson writes 
nothing about using real-world cases or how to find them. However, his de-
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scription of invented cases indicates that invented means something like ‘think-
able, but for practical reasons impossible or at least very unlikely’. 
Thus suppose we discovered creatures hundreds of miles below the earth’s surface 
which looked more or less like men, and had intelligence, but had no emotions, no 
art, and never made jokes. Would we count them as men? 
(Wilson 1963:32)
Thus, an ‘invented cases’ is a kind of borderline case.
8. Social context
Questions of concept are, according to Wilson, not asked in a social vacuum. 
For that reason, the analyst should imagine the social contexts in which the 
question is possible or likely to be posed. Who asks it, why it is asked, when, etc. 
This should not be confused with the ‘invented cases’ that were considered in 
step 7 above, which also include imagining situations. Under the heading of 
social context the analyst should ask in what context the concept should be used, 
not which situation would be an instance of the concept.
9. Underlying anxiety
Much like step 8, step 9 concerns the circumstances of the use of the concept. 
Where step 8 concerns social aspects, step 9 concerns psychological ones. 
What are the personal motives for the person who asks the question? Under-
lying motives and feelings may be relevant for understanding the concept.
10. Practical results
If there are no practical consequences to whether a question is answered with 
yes or no, chances are high that the question is badly put, and should be reph-
rased (or replaced with another, related question). Wilson’s example is, ‘Is the 
whole life just a dream?’ which, according to him, does not matter at all – 
even if life were simply a dream, it would not change anything about how we 
live. “[T]his suggests that the question ... does not very well represent in words 
the underlying worry or doubt in the questioner’s mind” (Wilson 1963:35).
This step seems to belong to a kind of meta discussion of whether the analyst 
is working with the right concept or not, and should perhaps be placed in 
connection to step 1, where the question of concept is identified.
11. Results in language
This header is somewhat confusing, since it puts focus on language, while 
Wilson’s intention with this item is really about usefulness of the concept. A 
concept that is so wide that most things under discussion are included may 
not be very useful; the same would go for a concept that is so narrow that it 
excludes all items under discussion. Wilson’s own example is about democracy, a 
term that can be used very widely, (‘any system of government where the 
people exercise some kind of control’) or very narrowly (‘any system of gov-
ernment where every person’s opinion have truly equal weight’). However, if 
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democracy is taken to mean one of these two things, there will most likely be a 
need for other concepts such as totalitarian and competitive elections.
Discussion
Wilson’s method is more than just a method of concept analysis. It addresses 
generally how questions of concept should be handled in critical thinking. Steps 
1 (isolating questions of concept) and 10 (practical results) are about finding out 
what to analyze, and steps 8 and 9 (social context and underlying anxiety) may 
also be used for that selection. Step 11 (results in language) is a normative re-
quirement1, and step 2 (‘right answers’) is not really an analytical step, but rather 
describes a property of concepts. What remains is the different kinds of cases to 
consider when analyzing a concept (steps 3-7), and in what contexts and for 
what purposes the concepts should be used (steps 8 and 9).
3.2.3 Allwood
Concepts
Jens Allwood (1989) developed the second theory I have found for investigating 
concepts. His model is a framework for concept determination, a term he prefers to 
the more traditional concept analysis. Analysis implies that the already concept exists 
and simply is described (in the sense of taking apart), but Allwood claims that 
the ‘analyst’ also partly constructs the concept in question (in the sense of putt-
ing together). Determination is a more neutral term in this respect.
Allwood’s view of concepts is conceptualistic (in his own taxonomy; see p. 43 
above), since he writes that concepts are created by us in attempts to ‘divide the 
world into concepts’ (Allwood 1989:11). He also calls his view dynamic, since it 
assumes that concepts are the results of certain cognitive processes aimed at 
compressing complex and dynamic information into entities better suited for our 
cognition. This compression includes simplification, but also usually reification 
and abstraction, since the products are objects with properties and/or relations. 
Allwood finds evidence for the reification that takes place in the formation of 
concepts in natural language, where there is a strong tendency for nominalization 
as soon as concepts are to be discussed. We prefer to speak of the concept yellow-
ness rather than the concept yellow, for example, or the concept running rather than 
the concept run.
The theory is to an extent compatible with the traditional (Aristotelian) view of 
concepts, since concepts are seen as abstract, mental entities, and this makes the 
model mainly an entity theory (in Rodger’s taxonomy). However, it differs from 
the traditional view in two ways. First, Allwood does not require concepts to be 
of a single kind. Some concepts may be iconic in nature, some a set of features 
1. Normative in a ’functional’ (as opposed to ethical) sense – the concepts must be 
useful, and not void of information.
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or relations, and others may be some other kind; combinations are possible as 
well (Allwood, personal communication). The other difference, which also gives 
the model a dispositional trait (according to Rodger’s taxonomy), is that it recog-
nizes the creative process, as well as the results of concept formation. Concepts 
are, according to this view, created according to certain semantic-epistemic prin-
ciples and through semantic-epistemic operations. Humans use such operations 
and principles on a daily basis to create, activate and change concepts. 
Language dependency
Allwood writes that although some concepts can be formed without language, all 
concepts have to be given a linguistic expression in order to be communicated. 
Natural language ‘shapes, structures and gives cultural stability’ to the cognitive 
operations that are used to create and manipulate concepts. In a sense, language 
provides a supply of ready-made concepts where the linguistic structure in some 
cases mirrors the semantic-epistemic operations behind the concepts. There is 
thus a dependency between concept and language, and a concept developed in 
one language/culture does not necessarily have a precise match in another lan-
guage/culture (Allwood 1989:15). 
Although I agree with Allwood on this issue, it should be noted that a concept 
can be communicated without having had a word assigned to it as name. Use of 
a fairly long description, accompanied by examples, is not an unusual way of 
communicating concepts, at least while they are fairly new (to the speaker or 
listener). 
Empirical anchoring
Allwood prescribes two ways of anchoring investigations of concepts empiric-
ally. The first is to use dictionaries and thesauri to find words belonging to the 
same semantic field, and the second is to use language corpora to investigate dif-
ferent uses of the word for expressing the concept in question. These uses in-
clude inflections and derivations, as well as compounds and phrasal relations. 
This empirical data sometimes more or less stands on its own, but often it has to 
be complemented with intuitive analysis. For example, when a set of compounds 
including the key word has been extracted from a corpus, an intuitive analysis is 
needed to see patterns in the material, and perhaps to see what is not there. 
Method for concept determination
When determining a concept, Allwood suggests the following main components:
• Analysis of the basic epistemic structure.
• Analysis of the basic conceptual structure
• Analysis of the anchoring in time-space
• Analysis of the processes and relations
• Analysis of the roles derived from process and relations
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• Analysis of the properties
• Analysis of the possibilities of quantification, evaluation and modality
• Analysis of normative requirements on concept determination
Most of these steps have several sub-steps, and these will be described in detail 
in the determination of the concept decision below (section 3.4).
Discussion
Allwood’s framework is quite comprehensive, and starting the process of getting 
acquainted with it and using it for determining a concept is not for the faint of 
heart. It includes a thorough description of what can be said of concepts in gen-
eral, and empirical methods for finding out what to say about a particular 
concept. A subset of the most important parts of the framework could perhaps 
be extracted for use in cases where time and space are limited.
Another problem with the framework is that the long lists of what could be said 
about concepts do not have an obvious theoretical foundation. Nothing in the 
framework explains why these lists can be expected to be exhaustive.
3.2.4 Comparison of Wilson's and Allwood's theories
Allwood’s and Wilson’s theories are quite different in kind, partly due to the dif-
ferent audiences intended for the two works. Wilson’s book is intended for teen-
age students, while Allwood’s paper is written for an academic audience, prefer-
ably one familiar with traditional analytical philosophy1. However, the two works 
are largely compatible. Wilson’s steps 3-9 (the different types of cases, social 
context, and underlying anxiety) can be used as a way to find values for the para-
meters in steps i-vii in Allwood’s model (everything but normative aspects). 
Wilson’s step 11 (results in language) can be handled under Allwood’s heading of 
normative requirements (step viii), while Wilson’s remaining steps are essentially 
motives for and uses of concept analysis, which belong outside Allwood’s 
framework. 
3.3 Method and material
In the present study, I shall use Allwood’s framework primarily, complementing 
it with Wilson’s insights when appropriate. The following steps will be 
performed:
• Determine the object and purpose of the determination.
• Describe the etymology of the words involved.
1. Allwood’s main paper (’Om begrepp – deras bestämning, analys och 
konstruktion’) is also an unpublished manuscript so far, and perhaps not as 
thoroughly worked through as it could have been.
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• Determine the basic epistemic structure of the concept.
• Determine the basic conceptual structure of the concept.
• Determine the anchoring in time-space of the concept.
• Determine processes and relations.
• Determine roles derived from process and relations.
• Determine properties of the concept.
• Determine possibilities of quantification, evaluation and modality of the 
concept.
• Determine the bases for a normative determination of the concept.
The second step here, etymology, is not present in (Allwood 1989) or (Allwood 
1999), but can be found in (Allwood and Gunnarsson 2003). It is meant to add 
insights about the historical roots of the concept.
Apart from my own intuition and understanding of the words, the input for 
concept determination will be: i) dictionaries and a thesaurus, and ii) language 
corpora. The thesaurus and dictionaries will be used to find other words that de-
note the same or similar concepts, and corpora will be used to find examples of 
how people talk/write about the concept. Examples illustrating the features un-
der discussion will be used when appropriate (using Wilson’s ideas of how to 
work with model, contrary and borderline cases).
The thesaurus used is the Swedish Svenskt ordförråd ordnat i begreppsklasser (Bring 
1930), in an electronically stored text version, which allows it to be searched us-
ing a computer. The Swedish dictionary used is Nordstedts svenska ordbok (Allén 
1990), and the English dictionary is The Cassell Concise English Dictionary (Kirk-
patrick 1989).
The language corpora used are the following:
• GSLC
The Göteborg Spoken Language Corpus (Allwood et al. 2003) consisting 
of 1 377 400 words, from recordings from about 25 different social activ-
ity types.
• GP-HD
This is a collection of article texts from Swedish newspapers, Göteborgs-Pos-
ten and Helsingborgs Dagblad. From the latter newspaper all articles publ-
ished between 1994 and 2001 (advertisements excluded) are used, and 
from the former all articles published between 1992 and 2001 (advertise-
ments excluded). The resulting written Swedish corpus consists of 
338 393 000 words.1
1. Where a word is a token that contains at least one number or letter.
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• BNC Written
The written segment of British National Corpus (Aston and Burnard 
1998) (see also http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk), consisting of 90 249 000 
words.1 
• BNC Spoken
This is the spoken segment of BNC, consisting of 10 448 000 words.1
When studying the use of words in large corpora, a common and efficient meth-
od is to let the computer generate concordances in KWIC format (Key Words 
In Context), illustrated in figure 3-3:
Figure 3-3: A KWIC format concordance.
eform NHS this need for an authoritative source of local decision making was not totally met for two reasons
ight away that the three star grading is highly personal decision that goes against the grain of usual stand
pt or turn down .| It is possible to challenge an appeal decision in the High Court but only on grounds of a
t help to quell current concern .| An appeal against the decision of the County Council was lodged with An B
is back in the spotlight after the Philadelphia Eagles ' decision to drop quarterback Randall Cunningham , w
units , then Pubmaster might have appealed against their decision to a Government inspector who might have o
d , Conservative member for the Thaxted , who backed the decision to close the local hospital said £10 milli
 'M THE BOSS GRAHAM Taylor is prepared to make his tough decision Splash out on the sea CHARLES FAWCUS ALL A
A person who decides not to be tested need not make this decision known to their doctor , but if the questio
 by incorporating it into its procurement strategy . Its decision comes as the Forum , which sponsors OmniPo
sktop , ” it says .| SCO says it does n't have to make a decision about the kernel technology route – O
ch a litigant can seek judicial review of a governmental decision . ”Judicial review” refers to th
s however to be the last before the lease runs out . The decision not to renew the contract with the landlor
 should check every name on the complete list and take a decision on whether or not each person will really 
Using lgconc, a program developed by Leif Grönqvist at the Department of Lin-
guistics, Göteborg University, six concordances were generated, consisting of a 
random sample of 100 occurrences of each of the studied words and corpora (be-
slut, besluta and bestämma for GSLC and GP-HD). Inflections were included as far 
as possible (misspellings and very uncommon forms were not included). For be-
stämma a closer inspection of its concordances revealed that 24 occurrences in 
GP-HD and 20 occurrences in GSLC were cases of meaning 2, ‘determine’, see 
below, and were left out. This resulted in a concordance of 556 lines, divided on 
6 “sub-concordances”. English concordances were also produced and studied, 
and this is presented and discussed in section 3.4.11. (See also section 3.4.1 
below.)
A special computer tool, Leonardo, was developed and used for analysis. A screen 
shot is shown in figure 3-4.
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Figure 3-4: Screen shot from Leonardo.
Leonardo lets the user put words, phrases and lines of a text file into categories 
that are defined by the user. Occurrence counts for the categories can be pro-
duced, and the text file can be filtered for certain categories, colors can be used 
for marking category instances, etc. 
Apart from concordances, lists of word types based on beslut/besluta/bestämma 
and decide/decision were generated from the corpora. This resulted in information 
on i) what types exists, and ii) how common they are. It is of course difficult to 
predict all forms of the words that can occur, but both Swedish and English are 
fairly agglutinative, and the roots are usually preserved in the word form. Thus, a 
search for all word forms containing the string decid or decis can be expected to 
capture the vast majority of all word forms derived from decide, while not captur-
ing more word forms (109, in fact) than can be checked manually for incorrect 
hits (such as deciduous). 
Using such word type listings, compounds and derivations can be investigated 
quite thoroughly, at least for Swedish. For English the list of compounds is 
severely limited, since compounds normally are written as separate words (Engl-
ish city map v.s. Swedish stadskarta). For Swedish, the list of compounds investig-
ated was limited to the 100 most common types, all having frequencies of at least 
25.
3.4 Determining the concept of decision
3.4.1 Object and purpose of the determination
The aim of this chapter is to determine the popular concept of decision. All 
words and expressions that could be used as synonyms for decide/decision should 
Determining the concept of decision 55
be investigated, ideally, along with corresponding words in all other known lan-
guages. This is obviously impossible, and we shall therefore focus this study on 
the Swedish words most clearly associated with the concept of decision. Swedish 
is the native and first language of the author, and his understanding of the stud-
ied examples can be expected to be considerably better for Swedish than for any 
other language. Further, the recorded activities used in this dissertation are all in 
Swedish. A brief comparison with English will also be provided, since English is 
dominant in the existing research on group decision-making. For the same reas-
on, focusing this study on Swedish has the benefit of broadening the linguistic 
and cultural empirical material for research on group decision-making. 
The thesaurus used to find synonyms and words related to decision, (Bring 
1930), has neither beslut nor besluta nor bestämma as entry words, but with the help 
of a variety of sources, dictionaries, thesaurus and personal knowledge of the 
Swedish language, the following list of (partial) synonyms was constructed1:
- besluta, bestämma, komma överens om, enas om, säga, stipulera, avgöra, välja, gå på
- beslut, utslag, avgörande, val
The Swedish words that I as a native speaker consider most associated with the 
concept of decision are besluta/beslut (verb/noun) and bestämma (verb). These are 
also the words from the list above that most frequently occur in GP-HD and 
GSLC (see below), with the exception of välja (‘choose, select’) and val (‘choice, 
selection’), which are more common than besluta and bestämma. However, these 
words only refer to one aspect of the decision, and it would be difficult to say 
precisely how they relate to the concept of decision. For English, the words decide 
and decision seem to have no real competitors (choose/choice and select/selection are 
excluded for the same reasons as välja/val). The concept determination will thus 
be centered on these five words. 
The model of group decision from section 2.6.1 serves as a focal point. Uses of 
the selected words that do not match that model (at least approximately) are 
considered cases of polysemy/homonymy, and are disregarded. This is most ne-
cessary with the word bestämma, which commonly is used in two other senses, 
described in the Swedish dictionary as shown below. (In the English translation 
column to the right, the word bestämma is left untranslated, and the reader can 
pick decide or determine as she prefers. Please remember that it is the Swedish word 
bestämma that is being discussed here):
1. The Swedish word decidera is worth mentioning here. It is obviously a cognate to 
the English word decide, but it is very rarely used in Swedish, and the meaning 
seems to be rather different. It is very rare – in the Swedish corpora it only 
appeared 19 times, the negated form odeciderad included – and only used as 
participle (deciderad/-t/-de). The meaning of the word in all these cases are 
something like ’explicit, clear’.
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bestäm/ma verb -de -t, pres. -mer 
1 fastlägga regler eller principer 
för ngt: man ~de att alla besökare 
skulle visiteras; kommunerna skall få 
~ över etableringarna; eleven får ~ tak-
ten själv  
bestäm/ma verb -de -t, pres. -mer
1 to stipulate rules or principles for some-
thing: it was ~ed that all visitors were to be 
searched; the towns will be left to ~ over the start-
ups; the student can ~ the pace himself.
äv. refl. i fråga om eget hand-
lande: väljarna måste få möjlighet att 
~ sig på saklig grund; hon -de sig för 
att göra karriär  
also as a reflexive verb concerning one’s 
own actions: the voters must be given the oppor-
tunity to ~ themselves based on factual reasons; 
she ~ed herself to make a career. 
ibl. med hänsyftning på ödet e.d. 
<vanl. perf. part.>: han tycktes ti-
digt vara ~d för något stort 
c) Sometimes referring to fate or some-
thing similar: from early on he seemed to be ~ed 
for something great.
2 fastställa värdet (eller läget) för 
ngt, ofta med mer el. mindre 
vetenskapl. metoder: ~ solens 
avstånd från jorden; ~ en punkt med 
radarfixering 
2 to specify the value (or position) of 
something, often with more or less sci-
entific methods: to ~ the distance of the sun 
from the earth; to ~ a point with radar fixing.
3 ange egenskaperna hos ngn. 
vanl. abstrakt företeelse <språk-
vet., fil.>: adjektivet ~mer normalt ett 
substantiv.
3 to list the properties of something, usu-
ally abstract <linguistic, philosophic>: the 
adjective typically ~s a noun.
(Allén 1990)
The quotation lists three main meanings for bestämma, and the English word de-
cide can also have meaning 2 (‘determine’), as in the following example from 
BNC Written:
Ex 1.Lisa's fists were clenched tightly at her sides as she rode up to 
the fourth floor in the silent lift. As the doors opened she stepped out 
and glanced quickly round her at the tastefully lavish five-star décor. A 
suite here for one night would cost, she decided, a couple of weeks of 
her former salary.
Although possible, it is highly unlikely that Lisa sets the price of the suite or her 
former salary in this excerpt. It is more likely that she makes an estimation 
(specification) of the price of the suite, and compares that to her former salary.
Sometimes it is indeed difficult to tell it apart from meaning 1 above, as in this 
example, also from BNC Written:
Ex 2. ...and the folk who decided which movies were important and 
meaningful...
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As mentioned above (p. 54), uses that are considered to correspond to defini-
tions 2 and 3 were filtered out of the concordance material. 
In the Swedish corpora there are plenty of compounds with bestämma that are 
based on meaning 2, a total of 9 types and 629 occurrences (inflected forms in-
cluded). The number shown within parentheses after the English translations de-
notes the number of occurrences in the Swedish corpora. (It should be noted 
that the meaning of the compound as a whole may be quite removed from the 
basic meaning of bestämma.)
artbestämma (‘determine species’, 94), artbestämning (‘determining species’, 47); 
genrebestämma (‘determine genre’, 33); könsbestämning (‘determining sex’, 31); pos-
itionsbestämning (‘determining position’, 93); tidsbestämma (‘determine time’, 255), 
tidsbestämning (‘determining time’, 32), åldersbestämma (‘determine age’, 41) and 
åldersbestämning (‘determining age’, 35).
Compounds using meaning 1 are more common, a total of 18 types and 779 
occurrences.
bestämmanderätt (‘right of determination’, 141), eu-bestämmelserna (‘eu regula-
tions’, 55), förutbestämma (‘predetermine’, 186), med-
bestämmande (‘codetermination’, 264), medbestämmandelag (‘joint regulation act’, 
167), medbestämmanderätt (‘right of codetermination’, 42), områdes-
bestämmelser (‘area regulations’, 213), planbestämmelser (‘development regula-
tions’, 152), självbestämmande (‘autonomy’, 847), självbestämmanderätt (‘right of 
autonomy’, 137), skyddsbestämmelser (‘protective regulations’, 132), strandskydds-
bestämmelserna (‘the regulations for beach protection’, 87), sär-
bestämmelser (‘special regulation’, 78), tullbestämmelserna (‘customs regulations’, 
47), tävlingsbestämmelse (‘competition regulation’, 87), undantagsbestämmelser (‘ex-
ceptional regulation’, 66), ödesbestämd1 (‘fated, predestined’, 145), övergångs-
bestämmelser (‘provisional regulation’, 201).
Appendix 2 contains frequency lists for the verb and noun forms of besluta, be-
stämma and decide. 
3.4.2 Etymology
According to Svenska akademiens ordbok (Svenska akademien 2004), besluta is bor-
rowed from Middle Low German besluten (‘decide’, ‘make an agreement’). Be- is a 
prefix used to make a verb (more) transitive, among other things, while sluta 
(Middle Low German sluten) means ‘to end, close, cover’. It is a cognate of the 
Latin claudere (‘to seal’), a derivation of a root that is left in the Latin clavis (‘key, 
bolt’). Classical Greek has the corresponding word pair, !"#$% [kleis] (‘key’) and 
!"#$& [kleio] (‘seals’).
1. This can be analysed in more than one way. Here I see destiny as the agent, 
deciding what shall happen.
58 Chapter 3: Concept determination
Bestämma is a common Germanic word, where the first part is the same prefix as 
in besluta. The stem stämma has two possible roots, either ste, stem meaning ‘stiff, 
make stiff, firm’, or stämma (‘voice’). In the latter case bestämma would mean 
something like ‘to utter approval’, and in the former case something like ‘to 
make firm or stiff’. It is possible that both roots have participated in the forming 
of the modern word, and that this is the cause of the polysemy of the word (ste, 
stem being the root of meaning 2 and stämma the root of meaning 1).
According to The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Onions 1966), the word 
decide has its roots in the Latin decaedere. The stem caedere means ‘to cut’, and the 
prefix de- can have several functions, the most likely of which in this case is as in-
tensifier. The relation between cutting and deciding goes via the Latin word de-
cidere, (‘to cut off, cut the knot, determine’). I personally get a rather vivid image 
of a problem as a Gordian knot and Alexander cutting it apart in a single, decis-
ive blow.
3.4.3 Basic epistemic structure
State or event
It is not obvious whether a decision should be seen essentially as an event or a 
state. Taken as an event, it is a change from a state without any obligation, to a 
state where there is an obligation concerning a future action. The alternative 
view is to see decision as a state, and then it concerns the state of obligation. 
Such a state of obligation could come about in some other way (for example, 
through tradition). In such a case, the concept of deciding could be formed with 
the intention of creating the state of obligation, in other words, the state concep-
tually precedes the event. However, obligation is a rather abstract phenomenon, 
and as long as the decision is understood and thoroughly agreed upon by parti-
cipants, the obligation is barely noticeable (can a person be forced to do some-
thing he wants to do?). Therefore, it is possible to sit down and try to reach an 
agreement, without having any obligations in mind at all, and to decide without 
realizing that obligations have been created. I therefore favor the latter view, and 
consider the event more basic. What is more, the etymologies of the words re-
veal that the verb form is older than the noun forms; the verb besluta (decide) is 
considered the most basic form.
Still, the resulting state is closely associated with the event, and the nominaliza-
tion beslut (which actually is more common than the verb in GP-HD1) indeed of-
ten refers to the resulting state, which is hard to distinguish from the obligation 
that has been reached. Since the decisions often are made by some kind of ruling 
body or large group of people, it is not surprising that decision results often re-
1. There are approximately 147 000 noun and 69 000 verb occurrences in GP-HD, 
compounds included. In BNC Written the noun occurs 23 800 times and the verb 
24 400 times.
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semble a rule to be followed. Some examples of this are given here, with English 
translations in italics:
! Vi har inte alls några beslut på att helt ta bort familjedaghemmen.
! Gore har begärt att Floridas HD:s beslut skall gälla.
! Det ska inte löna sig att strunta i våra beslut, förklarar miljönämndens 
ordförande.
! We do not have any decisions on completely removing the family child care 
centers
! Gore has requested that the decision of the Florida High Court shall be 
upheld.
! It must not pay to disregard our decisions, the chair person of the environ-
ment board explains.
In all these three examples, the decision is similar to a rule or a law.
Seizing decision
The expressions fatta beslut and ta beslut (‘make decision’, lit. ‘seize, take decision’) 
must be considered close synonyms to the verb besluta (‘decide’). In addition, the 
nominalization beslutsfattande/beslutstagande (‘decision-making’) occurs, in different 
forms, 852 times in the Swedish corpora1. Precise frequencies for fatta/ta beslut 
are more difficult to calculate, but out of the 100 investigated occurrences of be-
slut in GP-HD, 24 were part of one of the expressions fatta/ta beslut; in GSLC the 
corresponding number was 41. If the sample is representative for the entire cor-
pus there are approximately 35 000 occurrences of fatta/ta beslut in GP-HD, and 
about 60 such occurrences in GSLC.
The literal meaning of fatta/ta beslut (‘seize, take decision’) implies that decisions 
somehow already exist, and only need to be picked up (or taken down). The 
primary burden of deciding could be to choose which one of the available deci-
sions to pick up, or that the decision might somehow be difficult to hold, requir-
ing an effort to gather and get a grip on it. I personally find the latter more 
plausible.
Decision process
The compound beslutsprocess (‘decision process’), which occurs 1 092 times in dif-
ferent forms in the Swedish corpora, signals that a decision can be seen as a pro-
cess, an extended course of events that results in a state of commitment. In such 
cases, the process concerns work occurring before the actual decision is made, 
for example in connection with government decisions, which may be preceded 
by a commission, consultation procedure, opinion work, etc:
1. Beslutsfattande is tremendously more common than beslutstagande, with 850 
occurrances vs. 2.
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! Efter en lång beslutsprocess har regeringen nu givit Posten mandat att sälja 
Postgirot.
! I stället får vi ytterligare led i beslutsprocessen genom en mellanchef som ska 
förstärka analys och uppföljningsarbete.
! De bjuds inte in till förhandlingar på ett tidigt stadium i beslutsprocessen.
! After a long decision process the government has given Posten the mandate to 
sell Postgirot.
! Instead we get yet another link in the decision process by an intermediate 
level manager who is to improve on analysis and follow-up.
! They were not invited to the negotiations in an early stage of the decision 
process.
In these examples, decision process refers to preparations or investigations made be-
fore the actual decision. 
In some cases, the actual decision event turns into an extended process, for ex-
ample in political elections and similar contexts:
! När medlemsländerna närmar sig 30-talet i storlek måste beslutsprocessen 
ändras till någon form av majoritetsstyre.
! Parallellt med detta diskuteras en reform av unionens beslutsprocess i syfte 
att| garantera de större medlemmarnas inflytande inför en utvidgning österut.
! When the number of member states approaches 30 the decision process must 
be changed to some kind of majority rule.
! Parallel to this, a reform of the union’s decision process is being discussed 
with the intention of guaranteeing the influence of the large members in pre-
paration of an expansion to the east.
In these three cases it is the way the agreement is reached that takes time.
Adjectives and participles
Apart from the participle (see below), there is no Swedish word form directly de-
scribing decision as a property, such as *beslutig, but there are adjectival deriva-
tions: (o)beslutsam [‘(in)decisive’] describes a property of an agent, as do beslutsför, 
beslutsmässig and beslutsfähig1 (‘quorate’). 
There are two alternative ways of forming the past participle, either beslutad/-at/-
ade, which is used in passive constructions like summan är beslutad (‘the sum is de-
cided’), or besluten/-et/-na, which is used to describe an agent that has made a 
decision, e.g. det här är något som klubben är fast besluten att genomföra (‘this is some-
thing that the club is firmly resolved to do’). The present participle, beslutande 
(‘deciding’), is almost exclusively used for the body that is to decide in a certain 
issue or area, typically beslutande organ (‘decision-making body’).
1. The word forms can be said to be border line cases between derivations and 
compounds.
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The adjectival and verb forms can be derived to nouns again: beslutare (‘decision-
er’) from the verb besluta, and (o)beslutsamhet [’(in)decisiveness’] from the adjective 
(o)beslutsam.
For bestämma the verb is basic, and the noun form bestämmelse has received the 
specialized meaning ‘rule, regulation’. Also the form bestämning, with 188 occur-
rences, has received a special meaning of ‘specification, determination’. The form 
bestämmande, which is a more neutral nominalization of the verb, is a lot less com-
mon: bestämma occurs 66 157 times, bestämmelse 5 281 times and bestämmande 185 
times, all totalts including inflections.
The form bestämd can be adjective as well as participle; as an adjective it means 
roughly ‘clear, doubtless’, and can be used both for an agent that is convinced in 
his decision and for the actuality of a phenomenon:
! Det går inte och hålla på och tjata, säger en bestämd Bengt Gustafsson.
! Jag blev än mer bestämd att något måste hända i kampen mot våldet.
! Har ni egentligen haft någon bestämd avsikt med bomässan?
! Den handlar om fyra ungdomar som samlats i ett slags skyddsrum, ute råder 
en obestämd form av krigstillstånd.
! You cannot keep on nagging about it, says a firm Bengt Gustafsson.
! I became even more determined that something must happen in the struggle 
against violence.
! Have you really had any clear intention with the housing fair?
! It is about four kids who gather in a kind of shelter, outside there is an in-
determinate kind of state of war.
In these examples bestämd means roughly ‘without doubt or confusion’.
Reflexives
The reflexive form bestämma sig occurred in 21 of 80 examined cases in GSLC 
(26%), and in 34 of 76 examined cases in GP-HD (45%). Besluta also occurred in 
reflexive constructions, in 8 of 100 examined cases in GSLC and 9 of 100 ex-
amined cases in GP-HD. As mentioned above (p. 57) Nordstedts svenska ordbok 
states that the difference in meaning is that the reflexive version denotes deci-
sions concerning oneself, which seems to be compatible with the corpus data. 
However, it should be noted that the non-reflexive form also can denote deci-
sions about oneself. This also means that the reflexive variants often focus the 
aspect of choice more than the non-reflexive variants, comparable to the English 
to make up one’s mind:
! Regnet har inte riktigt bestämt sig trots allt och en kort sekund siktar vi en 
suddig fläck som kan vara solen.
! Men enligt hans advokat Christer Johansson har man ännu inte bestämt sig 
för detta.
! Hon bestämde sig efter bara några månader för att flytta.
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! Men om de bestämmer sig för det kan beslut komma mycket start, tror 
Löfström.
! The rain has not quite decided after all and for a brief second we glimpse a 
fuzzy spot that could be the sun.
! But according to his lawyer Christer Johansson one has not yet made up one’s 
mind about this.
! She decided to move after just a few months.
! But if they make up their minds, a decision can come very soon, Löfström 
believes.
3.4.4 Basic conceptual structure
Introduction
Allwood identifies eight parts of the basic conceptual structure of a concept: 
structural genesis, typification, instantiation, collection concept, division, quantification, evalu-
ation and modality. In the present study, collection concept and types are treated 
together, and modality is discussed in section 3.4.8-9 (p. 90). The other parts are 
discussed here.
Structural genesis
The concept of decision requires the ability to discern two states, delimited by 
the decision event, as well as the ability to perceive similarities between two deci-
sions. In order to construct the noun form, the decision event must be reified.
Typification
Allwood lists five categories of types that are relevant for concepts, plus a ‘non-
type’, or unanalyzed information unit. The five “type types” are type, prototype, ste-
reotype, maximal type and ideal type. Prototype is probably what best corresponds to 
Wilson’s model case, although it plays a much more prominent role in Wilson’s 
model, which is both positive and negative. Similarly, Wilson’s related cases corres-
pond to a certain extent to Allwood’s type, although type is restricted to similarity, 
while related cases might be any semantic relationship. Type/related cases will not 
be discussed more here, since different types of decisions are discussed through-
out the chapter. Wilson’s contrary, borderline and invented cases have no direct corres-
pondents in Allwood’s model, but fit easily into this section.
Prototype, Stereotype and Ideal Type
There is no obvious prototype for a decision (model case in Wilson’s terminology), 
or perhaps there are many. One example might be when a person is about to 
vote in a public election. There are several alternatives to choose from, and elec-
tion campaigns are held for several weeks or months before the election, provid-
ing information about the alternatives to the voter. The precise moment for the 
decision, that is, when the voter makes up his mind about it, may vary, and he 
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can change his mind several times. On Election Day, however, a single alternat-
ive has to be chosen. 
When talking to friends and acquaintances about my dissertation topic, using the 
term beslutsfattande i grupp or kollektivt beslutsfattande (‘group decision-making’), they 
almost always started talking about formal decision groups like boards and com-
mittees with a chair person, an agenda, minutes, etc. Decisions made in such 
formal contexts are thus probably stereotypical, at least for group decision. It is 
also prototypical for group decisions (although other prototypes are possible). 
Formal decisions are not treated separately here, but they do entail some concep-
tual difficulties, which can be illustrated by the following real world example: 
I participated in a faculty board meeting at my university in October one year, 
where the faculty board decided which departments and subjects should be given 
funding for a certain kind of temporary employment. The board agreed on a 
principle, and it was decided that the subjects that were covered by this principle 
should be given the funding, and the subjects that were not covered should not 
be. At the following meeting, in November, one board member pointed out that 
there had been a mistake in the minutes for the October meeting, so that one of 
the subjects that was covered by the principle had ended up in the list of subjects 
that would not be given funding. By then, the minutes had already been signed. 
After a brief discussion it became clear that the decision could not be changed, 
rather, a new decision had to be made that over-ruled the previous decision. It is 
also relevant to note that nobody protested against the claim that there had been 
a mistake in the minutes, but everybody agreed that the subject in question was 
covered by the principle.
It is interesting to examine which decision actually was made at the October 
meeting. As mentioned, everyone had agreed that the subject in question should 
be given funding, which was what they said yes to at the acclamation. Even so, 
the resulting decision at that meeting was that the subject should not be given 
funding.
There seem to be two different decisions in play. One belongs to a kind of ab-
stract, social apparatus, a game, namely the faculty board. In that game a decision 
is something that is written in signed minutes, I will call it an institutional decision. 
There are rules for what can be written in minutes and by whom – for example it 
is only allowed to write institutional decisions in minutes if the chair person at 
the corresponding meeting has struck his gavel in approval of the decision, 
which can only happen if the meeting participants have shown through acclama-
tion or vote that they support the decision, etc. The other decision in play, the 
“normal” one – I shall call it interpersonal decision – was how to maneuver the 
board apparatus, or what institutional decision should be put into the minutes. A 
mistake was made, causing something other than what was intended to be writ-
ten in the minutes, resulting in another institutional decision than the one that 
the interpersonal decision specified.
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The precise nature of an institutional decision depends on the organization it oc-
curs in, that is, which game it belongs to. An institutional decision in the Swedish 
parliament, Riksdagen, belongs to a game that is considerably more complex than 
the faculty board in my example (though there are connections between them).
The term game is of course influenced by Wittgenstein’s theory of language games 
(Wittgenstein 1968), which is a source of and parallel to Allwood’s theory of so-
cial activities (see p. 30). In accordance with these theories, it must be said that the 
interpersonal decision also belongs to a “game”, the difference being that the in-
stitutional “faculty board game” is considerably more formalized and more easily 
perceived as a system with explicit rules, than the interpersonal “meeting game”, 
which is controlled by conventions to a larger extent and more difficult to view 
as a game. The difference between the two kinds of decisions is not that institu-
tional decisions belong to a game and interpersonal ones do not, rather, that the 
former are more institutionalized and formalized than the latter.
In this dissertation, I am interested primarily in interpersonal decisions, which in 
fact are present in formal groups and organizations since institutionalized deci-
sions are always based on interpersonal ones.
An ideal type of decision concerns normative evaluations of what a good decision 
is. This includes how well different alternatives have been investigated, which 
people have been allowed to have a say in the decision, the time it took to make 
the decision, the alternative chosen, as well as the consequences of the decision-
act. Ideal decisions are discussed more on p. 68 ff..
Super, sub and co-ordinate types
There is no obvious taxonomy into which decisions can be placed analogous to 
the way animal species are placed in a zoological taxonomy. On a general level, a 
super type for decision is psychosocial act, and examples of co-ordinate types are 
(to) question, admit, deny, and guess. In case of individual decisions, it is problematic 
to call it an act, since there is no easily observable behavior connected with it. 
There may be some kind of cognitive behavior (electro-chemical signals in the 
brain) involved in the decisions, even so, we have no way of observing these be-
haviors, at least not at the current stage of technical development. The term 
psychosocial, intentional event would be more precise, but also considerably clumsier.
Using Wilson’s idea of looking at related cases, I identified another coordinated 
type for decision: when a group is given set of alternative actions to choose 
from, and no agreement is reached1. For individual decisions this can be com-
pared with situations where a person cannot make up his mind until the oppor-
tunity has passed. Say for example that the voter in the election example above 
cannot make up his mind about which party to vote for, and Election Day 
passes. Such situations are very much like decisions, but with a slight difference. 
1. See also 3.4.9 below for discussion of negative decisions.
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An immediate super type for this kind of ‘non-decision’ and decision could be 
‘decision relevant situation’, or just ‘decision situation’ for short, illustrated in fig-
ure 3-4.
Figure 3-5: Super type for non-decision and decision.
non-decision decision
decision situation
Sub types of decision occur in the investigated concordance material in five 
cases: beslut av detta slag (‘this kind of decision’), ett slags beslut (‘a kind of decision’), 
någon form av beslut (‘some form of decision’), protokollsbeslut (‘protocol decision’) 
and principbeslut (‘decision in principle’). The first three of these are completely 
abstract, but the two last are more “real”, and are of the same kind as the com-
pound detaljbeslut (‘detail decision’, 25 occurrences in the Swedish corpora). It 
would be difficult, however, to set up an exhaustive taxonomy for these sub 
types.
Another way of categorizing decisions is based on the area that the decision con-
cerns or the agent (the decision-maker): policybeslut (‘policy decision’), finansbeslut (‘ 
financial decision’), jurybeslut (‘jury decision’), etc. A more complete list of the dif-
ferent kinds of subjects (content) and agents (decider) that were found in the 
concordance material can be found in section 3.4.7.
One single case was found in the concordances that can be seen as a super type 
of decision:
! På den punkten var beslutet en framgång.
! Regarding that point the decision was a success.
This example expresses the idea that the decision was (can be) in itself a kind of 
success. However, the most likely interpretation of the sentence is that the deci-
sion was a successful one, it is rather a property, not a super type.
The present study makes a distinction between individual and group decisions, 
whether a singular agent or several agents make the decision. The compound 
gruppbeslut (‘group decision’) occurs 6 times in the Swedish corpora, which im-
plies that the distinction between individual and group decisions is made in 
everyday situations as well, but not very often. However, since the deciding agent 
usually is expressed (see see p. 78 ff.), it is typically completely trivial to infer 
which kind of decision is intended by the speaker.
Two related concepts occur in and around the scientific literature on group deci-
sion-making: negotiation and problem solving. The term negotiation is used in several 
senses, but one common use is a near synonym to bargaining, situations where 
two parties try to reach an agreement despite having conflicting interests. Such 
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situations are a kind of group decision-making, which makes negotiation a sub-
type of decision-making. 
Problem solving is a rather general term, which is applicable on many different 
levels. Decision-making may contain problem-solving elements (such as finding 
alternative solutions for a perceived problem), or it may be part of a larger prob-
lem-solving process, as when methodological decisions are needed during the 
course of investigating a problem in order to solve it.
Contrary, borderline and invented cases
We can imagine several kinds of contrary cases. One of these could be a person 
who is forced to do something against his will with physical force, for example 
when a parent picks up and carries away a screaming, protesting child. 
For decision in general there is at least one borderline cases of interest. Imagine a 
person who has the habit of getting up in the morning at seven o’clock, taking a 
shower and then having breakfast while reading the morning paper. On a morn-
ing when he follows this habit, has he decided to do these particular things in 
this particular order? Clearly, he is not forced to do it, and he has alternatives, 
but he does not actively consider the options. He just does what he is used to 
doing. One possible analysis is that the decision in this case lies on a low level of 
consciousness; another is that analogous to instinctive behavior, habitual behavi-
or does not involve will at all. 
I have not found any useful ‘invented case’ for decision.
Instantiation and quantification
Occurrence of both singular and plural forms in the corpora reflects the fact that 
decisions are countable. The Swedish word beslut has the same form in the in-
definite singular and indefinite plural (beslut), but the definite forms are different 
(sing. beslutet, pl. besluten). The definite singular occurs 30 340 times in the 
Swedish corpora, the definite plural 4 838 times1. In BNC the singular/uncount-
able form decision occurs 15 691 times and the plural form decisions 6 901 times2.
The number of decisions made in the world is extremely hard to estimate, but 
there is no reason to assume that it is infinite. The number of decision-making 
agents is finite, these agents have a limited life span, and it takes each agent some 
time to make each decision. Should one try to enumerate them, the large amount 
is not the only problem, however: there may be difficulty in determining what is 
a decision and what is not. In informal groups it is not unusual that there is con-
1. The forms besluten and beslutet are also used for the participle of the verb (see pp. 
61-2), but they are considerably less common. In a sample of 50 occurrences each 
of the forms, 5 besluten and 0 beslutet were participles. 
2. The Swedish and English numbers cannot be compared easily, since the 
morphologies of the two languages are too different. The word forms include 
definiteness and number in different ways.
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fusion after a meeting about which decisions have been made. Some of the parti-
cipants think that one decision was made, others disagree. 
Division
Taken as an event, a decision is indivisible, but seen as a process (see 3.4.3 
above, p. 59 ff. above), component parts can be identified. Precisely what these 
parts are depends on the process.
The alternative future actions that the decision-maker chooses between, in par-
ticular, the alternative that is chosen can be a set of related actions. For example 
when the Swedish parliament, Riksdagen, makes a decision about the state budget, 
there is a single decision made about a large set of actions. These sub-actions can 
be seen as component parts of the decision. The following examples probably 
reflect components of decisions:
! JK anser att det av beslutet inte framgår om uppsikten över biblioteket likaväl 
kan skötas på något annat sätt.
! I utskottets beslut sades inget om att bidraget från Kungälv ska betalas ut 
först när det är klart att andra sponsorer bidrar med pengar.
! The Chancellor of Justice is of the opinion that the decision does not specify 
whether or not the supervision of the library can be performed some other 
way.
! In the decision of the committee there was nothing stating that the grant from 
Kungälv only is to be paid when other sponsors have agreed to contribute with 
money.
In both these examples, the decision seems to include several actions.
Sometimes several decisions within a single area can be grouped and seen as one 
large decision; this large decision will have component parts. The compound 
delbeslut (‘part decision’), with 66 occurrences in the Swedish corpora, is probably 
used most often in such situations.
Evaluation
The notion that decisions can be good or bad is reflected in the concordances:
! ...för att kunna ”fatta bättre beslut”.
! Att det är ett förhastat beslut visar ovanstående,...
! ...då kommer SJ ledningsgrupp att fatta något klokt beslut
! ... in order to be able to ‘make better decisions’.
! That it is a rash decision is shown by what is said above,...
! ...then the SJ executive group will make some wise decision
The words better, rash and wise have strong normative components.
The norm for decisions can be based on at least two different things. First, the 
action that the decision concerns can be good or bad for a certain person or 
group of people. Second, the different alternative actions can be more or less 
well investigated and understood, making the chance low or high that the deci-
68 Chapter 3: Concept determination
sion maker chooses the alternative that yields the desired results. The former 
type is probably what lies behind the reservation in the following case:
! Nordsjökonferensen för två veckor sedan beslöt att i princip förbjuda dumpn-
ing
av oljeplattformar. England och Norge reserverade sig mot beslutet.
! The North Sea conference decided in principle two weeks ago to ban dumping 
of oil platforms. England and Norway made a reservation against the 
decision.
Here, it is most likely that England and Norway are negative towards the deci-
sion because they will face difficulties as a result of the decision.
The other type, which concerns how well investigated the options are, seems to 
be what lies behind the reaction in the following case, at least officially:
! Personalen på folkhögskolan har reagerat kraftigt på beslutet, eftersom man 
inte blivit ordentligt informerad och inte fick en chans att påverka beslutet.
! The staff at the adult education college reacted strongly to the decision, since 
they had not been properly informed and had not been given the chance to in-
fluence the decision.
In this example, the decision is considered bad because of the way it was made.
It also occurs, although not in the investigated concordances, that decisions are 
called correct:
i) Efter den delårsrapport som presenterades på tisdagen och som visade 
fortsatta förluster sade koncernchefen Sören Gyll till TT att det nu står ännu 
mera klart att det var ett riktigt beslut att lägga ned fabrikerna i Uddevalla och 
Kalmar.
ii) Peter Johansson tog ett korrekt beslut och blåste av matchen.
i) After the interim report was presented last Tuesday, showing continued 
losses, CEO Sören Gyll said to TT that it is now even more clear that it was a 
correct decision to close the factories in Uddevalla and Kalmar.
ii) Peter Johansson made a correct decision and stopped play.
Similarly, the compound felbeslut (‘wrong decision’) occurs 34 times in the 
Swedish corpora. There are at least two senses in which a decision can be right 
or wrong. In i) above correct means that the decision (the decision action) has the 
intended effect, and that it may have been difficult at the time of the decision to 
know what the consequences of the decision and its action would be. It is thus 
the judgment of the situation and the consequences of the alternative actions 
that are correct or not, and this correctness can be transferred to the decision. In 
ii) above, correct seems to mean how well the referee has followed the rules of the 
game.
In formal situations, there is often a possibility for people and groups to show 
their attitude towards a decision, possibly causing a change of the decision. In 
the concordances, this is reflected in the following things that happen to deci-
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sions: överklagas (‘appealed against’), godkännas (‘approved’), prövas (‘examined’) 
and omprövas (‘reexamined’). 
The actual option to decide is sometimes implicitly evaluated, using wordings 
such as stor frihet att själv bestämma (‘great freedom to decide by oneself’), rätt att be-
stämma (‘right to decide’), and självbestämmanderätt (‘right to autonomy’). In all 
these (quite rare) cases, the opportunity to decide is considered something posit-
ive, indicating that people in general (in Swedish culture) want to make their own 
decisions.
3.4.5 Anchoring in time-space
Allwood lists nine aspects of concepts’ anchoring in time and space that can be 
relevant: possibility of anchoring in time and space, change, localization, extension, occurrence, 
relations in time and space, divisibility in time and space, and quantification, valuation and 
modality (related to time and space). The abstract nature of decisions makes most 
of these sections irrelevant here, and only possibility of anchoring in time and space, 
change and extension will be discussed below.
Possibility of anchoring in time and space
A decision can quite clearly be located in time and space, at least if one does not 
require much precision, since individual(s) making the decision can be located in 
space and the event can be located in time. However, a decision is not physical, 
and thus it lacks spatial extension or location that is more precise.
Here are some examples of spatial and temporal location from the corpora:
! Redan i september 1992, alltså för snart fyra år sedan, fattade Banverket be-
slut om spårbygget Tångaberg-Varberg.
! Persson har hänvisat till den demokratiska processen i partiet och att män-
niskor först måste få studera och diskutera frågan - som han betecknat som 
det viktigaste politiska beslutet i hans generation.
! Bakgrunden är beslutet på miljö- och utvecklingskonferensen i Rio de Janeiro 
1992 där representanter från 180 länder beslöt att utfärda ett handlingspro-
gram för 21:a århundradet, för att bland annat undanröja hoten mot miljön.
! As early as in September 1992, almost four years ago, Banverket made a 
decision about the rail construction Tångaberg-Varberg.
! Persson has indicated the democratic process in the party and that people 
have to be given the chance to study and discuss the issue – which he has 
labeled the most important political decision in his generation.
! The background is the decision at the environmental and development confer-
ence in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 where representatives from 180 countries de-
cided to issue an action program for the 21st century, in order to remove the 
threats against the environment.
Change
A decision can be changed, that is, the obligation can be adjusted at any time un-
til the decision action has been performed or the opportunity for acting has 
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passed. One might want to see each such adjustment of a decision as being a 
new decision, overriding the old decision.
In formal/institutional settings such changes can be more difficult, as discussed 
on page 63-64.
Extension
When a decision is described as big or small, it concerns the importance that the 
decision action has, how many people that are affected by it, or how much 
money or resources it concerns.
! Frågan om var man ska lokalisera Rapport-redaktionen kan synas vara ett litet 
beslut...
! En rad stora beslut ska fattas under de närmaste månaderna.
! Före stora beslut måste en viktig utvärdering göras.
! The question of where to localize Rapport’s editorial office may seem like a 
small decision...
! Several big decisions are to be made during the following months.
! Before big decisions an important evaluation has to be made.
In these examples, big and small correspond approximately to important and 
unimportant. 
Another kind of extension concerns the time span of decisions. A decision can 
be made and cancelled, that is, come into existence and cease to exist, which 
makes it meaningful to speak about the life span of a decision1. The starting 
point of a decision is not very complicated – it is when the decision is made – 
but it is less obvious when a decision ends. If the decision is cancelled, there is 
obviously an endpoint, but if the selected action is performed, it seems a little 
strange to say that the decision does not exist any more. The consequences of a 
decision may be very noticeable for a long time. One could say that a decision 
does not really end when the action is carried out, rather, that it expires or 
becomes invalid.
There are also decisions that concern a kind of generic action, or decisions on 
principles. For example, a married couple can decide that the one who makes 
breakfast can also take the newspaper to his or her job (to read it on the bus). 
Such decisions are not invalidated after the first action has been performed ac-
cording to it, they continue to be valid until an over-riding decision is made or 
something else invalidates it. (E.g. if a café opens across the street from the mar-
ried couple, and they start having breakfast there together every morning, then 
the circumstances have changed so much that the decision about who can take 
1. To be precise, it is the obligation created by the decision that has a life span, but 
as mentioned on p. 59, the noun decision/beslut is often used in everyday language 
to denote the result of the event, that is, precisely the obligation that is focused on 
now.
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the newspaper has become invalid.) Thus, the decision concerns an action type, 
and that type is never performed, only instances of it. One could also say that the 
decision concerns an indefinite number of actions, and only time will tell when 
the last one is performed. 
Although not found in the concordances, decisions can be called permanent or 
temporary (permanenta/tillfälliga), at least in Swedish (no occurrence of ‘perman-
ent decision’ was found in BNC, and only a single occurrence of ‘temporary 
decision’). This refers to the “life span” of the decision – temporary decisions are 
replaced (‘superseded’) after some time by permanent decisions.
The time it takes for a decision to be made is another kind of extension, this is 
referred to twice in the concordances, once as lång (‘long’) and once as hastigt 
(‘quick, sudden’).
3.4.6 Processes and relations
Allwood lists nine aspects of processes and relations that may be relevant for a 
concept: similarity and similarity-based semantic field, relations and processes, arity, dynam-
ics and abstraction, basic epistemic category for possible relation and process arguments, localiz-
ation, extension and occurrence in time of processes, orientation of relations and processes, prop-
erties of relations, and quantification, evaluation and modality (of processes and 
relations). Only the first and second of these are relevant to the present study.
Similarity and similarity-based semantic field
One way of setting up a semantic field for a concept is to use thesauri and dic-
tionaries to find words related to decision, and then investigate these relations. 
We turn to such an investigation now.
The most general synonyms have already been mentioned (see page 55), but a set 
of words was also found that are partial synonyms, they can sometimes be used 
as synonyms to beslut/besluta/bestämma. Six areas distinguish themselves among 
these words:
Agreement
Comment: This use appears when speaking of group decisions, focus lies on 
the negotiation or search for an alternative that everybody can accept. 
Sample use: 
! Det drastiska beslutet meddelades efter en rörig debatt under vilken parla-
mentet inte lyckades besluta om nödvändiga lagändringar.
! The drastic decision was announced after a confused debate during which the 
parliament did not manage to decide about necessary changes in legislation.
Synonyms: avtala (‘make an agreement’), enas (‘agree’), göra upp (‘make an agree-
ment’), komma överens (‘reach an agreement’), lösning (‘solution’), solution 
(‘solution’)
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Arbitration
Comment: In many official/formal situations, a body is to decide on some is-
sue on which many people have different opinions.
Sample use: 
! Miljödomstolens beslut angående saneringen känns mycket förvånande.
! The environmental court’s decision concerning decontamination is very 
surprising.
Synonyms: avgöra (‘determine’), avgörande (‘determination’), besked (‘answer, in-
struction’), dom (‘verdict, judgment’), domslut (‘verdict’), skiljedom (‘arbitration’), 
utlåtande (‘statement, report’), utslag (‘decision, ruling, verdict’), uttydning (‘inter-
pretation, explanation’)
Intention
Comment: When an agent has decided to do something, that decision will of-
ten be synonymous with an intention of the agent.: 
Sample use:
! Men Frölunda hade bestämt sig för att vinna i går kväll.
! But Frölunda had set their minds to winning last night.
Synonyms: föresats (‘intention’), föresätta sig (‘to set one’s mind on’), intention (‘in-
tention’), sätta sig i sinnet (‘set one’s mind on’)
Rules and commands
Comment: When people and groups with power make decisions, those deci-
sions may concern what other people and groups must or must not do. 
Sample use:
! Därefter måste regeringen formellt sett göra som riksdagen bestämt.
! Subsequently, the government then, formally, has to do as the parliament has 
decided.
Synonyms: befalla (‘command, order’), bestämmelse (‘regulation’), bud (‘com-
mandment’), bulla (‘bull’), dekret (‘decree’), diktera (‘dictate’), framtvinga (‘force, 
enforce’), förbjuda (‘prohibit, ban’), förbud (‘prohibition, ban’), föreskrift (‘regula-
tion’), förordna (‘ordain’), förordning (‘ordinance’), kungabrev (‘royal regulation’, lit. 
‘king letter’), kungörelse (‘proclamation’), påbud (‘decree’), påtvinga (‘force’), regel 
(‘rule’), reglera (‘regulate’), resolution (‘resolution’), stipulera (‘stipulate’), åläggande 
(‘duty’)
Selection
Comment: Since decisions always are choices, there will be situations that fo-
cus on that aspect of choice. 
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Sample use:
! Tio jurygrupper – tittarna, Göteborg, Stockholm, Skåne, Sundsvall, Bergslagen, 
Värmland, Halland, Norrbotten och Öst – bestämmer vem som vinner.
! Ten jury groups – the viewers, Göteborg, Stockholm, Skåne, Sundsvall, 
Bergslagen, Värmland, Halland, Norrbotten and East – decide who wins.
Synonyms: avgöra (‘determine’), avgörande (‘determination’), dom (‘judgment, 
verdict’), gottfinnande (‘discretion’), kora (‘choose, elect’), skön (‘discretion’), taga 
sitt parti (‘make up one”s mind’), urskillning (‘discrimination’), utkora (‘choose, 
elect’), utse (‘choose, appoint’), utslag (‘verdict’), värdering (‘evaluation’) 
Specification
Comment: The meaning of determination that is possible for bestämma 
makes many words that concern specification partial synonyms to bestämma:
Sample use:
! Att han och Anita har sommarhus på Marstrand, närmre bestämt Instön, och 
att de har en liten båt...
! That he himself and Anita have a summer house on Marstrand, Instön to be 
more precise1, and that they have a small boat ...
Synonyms: avgöra (‘determine’), fastslå (‘specify, determine’), fastställa (‘specify, 
determine’), fixera (‘fix’)
In the concordances there were no metaphors or comparisons of decisions, but 
on one occasion fundering (‘thought, contemplation’) was held up as a kind of op-
posite or alternative to beslut:
! de är mina funderingar kring den här // den här sista punkten e ju inget be-
slut de e mer en fundering som var å en kan ta till sej så att säg i olika 
utsträckning
! it is my thoughts around this // this last item is not a decision it is more like a 
thought that everybody can accept so to speak to different extents
I understand this as saying that a fundering is a kind of incomplete decision, where 
the alternatives are still being investigated and no choice has yet been made.
A very loose association to decision is signaled in the concordances when words 
are coordinated (conjoined with ‘and’ or something similar) with beslut/besluta/be-
stämma, which occurred 13 times: yttranden (‘utterances’), sådant där (‘such things’), 
mycket annat (‘many other things’), en fråga (‘a question’), en målmedveten politik (‘a 
focused policy’), begär upplysningar (‘requests information’), diskutera (‘discuss’), 
gick samman (‘united’), gå på vernissage (‘visit the opening of an exhibition’), påverka 
(‘affect, influence’), dominera (‘dominate’), ta ansvar (‘take responsibility’), and 
bokat in (‘booked’). Two of these are very vague (sådant där, mycket annat), and two 
1. The literal translation of the Swedish phrase is ’closer determined’.
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are clearly very context specific (gick samman, gå på vernissage). The remaining 
phrases have a rather formal sound that reflects the stereotype that decisions are 
made in formal groups like committees and boards (see p. 64). Another thing to 
note is that 13 coordinations is not very many; one might wonder why it is not 
more common. Perhaps decisions are important enough to be dealt with on their 
own, without mixing them with other things. 
Relations, processes and events
Another way to investigate the semantic field of decision is to use corpora to 
find the semantic roles and processes that are related to decisions. Decisions are 
involved in several relationships, processes and events, the ones that were found 
in the concordances are listed below. The word process will be used as the general 
term for this. Based on the empirical material, the processes can be grouped into 
three broad categories, processes related to existence, processes related to evaluation, pro-
cesses related to communication, and processes related to implementation. The first of these 
concern processes in which decisions come into existence, are modified, and 
cease to exists. The second category contains processes where decisions are eval-
uated in some way, and the third and fourth categories concern communication 
and implementation of decisions.
The frequencies, shown within parentheses, concern the 200 occurrences of the 
noun beslut. 
1) Processes related to existence (129)
Decisions come into existence (‘are made’), they cease to exist, and they can be 
changed during their existence (see also ‘Extension’, p. 71 ff. above). When the 
decisions are expressed with the verbs besluta or bestämma the creation is obvious, 
but for the noun beslut, creation is often expressed as well. Frequently, this cre-
ation is expressed with a verb, but ownership (genitive, constructions with ha [’to 
have’]) and location (the decisions “exist” in the group where they are made) are 
used to express this as well. 
• Creation (124) 
någon fattar (ett) beslut (‘somebody takes [a] decision’), någon tar (ett) beslut 
(‘somebody takes [a] decision’), ett beslut kommer (‘a decision comes’), ett 
beslut formas (‘a decision is shaped’), ett beslut sker (‘ a decision happens’), 
någon står för besluten (‘somebody handles1 the decisions’), ett beslut växer 
fram (‘a decision grows’), ett beslut är (‘a decision is’), någon kommer (fram) 
till beslut (‘somebody comes (up) to a decision’), någon fullföljer ett beslut 
(‘somebody completes a decision’), kommunstyrelsens beslut (‘the decision of 
the city board’), domstolens beslut (the decision of the court’), ett beslut i 
1. The Swedish phrase stå för can mean ’handle, take care of’, or ’be responsible for’, 
or ’stand by for’. In the context where stå för appeared in this case, the word 
’handle’ was judged as the most appropriate translation.
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FN:s säkerhetsråd (‘a decision in the UN security council’), besluten i projek-
tet (‘the decisions in the project’).
• Change (0)
There are no occurrences of this in the concordances, but a directed 
search in GP-HD showed that there are cases where somebody ändrar 
(‘changes’) a decision.
• Invalidation (5)
någon river upp ett beslut (‘somebody tears up a decision’), någon upphäver ett 
beslut (‘somebody cancels a decision’), någon tar tillbaka ett beslut (‘some-
body takes back a decision’), ett beslut ligger kvar1 (‘ a decision remains’), 
någon motarbetar ett beslut (‘somebody tries to thwart a decision’).
2) Processes related to evaluation (19)
Those people who in one way or another are affected by a decision may have at-
titudes towards it:
• Positive (3)
någon stödjer ett beslut (‘somebody supports a decision’), någon prisar ett beslut 
(‘somebody praises a decision’), någon accepterar ett beslut (‘somebody ac-
cepts a decision’).
• Negative (4)
någon är upprörd över ett beslut (‘somebody is upset over a decision’), någon 
gör något i protest mot ett beslut (‘somebody does something in protest 
against a decision’), någon reagerar mot ett beslut (‘somebody reacts against a 
decision’), någon struntar i ett beslut (‘somebody ignores a decision’).
• Other (1)
någon är förvånad över ett beslut (‘somebody is surprised over a decision’).
In formal situations there may be special processes for handling attitudes, a kind 
of institutionalization of the attitudes:
• Positive (1):
någon godkänner ett beslut (‘somebody approves of a decision’).
• Negative (8):
någon överklagar ett beslut (‘somebody appeals against a decision’), någon re-
serverar sig mot ett beslut (‘somebody makes a reservation against a 
decision’).
• Other (2):
någon (om)prövar ett beslut (‘somebody [re]considers a decision’).
1. Non-invalidation.
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3) Processes related to communication (4)
Decisions are communicated in one way or another to people and organizations 
that are affected:
någon berättar om ett beslut (‘somebody tells about a decision’), någon förklarar ett 
beslut (somebody explains a decision’), någon kommenterar ett beslut (‘somebody 
comments a decision’), någon meddelar ett beslut (‘somebody somebody informs 
about a decision’).
4) Processes related to implementation (1)
Decisions are of course also implemented, or, the decision-action is carried out. 
This was not mentioned often in the concordances; only a single case belong to 
this category:
någon motarbetar ett beslut (‘somebody tries to thwart a decision’).
This example is discussed further on page 86.
3.4.7 Roles derived from process and relationships
Figure 3-6 shows an overview of the roles that were identified in the concord-
ances. Processes are denoted by ovals, and roles by boxes.
Figure 3-6: Roles derived from processes for beslut.
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The semantic roles are presented in greater detail below. The numbers in paren-
theses denote frequencies in the concordances or the corpora. 
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Process: Deciding
1) Decider (present in 382 out of 556 cases)
The agent performing the decision-making, here decider, is often expressed in the 
investigated material, frequently in formal groups or organizations.
• Deictically referring expressions (169)
vi (‘we’, 75), man (‘you, one’, 28), jag/mitt (‘I/my’, 21), dom (‘they/them’, 
12), du (‘you/thou’, 12), han (‘he’, 4), ni (‘you/ye’, 2), dom här tre (‘these 
three’), någon annan (‘somebody else’), var och en (‘each and everybody’), 
etc.
• Separate individuals (37)
fru Camillas (‘Mrs Camilla’s’), Greppets tyngdlyftare Anders Lindsjö (‘Greppet’s 
weight lifter Anders Lindsjö’), ledamoten (‘the member’), miljönämndens ord-
förande (‘the president of the environmental board’), människa (‘human be-
ing’), Nordstrand, President Khatami, etc. 
• Informal groups (22)
beslutsfattare (‘decision-maker’, 4), människan (‘humankind, the human be-
ing’, 2), 17-åringar (‘17-year olds’), människor (‘people, human beings’, 2), 
åklagare (‘prosecutor’, 2), pensionärer (‘retired persons’), politiker (‘politi-
cian’), producenterna (‘the producers’), publiken (‘the audience’), representanter 
från 180 länder (‘representatives from 180 countries’), etc.
• Formal groups and organizations (154)
nämnden (‘the board/commission’, 8), kommunstyrelsen (‘the city board/
management’, 5), styrelsen (‘the board/management’, 4), kommunfullmäktige 
(‘city council’, 3), beslutsgruppen (‘decision group’, 2), kommunen (‘the city/
municipality’, 2), regeringen (‘the government’, 3), länsstyrelsens (‘of the 
county administration’, 2), socialdemokraterna (‘the social democrats’, 2), 
linjen (‘the line’, 2), etc.
There are also indirect deciders, agents that make another agent make a decision:
! övervakningsnämnden förordnar att besluta om att omhändertagandena inte 
längre skall GÄLLA 
! the supervisory board directs to decide that the custodial sentences no longer 
be VALID
The words besluta/beslut and bestämma diverge somewhat regarding what kind of 
deciders are expressed in the concordances. In the case of beslut/besluta formal 
groups and organizations constitute 52% of the total number of found deciders, 
while they are only 17% in the case of bestämma. With bestämma, the category deict-
ically referring expressions dominates, showing 65% of the occurrences, which can 
be compared with 33% for besluta/beslut. It is difficult to identify what kind of 
agents hide under the words in this category, but the singular expressions jag (‘I’), 
du (‘you/thou’) and han (‘he’) are more common for bestämma than for besluta/be-
slut. All this adds up to the conclusion that the deciders for bestämma more often 
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than for besluta/beslut are separate individuals. This does not seem to be connec-
ted to the reflexive form (which is more common for bestämma than for besluta): 
of the 55 investigated reflexive occurrences of bestämma 13 (24%) had formal 
groups or organizations as deciders; a number too high to explain the difference 
between bestämma and besluta.
Several of the compounds with beslut/besluta and bestämma found in the Swedish 
corpora concern deciders: 
beslutsfattare (‘decision maker’, 28), beslutsgrupp (‘decision group’, 63), beslutsorgan 
(‘decision body’, 67), beslutsapparat1 (‘decision apparatus’, 51), domstolsbeslut 
(‘court decision’, 261), eu-beslut (‘EU decision’, 288), eu-bestämmelserna (‘EU reg-
ulations’, 59), fn-beslut (‘UN decision’, 79), fullmäktigebeslut (‘council decision’, 
265), kommunfullmäktigebeslut (‘city council decision’, 29), kongressbeslut (‘con-
gress decision’, 174), länsstyrelsebeslut (‘county board decision’, 43), majoritet-
sbeslut (‘majority decision’, 571), medbeslutande (‘co-deciding’, 30), medbeslutander-
ätt (‘right of co-deciding’, 25), medbestämmande (‘co-deciding’, 264), med-
bestämmandelag (‘law of co-deciding’, 167), medbestämmanderätt (‘right of co-de-
ciding’, 42), myndighetsbeslut (‘authority decision’, 117), myndighetsbeslutade (‘au-
thority decided’, 25), regeringsbeslut (‘government decision’, 746), riksdagsbeslut 
(‘parliament decision’, 1092), självbestämmande (‘autonomy’, 850), själv-
bestämmanderätt (‘right of autonomy’, 137), styrelsebeslut (‘board decision’, 204), 
stämmobeslut (‘assembly decision’, 35), ödesbestämd (‘fated’, 133).
Only once in the concordances was any property of a decider expressed, obeslut-
sam (‘indecisive’). When looking at compounds with beslut/besluta and bestämma, 
however, several concerned some property of the decider:
beslutanderätt (‘right to decide’, 388), beslutsbefogenheter (‘authority to decide’, 37), 
beslutsför (‘forming a quorum’, 32), beslutsförmåga (‘ability to decide’, 37), beslut-
skraft (‘strength to decide’, 110), beslutskramp (‘decision block’, 33), besluts-
makt (‘decision power’, 39), beslutsrätt (‘right to decide’, 177), beslutsvånda (‘deci-
sion pain’, 169), beslutsångest (‘decision anguish’, 167), bestämmanderätt (‘right to 
decide’, 141).
A conclusion of this is that decision-making is typically done by groups, often 
formal ones. This could be a consequence of Sweden’s democratic/collectivist 
culture, where important decisions are left to a group of people, not a single 
autocratic individual. Decisions made by individuals, then, typically have little 
general interest, and many of the texts and conversations in the present material 
do not concern themselves with private matters (although some conversations in 
GSLC do).
1. The word is ambiguous, or underspecified, concerning the organization that 
makes the decision and the procedure for making it.
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The fact that Decider is mentioned so often indicates that it is considered an im-
portant role. An explanation for this is that the Decider defines the scope of the 
decision – a government decision has a very different scope than the decision of 
a local housing committee.
2) Manner (present in 11 out of 556 cases)
On a few occasions in the concordances, properties of the actual decision-mak-
ing were expressed, that is, in what manner the decision was made:
utan vidare (‘just like that’), det är mycket lättare att (‘it’s much easier to’), snabbt 
(‘quickly’), i linjeordning (‘in line order’), öppet (‘openly’), alldeles för snabbt (‘much 
to fast’), efter votering (‘after voting’), helt plötsligt (‘all of a sudden’), till slut (‘fin-
ally’), genom en flora av uttalanden (‘by a variety of statements’), i folkomröstningen 
(‘in the referendum’).
As the last two cases show, the abstract nature of decisions sometimes makes the 
manner rather similar to an instrument for the decision-making.
There are also quite a few compounds in the Swedish corpora that concern the 
manner in which a decision is made, 7 types and 867 occurrences total: 
beslutsformer (‘decision forms’, 79), beslutsgång (‘decision procedure’, 198), beslut-
snivå (‘decision level’, 115), beslutsordning (‘decision order’, 164), beslutsregler 
(‘decision rules’, 53), beslutsväg (‘decision path’, 207), beslutsapparat1 (‘decision 
apparatus’, 51).
Looking at this, both the concordances and the compounds give the impression 
that a decision is something complicated and arduous, that it requires formal 
procedures and can go wrong.
3) Motive, Intention (present in 16 out of 556 cases)
The reason the decision maker chooses one alternative or another is sometimes 
expressed, as in the following cases:
! förslag till beslut med anledning av inkomna ansökningar
! eftesom den förra programledarn resultat va så usla så ha vi bestämt / å byta 
programledare
! Eftersom inte kvinnan var intresserad av 27-åringens uppvaktning så beslöt 
23-åringen sig för att markera detta, genom att tala om det för "charmören".
! proposed decision on account of received applications
! since the results of the last host were so lousy we have decided / to change 
host for the show
1. The word is ambiguous, or underspecified, concerning the organization that 
makes the decision and the procedure for making it.
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! Since the woman was not interested in the 27-year old’s courting, the 23-year 
old decided to indicate this, by telling it to the “charmer”.
The number of motives found is small, the reason could be that they are given in 
a wider context than the concordances show. It could also be that specific reas-
ons would be revealed by examining the story as a whole.
4) Input, Material (present in 2 out of 556 cases)
In some cases in the concordances a kind of material or input for the decision is 
mentioned:
! ett pm skulle utarbetas / som skulle ligga till grunn för samarbetsnämndens 
beslut
! ... upprättar förslag till beslut med anledning av inkomna ansökningar
! a pm was to be composed / that should be input for the decision of the co-
operation committee
! ... makes a proposed decision on account of the applications received
There are also some compounds in the Swedish corpora that denote input for 
decisions: beslutsförslag (‘decision proposal’, 45), beslutsunderlag (‘decision basis’, 
728). 
Describing the input involved in a decision does not seem to be important, 
probably because once the decision is made, the input becomes part of the deci-
sion and is clarified when describing the content of the decision.
5) Circumstance (present in 97 out of 556 cases)
The circumstances or conditions around decision-making are mentioned as well, 
note the following cases:
! Under hårt motstånd beslöt föreningen att gå ännu längre och börja 
miljömärka el från vattenkraftverk.
! nu e de väl så här i göteborg där man ju har efter många diskussioner be-
slutat att man SKA stänga av vissa gater inne i stan 
! Slutar vår säsong i helgen bestämmer jag mig i nästa vecka.
! Amid strong opposition the association decided to go even further and begin 
to environmentally certify electricity from hydro power plants.
! but the situation is like this in Göteborg where it has been decided after much 
discussion that some streets in the city will be closed
! If our season ends this weekend I am going to make up my mind next week.
A subcategory of Circumstance is Time, the most common kind of Circum-
stance, 78 out of 97 occurrences. It is expressed frequently (14% of the investig-
ated cases) in the concordances, sometimes very precisely (den 26 augusti 1996 
[’August 26 1996’], den sextonde juni [June sixteen]), and sometimes rather vaguely 
(i hans generation [’in his generation’], sommarbeslut [’summer decision’]).
There are also cases where the decision itself is used as a time reference:
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! Att den följde direkt efter besluten om sänkta ersättningsnivåer i socialför-
säkringssystemen, gav motståndarna extra bränsle.
! The fact that it followed directly after the decisions about lowered benefits in 
the social welfare system, gave opponents extra fuel.
The time aspect appears in the compounds as well: förutbestämd (‘predetermined’, 
499), förutbestämma (‘predetermine’, 184).
There are several explanations about why the time for decisions is so important. 
First it may be because of a decision’s connection to future actions – it is import-
ant to know when the decision is made in order to predict when the action is 
about to happen, or if it already has happened. A second explanation is that the 
time of the decision event functions as a reference for formal (institutional) deci-
sions, specifying precisely which decision the sender has in mind.
Another subcategory of Circumstance is Location. Physical people who are situ-
ated ar a particular location make a decision; in that way, the decision is created 
at a certain location. The expression of this is not very common, and typically 
denotes the activity or occasion where the decision was made. Here are some 
examples:
! Bakgrunden är beslutet på miljö- och utvecklingskonferensen i Rio de Janeiro 
1992 där representanter från 180 länder beslöt att utfärda ett handlingspro-
gram för 21:a århundradet, för att bland annat undanröja hoten mot miljön.
! Under årets sista utdelningssammanträde beslutade styrelsen för Knut och 
Alice Wallenbergs stiftelse att stödja verksamheten vid tre institutioner i 
Göteborg.
! ...vid sammanträdet överlämnades då samrådsgruppens / vice ordförande 
kapten lindskog / å brandchef å samrådsgruppens utredning angående / 
brandförsvaret i växjöblocket / å där beslöts att härom göra anteckning för 
dagens protokoll
! The background is the decision made at the conference on environment and 
development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 where representatives from 180 coun-
tries decided to issue an action program for the 21st century, in order to re-
move the threats against the environment.
! During the last dividend meeting of the year the board of the Knut and Alice 
Wallenberg foundation decided to support the work at three departments in 
Göteborg.
! ... at the meeting / the vice president of the consultation committee captain 
Lindskog / and fire officer and the commission of the consultation committee 
concerning / the fire prevention in the Växjö unit / and there it was decided 
that a note should be made about this for today’s minutes...
The reason location is mentioned so rarely (only 5 times) is probably that it is 
usually of little importance. A decision is abstract; the whereabouts of the group 
or person making the decision does not affect the decision in any significant way.
The number of cases of the Circumstance role concerning neither Time nor 
Location is too low (14) to make any generalizations about it.
82 Chapter 3: Concept determination
6) Product
The immediate result of the event of deciding is the decision, or more precisely 
the state of obligation. The term result, however, is often used (at least in 
everyday language) for consequences and results of the decision-action, thus the 
term product is used here to denote the result of the decision event. 
Since decision was one of the search terms for making the concordances, it is 
rather useless to analyze the presence of the decision role in these cases – it will 
always be present. Further, when the verb was used, the product was only men-
tioned as content (see below) – there was never phrasings of the type, ‘to decide 
a decision’. 
7) Content (present in 330 out of 556 cases)
What is decided is of course central in decision-making; here this is called content. 
It is very often explicit in the investigated concordances, in 331 cases (60%). The 
Content instances found in the concordances can be said to belong to four cat-
egories: area, chosen alternative, content detail, and scope: 
• Area (136)
This kind of Content specifies the general topic for the decision without 
specifying which alternative is chosen:
om färdtjänstbevis (‘about mobility service’), angående deras fortsatta existens 
(‘concerning their continued existence’), detaljerna (‘the details’), hur mycket 
tid de vill lägga ner (‘how much time they want to put into it’), om 
Balkankonflikten (‘about the Balkan conflict’), om kvinnor i prästämbetet 
(‘about women in the ministry’), rätt och fel (‘right and wrong’), över oss 
(‘over us’), etc.
• Chosen alternative (182)
This kind of Content does specify the alternative that is chosen:
att upplösa riksdagen (‘to disperse the parliament’), bekosta vistelsen för en 
grupp (‘to finance the stay for a group’), att byta programledare (‘to change 
host of the show’), för att bygga ett vattenkraftverk (‘to build a hydroelectric 
power plant’), gå skilda vägar (‘to split up’), ställa in Sommarskolan (‘to can-
cel Summer school), etc.
• Content detail (5)
This kind of Content concerns only part of what was decided: 
i beslutet sades inget om att bidraget från Kungälv ska ... (‘in the decision there 
was nothing stating that the grant from Kungälv is to be...’), på den punk-
ten (‘in this point’), att det av beslutet inte framgår om uppsikten över biblioteket... 
(‘that the decision does not say whether the supervision of the library...’), 
av misstag hamnade också Pelle Ahrnstedts namn på beslutet (‘by mistake the 
name of Pelle Ahrnstedt also ended up on the decision’), den är säkert då 
reglerad i något beslut (‘surely it is regulated in some decision’).
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• Scope (7)
This kind of Content concerns who, what or which time the decision ap-
plies to:
beslutet om kvinnor i prästämbetet gäller alla prästerliga tjänster i Svenska kyrkan 
(‘the decision about women in the ministry holds for all ministerial posi-
tions in the Church of Sweden’), den planeringsnivå vi beslutat om för 1995 (‘ 
the level of planning that we have decided on for 1995’), Gore har begärt 
att Floridas HD:s beslut skall gälla (‘Gore has requested that the decision of 
the Florida High Court shall hold’), dom som faktiskt har fått ett beslut 
(‘those who actually have got a decision’), dom som är mest berörda av be-
sluten (‘those who are most affected by the decisions’), de arbetsmarknads-
politiska insatser som beslutas för en arbetslös (‘the political measures for the 
labor market decided upon for an unemployed person’), vi kan ju besluta 
ett år i sänder (‘we can decide one year at a time).
Of the compounds with beslut/besluta and bestämma that were found in the 
Swedish corpora, several specify the content of the decision (42 types and 4 678 
occurrences):
• Area (26 types and 3 430 occurrences)
biståndsbeslut (‘aid decision’, 34), brobeslut (‘bridge decision’, 94), budgetbe-
slut (‘budget decision’, 176), delegationsbeslut (‘delegation decision’, 27), 
EMU-beslut (‘EMU decision’, 65), energibeslut (‘energy decision’, 37), förs-
varsbeslut (‘defense decision’, 680), hastighetsbestämmelser (‘speed regula-
tions’, 65), införselbestämmelser (‘import regulations’, 72), inriktning-
sbeslut (‘decision of aim and direction’, 54), miljöbeslut (‘environment 
decision’, 78), områdesbestämmelser (‘area regulations’, 213), planbestäm-
melser (‘plan regulations’, 152), policybeslut (‘policy decision’, 54), principbe-
slut (‘decision of principle’, 655), räntebeslut (‘interest decision’, 37), skat-
tebeslut (‘tax decision’, 47), skolbeslut (‘school decision’, 39), skyddsbestäm-
melser (‘protective decision’, 132), strandskyddsbestämmelserna (‘the regula-
tions for beach protection’, 89), säkerhetsbestämmelse (‘security regulation’, 
204), tillståndsbeslut (‘decision of permission’, 25), tullbestämmelserna (‘cus-
toms regulations’, 47), tävlingsbestämmelse (‘competition regulation’, 87), un-
dantagsbestämmelser (‘exceptional regulation’, 66), övergångsbestämmelser (‘pro-
visional regulations’, 201).
• Chosen alternative (15 types and 1 170 occurrences)
avslagsbeslut (‘rejection decision’, 51), avvecklingsbeslut (‘decision to wind 
up’, 30), avvisningsbeslut (‘decision to refuse entry’, 206), besparings-
beslut (‘decision of saving’, 66), flyttbeslutet (‘decision to move’, 1), häkt-
ningsbeslut (‘detention decision’, 58), investeringsbeslut (‘investment decision’, 
115), konkursbeslutet (‘bankruptcy decision’, 46), nedläggningsbeslut (‘decision 
to close down’, 132), nedskärningsbeslut (‘decision to cut down’, 45), rivning-
sbeslut (‘decision to tear down’, 48), sparbeslut (‘decision of saving’, 61), 
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stängningsbeslutet (‘decision to close’, 86), utvisningsbeslut (‘decision of expul-
sion’, 131), åtalsbeslut (‘indictment decision’, 94). 
• Scope (1 type and 78 occurrences):
särbestämmelser (‘separate regulations’, 78).
The two largest categories, area and chosen alternative, both contain a wide range of 
subjects, and no pattern can be discerned. It seems to be possible to make a 
decision about anything, as long as alternative courses of action are available. 
8) Consequence (present in 22 out of 556 cases)
Consequences of decisions were expressed 22 times in the concordances, these 
are often synonymous with consequences of the actions that are decided, for ex-
ample as in the following cases: 
! Rydbeck försöker också bedöma hur stor del av Gota Banks förluster på 29 
miljarder kronor 1990-1993 som beror på styrelsens beslut under 1990.
! Nära 20 000 nya taxeringsbeslut har resulterat i att företagen ska betala 2,1 
miljarder kronor mer i inkomstskatt, moms, arbetsgivaravgifter och 
skattetillägg.
! ...vicket vi vill ha ett styrelse beslut på då för revisorernas skull...
! Rydbeck is also trying to estimate what share of the 29 billion kronor in losses 
at Gota Bank 1990-1993 depend on the board decisions during 1990.
! Almost 20 000 new tax decisions have resulted in the companies having to 
pay 2.1 billion kronor more in income tax, sales tax, employer’s contributions 
and tax surcharges.
! ... which we wanted a board decision on for the sake of the auditors...
Decisions are important because of the actions they concern, while actions are 
usually important because of their consequences. It is not strange, therefore, that 
Consequence is often expressed for decisions – it is what makes the decisions in-
teresting. That the role is not present more often is probably due to the fact that 
the immediate consequences of a decision (and decision action) often are 
obvious.
Process: Changing
9) Changer (present in 0 out of 556 cases)
A decision can be changed, but it does not seem to be very common – as men-
tioned on p. 76, there were no occurrences of the Changer role in the investig-
ated concordances. However, a directed search in the corpora revealed examples:
! Men min förseelse var INNAN man ändrade beslutet och flyttade på skylten.
! But my offense was BEFORE the decision was changed and the sign was 
moved.
It seems like decisions are not easily changed.
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Process: Invalidating
10) Invalidator (present in 1 out of 556 cases)
Decisions can be withdrawn, as described on p. 76 above, but it is not a com-
mon occurrance in the investigated concordances; in fact it only occurred once:
! så att de finns ju liksom / en risk att dom så småningom river upp de här / 
beslutet om naturmark å sen exploaterar ytterliare å fördubblar en gång till va
! so there’s like / a chance that they reverse this in a while / the decision about 
natural land and then exploit further and double once more you know
As for change, decisions seem to be difficult to withdraw. Once a decision is 
made, it is kept until the decision-action is performed. At that time, the decision 
has not exactly ceased to exist, but rather become invalid (see p. 71).
Process: Evaluating
11) Evaluator (present in 14 out of 556 cases)
As described on p. 76, it is possible to have attitudes about decisions, that is, 
decisions can be evaluated. In formal situations there may also be processes ded-
icated to handling (some of the) attitudes, such as appeals, reservations, etc. The 
different kinds of evaluation that were found in the concordances have already 
been discussed on p. 76 above. 
Since evaluators were mentioned only 14 times in the concordances it is difficult 
to say anything certain, but 6 of these (40%) were separate individuals (including 
singular deictic expressions), which can be compared to 20% for the same group 
as deciders. These are the evaluators: Johansson, han (‘he’, 2), oss (‘us’), personalen på 
folkhögskolan (‘the staff at the adult education college’), England och Norge (‘Eng-
land and Norway’), facket (‘the trade union’), medlemmarna (‘the members’), kam-
marrätten (‘the administrative court of appeal’), Stena, varannan polack (‘every other 
Pole’), den (‘it’), Tomas von Brömssen, försäkringskassan (‘the Insurance Office’). 
If the numbers are representative, it is somewhat surprising, since formal groups 
make decisions so often. One explanation could be that formal groups operate 
within a formal system, so, either they are not affected by the decision-action, or 
they have opportunities to have their say on the issue before the decision is 
made.
Process: Communicating
12) Communicator (present in 4 out of 556 cases)
When decisions have been made they sometimes have to be communicated to 
parties affected by the decision. This is usually not given much attention: the af-
fected parties read a protocol or a summary of the protocol in a newspaper or 
other media. Sometimes, however, the communication process is more explicit. 
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The communicating agent is in these cases most often expressed. The following 
4 cases occurred: Andreasson har berättat (‘Andreasson has told’), Bois ordförande 
James Benson förklarar (‘Bois’ president James Benson explains’), han kommenterade 
(‘he commented’), Nordstrand meddelade (‘Nordstrand informed’).
One possible explanation the communicator is present so seldom is that often 
decisions made by formal groups are communicated in written form (for ex-
ample as a press release), and then the group as such is seen as both the deci-
sion-maker and communicator. In other cases the communicator may be obvi-
ous from the situation, for example when a sports personality tells a journalist 
that he has decided to retire.
13) Receiver (present in 1 out of 556 cases)
As discussed in connection to the Communicator role above, the communica-
tion of a decision is seldom given much attention. Usually the receiver is com-
pletely implicit. In one case, however, the recipient of a decision is made more 
explicit:
! ... som skulle ge jurister tolkningsrätt när det gäller politiska beslut 
! ... that would give lawyers preferential right of interpretation regarding polit-
ical decisions’
The interpretation of a decision is part of the reception of it, and the lawyers 
here are (some of) the recipients of the decision.
Process: Implementing
14) Implementer (present in 1 out of 556 cases)
When a decision has been made, it can also be implemented, that is, the action 
decided on is performed. The agent performing this action is called an imple-
menter here. This role occurred only a single time in the investigated concord-
ances, moreover, it is not obvious that this occurrence should be classified as an 
implementer:
! Maktkamp uppstod, och ordföranden kritiserade en del styrelseledamöter för 
att utåt motarbeta beslut som de varit med om att fatta.
! A power struggle arose, and the chairperson criticized some of the board 
members for publicly trying to thwart decisions that they had participated in 
making.
When a decision is made, the people making the decision agree to either particip-
ate in performing a certain action, or to let that action be performed. In this ex-
ample, a person is accused of not sticking to that agreement. In other words, the 
decision is made, that is, the obligation is created, but the decision-action is not 
performed accurately. Thus, the implementer is criticized for not implementing 
the decision correctly.
Determining the concept of decision 87
Another, and more obvious example can be found in a directed search for 
verkställa:
! Vidare föreslås att länsstyrelsen, och inte polisen, ska verkställa beslut om 
omhändertaganden av djur.
! Furthermore, it is proposed that the county board, and not the police, should 
carry out decisions on animal custody.
It seems the carrying out of decisions is not talked about much. Perhaps this in-
dicates that decisions are normally carried out according to what is indicated in 
the decision.
Summary of the role analysis
To summarize the above role analysis: decisions can be made by individuals, but 
are made more often by groups that usually are formal. However, individuals 
evaluate decisions more often than groups. A decision can be made about any-
thing (as long as there are alternative actions to choose from), but it can be diffi-
cult and complicated. Moreover, when a decision has been made, it is not easily 
unmade or changed. The time that a decision is made can be important, but the 
location seldom is. The consequences of a decision are usually the same as the 
consequences of the action decided about. The carrying out of decisions, finally, 
is not discussed much, possibly because it is unproblematic.
3.4.8 Properties
Relevant properties
Allwood lists seven types of properties that a concept can have, and all these are 
relevant for the concept decision. One limitation, however, is that properties related 
to perception, emotion and cognition are not relevant for perception, since decisions are 
not concrete.
In general one can say that properties for decisions are expressed quite rarely. Of 
556 examined occurrences properties were expressed only 33 times.
Properties derived from time and space
Time and space related properties are not difficult to imagine for decisions: a new 
decision, a quick decision, a Brazilian decision, etc; the relationship between decisions 
and time/space has also been discussed in section 3.4.5 above. Four occurrences 
of time-derived properties were found in the concordances:
• Localization in time
nya (‘new’, 2).
• Extension in time
hastigt (‘quickly’), lång (‘long’)
A fifth case was särskilda (‘special, separate’), which is rather vague. A särskilt 
decision can be made on a different occasion, a different location, or both. 
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Properties that are seemingly spatial, such as big and small, refer to the import-
ance of the decisions, as discussed on p. 71 above.
Properties derived from processes
The processes that decisions are involved in can give rise to properties, such as 
made, changed or communicated, but only a single case of this was found in the con-
cordances, överklagade1 (‘that has been appealed against’), so it must be considered 
rare. A more directed search in the corpora reveals that it does occur for other 
processes: fattade beslut, tagna beslut (‘made decisions’).
Properties related to emotion and cognition
Properties like happy and stupid are related to emotion and cognition, and one 
could imagine such properties being applied to decisions. The evaluating proper-
ties found (see below) are often related to emotion or cognition, for example 
klokt (‘wise’) or glatt (‘happy’), but apart from those, these kinds of properties are 
rare in the concordances. The only property that was found that was related to 
emotion or cognition without directly evaluating the decision was the cognition 
related konkreta (‘concrete’).
Properties related to roles
Properties related to roles was the most common type of the properties found in 
the concordances:
• Content (9)
[viktigaste] politiska (‘[most important] political’, 6), redaktionella (‘editorial’), 
ekonomiska (‘economic’), operativa (‘operational’).
• Decider (6)
formell/a (‘formal’, 2), motiverat internationellt (‘motivated international’), 
privata (‘private’), centrala (‘central’), kommunala (‘municipal’). 
• Motive (1)
affärsmässiga (‘businesslike’).
• Consequence (1)
hårda (‘tough’).
Not surprisingly, the two most common roles, Decider and Content, are also the 
most common property sources.
1. The word form can be used as past participle as well as past tense, but the context 
in this case made it clear that it is the participle.
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Quantification
There were no cases of quantifying properties in the concordances, but a direc-
ted search shows that they do exist: många beslut (‘many decisions’), få beslut (‘few 
decisions’).
Evaluation
Evaluation of decisions can be, and is, expressed through properties:
• General (3)
bättre (‘better’), klokt (‘wise’), överklagade (‘that has been appealed against’).
• Preparation related (1)
förhastat (‘rash’).
• Importance (3)
stora (‘big’), oerhört (‘tremendous’), viktigaste (‘most important’).
Decision evaluation was also discussed above (p. 86).
Modality
Decisions can of course be possible, actual, probable etc., but in the concord-
ances examined modal properties only occurred as descriptions of how far things 
had gone in a formal process: preliminära (‘preliminary’), slutliga (‘final’).
Conclusion
Looking back at the decision properties that were found in the concordances, it 
is clear that it is not very common to describe decisions with properties; the few 
cases that were found in the concordances are difficult to generalize about. All-
wood (1989:29 ff) writes that an expression for a property may or may not have 
a marked property source. For example a property like furry has the property source 
fur, while a property like blue has no such corresponding source. The most com-
mon properties found were those related to roles, these also have marked prop-
erty sources. Beside these, however, marked property sources are rare. Again, it 
might be the abstract nature of decisions that makes it difficult to create proper-
ties based on its similarities to other phenomena.
3.4.9 Possibilities of quantification, evaluation and modality
In Allwood’s model, this is a very general heading under which several aspects of 
the concept can be discussed. In the case of decision, I would like to say some-
thing about the modality of the roles, and about negative decisions.
Modality of roles
A decision is always made by someone at a specific time, under some circum-
stances, in one way or another, and it is always about something. Thus Decider, 
Time, Circumstance, Manner and Content are necessary roles, (although they 
need not be expressed). Consequence is less clear, and depending a little on how 
this role is defined, it can be necessary or optional. If a person decides to do 
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nothing regarding a certain issue, one might want to say that there are no con-
sequences of the decision. However, most people would probably agree that lett-
ing something happen or not happen also has consequences (that it happens/
does not happen). Thus it is reasonable to say that whenever we have a choice of 
doing something, there will be consequences of our choice, that is, our decision. 
Because of this, Consequence is also a necessary role.
It is at least conceivable that decisions could be made completely without 
Motive, although those are probably rare. Using a die or something similar to 
choose between given alternatives is perhaps a way of avoiding Motive, but there 
will still be a Motive behind the choice to let the dice decide.
It is even more difficult to think of decisions that are completely void of Input, 
since one at least has to know enough about the alternatives to understand what 
they are; that information is a kind of Input. However, one might want to define 
Input as information other than information about which alternatives are avail-
able, and in that case the role is optional, though probably common.
Changer, Invalidator, Evaluator and Communicator are all optional roles.
Negative decisions and non-decisions
A decision can be said to be negative if it has consequences that are negative; typ-
ically this is relative to the interests of one party:
! Ett ur folkhälsosynpunkt negativt beslut ska kunna stoppas lagvägen.
! It should be possible to use legal channels to stop negative decisions concern-
ing public health.
A decision can also be negative in another sense, as in ‘they decided not to do it’. 
This can be compared to, ‘they did not decide to do it,’ which can be called a 
non-decision. More precisely, a non-decision occurs when a suggestion is rejected 
by one or more participants, no agreement is reached, and no obligation is cre-
ated. In the case of individual decisions, this corresponds to an individual not be-
ing able to make up his mind. A negative decision, on the other hand, occurs 
when an agreement is reached to not perform a certain action. The following 
diagram shows the relevant cases:
Figure 3-7: Negative decisions and non-decisions.
to act to not act
agreement 1) they agreed to do it 2) they agreed not to do it
disagreement 3) they did not agree to do it 4) they did not agree to not do it
The prototypical decision is shown in square 1, where the participants agree to 
perform a certain action. (When it is necessary to separate this from negative 
decisions, it can be called a positive decision.) The situation in square 2 (negative 
decision) is not very complicated either, and although no such cases were found 
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in the sample used in this investigation, a directed search found a number of 
cases, such as the following one:
! Han överklagade till Högsta domstolen men HD beslöt i höstas att inte pröva 
målet.
! He appealed to the High Court but HC decided last autumn not to accept the 
case.
Here the High Court has considered a suggestion to take up a case, but decided 
not to. Standard language obviously treats this situation as a decision. Square 3 
(non-decision) does not seem to be treated as a decision in ordinary language, as 
illustrated in the following example (also found after a directed search in GP-
HD):
! Det drastiska beslutet meddelades efter en rörig debatt under vilken parla-
mentet inte lyckades besluta om nödvändiga lagändringar.
! The drastic decision came after a messy debate during which the parliament 
did not succeed in deciding about the necessary changes in law.
(Note that it is the decision about changes in law that is interesting here.) The ac-
tion that was suggested here was to change some laws, but no agreement was 
reached; thus, no decision was made. 
The last square, 4, is not as easy to illustrate, and it is indeed not clear that it ac-
tually exists (negative non-decision). However, a situation where a group tradi-
tionally behaves in a certain way could possibly qualify for such a labeling, as in 
the following invented example:
The Jonsson family has always celebrated Christmas in their cottage in the 
countryside. This year, the 16-year old daughter suggests that they stay in 
the city instead. The other ones disagree, and they all end up going to the 
cottage.
The situation could also be analyzed as a ‘routine, implicit’ decision to go to the 
cottage, or perhaps in some other way, and perhaps negative non-decision is an 
impossible or unnecessary category. However, until I have found and analyzed a 
number of such authentic situations, I leave negative non-decision as a 
possibility.
The distinction between negative decisions and non-decisions may be of little 
importance in many situations, especially when not performing the suggested ac-
tion has clear and important consequences. Consider the following, invented 
example:
The EU and China are on the verge of a trade war, and the council of 
ministers gather to decide about possible sanctions against China. After 
some discussion it is clear that there is no good way out: if sanctions are not 
imposed, large parts of the EU manufacturing industry will collapse, since 
the cheap labor gives the Chinese manufacturing companies huge 
competitive advantages. On the other hand, if sanctions are imposed large 
parts of the EU mobile telecom industry will collapse, since 80% of their 
sales go to the rapidly growing Chinese market. 
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In this example, both a “yes” to sanctions and a “no” to sanctions can be seen as 
actions. Moreover, whether the council reaches a decision to not impose sanc-
tions or does not reach a decision to impose sanctions, may for most people be 
of very little importance. 
3.4.10 Normative requirements on concept determination
Allwood lists four sections of normative aspects of concept determination. The 
first is basis for evaluation. In our case the concept determination primarily has an 
instrumental value: researchers of decision-making in general, I and myself in 
particular, could benefit from a clear understanding of what decision is. The two 
most important aspects of its instrumental value are, the way I see it, the alethic 
and the cognitive aspects. The determination should be true in the sense that it 
reflects the concept as it is used and understood by real world people. In addi-
tion, it should be cognitively both accessible and helpful in order to actually give 
a clear understanding of the concept.
Allwood (1989:38) claims that the traditional normative requirements of concept 
determination are the following:
• truth (correct anchoring in reality)
• consistency
a) internal
b) external
• exhaustiveness
• simplicity
• perspicuity
• fruitfulness
The requirements of truth on the one hand and simplicity, perspicuity and fruit-
fulness on the other correspond to the alethic and cognitive aspects already men-
tioned. An inconsistent determination would probably neither be true nor 
simple, perspicuous and fruitful. It is my belief and intention that this concept 
determination is consistent, both internally and in relation to other concepts.
Exhaustion, finally, is desirable but difficult to guarantee. One of the reasons for 
following Allwood’s model is that no important aspects of the concept should be 
forgotten, but it is obvious that there are more things to say about the concept 
of decision than what I have presented here. However, I hope that the omitted 
issues are not worthy of note.
Below (section 3.4.12) I will give a summary of the concept determination, that 
will serve as results.
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3.4.11 English – Swedish
As discussed on pp. 55-56, I am also interested in differences between Swedish 
and English concerning the concept of decision. In order to discover any large 
such differences, a concordance of 400 occurrences of decide and decision was 
made from BNC Spoken and BNC Written (100 occurrences of each combina-
tion). 39 of the cases were deemed as cases of meaning 2 of bestämma (see p. 57 
above). Most of the roles and processes found in the Swedish concordances 
were also found in the English concordances and vice versa, but there were 
some exceptions, presented below.
Using
One case found in the English concordances was a decision used as a precedent 
for something. 
! The judge has set our fears at rest that Ridley's decision would be used as a 
precedent for demolishing thousands of other listed buildings.
That means that the product of the decision-making process (i.e. the decision) 
functions as an instrument in another process. There is nothing strange or 
surprising about this. A directed search in the Swedish corpora resulted in sev-
eral cases of this, as in the following example:
! Dessutom används besluten i undervisningen inom vården.
! What is more, the decisions are used in health care education.
Studying
One case was found in the English concordances were decisions were illuminated. 
! That leaves obvious questions about why exactly this illuminates decisions by 
finite human agents in worlds full of ‘friction’, but we would rather leave them 
to Chapter 6, where Game Theory will be found illuminating for thinking 
about international relations in an ideal-typical way.
This was part of an article on decision research, in fact, this entire thesis is an-
other example showing that decisions can be studied and, I hope, illuminated. 
(No such article was found in the Swedish corpora, which is not surprising, since 
they contain few, if any, scientific articles.)
Precondition
Two cases were found in the English concordances where some kind of precon-
ditions for decision-making were mentioned; one of these is presented here: 
! This left it to Mr [anonymised], to come up with sufficient information to en-
able that decision to be made.
It is difficult to conceive of a process that do not require any kind of precondi-
tion, there is nothing peculiar about this role. A search in the Swedish corpora 
revealed that it occurs there too:
! Därför saknas tillräckligt underlag för beslut, enligt SGU.
! Because of this there is not enough material for a decision, according to SGU.
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Postponing
One case was found in the English concordances where a decision was 
postponed:
! The ruling executive wanted a decision postponed to assess a review of bene-
fits and taxation.
Postponing is a process that operates on the decision-making process, and con-
sidering that it has already been revealed that decision-making can be complic-
ated and time consuming (see p. 80), it is not surprising that it can be postponed. 
It occurs in the Swedish corpora as well:
! Flera gånger har beslutet skjutits upp och/eller förhalats.
! Several times the decision has been postponed and/or deliberately delayed.
Comparison
The Swedish and English concordances did not differ very much, but some of 
the roles found in the English concordances were not found in the Swedish 
ones. Figure 3-8 contains all semantic roles found in the Swedish and English 
concordances.
Figure 3-8: Semantic Roles and Processes found in the Swedish and English 
material.
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The roles and processes that differed between the Swedish and English concord-
ances all had very low frequencies, and directed searches revealed that they do 
occur in both corpora. Thus, coincidence may have caused them to appear in 
one concordance set and not the other.
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Two roles are frequent enough to compare their sub categories, Decider and 
Content. Both roles are present almost exactly as often in English and Swedish, 
but the sub categories differ somewhat.
Table 3-1: Comparison of the Decider role in Swedish and English.
English Swedish
Decider 241 (67% of decisions) 382 (69% of decisions)
   Deictic. ref. exp. 126 (52% of deciders) 169 (44% of deciders)
       singular1 53 (42% of deictic) 29 (17% of deictic)
       plural 52 (41% of deictic) 88 (52% of deictic)
   Sep. Individuals 47 (20% of deciders) 37 (10% of deciders)
   Inf. groups 7 (3% of deciders) 22 (6% of deciders)
   Form. groups 59 (24% of deciders) 154 (40% of deciders)
It seems that English deciders are individuals more often than Swedish deciders, 
41% compared to 17%, statistically significant on the 99.99% level (!2-test; see p. 
227-8 for an explanation). We can only speculate about the reasons for it. One 
explanation could be that Swedish society is more collectivist in this aspect, with 
a preference for group decisions. Another explanation could be that the material 
in the Swedish corpora more often concerns group decisions than individual 
ones, compared to the English BNC. For example, the written Swedish corpus 
only contains newspaper texts, while the written section of BNC consists of 
many kinds of texts, including novels.
Turning to the content role, its distribution in the corpora is shown in table 3-2. 
Table 3-2: Comparison of the Content role in Swedish and English. See p. 83 ff. 
for explanations and examples of the categories.
English Swedish
Content 225 (62% of decisions) 331 (60% of decisions)
   Area 70 (31% of contents) 136 (41% of contents)
   Chosen alternative 146 (65% of contents) 182 (55% of contents)
   Content detail 0 5 (2% of contents)
   Scope 9 (4% of contents) 7 (2% of contents)
1. A number of deictic expressions are ambiguous as regards number, which is why 
singular and plural do not add up to 100%. In order to make the figures more 
comparable between the languages, the Swedish correspondents to English you (du 
and ni), have been treated as ambiguous. 
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Table 3-2 shows that the English Content role more often than the Swedish con-
cern Chosen alternative than Area, with statistical significance on the 98% level 
(!2-test). It is difficult to see any reason to why this should be.
All in all, there does not seem to be a large difference in the concept of decision 
between (British) English and Swedish.
3.4.12 Summary of the empirical investigation
The results from the empirical investigation made here are extensive, and it is 
easy to get lost in the details. I shall therefore make a summary of the findings 
below.
“What and Why”
Ideally, all words that can be used to refer to decisions, in all languages, should 
be investigated, but due to time limitations this was only done with the two main 
Swedish words, beslut/besluta and bestämma. Comparisons was done to the English 
word decide/decision. The meanings ‘determine’ and ‘control’ that bestämma can 
have, have been excluded.
Etymology
The word besluta originally means ‘to end or close something’, the probable ori-
ginal meaning of bestämma can be described as ‘to utter approval’. The English 
word decide derives from a Latin word meaning ‘to cut, to determine’.
Basic Epistemic Structure
A decision is considered to be essentially an event here, that is, a change from 
one state to another. In that respect the verb besluta (decide) is the most basic 
form, beslut (decision) is a derivation. However, the resulting state of obligation is 
linked closely to the event; perhaps both the state and the event are necessary for 
the concept. Both the verb and noun forms are common; the noun is actually 
more common than the verb in the Swedish written corpus. The noun often 
refers to the resulting state, the obligation, often indistinguishable from the doc-
ument where the decision is written, in particular with institutional decisions. In 
such cases beslut is more of an entity.
Sometimes, a decision is seen as a process instead of an event. Then, it usually 
refers to the work done before the actual decision. Decision as a process is rare, 
and the same goes for adjective forms.
For bestämma, the verb is basic. The most common noun form bestämmelse has re-
ceived the special meaning of ‘rule, regulation’, and similarly the form bestämning 
has received the meaning ‘specification, determination’. The more neutral form 
bestämmande is very rare. In the same way as for the noun forms, the meaning of 
the adjective bestämd has diverged from the original verb meaning, instead con-
noting ‘clear, doubtless’.
Both besluta and bestämma occur in reflexive constructions, although this is more 
common for bestämma. Results support the dictionary claim that the reflexive 
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form is used for decisions concerning decision-maker, while it should be noted 
that the non-reflexive form could be used for this as well. 
Basic Conceptual Structure
A possible prototype for a decision is when a person is about to vote in a public 
election. There are several alternatives to choose from, and election campaigns 
are held for several weeks or months before the election, providing information 
about the alternatives to the voter. The precise instant for the decision, when the 
voter makes up his mind, can vary, moreover, he can change his mind several 
times. On Election Day however, a single alternative has to be chosen.
A possible stereotype for a decision is a formal group decision, with a chairper-
son, agenda, minutes etc. In such a situation it can be necessary to separate insti-
tutional decisions (that which is written down in minutes, signed and used to reg-
ulate an organization) from interpersonal decisions (when the participants of a 
meeting decide what institutional decision to make).
A general super type for deciding is psycho-social acts. Examples of coordinated 
types are questioning, admitting and denying. A more immediate super type is ‘deci-
sion situation’, which includes situations where an agent does not manage to 
choose from the available alternatives until the opportunity has passed.
Decisions can be subcategorized in many ways, and it is common to do so on 
the basis of the properties of the decision-maker or on the content of the deci-
sion, for instance ‘jury decision’ or ‘financial decision’.
The evaluation of a decision can be made on two grounds – either the action 
that the decision concerns, or the decision-making process itself. The option to 
decide is also evaluated sometimes, as something positive.
Anchoring in time-space
Decisions are located in time, and, through their decision-makers, they are loc-
ated in space as well. The temporal location is far more important (i.e. more fre-
quent in the concordances) than the spatial location.
Once made, a decision can be changed up until the moment when the decision-
action is performed; in institutional settings, there are often formal procedures 
for for making such a change. In addition, a decision can be cancelled or with-
drawn. When the decision-action is performed, the decision does not really end, 
but rather it expires. However, when decisions concern action types, the number 
of actions is not necessarily specified; such a decision does not expire as easily. 
Rather, it continues to be valid until an over-riding decision is made, or some 
other circumstance renders it invalid.
Processes and Relations
Decisions are related to other concepts that can be grouped into six main areas: 
agreement, determination, intention, rules and commands, selection and specification. In the 
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concordances decisions are seldom coordinated with other phenomena, indicat-
ing that they are important enough to be dealt with on their own.
The processes and relations that decisions were found to be involved in are the 
following: deciding (‘to make a decision’), changing (‘to change a decision’), invalidat-
ing (‘to cancel a decision’), evaluating (‘to praise a decision’), communicating (‘to in-
form about a decision’), implementing (‘to carry out a decision’), using (‘use a deci-
sion as a precedent’), studying (‘to illuminate a decision’) and postponing (‘to 
postpone a decision’). Deciding is the most common process, present in 62% of 
200 investigated cases, with evaluation at a distant second place with a trifling 
10%. 
Roles Derived from Processes and Relations
Figure 3-8, repeated below as 3-9, shows the processes/relations and roles with 
which decisions are concerned.
Figure 3-9: Semantic Roles and Processes for Decision.
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Decider and Content are the most common roles, and Time and Consequence 
are somewhat common as well. The other roles are more sporadic. Both indi-
viduals and groups are common as Deciders, but groups are more common in 
the Swedish material than in the British English material. There is no discernible 
pattern in the various Contents of decisions.
It is perhaps not strange that the Content of a decision often is mentioned, since 
Content simply specifies what the decision is, but it is less obvious why Decider 
is so frequent. One explanation for this is that the Decider defines the scope of 
the decision – a government decision has a very different scope compared to the 
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decision of a local housing committee. The relative frequency of Time can be ex-
plained by the way that decisions are anchored in time, having a period of valid-
ity between the decision-making and the performing of the decision-event. Con-
sequence being common is explained by decisions’ tight connection to actions, 
and the fact that the consequences of actions are considered to be consequences 
of the decisions leading up to the actions. 
Properties
Decisions are not often described with properties, but when they are, the de-
scription are usually derived from some of the semantic roles surrounding deci-
sions, such as ‘political’ or ‘formal’. Perhaps the abstract nature of decisions 
makes it unusual to talk or write about their properties.
Possibilities of Quantification, Evaluation and Modality
Decider, Time, Circumstance, Manner, Content, Consequence and Precondition 
are necessary roles for decisions, in the sense that each decision must be made 
by somebody, at some time, in some way etc. (Although these roles might not be 
expressed when talking or writing about the decision.) Motive and Input are 
probably also necessary, depending on their precise definitions. The other roles 
are optional.
Decisions can be negative in two senses, non-decisions and decisions-not-to. A non-
decision involves no agreement being reached among the participants in a group, 
or when an individual cannot make up his mind. A decision-not-to is brought 
about when a group agrees to not perform a proposed action, or when an indi-
vidual makes up his mind not to perform a possible action.
English-Swedish
There do not seem to be any large differences between the Swedish and British 
English decision concepts, but groups are more often Deciders in the Swedish 
corpora than in the British English ones. This is either a reflection of Swedish 
culture being more democratic/collectivist than the British one, or due to dif-
ferences in the types of texts and conversations of the corpora.
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 A definition
One important, although not strictly necessary, result of a concept determination 
like the one made here is a definition. This is not a way to capture the entire 
concept in a few short phrases, but rather a way to set up the limits for the rest 
of this dissertation, and to be clear about what I mean with decision here.
Of course, definitions of decision and group decision have been made before. 
Putnam and Stohl use a rather straight-forward and simple definition:
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A decision is a choice that group members make among alternatives available to them
(Putnam and Stohl 1996) quoting (Fisher and Ellis 1990)
The definition is attractive in its simplicity, but I do not find this definition very 
clarifying. There cannot be a choice without alternatives, so the definition merely 
says that a decision is a choice. Geist and Chandler use a theory developed by Si-
mon (1976), their definition is compatible with Putnam’s and Stohl’s, but more 
informative. They write as follows:
[decision] should be viewed in terms of the alternative behavioral possibilities and 
consequences that individuals within the organization are confronted with at any given 
moment, and that decision or choice, therefore, “is the process by which one of these 
alternatives for each moment’s behavior is selected and carried out”.
(Geist and Chandler 1984:68)
First, one should note that the word select is somewhat ambiguous. If it is inten-
ded to include only a conscious choice, then the last part of the description 
above is sufficient. However, select is used sometimes in a wider sense, as in natur-
al selection, where conscious choice is not present. In that sense alternatives for 
action can be selected and carried out without a decision having been made.
Further, Simon seems to view carrying out a decision as being part of the deci-
sion. This notion is interesting, since it implies that a decision is never final until 
the action (which we may call the decision-action) is carried out.1 A decision can, in 
principle, be changed anytime, until the decision-action has been performed, the 
only definite end of the decision process. However, if the decision-action is con-
sidered part of the decision, then a decision is never made until the decision-ac-
tion has been performed. But, have I not decided to buy a book until I have 
bought the book? The idea of a decision could probably not endure if decision-
actions were never carried out; it is likely that it is necessary that decision-actions 
usually be carried out in order for the concept of decision to survive. What is 
missing in the two definitions above is commitment to the decision-action. A per-
son that commits to doing something without intentions to stick to the commit-
ment violates the commitment, or one of the felicity conditions of decisions in 
Searle’s terminology (Levinson 1983:229ff). Thus, there is a close, and well-mot-
ivated link between the decision and the decision-action. However, including the 
decision-action in the decision seems counter-intuitive.
Yates, Veinott and Patalano are more careful in their definition, stopping at the 
commitment to an action:
1. Or, the opportunity for carrying out the decision-action has passed without the 
action having been carried out.
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A decision is a commitment to a course of action that is intended to produce a satisfying 
state of affairs.
(Yates et al. 2003:15)
Yates and his colleagues are interested in normative aspects of group decision-
making; therefore incorporating a part about intentions behind the decision-ac-
tion in their definition. At least analytically speaking, the decision and the inten-
tion behind the decision-action can be kept apart. For example, two people may 
decide to go on a journey to Paris together, one of them for the sake of the com-
pany, and the other to find an opportunity to steal the other person’s wallet. In 
this example the intentions behind the decision-action (to go together) are differ-
ent, but I would say that there is only one group-decision. The decision is to act 
in a certain way, and the (personal) intentions behind that action are something 
else.1
Huisman, in contrast, stops short at commitment: 
[A decision is] a commitment to future action
(Huisman 2001:70)
In my opinion, commitments for future actions can arise without decisions hav-
ing been made (for example based on habit), so this definition is a bit too broad. 
The passive voice in Huisman’s definition also implies that decisions may be 
made without agents, an implication I find unfortunate. All this leads to the fol-
lowing, preliminary definition:
(1) A decision is an event where one or more agents choose one out of at 
least two alternative future actions and create a commitment to act 
according to it.23
1. One may say that there are intentions on different levels – there is one 
“immediate” intention of performing the action, and one “indirect” intention 
concerning the results of the action. The first kind of intention is of course shared 
by the two companions in the example (traveling together to Paris), but in the 
definition above it seems to be the second kind of intention that is referred to 
(having company/stealing a wallet). The article speaks of results in a way that 
makes it clear that the satisfying state of affairs is not the immediate result of the 
action (being in Paris), but rather some long term effects, for example this quote: 
this decision is hard because it is difficult to imagine or predict what its possible outcomes might 
be (Yates et al. 2003:21).
2. It should perhaps be pointed out that the alternative future courses of action 
could be to either perform an action, or not to perform it.
3. Another way of dealing with decisions is to treat groups as single agents, which 
would reduce the definition of decision into something like, ‘an agent starting to 
follow a plan.’ Rubin (1984) seems to want to handle group decisions this way, 
saying that ‘groups [can] clearly act (witness the behavior of a lynch mob) and can 
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A problem with this definition is that it assumes that the ones who decide are 
also the ones who act. This is not always the case, so we need to adjust the 
definition:
(2) A decision is an event where a set of agents A chooses one out of at least 
two alternative future actions, and a set of agents B becomes committed 
to act according to it.
Here, the deciders and the implementers have been separated. This adjustment 
makes it obvious that the term commitment is not satisfactory: it implies a certain 
amount of voluntariness, which may be common and ethically desirable, but not 
analytically necessary. Obligation is a better term:
(3) A decision is an event where a set of agents A chooses one out of at least 
two alternative future actions, and creates an obligation for a set of 
agents B to act according to it. 
It should be noted that there may very well be only a single member of A, or of 
B, and that A and B may be identical.
This definition requires an obligation to be created for something to count as a 
decision. On the other hand, some situations seem to defy this. Let’s take an 
example:
Pem and Pom are cleaning out the garage. They have rented a large 
container to throw the garbage in. Pem points at a large glass bottle, saying 
‘Is it O.K. with you if we throw it away?’. Pom then picks up the bottle, 
throws it into the container, and it breaks against the metal bottom.
Here Pem and Pom clearly agree to throw away the bottle, and they have a 
choice, but when and where is the obligation created? The problem lies in that 
the action that is under discussion is also the one that is used to communicate 
Pom’s acceptance of Pem’s proposal. One solution to this could be to to say that 
the obligation exists instantaneously (zero time lapse), but that would be rather 
dubious. Another, real-life, example can also be used to challenge definition 3:
be thought of for many purposes as persons who are responsible for their actions; 
for example, they can be sued, go bankrupt, or be held liable for injuries’ (Rubin 
1984:18). Even though Rubin has a point in that groups often are thought of as 
actors, this view has definite problems. Intention is a crucial concept when 
analyzing action, and what would the intention of a group be, if not some union 
or intersection of the intentions of its participants? Further, when a group 
performs some behavior, mustn’t that be through one or more of its participants? 
Thus, if both intention and behavior are tied to individuals, actions of a group 
must be fundamentally different from the actions of an individual. I find it more 
reasonable to define group decision as a result of interacting individuals. 
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Excerpt 3-1. A850101, line 60.
A meeting with the board of a rural township in southern Sweden. The chairperson 
opens the meeting, and proposes a minutes verifier (utterance 1, from #1# to #2#).
1 $A: ... Bäckmåla kommun+ / 
kommunalnämnd / behagar 
härmed sammanträda // å #1# då 
har vi på / fördragningslistan val 
av justeringsman / i tur att justera 
/ kvällens pro+ / protokoll / 
skulle va Bengt Alkvist #2# // 
något annat förslag
$A: ... Bäckmåla town+ / township 
board / is hereby gathered for 
conferral // and #1# on the agenda 
we find election of minutes verifyer 
/ the person in turn for verifying 
tonight’s min+ / minutes / would be 
Bengt Alkvist #2# // any other 
suggestion
2 $X: nä $X: no
3 $A: utses Alkvist $A: is Alkvist appointed
4 $X: <1 ja >1 <2 | >2
@ <1 comment: several 
participants >1
@ <2 event: strike of 
chairperson's gavel >2
$X: <1 yes >1 <2 | >2
@ <1 comment: several 
participants >1
@ <2 event: strike of chairperson’s 
gavel >2
In this example there are several obligations at work: there is a general obligation 
by all participants to appoint a minutes verifier, and when Alqvist has been ap-
pointed, he is obliged to verify the minutes, while the other participants are ob-
liged to treat him as a verifier (i.e. allow him to verify the minutes). However, the 
action associated with the group decision is to appoint Alqvist as the minutes 
verifier, and there is never any obligation to do exactly that. At the same time the 
decision is made, Alqvist is appointed, that is, the action is carried out (utterance 
4). The explicit agreement (choice) performs the action. This corresponds to 
Austin’s (1962) classic performatives, and is obviously a way to decide without 
obligation. 
Both the example with the glass bottle and the minutes verifier show that the 
communication of choice can perform the chosen action. The definition must be 
adjusted to cover this case:
(4) A decision is an event where a set of agents A chooses one out of at least 
two alternative future actions, and in this choice a set of agents B either 
acts according to the choice, or becomes obliged to do so.
This definition thus contains a disjunction (either...or) effectively creating two 
types of decisions, one where the decision-action is carried out through and by 
making the decision, and one where an obligation is created.
However, there is still one special case of decision not covered, and that is priv-
ate decisions, when A and B are equal, having a single member who has not 
communicated the decision to anybody else. In this case it is strange to say that 
this person is obliged to follow the decision. For example, I may decide one day 
at 11 o’clock that I am going to have lunch at a Thai restaurant. At 12 o’clock, 
104 Chapter 3: Concept determination
when I go for lunch, I change my mind and go for a pizza instead. I see no ob-
ligation in this example, simply an intention to go to the Thai restaurant. 
There may be cases where people create obligations for themselves. For ex-
ample, I could say to myself at 11 o’clock, ‘Magnus, today you should go to the 
Thai restaurant. You have had pizza every day for two weeks. Thai is much 
healthier. Magnus, I’ll be disappointed with you if you fail to do this!” In such a 
case, it is not unreasonable to talk about an obligation for a private decision, but 
I see it as a special case.
Thus, we arrive at the following, our final definition:
(5) A decision is an event where a set of agents A chooses one out of at least 
two alternative future actions, and either performs that action, or forms 
an intention to make that action happen. If a decision is made public 
(becomes known to others), an obligation to follow the decision arises 
for a set of agents B.1
When there is more than one member of A, then the decision is public from the 
start, so the members of A are obliged to each other to make the action happen. 
Similarly, members of B may witness the decision being made, and the obligation 
to act according to the choice may then arise in and by the choice (if the institu-
tional structure that A and B are part of stipulates it). Further, the intention held 
by A to make the chosen action happen may be limited to an intention to let B 
perform the action.
The attentive reader may have wondered why the phrase ‘set of agents’ is used 
instead of the original ‘one or more agents’. The reason is that it enables us to 
make certain distinctions. First we define a group decision as one where the first set 
of agents (A) contains more than one member, and an individual decision as one 
where A contains only one member2. Further, the relationship between A and B 
can be used to set up a typology for decisions:
i) A and B are equal [A = B]
AB
The simplest case is perhaps when A and B are the same: either an indi-
vidual making up his mind about what to do (if there is only one member 
of the set), or a “democratic” group decision, where everybody that is to 
perform the action also participates in the decision. In the latter case, the 
1. The action may be generic, as discussed on pp. 71-2.
2. Logically oriented readers may wonder what to do with cases where A or B or 
both A and B are empty, and the answer is that they simply become irrelevant. 
The definition requires both a choice to be made and an obligation to be created 
(or an act to be performed), and these things cannot happen without agents.
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degree of democracy can vary, since the decision need not be made in 
consensus, nor with the principle of one-man-one-vote.
ii) A and B are separate [A ? B = ?]
A B
If A decides what B should do, then it means that A has power to tell B 
what to do (a power that may be restricted in many ways). 
iii) A and B overlap [?x (x?A ? x?B) ? ?y (y?A ? y?B) ? ?z (z?A ? z?B)]
A B
When some-but-not-all members of A are also the ones who are to do the 
job, then it is more difficult to categorize the decision using ordinary lan-
guage. An example of this case might be when the CEO of a company 
who is also a member of the company board. He participates in the deci-
sions made by the board, as well as in performing the actions chosen by 
the board. However, other people working at the company play no part in 
the choices made.
iv) A is a part of B [A ? B]
A
B
When less than all members of a group decide what the entire group 
should do, it might look like dictatorship (if there is only one member of 
A) or a junta (if there is more than one member in A), but this is perhaps 
the most common case of decision in most large organizations – a subset 
of the organization members decide what the entire organization should 
do. Dictators and juntas are examples of such subsets, but also elected 
parliaments.
v) B is a part of A [B ? A]
B
A
Sometimes a group may decide what a single member should do. This can 
be called ‘appointing’ or ‘designating’.
Whether one accepts category ii) depends a little on one’s view on action. One 
may say that if a person is responsible for an action, then that person also parti-
cipates in the action. If for example an officer orders a soldier to dig a hole in the 
ground, then one might want to say that the officer is responsible for the digging 
of the hole, thus also participating in the action to some degree. With this view 
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of action, not only category iii) disappears, but also categories iii) and v)1. It is 
not important for this dissertation whether this view of action is used or not.
The degree of participation in a decision may vary between the members of a 
group; this blurs the borders between the categories. A person in a group may 
have little actual opportunity to influence the decision (due to low status, little 
knowledge, etc.), making participation low for that person, although not strictly 
nonexistent. What looks like a case of i) may then in effect be a case of iv). If a 
chairperson pushes through a decision that he should write a letter to the gov-
ernment asking for financial support, then participation in the decision as well as 
in the action is likely to be low for the other group members. What looks like a 
group decision may then in effect be an individual decision. Another case is 
when a group of people working at a company has a meeting, and the chairper-
son, who is also a manager, proposes that an employee do a certain task. If that 
employee readily accepts the task, then it may be very unclear if it is a case of cat-
egory i) or ii).
Something should also be said about the terms obligation and commitment. It is un-
problematic to say that the obligation created in a decision is a commitment for 
each member in B who is also a member of A and who wants the selected course 
of action to happen. However, there are cases which are less clear. For example, 
there may be a group that uses voting to settle an issue. One member votes 
against the proposed action, but looses the vote, and finds himself obliged to 
perform the action. Is he then committed to do the action?
3.5.2 Relation between the definition and the empirical results
The definition set out here is contradicted by the empirical data in one aspect: it 
states that a decision is an event while the empirical data shows that it can be 
seen as an event, a state or a process. However, the definition is not meant to de-
scribe the concept of (group) decision-making as used in everyday language 
today, but to be used in a detailed, scientific investigation of group decision-mak-
ing. Therefore, I prefer to keep the somewhat stipulative definition of decision as 
an event, considering the discussions and preparations preceding a decision as 
something other than part of the decision. It is of course desirable that the terms 
used in scientific contexts do not deviate from everyday language, but it is some-
times necessary that they do.
The empirical data have several points in common with the definition (5): the 
decision-maker can be a group (p. 78 decider), the decision involves a choice (p. 
73-4 selection), and it involves an obligation (p. 73 rules and commands).
1. In that case, one may want to make finer distinctions for the obligations, for 
example between being obliged to perform an action and being obliged to let 
someone else perform an action.
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The remaining parts of the definition are neither contradicted, nor supported by, 
the empirical data.
3.5.3 Object of study in this dissertation
In this dissertation, I am primarily interested in group decision-making, that is, 
the set of agents that makes the choice should contain more than one member. 
The restriction that is present, implicitly or explicitly, in most studies of group 
decision-making will apply here too: only small groups are included, where ‘small 
group’ is defined loosely as a group of people where each member can interact 
face-to-face with each other member.
Further, I will focus on the linguistic communication of decision-making in small 
groups, as opposed to underlying psychological motives or the quality of the 
decisions that are made.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter I have investigated of the concept of decision using Allwood’s 
model for concept determination, enriched with some of Wilson’s methods for 
concept analysis. Uses of the words beslut/besluta/bestämma and decide/decision in 
Swedish and English corpora have been used as input for the determination. A 
summary of the empirical investigation was made in 3.4.12, and a definition of 
decision was set up in 3.5.1. 
A prototypical example of a decision can serve as an illustration of what a deci-
sion is. It is more common that the decider is a group than an individual, and the 
most common content is a chosen alternative. All other roles are so uncommon 
that they should be left out of a prototypical example. The following example 
from GP-HD matches the requirements: 
– Nämnden beslutade att föra frågan vidare till kommunstyrelsen...
– The committee decided to forward the question to the city board...
A maximal type is perhaps more illustrating, but will have to be artificial, and not 
fetched from the corpora, to ensure the presence of all roles:
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A man applies for a building permit for a house to 
the local building committee in a small town. An 
official prepares the issue and sets up a proposition 
for decision, which is negative. However, the man 
earns a lot of money, and the municipality would 
risk loosing a considerable tax income if the man 
would choose to live somewhere else. At the 
committe meeting on February 25 the issue is 
discussed for a while, and then postponed to allow 
further consideration and investigation. At the next 
meeting on March 25 the issue is discussed again, 
and then a vote is made, resulting in the man being 
granted the building permit. The two members of 
the environmental party and the socialist party 
respectively make a reservation against the 
decision, and the chairman of the local 
environmental party branch used the decision to 
obtain media time, by filing an appeal to the 
government. ’We want the government to cancel the 
shameful decision of the building committee, or at 
least to change it to allow only a single-storey 
house’, he says in a newspaper interview where he 
tells about the building permit decision. But the 
governement chooses not to accept the case for 
consideration. When the man starts to build his 
house, some environment activists, who have heard 
about the decision, try to obstruct the construction 
workers, but they are carried away by the police. 
Eventually the house is built. The man dies soon 
after, and it turns out that in his will he gives all his 
money to the municipality, with a direct reference to 
the ’generously given building permit’.
Decider
Manner: 
  by voting
Time
Content
Input
Consequence
Motive
Location
Circumstance
Changer: 
  the government
Invalidator: 
  the government
Evaluator 1: 
  the two party 
  members
Communicator: 
  the chairman
Receiver: 
  the activists
Implementer: 
  the police
User: 
  the chairman
Postponer: 
  the committee
Evaluator 2: 
  the chairman
The example is maximal in the sense that it contains all the roles found in the 
corpora (with the exception of the role of the studier – the reader is an example 
of that role). 
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4. Argumentation
4.1 Introduction
As mentioned in 2.5, argumentation enters group decision-making naturally 
when members of a group try to persuade each other that “their” suggested 
alternative is the best one. Argumentation is one of the oldest branches of lan-
guage studies, the first schools of Ancient Greece taught it, although under other 
names, but to a large extent it has been kept out of main-stream linguistics, and 
the theories and developments of argumentation/rhetoric on the one hand and 
linguistics on the other have been separate tracks. During the 20th century the 
rhetorical track was made more scientific, through the works of Chaïm Perel-
man, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Stephen Toulmin and others, as described above 
(section 2.5). However, argumentation and linguistics are still kept fairly separate, 
and I think that both fields would benefit from being brought closer to each oth-
er. One example of this is that argumentation theory still focuses to a large ex-
tent on written argumentative discourse,1 while linguistics during the last decades 
has opened up towards spoken language. Moreover, even though some work has 
been done in argumentation analysis on naturally occurring spoken language, the 
underlying frameworks and theories have been developed for written language. 
Since my present interest in argumentation comes from its being part of group 
decision-making, and since group decision-making often, and to a large extent, is 
a spoken, interactive, face-to-face activity (see chapter 5), this written language 
bias of traditional argumentation analysis is a drawback. 
In this chapter I shall attempt to put argumentation analysis in closer contact 
with modern linguistics. A linguistic theoretical framework that has been de-
veloped with full recognition of spoken language (Allwood’s activity-based com-
munication analysis) will be combined with a well established framework for ar-
gumentation analysis (van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical 
1. Oral speeches have of course been studied, but they have been expected to be 
carefully planned, in a way very similar to written language.
school of argumentation analysis), to analyze argumentation in naturally occur-
ring spoken language.
4.2 Pragma-dialectics
4.2.1 Introduction
The Dutch researchers Frans van Eemeren and the late Rob Grootendorst de-
veloped a school of argumentation analysis that they call pragma-dialectics. A de-
tailed explanation of the theory can be found in (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
1992), but only a brief explanation is presented here.
The name pragma-dialectics comes from the attempt to merge linguistics, or, more 
specifically, pragmatics, with the philosophical study of critical dialogue, dia-
lectics. The name reveals that the present study is not the first attempt to merge 
linguistics with argumentation analysis.
In this section I shall present, and to some degree criticize, the pragma-dialectical 
model. The first part of this, 4.2.2 to 4.2.4, contains a presentation of the ideolo-
gical foundations, a discussion of the pragma-dialectical view on the distinction 
between normative and descriptive aspects, and finally a description of the prag-
matic (linguistic) theories that pragma-dialectics includes. 4.2.5 through 4.2.11 
contains a presentation of the actual model, starting with some basic concepts. 
At the end of this section, in 4.2.12, the model as a whole will be discussed.
4.2.2 Ideological basis
The ideological foundations of pragma-dialectics are captured in the four key 
terms, briefly explained here (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984:4-18):
Externalization
By externalization, pragma-dialecticians mean that the analysis of argumentation 
must concern expressed opinions and argumentative statements, that is, utter-
ances and text, as opposed to thoughts, ideas and motives. Naturally, the inten-
tions and meanings that a speaker has cannot be completely avoided when ana-
lyzing argumentation, which is not what the pragma-dialecticians advocate. 
Rather, they claim that these ‘psycho-pragmatic primitives’ (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 1984:6) must be clearly linked to utterances and texts, and great 
care has to be taken when they are attributed to speakers.
Functionalization
In argumentation theories that are more oriented towards logic, argumentation is 
sometimes presented in a very static way. According to the pragma-dialecticians, 
functionalization means that argumentation has to be seen as ‘a purposive activ-
ity’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984:7), more precisely, ‘a form of verbal 
action.’ 
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The precise consequences of this view are somewhat unclear, but they seem to 
be connected to an interest in speech-acts displayed by pragma-dialectics.
Socialization
The term socialization is used in this context to refer to the emphasis the 
pragma-dialecticians put on looking at communication and interaction during ar-
gumentation. Argumentation does not appear in a social vacuum, but between 
people, so argumentation has to be seen as ‘a part of a bilateral process’ (van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984:9).
Dialectification.  
Dialectification, finally, puts emphasis on the dialectical process of argumenta-
tion. Argumentation is not simply about justifying a claim, but also refuting other 
claims, since the other party usually has a conflicting opinion. Argumentation is a 
process where both pro- and contra-argumentation must be allowed to occur.
4.2.3 Descriptive vs. normative aspects
According to the pragma-dialectical school, argumentation starts with a differ-
ence of opinion, and aims at resolving this difference. Furthermore, the study of 
this process should neither be strictly descriptive nor strictly normative, but 
normative and descriptive approaches should be ‘so closely interwoven that they 
become integrated’ (van Eemeren et al. 1996:275). This is developed somewhat 
in (van Eemeren 1990), but it is still not obvious why this intermingling of norm-
ative and descriptive approaches is necessary. The key probably lies in van Eem-
eren’s view of what argumentation theory is: ‘Scholars of argumentation are in-
terested in how argumentative discourse can be used to justify or refute a 
standpoint in a rational way’ (van Eemeren 1990:37). Van Eemeren simply does 
not see any point in studying argumentation unless it is normative. 
Although I agree that human sciences have a tendency to become irrelevant for 
people outside the universities by refusing to show how research results can be 
applied to solving practical problems, I cannot see why the description and the 
norms cannot be kept apart in the traditional scientific way. Moreover, since the 
present work starts with the ambition of describing naturally occurring argu-
mentation, the unclear distinction between normative and descriptive elements is 
a major disadvantage of the pragma-dialectical school.1 
4.2.4 Pragmatic foundation
The pragmatic theory used as starting point for van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
is based on the works of Austin (1962), Searle (1969; 1979) and Grice (1975). 
Grice’s maxims of conversation are general principles for conversations, and 
pragma-dialecticians adopt these, adapting them slightly. Grice’s communicative 
1. See also section 4.3.3 below.
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principle is adjusted into the Principle of Communication: be clear, honest, efficient and to 
the point, and the four maxims supporting Grices cooperative principle are adjus-
ted into five rules of communication:
• The First Rule of Communication
Do not perform any incomprehensible speech acts.
• The Second Rule of Communication
Do not perform any insincere speech acts. 
• The Third Rule of Communication
Do not perform any superfluous speech acts.
• The Fourth Rule of Communication
Do not perform any futile speech acts.
• The Fifth Rule of Communication
Do not perform any speech acts that do not appropriately connect to pre-
ceding speech acts.
From (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992:50-51)
Readers who are not familiar with Grice’s maxims are recommended to read 
Levinson (1983), or some other introductory textbook on pragmatics. Briefly, it 
can be said that these maxims are rules that participants in conversation do fol-
low and expect other participants to follow as well. Relying on these maxims, im-
plicatures can be calculated, which means that meaning can be inferred. Consider 
the following example:
Pem is writing a dissertation. One day Pom asks how the dissertation is 
coming along, and Pem answers: It has been nice weather lately, hasn’t it?
Here, Pem’s answer seems to be in conflict with the Fifth Rule of Communica-
tion, since it does not seem to connect to the preceding question. However, be-
cause we assume that Pem is following the rules, we infer that the change of top-
ic is significant, and that it probably means that Pem does not want to talk about 
the dissertation. ‘Pem does not want to talk about the dissertation’ is thus an 
implicature.
Both the pragma-dialectical rules of communication and Grice’s maxims suffer 
from two main weaknesses: i) they overlap, and ii) they are not formed on a prin-
cipled basis. The overlapping occurs for example with the first and fifth rule – 
when you are not able to appropriately connect a speech act to the preceding 
conversation, then you do not understand it (fully) – and with the third and 
fourth rule – futile speech acts are likely to be superfluous. The lack of a prin-
cipled basis for the rules leads to the suspicion that the list is not exhaustive 
(Grice admits this himself). 
In Allwood’s framework (see section 2.4.2), implicatures are inferences based on 
several assumptions, not just a single maxim. In the example with the disserta-
tion above, it is assumed that Pem is a rational, motivated agent, who is cooper-
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ating at least as much as to be understood. Pem is also most likely taking Pom 
into ethical consideration. It would be neither cooperative, nor ethical, for a ra-
tional agent to simply ignore Pom’s question. Therefore, we can infer that the 
change of topic is significant. Further, our knowledge of the world tells us that 
dissertations often are hard to write, and that many students feel stressed about 
them. It is thus reasonable to assume that Pem is feeling stressed about the dis-
sertation, and feels embarrassed or just generally uncomfortable talking about it. 
The implicature ‘Pem does not want to talk about the dissertation’ is an infer-
ence based on all of these variables.
For speech-acts, the pragma-dialecticians use Searle’s taxonomy, claiming that 
some speech act types cannot play a direct part in a ‘critical discussion’, meaning 
a well functioning resolution of a difference of opinion (van Eemeren et al. 
1996:286-288). An example of a speech act type that the pragma-dialecticians 
claim cannot play a direct part in a critical discussion is that of expressives. An ex-
pressive is defined by the authors as ‘a speech act by means of which the speaker 
or writer expresses his or her feelings about something,’ one of the examples giv-
en is the phrase ‘I wish I could find such a nice girl friend.’ 
It is not difficult to imagine a situation where such a phrase shows that the 
speaker has accepted some thesis that he previously did not. Let’s say that Adam 
has claimed that it is futile to try to create good relationships with women, since 
they never accept men as they are, but try to change them into something else. 
Bill then argues passionately against this, using his own girl friend as an example. 
Adam then says, ‘I wish I could find such a nice girl friend,’ showing that he ac-
cepts Bill’s argument. This seems like a counter example to the claim that ex-
pressives cannot play a direct part in a critical discussion, but the pragma-dialec-
ticians, who would most likely accept the example, stick to their claim. The 
solution lies in the conception of indirect speech acts: according to van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst (1992:44 ff), the utterance, ‘I wish I could find such a nice girl 
friend,’ can implicitly convey a commissive (acceptance), even though it ‘at first 
sight, [does] not express [its] primary function’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
1992:48).
The idea of indirect speech acts is problematic, as pointed out by Levinson 
(1983:263 ff). Or, to be more precise, making the distinction between direct and 
indirect speech acts is troublesome. If the direct speech act is anything other 
than grammatical mood (e.g. interrogative, indicative, imperative), then how is it 
conventionally linked to the expression? Further, if it is not conventionally linked 
to the expression, then what separates it from the indirect speech act? In the 
pragma-dialectic writings, direct speech acts are sometimes seen as speech acts 
that are labeled directly by the speaker, as in ‘I hereby promise that I will pick 
you up at eight!’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992:44). Sometimes, direct 
speech act seems to refer to the most prominent of several functions of an utter-
ance: ‘Incidentally, in practice, all speech acts that are crucial to a critical discus-
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sion can be indirectly performed by way of speech acts that, at first sight, do not 
express their primary function’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992:48).
Allwood (2000) points out some further problems with Austin’s & Searle’s 
speech act theory. One problem is that the taxonomy used does not have a sys-
tematic basis, rather, it is a grouping of English verbs, resulting in a) an unfortu-
nate Anglo-centrism, and b) unclear categories. Another problem is the “mono-
lithic” view of speech acts, that there is no recognition of the multi-functionality 
of utterances.
A: Mummy, I want ice cream!
B: Do you want me to get angry?
In the example above, B’s contribution is a question as well as being a threat. 
There are other problems with Austin’s & Searle’s speech act theory; a further 
discussion of these, and of speech acts in general, can be found in (Allwood 
1978) and (Allwood 1996a). 
4.2.5 Basic concepts
As we now turn from the theoretical foundation of pragma-dialectics to the 
pragma-dialectical model itself, there are a number of basic concepts that are 
more or less presupposed, and I shall present these here.
Standpoints and arguments
The pragma-dialectical theory assumes that speakers put forward standpoints, 
which may, or may not, be accepted by the listener. In the latter case, the speaker 
is likely to advance an argument in support of the standpoint. Standpoint–argu-
ment is a relationship, in the sense that an argument for a standpoint very well 
may need an additional argument, compared to which it is itself a standpoint. 
The neutral term used is utterance, including written argumentation.
Logical and pragmatic levels
Sometimes a distinction is made in the pragma-dialectical writings between the 
logical level and the pragmatic level, described in the following way:
At the pragmatic level, the analysis is directed toward reconstructing the complex speech 
act performed in advancing the argumentation, while at the logical level, the reasoning 
underlying the argumentation is reconstructed.
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992:60)
The word level implies a hierarchical organization, where the pragmatic level is 
above or below the logical level, but I have found no other traces of such an or-
ganization in the pragma-dialectical works I have studied, and I do not think that 
the pragma-dialecticians have intended such a hierarchical organization. Thus, 
the ‘pragmatic level’ can be seen as an analysis of the speech acts, while the ‘lo-
gical level’ connotes analysis of the reasoning. 
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Premises and conclusions
In pragma-dialectics, the logical level deals with premises and conclusions, as in tradi-
tional logic. The basic schema for logical reasoning is that of the syllogism, with 
a general rule connecting two kinds of propositions (major premise), an instance 
of the first type of proposition, and an instance of the other type.1 For example:
• All men are mortal (major premise)
• All Greeks are men (minor premise)
• Therefore, all Greeks are mortal (conclusion)
In actual conversation, all three elements are seldom expressed, often of them is 
left implicit, to be inferred by the listener. Unexpressed premises are premises that 
have not been put forward explicitly, but are needed to complete the argumenta-
tion, on a logical level. Ex:
Cats should not be allowed to run around freely, since they are malicious carnivores. 
Here the first proposition, ‘cats should not be allowed to run around freely’, is 
supported with the second proposition, ‘cats are malicious carnivores’. The un-
derlying premise here is the general rule that ‘malicious carnivores should not be 
allowed to run around freely’, without which the second proposition is not an ar-
gument for the first one. This type of unexpressed premises are very common 
and usually makes communication more efficient, since the listener can deduce 
the unexpressed premise quicker than it can be uttered by the speaker. 
Unexpressed premises have been a major concern for argumentation theorists 
for a long time, and a survey of the field can be found in (Gerritsen 2001). The 
problem with unexpressed premises is that there are usually many possible 
premises that would make the argumentation complete. Or, to put it differently, 
it is unclear what ‘complete argumentation’ is. The traditional view is that the un-
expressed premise is the premise that is needed to make the argument logically 
valid. There are some difficulties involved with that approach when applying it 
to natural language, since it is not obvious that all reasoning is deductive in the 
strict, logical sense. The pragma-dialectical solution to this is modern deductivism, 
shown in (Gerritsen 2001:59), and consists, simply put, of adding probabilities to 
the syllogisms (‘all men are probably mortal’). 
Another difficulty with unexpressed premises is pointed out in the distinction 
between used and needed premise, introduced by Ennis (1982:64). The needed 
premise is the logical minimum, that is, the premise needed to make the argu-
ment logically valid. In cases where the major premise is unexpressed, the logical 
minimum is a simple joining of the minor premise and the conclusion in an 
if...then-clause: ‘If cats are malicious carnivores, then cats should not be allowed 
to run around freely.’ The used premise, on the other hand, is the premise that 
1. See also p. 31.
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the speaker had in mind. In the cat example above, the used premise is probably 
not the simple if-then-clause, but more likely ‘malicious carnivores should not be 
allowed to run around freely.’ Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992:64) claim 
that the logical minimum does not contribute anything new; assuming that the 
speaker intends to communicate only the logical minimum would be to assume 
that she breaks the Gricean maxim of quantity (or the Third Rule of Communic-
ation) (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984:141).
Pointing at the maxim of quantity, the pragma-dialecticians introduce the prag-
matic optimum, which corresponds to Ennise’s used premise. 
Predominantly, [the pragmatic optimum] is a matter of generalizing the logical minimum, 
making it as informative as possible without ascribing unwarranted commitments to the 
speaker and formulating it in a colloquial way that fits in with the rest of the 
argumentative discourse.
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992:64).
The authors provide a procedure for making this generalization, a procedure that 
essentially consists of making such expansions of the logical minimum that the 
context allows. Any expansions of the logical minimum should be based on in-
formation in the context. A key factor here is the commitments that the speaker 
can be seen to have due to the utterance.
I do not quite agree with this analysis. The pragma-dialecticians claim that since 
the logical minimum does not contribute anything new, the speaker would break 
the Gricean maxim of quantity if she said it.1 The problem with this argument is 
that unexpressed premises are not expressed, so the break does not occur. I do 
agree with the pragma-dialecticians that a pragmatic optimum/used premise is 
needed, but it can not be explained as simply as a violation of the maxim of 
quantity.
4.2.6 Stages
According to the pragma-dialectical school, argumentation can be divided into 
four stages: 
i) The confrontation stage, where participants establish that they have a differ-
ence of opinion.
ii) The opening stage, where participants set up rules and assign roles for resolv-
ing the difference.
iii) The argumentation stage, where participants put forward arguments for their 
standpoint or against the other’s standpoint.
1. To be precise, they claim that it would break the third rule of communication, Do 
not perform any superfluous speech acts, which is a modification of Grice’s theory.
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iv) The concluding stage, where participants decide on the result of the argu-
mentation, that is, if and how the difference of opinion was resolved.
The authors emphasize that these stages are purely analytical, that it may be quite 
difficult to perceive them in actual conversation and that they need not occur in 
the order given above. Because of this, a better term would perhaps be some-
thing less sequential, such as component.
4.2.7 Roles
The participant that puts forward a claim is called the protagonist in the pragma-
dialectical school, while the participant that attacks or questions the claim is 
called the antagonist. The labels are convenient, although it should be noted that 
participants in actual argumentative conversation will typically shift roles many 
times.
4.2.8 Rules for Critical Discussion
In the core of the pragma-dialectical model lie the Rules for Critical Discussion, 
which have been developed in order to capture fallacies (see p. 122 below).1 The 
rules for critical discussion are continuously updated and modified, and the ver-
sion presented here should be considered typical rather than canonical:
1. Freedom rule
Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward standpoints or casting doubts 
on standpoints.
2. Burden-of-proof rule
A party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.
3. Standpoint rule
A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been ad
vanced by the other party.
4. Relevance rule
A party may defend his or her standpoint only by advancing argumentation related to 
that standpoint.
5. Unexpressed premise rule
A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed 
by the other party or deny a premise that he or she has left implicit.
6. Starting point rule
No party may falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point, or deny a premise 
representing an accepted starting point.
1. The relationship between the five rules of communication on the one hand, and 
the rules for critical discussion on the other hand, is discussed below.
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7. Argumentation scheme rule
A standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence does not take 
place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied.
8. Validity rule
The reasoning in the argumentation must be logically valid or must be capable of being 
made valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises.
9. Closure rule
A failed defence of a standpoint must result in the protagonist retracting the standpoint, 
and a successful defence of a standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting his or 
her doubts.
10. Usage rule
A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, 
and they must interpret the other formulations of the other party as carefully and accur
ately as possible.
(van Eemeren et al. 2002 pp. 182-183)
The rules are in most cases clear; only a brief explanation is offered here. Inter-
ested readers may study (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992), for example.
The freedom rule prevents people from threatening the opponent into silence, for 
example, or in some other way preventing arguments from being put forward. 
The burden-of-proof rule is in a way the basis of argumentation, stating that if you 
claim something you have to be able to provide reasons for it. 
The standpoint rule is there to prevent arguers from implicitly modifying the pro-
positions made by the opponent by arguing, not against the propositions actually 
made by the other party, but against some related, similar argument. An example:
A: Cats should not be allowed to run around freely, since the are malicious 
carnivores. 
B: But it would be unethical to put all animals in cages.
Here B argues against the standpoint that all cats should be put in cages, while A 
has said nothing about cages. A may very well have another solution in mind, 
such as leashes or even destruction.
A similar problem is addressed by the relevance rule, which prevents an arguer from 
putting forward arguments that support a different claim than the one made.
Assuming that cages are the only alternative to prevent the cats from running 
around freely in the example above (it might have been settled earlier), the ex-
ample also illustrates a break against the unexpressed premise rule. Unexpressed 
premises are not in themselves problematic, as explained above (p. 117-118), 
since they speed up communication, leaving trivial elements of reasoning for the 
listener to infer. However, there may be more than one possible unexpressed 
premise that connects two expressed propositions. In the cat example on p. 117, 
the general rule connecting A’s two propositions could also be ‘malicious beings 
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should not be allowed to run around freely’, or ‘carnivores should not be allowed 
to run around freely’. Because of this, an arguer who wishes to attack an unex-
pressed premise of the opponent needs to make sure that she has deduced the 
premise the opponent intended. In the cat example, B attacks the unexpressed 
premise ‘animals should not be allowed to run around freely’, which is not neces-
sarily the major premise A has in mind. At the same time, a necessary unex-
pressed premise cannot be denied by a speaker on the grounds that it was unex-
pressed. Rule 5 ensures that unexpressed premises are handled correctly.
The starting point rule targets cases when an arguer masks her claims as generally 
accepted propositions, or denies a point to which she has already conceded. An 
example of the first case is claims being framed in phrases like: ‘It is a well 
known fact that...’
The argumentation scheme rule addresses cases when the connection between the 
claim and the argument is bad, although not necessarily logically invalid. For ex-
ample, during the 1990’s in Sweden if one argued against letting children have 
mobile phones by saying that they have never had mobile phones before, the op-
ponent would have been unlikely to accept such an argument. Mobile phones 
were not available until the 1990’s (at least not for a reasonable price), so it was 
not possible for most people to let their children have mobile phones. The op-
ponent would not accept tradition as an authority in this case; she would not ac-
cept the argumentation scheme of tradition as authority.
The validity rule brings the insights of formal logic into argumentation, saying that 
arguments cannot be illogical. For example: ‘There cannot be smoke without 
fire, we know that, and we see the fire from here, so we must take precautions to 
avoid the smoke that is bound to come.’ Here the rule ‘smoke always comes 
with’ fire is used to argue that fire will bring smoke, which is logically invalid.
The closure rule demands that if all the arguments of a participant have been de-
feated, she has to give up and accept the claim of the opponent. This may seem 
like a very hard requirement, but remember that in practice, few discussions 
reach this kind of closure explicitly. The closure rule states the purpose of the 
critical discussion – that one party should be convinced that the other party is 
right. One could imagine other purposes for argumentation, but this is what the 
pragma-dialecticians have in mind for a critical discussion.
Finally, the usage rule targets cases where a participant tries to mislead the oppon-
ent by using unclear wording, or deliberately misinterprets something said by the 
opponent.
According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, these rules are normative in the 
sense that if one does not follow them, it is not a critical discussion, the ideal 
way of resolving a difference of opinion. Using these rules the authors can define 
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so called fallacies1 elegantly as a breach of any these rules, thus avoiding the prob-
lem of finding a common element in all the different kinds of fallacies. An ex-
ample is the fallacy known as argumentum ad baculum, where violence or the threat 
of violence is used as an argument. This can be done to simply silence the op-
ponent – ‘shut up, or else...!’ – in which case it violates rule 1, the freedom rule. 
The fallacy can also be done slightly differently, allowing arguments to be put 
forward, but forcing the opponent to accept a standpoint – ‘accept this, or 
else...!’. In that case, the argumentation scheme rule points it out as a fallacy, 
since threats are not accepted argumentation schemes. 
Although the intention for the practical use of these ten rules is clear (to capture 
fallacies), its theoretical status is less obvious. The rules for communication ad-
opted from Grice (see p. 114 above) and adapted are general principles for how 
humans do communicate, while the ten rules for critical discussion seem to be 
primarily normative. The problem is, however, that these two sets of rules over-
lap partially. The relevance rule, for example, overlaps with the fifth rule of com-
munication, ‘do not perform any speech acts that do not appropriately connect 
to preceding speech acts’. Rules 5 and 6, the unexpressed premise and the start-
ing point rules, overlap with the second rule of communication, ‘do not perform 
any insincere speech acts’. In addition, rule 10, the usage rule, overlaps with the 
first rule of communication, ‘do not perform any incomprehensible speech acts’. 
The third and fourth rules of communication, ‘do not perform any superfluous 
speech acts’ and ‘do not perform any futile speech acts’, are not covered, how-
ever, so the ten rules of critical discussion do not replace the five rules of com-
munication. For this reasons, the intended relationship between the five rules of 
communication and the ten rules of critical discussion is unclear. Are the rules 
for critical discussion meant to replace the rules for communication? If so, why 
are the third and fourth rules left out? Moreover, are the ten rules meant to be 
conversational principles in the same way as the rules for communication: prin-
ciples that speakers can use to create implicatures of various kinds? If so, wow? 
Also, if the ten rules are not meant to replace the rules of communication, then 
why the considerable overlap?
As I understand it, the rules are primarily normative, meant for identifying bad 
parts of an argumentation, but some of the rules seems to have more of a defin-
ing character. The burden-of-proof rule, (2), is partly descriptive and partly 
normative: for epistemological reasons it is advantageous not to accept state-
ments without evidence (normative), and if nobody in a conversation is prepared 
to provide reasons for her standpoints, there will be no argumentation (descript-
ive). A weaker phrasing of the rule would cover the descriptive aspects and leave 
1. Fallacies are typically defined as arguments that ’seem to be valid but are not’. 
There are, however, many kinds of argumentative phenomena that are called 
fallacies without matching this definition, for example argumentum ad baculum. 
Hamblin (1970) discusses this in detail.
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the normative aspects out: when two opponents have conflicting standpoints, at 
least one of them must defend her standpoint. Similarly, the rules about relev-
ance, 3 and 4, cannot be broken without the entire conversation becoming rather 
absurd. 
Further, the closure rule, (9), is a requirement for argumentation as a whole, al-
though it is phrased very strongly: it is not necessary for the antagonist to retract 
her doubts, it is enough that she accepts, for the time being, the opponent’s 
standpoint. However, if the closure rule were removed completely, there would 
not be much point in argumentation.
The freedom rule (1) is clearly an ethically normative rule, but not so much for 
argumentation as for whatever the the purpose of argumentation. A person 
threatened into silence has not been convinced of the truth of the opponent’s 
view, but only lets the opponent have her way. An example: A and B are discuss-
ing what to have for dinner. A says that if B does not agree to cook fish, A will 
be angry all night. In that case, B may agree to cook fish, but not because her 
doubts have been removed, but because she finds keeping A happy more im-
portant than deciding what to cook for dinner. That is not so much a way to ar-
gue as a way to make a decision without arguing. 
Another understanding of the ten rules is that they constitute a prescriptive 
model, i.e. that they describe one way of resolving a dispute, not necessarily the 
way, and not necessarily the best one. This seems to be what the authors have in 
mind in (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984:151).1 However, even if this is the 
case, the overlap between the five rules of communication and the ten rules of 
critical discussion is still a problem – why prescribe rules that all participants 
already follow? Further, the theoretical value of the ten rules would in that case 
be quite limited, since they could only be used for analyzing conversations where 
participants have declared that they intend to follow these rules.
These rules are discussed more in section 4.3 below.
4.2.9 Reconstruction
The actual analysis of an instance of argumentation, termed reconstruction by the 
pragma-dialecticians, emphasizes that identifying the different stages and classify-
ing arguments modifies the original data; the structure is not present until it is 
added by the analyst. A reconstruction consists of a series of operations, deletions 
(elements are removed), additions (missing elements are added), permutations (the 
order between elements are changed), and substitutions (replacing vague or 
ambiguous elements with clearer alternatives).
1. I assume now that the “code of conduct” the authors speak about is a variant of 
the ten rules of critical discussion; if it is not, the relationship between the ten 
rules of critical discussion and the five rules of communication is further 
complicated by an unclear relation to this “code of conduct”.
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4.2.10 Analytical overview
Actual argumentative discourse can be rather complex and winding, and the ana-
lyst of such discourse may want to describe the standpoints and arguments of 
the participants, as well as how these relate to each other. In pragma-dialectics, 
this is done in an analytical overview (van Eemeren et al. 1996:288 ff; van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 1992:73 ff). The crucial part is how to describe the relations 
between the arguments and standpoints. The pragma-dialecticians start with a 
distinction between single, multiple, coordinatively compound and subordinatively com-
pound argumentation. I shall explain and illustrate these now; examples have been 
chosen to be logically valid in order to facilitate understanding for the reader, but 
logical validity is not necessary for the notation to work.
In single argumentation, two premises (typically one unexpressed) are provided 
to support a standpoint:
Figure 4-1: Example of single argumentation. ‘We can't go skiing tomorrow, 
because our skis have been stolen’ 1
1. We can't go skiing tomorrow
1.1 Our skis have 
been stolen
1.1' [If our skis have been 
stolen, we cannot go skiing.]&
The apostrophe and the square brackets in the right-hand argument signal that it 
is an unexpressed premise. To make the diagram more compact and lucid, the 
unexpressed premise of a single argumentation is often left out:
Figure 4-2: Example of single argumentation, abbreviated. ‘We can't go skiing 
tomorrow, because our skis have been stolen’
1. We can't go skiing tomorrow
1.1 Our skis have been stolen
1. This might not be true (perhaps we can buy new skis, for example), but that is 
another story. 
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Figures 4-1 and 4-2 represent the same argumentation.
In multiple argumentation, several independent arguments are given for one and 
the same standpoint:
Figure 4-3: Example of multiple argumentation. ‘We can’t go skiing tomorrow, 
because our skis have been stolen, we have to take John to the dentist, and my 
back hurts too much.’
1. We can't go skiing tomorrow
1.1 Our skis have 
been stolen
1.2 We have to take 
John to the dentist
1.3 My back hurts 
too much
Multiple argumentation thus consists of several single argumentations, and the 
unexpressed premise of each of them can be added to the diagram, if the analyst 
chooses to.
Coordinatively compound argumentation consists of several arguments the same 
way multiple argumentation does, but they are not independent:
Figure 4-4: Example of coordinatively compound argumenation. ‘We can’t go 
skiing tomorrow, because our skis have been stolen and the ski shop is closed.’
1. We can't go skiing tomorrow
1.1a Our skis have been stolen 1.1b The ski shop is closed
Here 1.1a and 1.1b work together to form support for standpoint 1. An unex-
pressed premise may be added to the diagram:
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Figure 4-5: Example of coordinatively compound argumentation with unexpressed 
premise added. ‘We can’t go skiing tomorrow, because our skis have been stolen 
and the ski shop is closed.’
1. We can't go skiing tomorrow
1.1a Our skis have 
been stolen
1.1b The ski 
shop is closed
1.1(a-b)' [If we do not have any 
skis and we cannot buy new ones, 
we cannot go skiing tomorrow]
This example also shows that there is considerable freedom for the analyst con-
cerning the level of detail in the analytical overview. The unexpressed premise 
above may be expanded to include ‘if the ski shop is closed we cannot buy new 
skis,’ ‘there is no way of obtaining skis other than buying them’, or some other 
premise that the analyst wants to focus on.
Subordinatively compound argumentation, finally, consists of at least two argu-
ments where one supports the other:
Figure 4-6: Example of subordinatively compound argumentation. ‘We can’t go 
skiing tomorrow, because we have to take John to the dentist, since he bit off a 
tooth today.’
1. We can't go skiing tomorrow
1.1 We have to take John to the dentist
1.1.1 He bit off a tooth today
Another way of explaining this is to say that subordinatively compound argu-
mentation occurs when single argumentation is provided to support the argu-
ment in a single argumentation.
Another kind of relationship between arguments and standpoints concerns what 
makes an argument into a support of the standpoint, or, what it is that makes the 
argument relevant. This is called the argumentation scheme, and it is discussed in the 
next section. 
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4.2.11 Argument schemes
There is a long history of studying and classifying kinds of arguments. In modern 
argumentation analysis, these are usually referred to as argument schemes or argu-
mentation schemes (in French schèmes argumentatifs). Several classification systems ex-
ist, and an overview is given in (Garssen 2001). 
The pragma-dialecticians identify three types of argumentation schemes: cause, 
symptom and analogy, a division very similar to Whately’s (1846) and closely remin-
iscent of the one found in (Freely 1993). The pragma-dialectic system differs 
from the others in the respect that the types are based on critical questions that 
should be asked when faced with different argumentation schemes (Garssen 
200191 ff). In a causal (or instrumental) relationship between argument and claim, 
the argument is presented as the cause of the claim, or vice versa.
Because Tom has been drinking an excessive amount of whiskey (and drinking too much 
whiskey leads to a terrible headache), Tom must have a terrible headache.
(van Eemeren et al. 1996:97)
The key critical question is if the cause given really leads to the presented result. 
The second type of argument, analogy, also argument based on comparison, presents a 
controversial idea as being similar to something that is not controversial, thus 
showing that what applies to the already accepted case also applies to the not yet 
accepted case:
The method I proposed last year worked (and this problem is similar to the one we had 
last year), so it will work again.
(van Eemeren et al. 1996:97)
The key critical question here is whether there are enough relevant similarities 
between the two compared situations.
The third type of argumentation scheme is called symptomatic arguments or token 
type arguments, but both terms are confusing. By a symptom we usually mean 
something that has been caused by something else (a disease), but the cause-ef-
fect relationship here belongs to the first argumentation scheme type discussed 
(causal or instrumental). A type-token relationship has to do with general instan-
tiation, possibly a kind of similarity, which belongs to the second type of argu-
mentation scheme (analogy or comparison). What the pragma-dialecticians mean 
by this type seems to be something close to concomitance: the two phenomena 
often occur together, but are not necessarily in a cause-effect relationship. Their 
own example is about Americans and their concern about costs:
As Daniel is an American (and Americans are inclined to care a lot about money), he is 
sure to be concerned about the cost. 
(van Eemeren et al. 1996:97)
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The authors clearly do not consider the relationship between Americanness and 
concern over cost a cause-effect relationship, but perhaps that they often go to-
gether for no particular reason. The central critical question in this case is if the 
sign really is typical for the claim.
There are some problems with the classification described here. First, the differ-
ence between causal and symptomatic argumentation is bound to be rather 
fuzzy. Consider the whiskey example above, repeated here without the linking 
premise:
Because Tom has been drinking an excessive amount of whiskey, Tom must have a 
terrible headache.
The implicit premise could now be any of the following (at least):
i) Drinking an excessive amount of whiskey always leads to a terrible 
headache.
ii) Drinking an excessive amount of whiskey usually leads to a terrible 
headache.
iii) Drinking an excessive amount of whiskey sometimes leads to a terrible 
headache. 
This points out that the cause-effect relationship does not have to be absolute, as 
in (i), but less certain cases can also have cause-effect relationships, as in (ii) and 
(iii). Comparing this to the example with Americans and money, one could ask 
whether being American has caused the concern of money, or if these two prop-
erties simply go together. Looking at what it means to be American – to be 
raised in an American culture with American values – it is not unreasonable to 
see the concern of money as resulting from being American. One way to distin-
guish symptomatic from causal is of course to let the intention behind the argu-
ment determine the type – if the arguer sees the relation as causal, it is causal; if 
she sees it as symptomatic, it is symptomatic. However, it is not necessary for 
the arguer to have thought much about it, unless it matters directly. Neither in 
the whiskey example nor in the example with Americans and concerns about 
money does it matter much to the arguer whether the argument type is sympto-
matic or causal.
Another problem with the taxonomy is that the critical questions are not the 
only important questions that should be asked when faced with these kinds of 
arguments. In a causal argument it is also important to ask whether the cause has 
really occurred: Has Tom really been drinking an excessive amount of whiskey? 
Does the cause necessarily lead to the result: Is it impossible to drink an excess-
ive amount of whiskey without getting a terrible headache afterwards? Does the 
cause lead to exactly the result that has been presented: is the headache one gets 
after drinking an excessive amount of whiskey always terrible? 
The same type of questions should be asked for symptomatic arguments: Has 
the symptom really occurred? (Is Daniel really American?) Does the symptom al-
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ways occur with the claimed phenomenon? (Do all Americans care about 
money?) Is the symptom a token of precisely the phenomenon that is claimed? 
(Do Americans care about money or do they like money?) 
For analogical arguments, one should not only ask if there are enough relevant 
similarities, but also if the uncontroversial situation is really something to copy 
(perhaps the method that was proposed last year did not work as well as the 
speaker claims). 
In pragma-dialectics one of the important motivations for doing argumentation 
analysis is to find out whether argumentation is good or bad. Moreover, the clas-
sification of arguments into symptomatic, causal and analogical categories may 
very well serve a purpose, as a tool to discover weaknesses in arguments. If a cer-
tain argument is seen as a causal argument, what questions should we ask? What 
if it is viewed as a symptomatic argument? Accordingly, classification can help 
the analyst to discover different aspects of the argument.
4.2.12 Discussion
The theory of argumentation analysis developed primarily by van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst has practical strengths. The creators assume that an argumentation 
analyst has a piece of argumentation that she wants to investigate to find out 
what is good or bad with it. The four stages help to set out a general structure 
for argumentation, while the four operations allowed for reconstruction help the 
analyst to take greater care and be more explicit.
The rules for critical discussion are a quite small set of rules that potentially en-
able the analyst to discover any fallacy, a powerful tool indeed. It is, however, 
not always easy to see that a given fallacy breaks the rule in question, since the 
rules are rather abstract. An example is the ‘argumentum ad hominem’ fallacy, 
where the expertise, intelligence or general character of the opponent is attacked. 
According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:110-111) this is a breach of 
rule 1, the freedom rule, since it undermines the opponent’s right to participate 
in the argumentation. Such reasoning may be used to classify any successful 
counter-argumentation as a fallacy, since loosing an argument may be intimidat-
ing for the arguer, making her less credible. My own analysis would be that argu-
mentum ad hominem breaks the relevance rule.
The weakness of the theory is its basis in pragmatic theory and that it mixes 
normative and descriptive elements. The former becomes clear during attempts 
to couple certain speech act types with particular argumentation stages, despite 
the fact that the speech act typology used has no basis in argumentation. Anoth-
er problem connected to the underlying pragmatic theory is its lack of a clear 
definition of ‘argument’. The term is used widely in the texts, but it is unclear if 
an argument is a speech act, a proposition or something else. It is also unfortu-
nate that terms like argumentation, utterance, speech-act and premise are not used con-
sistently. An example of this is the description of the reconstruction, which 
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sometimes deals with speech-acts, sometimes with standpoints or arguments, and 
sometimes with unspecified elements (van Eemeren et al. 1996:288 ff).
The mixing of normative and descriptive aspects is obvious in the Ten Rules for 
Critical Discussion. These are primarily normative, but they are also used to de-
fine what ‘critical discussion’ is.
In order to attend to the problems mentioned here, I shall merge the pragma-
dialectical model of argumentation analysis with Allwood’s Activity-based Com-
munication Analysis, presented in section 2.4.2 above.
4.3 A merged model of argumentation
4.3.1 General
In this section, I shall put forward a modified version of the pragma-dialectical 
model for argumentation analysis. The section should be understood as a num-
ber of suggested modifications, so the parts of pragma-dialectics that are not dis-
cussed here, are left untouched. The general idea behind the modifications will 
be to replace the linguistic theories of Austin and Searle with those of Allwood. 
Terminology
First, some clarification of terms is necessary. I will use the following terms with 
the given meanings:
• Arguing: The social interactive activity that argumentation analysis is con-
cerned with. (The word will be used as a countable noun when applicable, 
for example, an arguing will be used for an instance of this activity type, in 
order to avoid confusion with the terms below). 
• Standpoint: A proposition claimed to be true by a participant in an arguing.1
• Argument: One or more proposition which supports or backs up a stand-
point (argument for the standpoint) or the standpoint’s negation (argu-
ment against a standpoint). 
• Argumentation: A set of arguments that collectively supports or backs up 
one or more standpoint made by a participant in an arguing. 
In everyday English, the word argument can be used in (at least) two senses, 
somewhat synonymous to reason or somewhat synonymous to quarrel. This has 
caused some confusion in Anglophone argumentation research, and O’Keefe 
(1977) made a distinction between argument1 (! reason) and argument2 (! quarrel). 
The term arguing in the proposed model corresponds to O’Keefe’s argument2, and 
the term argument to O’Keefe’s argument1. However, O’Keefe sees argument1 as a 
speech act, while argument is a (possibly complex) proposition in this model. 
Communicative acts involved in arguing are discussed in section 4.3.6, p. 141 be-
1. Or at least the most probable of the available alternatives.
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low. Further, argument2 covers conversations that do not match arguing as used 
here,1 such as the one used as an example by Jacobs and Jackson (1982:225):
S: Do you know where my bag is?
C: Yeah, it’s packed away.
S: Whadya mean it’s packed away?!
C: Just what I said!
S: Why in the world would you do something like that?!
C: Hhhhhhh [C stalks off in a huff]
Arguing, as used here, does not include this quarreling sense that argument2 does, 
but is more similar to the Swedish verb argumentera.
The activity of arguing
Following Allwood’s theory of Activity-based Communication Analysis, the 
merged model treats argumentation as an activity type, arguing. This is also in ac-
cordance with van Eemeren, (van Eemeren et al. 1996:5). 
As Allwood (1993a) writes, several activities can be going on at the same time. 
For example, the activity ‘driving a car’ can be going on at the same time as the 
activity ‘moving’ (i.e. to change address), where the former is a sub-activity of the 
latter. Another example is a customer in a shop flirting with the shop assistant 
while purchasing some goods; the flirting and the purchasing are parallel activit-
ies. Many activities are sub-activities of some other, higher-level activity, which is 
obviously the case with arguing as well. Arguing can show up as a sub-activity in 
many activity types: one may argue about the price at a bazaar, one may argue as 
part of a discussion preceding a decision in a committee, one may argue about 
which road to take when traveling by car, etc.
An alternative to this activity perspective is to see arguing as some kind of mode 
of conversation, perhaps characterized by frequent disagreement and criticism of 
the opponent’s views. This is roughly what Jacobs and Jackson have done (see 
2.5.5), and although it may be an interesting aspect of human communication, it 
is not the aspect studied here.
A precondition of the activity arguing is that the participants have discovered that 
they have conflicting views on some issue. In Allwood’s theory such a precondi-
tion would be part of the participants’ individual backgrounds (see p. 28 ff.), but 
it can also be described as a part of the purpose of the activity type. The latter 
solution is used here:
1. A more detailed description of arguing will be given below.
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Purpose
The purpose of arguing is to reach a shared view on some issue on which the 
participants have discovered that they have conflicting views.1 The reason for a 
shared view to be desired may vary. 
The description given here of the purpose of arguing is somewhat stipulative, 
and in everyday language the term may be used for other activities as well. Some 
might say that quarreling is arguing, even though the participants may not seek a 
shared view at all2. I would say that quarreling is arguing only to the extent that 
the participants do seek a shared view on the issue their quarrel concerns. There 
are probably other purposes involved in quarreling (inflicting pain on the oppon-
ent? forcing the opponent into social subordination?) and when these are in fo-
cus, the quarreling ceases to be arguing. A similar case is that of political debates, 
where an important purpose is to make the audience behave in a certain way in 
an election, for example not to vote at all, which perhaps could be achieved by 
boring the audience. However, even in situations where none of the participants 
have any real intention of changing either their own view or their opponent’s, 
they might still have to pretend, to some degree, that they believe that a shared 
view can be reached, and they have to phrase their communicative acts accord-
ing to that purpose. The following excerpt is taken from a television broadcast 
debate on nuclear power preceding in Sweden in 1980. The English translation is 
idiomatic.
  Lennart Daleus: ja Per Unkel vet ju att de finns fler möjliheter te stora 
olyckor än den som vi har diskuterat den här med / ä ångexplosioner å att 
kärnkraften / är en farlig energikälla å att den innehåller oerhörda risker allting 
från / ö uranbrytningen till avfallshanteringen de ä e vi nog överens om å att 
de e risker / som inte har någen motsvarihet i andra energikällor / att dom här 
oerhörda olyckorna kan inträffa å ja tycker fortfarande de att de e rimlit att vi 
använder oss av dom statlia rapporter som har kommit inför den här 
folkomröstningen när vi ska diskutera riskbedömningen / å dom eventuella ä 
konsekvenser de kan / ä få me sej...
  Lennart Daleus: yes Per Unkel knows that there are more possibilities for 
major accidents that the one we have been discussing here the one with / er 
steam explosions and that nuclear power / is a dangerous source of energy 
and that it contains enormous risks everything from / er extraction of uranium 
to handling of waste we er probably agree on that and that there risks / 
unparalleled by any other source of energy / that these enormous accidents 
can happen and I still think that it is reasonable for us to use the government 
reports that have been produced for this referendum when we are to discuss 
the estimation of risks / and the possible consequences that it can / er bring 
along...
1. A similar attitude is expressed in (Strecker 1976:17), quoted in (Schwitalla 1987): 
Argumentation has the goal of solving conflicts by attaining a common language, which also 
implies a common system of viewing the world.
2. One party adopting the other party’s view is one way of attaining a shared view.
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Here, Lennart Daleus tries to establish a common ground for continued argu-
mentation, as if a shared view on the future of nuclear power could indeed be 
reached for him and Per Unkel, even though he can hardly have believed that 
such a shared view would actually be reached.
Another consequence of the purpose and requirement stated here is that pure 
explanations are not arguings. A person who describes her view on an issue to 
another who does not have an opinion on that issue at all is not arguing. In prac-
tice, arguing and explaining may be difficult to tell apart, and when analyzing an 
arguing that has started, it is probably best to consider pure explanations as 
arguments.
Procedures
The basic procedure for arguing is that the participants put forward standpoints 
that describe their view on the issue in question, and then supply arguments that 
support their own standpoints, and attack the standpoints of the opponent.
Roles
There is only one stable role in standard arguing, participant. The two roles prot-
agonist and antagonist identified in the standard pragma-dialectical school are 
useful, but can shift many times in an instance of arguing, just as the defensive 
and offensive roles can shift during a game of soccer. A participant may actually 
be a protagonist and antagonist at the same time, if an utterance supports her 
own standpointwhile it attacks the other participant’s standpoint. In an analysis 
of argumentation (i.e. the set of propositions used to support a standpoint), the 
roles of protagonist and antagonist are more stable.
Rules
In the merged model, I choose to describe the obligations, rights and required compet-
ence of the roles as a set of rules, comparable to the rules of a game. In the case 
of arguing, there is only one, very general, rule:
I The Foundation Rule
Each participant should be a rational, motivated agent, trying to fulfill the 
purpose of the activity.
This is the only completely necessary rule for arguing to work, but there are sev-
eral other rules that make arguing work better, section 4.3.3. As far as I can see, 
rule I holds for all social activities where the participants are “normal” humans 
(which explains the somewhat turgid name); this means that there are no specific 
rules necessary for arguing, a considerable difference to the standard pragma-dia-
lectical model. Arguing is primarily defined through its purpose. 
The attentive reader may wonder what has happened to cooperation, which is so 
important both in Allwood’s and Grice’s works. It has not been left out, but it is 
a consequence of the fact that all participants have a common purpose (to reach 
a shared view), which they try to fulfill. 
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It should be noted that the foundation rule is assumed to be “on a low level,” in 
the same way as Grice’s maxims and cooperative principle. A participant may 
very well state that she thinks the opponent is irrational, and then continue to 
provide rational arguments for her view. If she really considered the opponent ir-
rational, it would be useless to try to convince her with rational arguments. 
Problems arise when one of the arguers suffers from a mental illness of some 
kind, for example senile dementia, and her ability to behave in a rational, motiv-
ated and agentive way is limited. However, the limitations on her rationality, mo-
tivation and agency also limits her ability to perform arguing. At a certain mo-
ment, she might remember that she is arguing, but forget what she is arguing 
about. She may then choose to admit that and ask her opponent what they are 
talking about, she may choose to simply stop arguing and start another conversa-
tion, or she may make a guess about what they were talking about, and pretend 
she has not forgotten. In the last case, the arguing is likely to break down 
quickly. An arguer who is faced with this kind of behavior from her opponent is 
likely to stop considering the opponent a rational, motivated agent, and will try 
to argue only to the extent that she judges the opponent capable of reciprocat-
ing. She may also try to use some other causally effective behavior to get the op-
ponent to behave as she wants her to behave, or (most likely) use a combination 
of these methods.
Instruments, artifacts and media
No particular instruments, artifacts or media are needed.
Environment
There are no particular requirements on the physical environment. Arguing can be 
performed in face-to-face spoken interaction, on the telephone, in writing or in 
some other way that allows detailed interaction.
On the social-emotional level, different cultures put different requirements on what 
is good behavior in arguing, and indeed whether arguing is good or bad in itself. 
The present study is not concerned with cross-cultural comparison, but the au-
thor of this study is Swedish, as are the participants of the analyzed conversation 
(below), therefore, the analysis is made from a Swedish perspective. 
4.3.2 Stages
Of the four stages of argumentation identified in standard pragma-dialectics, 
three match the model proposed here in a straightforward way. The confrontation 
stage is when the participants discover that they have different views on some is-
sue, and decide whether they shall argue about it or not. If they decide not to, 
they have not performed any arguing, as I see it, and the confrontation is not 
part of the arguing. Rather, it is an interactional event (or possibly a process) that 
is a precondition for arguing.
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During the argumentation stage, participants describe their own view of the issue, 
modify their view in the light of what is said, and try to make the other parti-
cipant(s) share their view by putting forward arguments for it. In the proposed 
model, this covers the entire arguing.
The conclusion stage, ideally, is where the arguing ends according to the pragma-
dialecticians, but in the proposed model, this is simply the end of the arguing – 
an arguing ends, in one way or another. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(1992:43) make a distinction between settling a dispute and resolving a dispute, 
where the former refers to situations like tossing a coin or calling on an arbiter, 
and the latter to situations where one of the participants “wins” and the other 
party abandons her original standpoint. As I see it, settling a dispute only occurs 
if the conclusion shows that the participants still have conflicting views, and it is 
necessary to make a decision dependent on these views. Settling a dispute is then 
about making a decision despite conflicting views. However, an instance of ar-
guing is an instance of arguing no matter how it ends. In addition, like the con-
frontation, the conclusion is an interactional event rather than a stage.
Compared to standard pragma-dialectics, the fourth stage, the opening stage, where 
the participants set up rules for the discussion, is missing. In most activities the 
participants may stop to discuss and possibly adjust the structure, procedure, 
roles or some other aspect of the activity. It seems more natural to view this as 
not being part of the activity, but rather as a meta-discussion.1
Therefore, like any other activity, arguing has a start and an end, and what lies 
between is the activity. However, the arguing may be part of a larger discussion 
that started before the confrontation, and the arguments used may refer to 
things said and done before the arguing started. Similarly, a participant may at-
tempt a conclusion, for example by suggesting that a shared view has been 
reached. If the opponent rejects the suggestion, the arguing continues, but when 
the analyst afterwards tries to identify the end of the arguing, all attempts to con-
clude the arguing, successful as well as unsuccessful ones, may be treated togeth-
er. Because of this, the boundaries of an arguing may not be precise. 
4.3.3 Normative aspects
The traditional separation of rhetoric and argumentation is based on a normative 
requirement – in rhetoric one can use any means to persuade, while only “good” 
or “proper” arguments are allowed in argumentation. For example, reasoning 
should be logically valid, at least when unexpressed premises are considered. 
However, under the presupposition made here, that the purpose of arguing is to 
reach a shared view on an issue where there are conflicting views (see p. 132 
above), any proposition that is meant to convince the opponent to change her 
1. This does not mean that the set-up of the arguing is neutral in relation to the 
goals of the participants.
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view, is an argument. One may claim that logically valid reasoning is the only way 
to change a person’s view, and that other cases of view change are mistakes of 
one kind or another. I consider this an empirical question, and until this has been 
sorted out, a descriptive model of arguing must allow for all kinds of proposi-
tions to be treated as arguments and normative requirements should be kept 
separate. 
In the model of arguing proposed here, an argument is a proposition that backs 
up a standpoint or another argument (see p. 130 above); the term backs up is in-
tentionally vague. Basically any proposition that is intended to make the opponent 
accept another standpoint or argument, is an argument. At the same time, argu-
mentation analysis is often performed to find out which arguments are good and 
which are bad, and therefore a useful model of arguing must also include norm-
ative aspects.
The long and strong normative tradition in rhetoric and argumentation analysis 
is fueled by two problems with persuasion in general, and arguing in particular. 
First, an arguer may try to deceive her opponent, which is an ethical problem. 
Secondly, it is generally desirable that the shared view that is reached shall persist 
over time, and not change when a participant gets time to think more about the 
issue, which is an epistemological problem. I shall first attend to the ethical 
problem.
In most kinds of cooperation the participants need to take each other into ethical 
consideration to some minimal degree; this goes for conversation as well (see 
(Allwood 2000:12)). Arguing, however, is an activity type that is not unlikely to 
occur under circumstances where participants cannot be assumed to have much 
concern for the other’s well-being, either because they dislike the other parti-
cipant, or because the expected consequences of the arguing are very important 
(e.g. in a court). Because of this, normative aspects of arguing require special at-
tention. An extra rule of the game of arguing can be added to call attention to 
ethical issues:
II The Ethics Rule
The participants should take each other into ethical consideration.
This rule prevents any intentional misleading of the opponent. In many cases, it 
is a descriptive rule; it is assumed that the participants follow it. However, when 
analyzing for example the arguing between the prosecutor and council for the 
defense in court, the participants cannot be assumed to follow this rule. It is then 
only useful for normative analyzes.
Looking at the epistemological side of normativity, the view reached through ar-
guing is a part of the participants’ beliefs, and we generally desire our beliefs to 
be true and well motivated. There is a long tradition in science of how to evalu-
ate different kinds of evidence; the general epistemological ideals from that tradi-
tion are valid for evaluating arguing and argumentation. For our purposes, those 
ideals can be said to be that beliefs should be based on logically valid reasoning 
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and reasonable premises. Many so-called fallacies are arguments which seem epi-
stemologically sound, but are not. An example of this is when king Charles Gust-
avus of Sweden some years ago criticized the Norwegian prime minister for the 
Norwegian seal hunting industry, he argued in the following way: ‘If [the prime 
minister] cannot handle the seal problem, how will she be able to handle the 
Norwegian people?’ The utterance assumes that the prime minister’s inability to 
handle the seal problem is a sign that she is unable to handle the people. How-
ever, these two abilities are not necessarily related, and it is also likely that the 
prime minister prioritizes her people over the seals, which means that her inabil-
ity to handle the seal problem says nothing about her ability to handle the 
people. Thus the arguing is not epistemologically sound.
When epistemological soundness of the arguing is desired, the following rule 
may be added:
III The Epistemology Rule
The arguments put forward should be connected to the claim in an epi-
stemologically sound way.1
This rule cannot be assumed to hold for all arguings. For example, when analyz-
ing the arguing occurring when a person tries to persuade another person to 
dance with her, it is perhaps much more important that the courting person 
comes through as entertaining, amusing, nice, or interesting than that the argu-
ments are epistemologically sound.2
One consequence of the above rules is that the participant who claims that some 
proposition should be part of the shared view also must defend that proposition, 
if asked to do so. Hence, if A says that Munich is a bad city because it rains all 
the time, and B wonders how A knows that it rains so much in Munich, then A 
cannot evade the burden of proof by asking how B knows that it does not rain in 
Munich all the time. This is motivated on epistemological grounds (Ockham’s 
razor), but also on rational grounds (it is not rational to withhold reasons for the 
shared view if you try to reach a shared view) as well as ethical (if the other party 
is trying to understand why you believe as you do, it is probably unethical to 
withhold that information).
IV The Corollary of Burden-of-Proof
The participant advancing a claim must defend that claim with arguments 
if asked to do so.
1. That is, it should be possible to make this connection. Every step in the chain 
need not be taken explicitly.
2. One may want to say that such a conversation is not arguing, but something else, 
or that the actual arguing is implicit and concerns exactly how entertaining, 
amusing etc. the courting person is. However, the conversation may still look very 
much like explicit arguing, and it is in that respect that the rule does not apply.
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This principle is not an absolute demand for high quality arguing, and if the pro-
position claimed to be true is a wide-spread or traditional belief, it is not unreas-
onable to ask the person who doubts the proposition to explain the reasons for 
her doubts. However, if a dispute arises about who has the burden of proof, this 
principle should be used. 
Note that a comparison of the the proposed list of four rules with the ten Rules 
of Critical Discussion shows that most of the latter can be derived from the 
former, illustrated in figure 4-7.
Figure 4-7: How the Rules of Critical Discussion correspond to the rules in the pro-
posed model.
The Foundation 
Rule (I)
The Ethics 
Rule (II)
The Epistemology 
Rule (III)
The Corollary of 
Burden-of-proof 
(IV)
The Freedom Rule 
(1)
The Burden-of-
proof Rule (2)
The Standpoint 
Rule (3)
The Relevance Rule 
(4)
The Unexpressed 
Premise Rule (5)
The Starting Point 
Rule (6)
The Argumentation 
Scheme Rule (7)
The Validity Rule 
(8)
The Closure Rule 
(9)
The Usage Rule 
(10)
In contrast to the rules proposed here, the Rules of Critical Discussion make no 
distinction between normative and descriptive rules, or between ethically norm-
ative and epistemologically normative reasons. A consequence of this is that in 
order to derive one of the Rules of Critical Discussion, it is often necessary to 
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combine two or more of the rules proposed here. Thus, most of the Rules of 
Critical Discussion cannot be broken deliberately with the intention of deceiving 
the opponent without also breaking the ethics rule (II); the exceptions are rule 1 
and 9, which are discussed below.
Most cases of breaches of rules 3-6 (standpoint, relevance, unexpressed premise, 
and starting point) would also break the ethics rule (II). However, arguers may 
accidentally infer an unexpressed premise that was not intended by the speaker, 
they may confuse a standpoint of the opponent with a similar standpoint that 
has not been advanced, etc. If discovered, such mistakes can be corrected by the 
opponent on the grounds of the foundation rule (I) – it is irrational to attack a 
standpoint that has not been advanced, to try to support a claim with arguments 
for another claim, or to treat a premise as an accepted starting point. 
The argumentation scheme rule (7) and the validity rule (8) can be derived from 
the epistemology rule (III), and the burden-of-proof rule (2) is left untouched in 
rule IV. 
The closure rule (9) is a consequence of the foundation rule (I) in combination 
with the purpose of arguing, since it really just defines what it means to win/
loose an arguing – to reach a shared view is the whole point of arguing.
The freedom rule (1) does not really concern arguing, since shared view is not 
achieved by breaking the freedom rule. On the other hand, the ethics rule (II) is 
valid for many other activities, so that if the activity that the arguing is a part of 
(for example a group decision) has the ethics rule, then the freedom rule is 
covered there.
The last of the ten Rules of Critical Discussion, the usage rule, is rather vague, 
and overlaps greatly with Grice’s maxim of manner. It is clear that a deliberate 
violation of that rule would also be a break against the ethics rule (II), but what 
about unintentional violations? What do ‘insufficiently clear’ and ‘as carefully and 
accurately as possible’ mean? The foundation rule (I) demands the arguers ex-
press themselves clearly enough for the opponent to understand what is going 
on, and as a consequence the arguers must take each other into cognitive consid-
eration. Moreover, if this is not possible, the arguing can hardly continue. How-
ever, if an arguer accidentally using an ‘insufficiently clear’ formulation that 
forces the opponent to request a clarification would not cause the arguing to 
break down. 
4.3.4 Reconstruction
The pragma-dialectical recognition of the reconstruction (see p. 123 above) is 
very attractive, but the detailed division of it into addition, deletion, substitution 
and permutation has little practical value, since these steps blend into each other. 
It is important, however, that the analyst’s interpretation of the text/conversa-
tion is explicit. In the merged model suggested here, the reconstruction is kept as 
an important step, but it is not analyzed into sub-steps.
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4.3.5 Unexpressed premises
In standard pragma-dialectics, a modified version of Grice’s maxim of quantity is 
used to find out what the unexpressed premises in argumentation are. As ex-
plained above (p. 118) this is unsatisfactory, and a closer analysis of the underly-
ing principles of unexpressed premises is necessary. 
Unexpressed premises are beliefs that together with expressed premises make (or 
are intended to make) the listener understand the conclusion, or to understand 
why it is reasonable to believe the conclusion. 
It is difficult to pinpoint what understanding means, but it seems to be about how 
a certain belief is connected to other beliefs. Allwood describes understanding as 
a relation between an agent and some particular type of information (Allwood 
1986). The work of the agent consists of connecting, in a meaningful way, the in-
formation that is to be understood with other information already understood by 
the agent (Allwood 1986). In other and less formal words, a person understands 
something when she sees how it fits with her view of the world, including her 
view of other people and their views of the world. 
So, expressed and unexpressed premises link a belief to other beliefs. When a 
premise, or a part of a premise, is unexpressed, it is typically because the speaker 
assumes that the listener can infer it herself, in the same way as with other im-
plicatures.1 All kinds of encyclopedic and situational information can be neces-
sary to infer what an unexpressed premise is likely to be, and there is no single 
maxim that can explain all unexpressed premises. Here is an example:
Mary and Sue are discussing what to give Jenny at her birthday. Mary 
suggests a guide book to country-side restaurants.
Sue: That would be pretty useless, since Jenny does not have a car.
The full explanation to why the suggested present would be useless is something 
like this: 
The purpose of a guidebook is to help people choose among whatever-the-guide-book-is-about. 
Since Jenny has no car she cannot go to the country side and thus she has no opportunity to 
choose among country side restaurants. The book would thus fill the purpose for a task that 
Jenny would not do.
Sue relies on Mary to be able to infer this from the little information in her utter-
ance. To make that inference a lot of information about restaurants, guidebooks 
and transportation is needed. In the merged model, unexpressed premises are 
understood in the same way as other implicatures, and cannot be reduced to 
simple results of a single communicative rule.
1. Another reason for leaving out parts could be that the speaker does not notice 
that the part is needed.
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4.3.6 Communicative acts
A taxonomy of communicative acts for arguing must, as I see it, relate to the 
general purpose of arguing, which is to reach a shared view on some issue where 
the participants have discovered that they have conflicting views. A simple mod-
el of this is to consider the shared view as a pool of beliefs held by all parti-
cipants, and that the arguers try to modify this pool. The complete shared view is 
normally very large, containing our general understanding of the world (e.g. ‘if 
you throw a drinking glass on stone, the glass is likely to break’), things we may 
have learned in school or similar situations (e.g. ‘the Battle of Hastings occurred 
in 1066’), as well as value judgments (e.g. ‘democracy is to be preferred over fas-
cism’). Most modifications to the shared view are never questioned, but are 
simply accepted by the participants. For example, a person A may tell her friends 
that she intends to go to France. The friends then usually accept this piece of in-
formation, and the belief that ‘A intends to go to France’ is added to pool of be-
liefs held by all participants. However, in some cases, one or more of the parti-
cipants in a conversation may not accept the claim made, resulting in a discovery 
of conflicting views. For example, one of A’s friends may respond ‘No, you do 
not! I saw your plane ticket – you are going to Spain!’ In such a case, the parti-
cipants have discovered that they have conflicting views on an issue, and they are 
likely to want to reach a shared view on that issue, and so arguing can start. 
The following types of communicative acts can be predicted:
• Suggesting modification the shared view (making a claim)
• Elaborating (specification, description) a claim
• Modifying a claim
• Agreeing with a claim
• Disagreeing with a claim
The most prominent feature of arguing is perhaps that disagreements to claims 
are not left as disagreements; attempts to resolve the conflicts are made. Two 
more types of communicative acts can then be predicted:
• Giving reason for a claim
• Giving reason against a claim
A reason for or against a suggested modification of the shared view is in itself a 
suggested modification of the shared view (or at least a focusing of a part of the 
shared view), and can be elaborated or modified; other participants can agree or 
disagree about it, and there can be reasons for or against it.
In addition to these basic types of communicative acts, some types can be pre-
dicted that are indirectly oriented towards the purpose of reaching a shared view, 
such as request for elaboration, request for reason, request for attitude (agree-
ment/disagreement), clarifications, etc.
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A more precise taxonomy must be based on analyzes of actual arguing.
4.3.7 Analytical overview
In the model suggested in this chapter, the participants in a successful arguing 
session do reach a shared view, and the content of this view develops during the 
arguing. Some suggestions are accepted, others are discarded. The resulting argu-
ment structure is a description of the shared view and how the beliefs in it are re-
lated to each other in terms of some being reasons for others, but there may be 
many suggestions that do not reach the final shared view. The analytical over-
view has a dynamic character that is difficult to capture in a diagram. However, 
the ideas of the pragma-dialectical school of how to represent the structure of 
the arguments (see p. 124 ff.) can be used to describe the claims and reasons oc-
curring at some point in the conversation.
The purpose of the analytical overview is to describe the reasoning advocated by 
the participants in the conversation, a description that can be used to evaluate 
the quality of the arguments (normative aspects). The overview contains propos-
itions that according to the analyst’s interpretation are held as beliefs by the par-
ticipants, and used by the participants as arguments and standpoints. To avoid 
cluttering the overview with details about precise references, the propositions are 
described as statements made in the context of the analyzed conversation, that is, 
deictic words like we and tomorrow can be used, etc. The examples in section 
4.2.10 illustrate this.
4.4 An analysis of authentic argumentation
4.4.1 Overview
As an example of how the merged model of argumentation can be used for ana-
lyzing argumentation, a conversation within a family about buying a new car will 
be analyzed. The cultural context is Swedish, and the social institution is, as men-
tioned, the family. The main arguers are husband (Roland) and wife (Eva), while 
the teenage son (Anders) is participating to a limited degree. Being a native 
Swede I understand the general principle of important decisions for the family to 
be that they should be made with consensus between husband and wife, and that 
children have a right to state their opinion and argue for their views in propor-
tion to their age and degree of maturity. 
The conversation takes place while the family is having dinner. Only the part of 
the dinner conversation where the purchase of the car is discussed is analyzed. 
There are two activities going on, having dinner and arguing about what type of 
car to buy. The dinner activity is left unanalyzed here. The arguing is clearly a 
part of the more general activity of making a decision about what car to buy, al-
though I can reveal already at this point that no decision is reached in the tran-
scribed section of the conversation.
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The family has a jeep, and now they are in need of a new car. In earlier discus-
sions a small truck or van has been suggested (folkvagnsbuss), and the arguing 
starts when the husband suggests that the family should buy another type of car 
(van). It should be noted that the Swedish use of the word van does not match 
the English use precisely (because of this the word will be italicized in this thesis 
each time it is used in the Swedish sense). In fact, the precise meaning of the 
terms folkvagnsbuss and van in the conversation are not clear, but it is not neces-
sary to know the precise meaning in order to understand the arguing.
The preconditions and purpose of the activity are thus that the family should buy 
a new car, and they need to reach a shared view on which type of car it should 
be.
Below is a brief summary of the arguing; only the main arguments are men-
tioned. The numbers to the left indicate which line in the transcription corres-
ponds to the summary to the right. Appendix 4 contains a complete transcrip-
tion of the conversation. 
Table 4-1: Summary of the analysed conversation.
Line Summary
1 R suggests that the family should buy a van instead of a folkvagnsbuss, and
E questions this.
7 A says that vans have low fuel consumption.
10 R says that vans are cheap, and gives an estimated price.
13 E argues that vans do not have low fuel consumption.
16 A says that the spare parts for vans are cheap.
18 R says that vans are cheap to buy.
24 E says that she still is not convinced.
25 R and E discuss whether or not it is easy to drive vans.
42 E says that the car they buy must have proper seats with seat belts, and 
she and A discuss the seating of vans.
67 E returns to the main topic, saying that the cost is very important.
70 R repeats the estimated price of a van. He and E discuss why vans are 
cheap.
81 E raises the question of crash safety, and R assures that vans are very 
crash safe. E requires R to explain how he can be so sure of the crash 
safety of vans. E is not satisfied with the explanation, and says that they 
should check the statistics with one of the insurance companies.
126 E asks how much it costs to insure a van, and after some discussion 
they agree to check with an insurance company.
140 E says that she wants to test drive a van before she agrees to buy one.
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140 E says that vans normally have an automatic gear box and that she does 
not like automatics.
158 E says that she likes large steering wheels and that vans do not have 
large steering wheels. R says that vans have small steering wheels 
because they have servo. E says she likes servo.
174 E says that automatics are bad on winter roads, and R disagrees. They 
argue about this at some length. R finally says that there are only two 
draw-backs with automatics and that is that they cause slightly higher 
fuel consumption and that they cannot be jump-started.
246 E leaves the room to do other things. The arguing ends.
Appendix 4 contains, along with the transcription of the conversation, the result 
of the reconstruction of the arguing (column 3), that is, my interpretations and 
reformulations of the utterances, and notes on which utterances have been dis-
regarded as unclear or not belonging to the arguing. The fourth column shows 
the categorizations of the utterances as communicative acts, along with refer-
ences to the analytical overview in appendix 5.
It is perhaps a good idea for the interested reader to read a few utterances from 
the transcription first, to gain an understanding of the conversation. Then, look 
at the reconstruction and the communicative act classification, and how all this is 
matched in the analytical overview. When one has an understanding of how the 
utterances, reconstructions, communicative acts and boxes in the analytical over-
view hang together, it is easier to browse more freely through the diagrams.
4.4.2 General comments
The activity structure of this arguing is somewhat unbalanced. The confrontation 
occurs in two short utterances, lines 1 and 6. Discussion follows, but no conclu-
sion is reached. This means that the goal of a shared view is not attained. When 
the transcription ends, the husband and wife still do not agree on which car type 
to buy, at least they do not agree explicitly. It is reasonable to think that they will 
continue the arguing later, and so the arguing may not be as unsuccessful as it 
may seem, but simply unfinished. In one interpretation of Eva’s utterance on line 
24 (which is difficult to analyze as discussed more below) Eva suspects that the 
other participants are preparing a conclusion, and she “forces” the discussion to 
continue. 
Another thing to note is that the arguing clearly fits into a more general activity, 
‘to decide what type of car to buy’, or perhaps the even more general ‘to buy a 
car’. The husband and wife do try to find a solution to a common problem, not 
necessarily to win an argumentation competition. The traditional view of argu-
mentation as a game with winner and looser, where the participants attack, de-
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fend, retreat etc., fits poorly with this conversation. An example of this is found 
on line 24:1
$E: PROBLEMET e ju att ja ska köra ren de e JA som ska köra ren
$E: THE PROBLEM is that I am going to drive it it is I who is going to drive it
It is obvious from the start of the arguing that Eva does not like vans, but simple 
dislike is not an important factor in this decision, at least not “officially” – dislike 
has to be motivated by more objective reasons. Because of this, from a strictly 
argumentative view point, it is not obvious what Eva’s argument really is here. 
But when reading the transcription, and listening to the recording, the utterance 
is not strange at all: Eva is frustrated with the answers she gets to her questions 
and objections, and she points out that unless she is properly convinced that vans 
are good, it will not be a good idea to buy a van. The shared view that the parti-
cipants strive for includes Eva’s attitude to the car, and if she does not like vans, 
there can be no shared view that the family should buy a van. However, Eva does 
want to reach the shared view, she wants to be convinced. If the traditional view 
of argumentation as a competitive game is to be upheld, one has to say that Eva 
wants to loose, making it a rather strange game. Alternatively, the game has to be 
cooperative in nature, similar to climbing a mountain2. Another example of this 
is found on line 67:
$E: fast de e ju e prisfråga
$E: but it IS a matter of cost
Here Eva flatly gives a reason for buying a van (since it has already been establ-
ished, at least to some extent, that vans are cheaper than folkvagnsbussar), even 
though she is the main (and only) contender against buying one. Comparing it to 
a game of tennis, it is like telling the opponent, ‘My backhand is really weak, so 
you should put as many balls as possible on that side’. 
Allowing some speculation, this might reflect a difference between Swedish cul-
ture on one hand and continental or Dutch culture on the other. It is often said 
that Swedes are consensus-oriented or conflict-avoiding, and if so, it is not 
strange that the arguing in a Swedish conversation displays more cooperation 
and less competition than the continental/Dutch arguings that presumably con-
stitute the basis of standard pragma-dialectics. A much more extensive investiga-
tion than the present one is needed to confirm or reject this speculation. 
1. The English translation in italics is idiomatic, and does not necessarily match the 
Swedish utterance word-for-word. Nor does the translation try to render spoken 
language features like reductions and specific spoken language forms.
2. Allwood touches on such an analysis in Allwood, J. (1992) The Academic Seminar as 
an Arena of Conflict and Conflict Resolution. Department of Linguistics, Göteborg 
University, Sweden. 
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4.4.3 Communicative acts
All types of communicative acts that were predicted in section 4.3.6 were found 
in the conversation, but some communicative acts occurred that were not pre-
dicted. One such act is found on line 42:
$E: e re nånting vi framföallt ska se till de e att vi får ordentliga SÄTEN me 
ordentliga säkerhetsbältar å nackstöd annars e inte ja intresserad
$E: one thing e really must make sure is that we get proper SEATS with proper 
seat belts and head restraints otherwise I am not interested
This is not a reason either to accept the claim or to reject it, but rather it is re-
quirement placed on any solution to the problem of finding a new car for the 
family: ‘whichever car we buy, it must have proper seats.’ The communicative act 
label that has been used is assertion of evaluation criterion, since that signals how the 
requirement relates to the ongoing discussion. When evaluating the strengths 
and weaknesses of vans and folkvagnsbussar (the arguments for and against them), 
the quality of the seats must be taken into account. One could argue that the ut-
terance really belongs to another discussion, on the topic ‘what is a good car for 
this family?’ while the current discussion concerns the topic ‘are vans good cars?’. 
If other participants had disagreed with the evaluation criterion and started to 
give reasons against it, a separate analytical overview could have been set up for 
that issue. Since such disagreement does not occur, there is no need for a separ-
ate diagram, and the label assertion of evaluation criterion is used. However, it serves 
as a reminder for the analyst that (i) people can argue about more than one thing 
at the time, and (ii) arguing is not isolated from other activities, but forms a part 
of a “larger” activity, in this case ‘to buy a car’.
A similar situation of “leaving the actual arguing” occurs on line 111, in connec-
tion with the arguing about the crash safety of vans (Trygg-Hansa is an insurance 
company):
$E: ja de e ju ba å titta på Trygg-Hansas statistik /// kan ju int va så svårt dom 
ha ju statistik på de // de finns ju minibussar (dä sånna små)
$E: well we can just have a look at Trygg-Hansa’s statistics /// couldn’t be too 
difficult they do have statistics for that // there are mini buses (you know such 
small ones) 
The participants have been discussing the crash safety of vans, providing reasons 
for and against their being crash safe. With this utterance Eva suggests a method 
to solve the dispute (to reach a shared view), without actually using that method 
(since it cannot be done immediately). The communicative act label is deferral to 
other arbiter, where the important part is the deferral – the issue is not solved here 
and now, but the participants know how to solve it, and will do so, later. 
If the other participants do not agree to the suggested deferral, an arguing can 
arise on that issue, just as it can with evaluation criteria, as discussed above. On 
line 135 Roland suggests a method to find out what it costs to insure a van, but 
this suggested deferral is not accepted by his wife:
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$R: ja de e ju bara ringa te e te Björn elle Sten-Åke elle nån dom ha ju en sån 
(där)
$E: ja me man ska int ringa ti entusiasterna Roland /// då e de bättre rö+ jöra 
me sitt försäkringsbolag va re kostar å försäkra en sån ti xempel då va
$R: well it’s just to ring to er to Björn or Sten-Åke or somebody they have got 
one of (those)
$E: but one can’t ring the enthusiasts Roland /// it is better to check with the 
insurance company how much it costs to insure for example such a car like
If the disagreement develops into a larger arguing, it could be necessary to set up 
a separate analytical overview. This does not occur here.
Another unpredicted case occurs on line 7, where the son speaks about vans:
$A: dom drar lite bensin pappa de e ju re enda som e bra me rom
$A: they need very little gas dad that is the only thing that is good about them
The utterance contains two reasons: that vans have low fuel consumption is a 
reason to buy a van, and that vans do not have any other advantage over folkvagns-
bussar is a reason not to buy a van, and the second reason is meant to outweigh 
the first reason. This technique to introduce and admit reasons for not accepting 
a claim that one tries to get acceptance for, and then dismiss them as non-vital, is 
used again at a later stage, by the husband:
$R: nä ja få säja de att e ja ka // de // de de finns bara EN nackdel me 
automatlådor / idag /// å de e de att dom dra LITE mer bensin men de LITE 
mer bensin för dom drar mer bensin (...) (överhuvudtaget)
$R: no I must say that er I can // there’s / there’s there’s only ONE 
disadvantage with automatics / today /// and that’s that they cause SLIGHTLY 
higher fuel consumption but that is SLIGHTLY higher fuel consumption because 
they do have higher fuel consumption (...) (at all)
However, in the case of the son’s utterance, it is not so clear that the second 
reason is really meant to outweigh the first reason. Throughout the conversation 
he does not commit himself strongly either to buying a van or to not buying one, 
although he seems to lean somewhat towards the first alternative. Presumably, he 
does not want to “choose sides” between his parents, and is careful not to dis-
please either of them. Thus, the utterance on line 7 has the ring of support for 
his mother’s view, while it actually provides his father with a reason for accepting 
the suggestion of buying a van. In that sense the communicative act is simultan-
eously a reason for and against a suggested modification of the shared view. 
One difficulty with analyzing argumentation that is neither explicitly handled by 
the model suggested here, nor by the standard pragma-dialectical model, is that 
the importance of the arguments (i) are different and (ii) can be negotiated. The 
table below lists the reasons for and against buying a van that seem to be accep-
ted by all participants:
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Table 4-2: Reasons for and against buying a 'van'.
The family should buy a van The family should not buy a van
1.2 Vans are cheaper.
1.4 Many other families have vans.
1.5 Vans have power steering.
1.6 Vans have good loading capacity.
2.2 Vans have small steering wheels.
2.7 Vans have high fuel consumption.
2.8 Vans are like living rooms.
Clearly, some of these reasons are more important than others. The fact that 
many other families have vans is so weak as a reason that it is not clear if it 
should be considered a reason at all, and it is also unclear why it is a disadvantage 
of vans that they are like living rooms. 
In situations where a shared view is reached, the overall prioritizing done by the 
participants is obvious (the arguments for the shared view are considered most 
important), but on a more detailed level, motives behind prioritizing are not 
clear. In some cases the importance of the reasons is mentioned explicitly, as on 
line 79:
$E: ja vi KÖR ju så lite så fö den sakens skull så e re ju ingen
$E: well we DRIVE so little that for that sake it is no big
Here Eva says that the higher fuel consumption for vans is not an important ar-
gument, since the family does not drive much. 
The importance of arguments can also be addressed more indirectly, as on line 
24:
$E: PROBLEMET e ju att ja ska köra ren de e JA som ska köra ren
$E: THE PROBLEM is that I am going to drive it it is I who is going to drive it
As discussed above, Eva’s intuitive dislike of vans would normally not be an im-
portant argument, but the utterance on line 24 shows that Eva in this case thinks 
that her dislike is an important argument (and the other ones seem to accept 
that). Even if this interpretation is wrong, it is clear that the utterance attacks, 
not the logical validity or truth of the given reasons, but their importance: they 
are not strong enough to outweigh the (not fully expressed) argument that Eva 
does not like vans.
4.4.4 Other observations
The temporal order of the given reasons is sometimes surprising, as on line 
25-27:
$R: ja men de e ändå lättare å köra 
$E: ja de säjer du också men nu e re så här att INGER hon ha ju inte haft nåra 
svåriheter ALLS me såna fordon å hon ha kört va som helst // men HON tycker 
att den här e hon dra se allså för å köra rom
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$R: yes but it is easier to drive anyway
$E: well so you say but this is the way it is that INGER has not had any 
difficulties at ALL with vehicles of this kind and she has driven anything // but 
SHE thinks that this is she is reluctant to drive them
Here the reason vans are difficult to drive is countered by Roland before Eva has 
said anything about it. Roland assumes that Eva’s dislike of vans has to do with 
that she fears that they are difficult to drive, and considering Eva’s response, he 
is probably right.
4.4.5 Normative aspects
As discussed above (p. 135 ff.), normative aspects of arguing can be divided into 
ethical and epistemological aspects. Looking first at the ethical side, we observe 
that the participants behave very well towards each other. Only on one occasion 
can the behavior be criticized as ethically dubious, on line 198, presented here 
with the preceding utterance:
$R: ja JA kan det inte å ja e betydlit duktiare förare än va du e
$E: ja de vet ja ju inte ja kan ju va lyhörd på andra saker
$R: well I can’t do that and I’m a considerably better driver than you are
$E: well I don’t know about that I may be more keen in other things
Here the topic is whether an automatic gear box renders more control to the 
driver than a manual gear box, and Roland says that he is a better driver than 
Eva. Eva attacks this as incorrect, since being a good driver is not only about be-
ing able to control the car. (Roland modifies his claim a few lines further down, 
202, to ‘a better driver technically.’) The problem here is that what it means to be 
a good driver it is not well defined, but considering that they are talking about 
controlling the car, it is not unreasonable to assume that Roland intended better 
driver to mean ‘better at maneuvering the car.’ Eva, however, does not take the 
context into account when interpreting the phrase, but responds to it as if it had 
the meaning ‘better motorist road user.’ If she does so deliberately, it is ethically 
questionable.
Epistemologically, there are more problematic cases. Arguments 1.4 (a reason to 
buy a van is that many other families have vans), and 2.8 (a reason not to buy a 
van is that they are like living rooms) have at best limited relevance. 2.6.1.1a (be-
ing responsible for family and children makes mature women think it is difficult 
to drive big cars) is quite difficult to understand at all.1
1. One interpretation is that the responsibility for family and children makes mature 
women more careful and worried about dangers in general, and large cars are in 
an unclear way associated with danger. This makes mature women dislike large 
cars (rather than making them think it is difficult to drive large cars). This 
interpretation is rather speculative, however. 
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Figure 4-8: Arguments 1.4, 2.8 and 2.6 with immediate relations.
1.4 Many 
other families 
they know 
have vans.
1. The family 
should buy a 
van.
2. The family 
should not 
buy a van.
2.8 Vans are 
like living 
rooms.
2.6.1a Inger 
avoids driving 
her van.
2.6 It is difficult to 
drive vans.
2.6.1.1b 
Inger thinks 
her van is 
large. 
2.6.1.1a Mature 
women with 
responsibility for 
family and 
children avoids 
driving large cars. 
2.6.1b Inger has 
driven all kinds 
of vehicles. 
On one occasion an epistemologically irrelevant argument is explicitly refuted by 
a participant. That is 1.3.2.1’ (the heavy framework of the jeep shows that vans 
have heavy frameworks), put forward on line 105 and immediately refuted:
$A: mamma / mamma ko+ kolla (...) å så känne ru på jeepen där de e så hä 
tjock RA:M i n vetdu
[...]
$E: ja de jeepen de anders me ja e inte så säke på att dom hä va:narna e såna 
// de vill ja no se: e fakta på innan
$A: mum / mum loo+ look (...) and feel on the jeep the FRAMEWORK is this 
thick you know
[...]
$E: yes that is the jeep Anders but I am not so sure that these vans are like 
that // I think I want to see facts on that before
Here Eva immediately refutes Anders’ argument on epistemological grounds, 
saying that the construction of the jeep cannot be used as an argument for the 
crash safety of vans.
A more subtle epistemological problem concerns the relation between the crash 
safety and the weight of the car, and the argumentation about this is shown in 
figure 4-9.
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Figure 4-9: Argument 1.3.2.1’ with immediate relations.
1.3 The crash safety 
is good for vans.
1.3.1a Vans 
are heavy.
1.3.2 (1.3.1a.1) 
Vans have sturdy 
frameworks.
1.3.2.1 The jeep 
has a sturdy 
framework.
1.3.2.1' [If the jeep 
has a sturdy 
framework then vans 
have so too.]
9. The fact that the 
jeep has a sturdy 
framework says 
nothing about vans.
&
 Roland argues that vans are crash safe since they are heavy, without being very 
explicit about the reasoning behind this. He does give an example though, and 
the underlying reasoning is probably that if a heavy car crashes with a light car, 
the light car will be struck much harder than the heavy car (due to physical laws). 
Statistical laws tell us that the heavier car you have, the higher the chance that 
the car you happen to crash with is lighter than your car, thus, a heavy car is 
more crash safe than a light car. Crash safety is seen as the risk of being severely 
injured in a car crash. Eva, however, seems to look at crash safety from another 
angle, as how well the construction of the car distributes the forces involved in a 
crash in order to protect the driver. The participants do not discover that they 
understand crash safety in different ways, so the arguments relate badly.
4.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, I have described a model for analyzing argumentation in natur-
ally occurring conversation, the model being a merger of the pragma-dialectical 
theory of argumentation analysis and the theory of language in general and con-
versation in particular called activity-based communication analysis (ACA). The 
basic idea was to replace the weak linguistic underpinnings of the pragma-dia-
lectical school with the well-developed linguistic theory, ACA. 
The intermingling of normative and descriptive aspects that is made consciously 
in the pragma-dialectical model has been separated in my model, without great 
difficulty. The mixing seems rather unnecessary, and the proposed model is in 
my opinion clearer and more useful than the pragma-dialectical one, since it can 
be used for normative as well as for descriptive analyses.
In the proposed model, arguing is an activity with the purpose of reaching a 
shared view on an issue where the participants disagree. A description of the 
activity arguing was made using a modified version of Allwood’s template for de-
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scribing social activities. Based on the description of the activity, a rudimentary 
taxonomy for communicative acts was set up.
In this study I have also shown how the model can be used to analyze argument-
ation by analyzing a naturally occurring conversation containing arguing. One 
thing that was discovered in the analysis was that the weight of arguments is im-
portant, but not handled well in the pragma-dialectical model or the proposed 
one. Additional research is needed to find a way of handling argument import-
ance (see also p. 299-301). Another thing that was made obvious in the example 
analysis is that arguing typically occurs in a context of other activities, in this case 
as a part of the activity to decide what car to buy. Naturally occurring arguing 
cannot be separated from the reason for which a shared view is desired. 
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5. Interaction in group 
decision-making
5.1 Introduction
For a linguist studying group decision-making, the interaction associated with the 
group decision-making event appears as the core of the problem. What is it that 
people say and do to make a decision? I shall start this study of the interaction of 
group decision-making by presenting the group decision-making corpus that will 
be used as empirical input (section 5.2), and then proceed to work out a frame-
work for analyzing the detailed linguistic interaction of group decision-making 
episodes (section 5.3). Using this framework, I will investigate the recordings in 
the decision-making corpus in order to discover interactional regularities (section 
5.4), and then try to find more general decision-making patterns (section 5.5). 
Towards the end of this chapter, I will produce an activity description of group 
decision-making (section 5.6), and compare the results to the research of Marjan 
Huisman, who performed a similar study (section 5.7). In the last section (5.8), 
general conclusions will be drawn.
5.2 Material
The empirical basis for the present work consists of 18 recordings and transcrip-
tions of naturally occurring activities where group decisions have been made. 
The principle for collecting these was simply to gather as many recordings as 
possible of conversations where adults make group decisions in Swedish. The 
criteria for inclusion was somewhat intuitive: naturally occurring activities, with 
Swedish speaking adults, spending a considerable amount of time on making 
decisions together.
Most of the recordings come from the Gothenburg Spoken Language Corpus 
(GSLC) (Allwood et al. 2003), a corpus of spoken language developed at the De-
partment of Linguistics, Göteborg University. GSLC consists of approximately 
375 recordings totalling 1.4 million tokens, distributed over about 25 different 
Table 5-1: Overview of Group Decision-Making Corpus. Recordings with IDs 
starting with an A are audio recordings, and recordings with IDs starting with a V 
are video recordings.
ID Title Description Rec.
Year
Tokens Dur.
A321001 Quitting 
Work
A married couple discusses the 
strategy for him to quit his work.
Two participants: the husband 
and the wife.
1995 5 250 00:26
A321601 Budget 
Negotiation
A project leader at a large 
company discusses the budget of
his project with some superiors. 
Three participants: the project 
leader and two superiors.
2002 9 124 00:58
A322501 Budget 
Revision
The project leader in A321601 
returns to his project group, and 
they revise the budget together. 
Four participants: the project 
leader and three project group 
members.
2002 11 682 1:42
A462701 Culture-
Nature Project
Researchers in the Humanities 
meet to discuss a common 
project on culture. Seven 
participants.
1989 18 920 1:35
A771101 Making 
Recordings
A communication researcher 
negotiates with the manager of a 
company about making 
recordings at the company. Two 
participants.
1992 3 141 00:17
A792501 Esperanto 
Foundation
A board meeting at an esperanto 
foundation. Five participants.
1997 16 589 1:35
A850101 Bäckmåla 
Municipality 
Council
A meeting with the council of a 
municipality in a rural area in 
Sweden. Eight participants.
1969 24 005 2:54
A850401 Bäckmåla 
Health 
Committee 
A meeting with the Health 
Committee of a municipality in a 
rural area in Sweden. Eight 
participants, including the 
recording researcher.
1969 28 781 2:55
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ID Title Description  Year Tokens Dur.
A850701 Bäckmåla 
Local Housing
Committee 
A meeting with the Local 
Housing Committee of a 
municipality in a rural area in 
Sweden. Seven participants.
1969 12 718 1:31
A851501 Patent Office A meeting at the Patent Office. 
Eight participants.
1966 7 307 00:49
AXX0101 Buying a Car A family discusses what new car 
to buy. Four participants.
1997 2 328 00:12
V321601 Choir During a rehearsal, a choir has a 
discussion session. There are 
fifteen participants with 
individual contributions, and 
approximately fifteen 
participants without.
2004 3 469 00:21
V321801 City District 
Committee
A meeting with a City District 
Committee in a Swedish city. 
The participants are elected 
members of political parties. 
There are 26 participants with 
individual contributions, and five
to ten participants without.
2004 15 441 2:02
V770201 Strategy 
Meeting
A meeting at a consultancy 
company where future plans are 
made. Twelve participants.
1992 26 950 3:12
V770301 Board of City 
District 
Committee 1
Meeting with the Board of City 
District Committee in a Swedish 
city. The participants are civil 
servants in the city administra-
tion. Fourteen participants.
1993 34 013 3:58
V770501 Board of City 
District 
Committee 2
Meeting with the Board of City 
District Committee in a Swedish 
city. The participants are munici-
pal administrative officials. 
Eleven participants.
1994 11 414 1:09
V770901 Board of City 
District 
Committee 3
Meeting with the Board of City 
District Committee in a Swedish 
city. The participants are munici-
pal administrative officials. Ten 
participants.
1995 25 233 2:58
Total: 265 931 28:33
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activity types. Colleagues contributed a few other recordings, and I made a few 
recordings myself. 
Readers unfamiliar with corpus linguistics may find this method of collection 
strange – why did I not find representative groups, record these, and then con-
struct a corpus from these recordings? The simple answer is that it would have 
taken too much time. Finding and recording representative groups would have 
taken considerable time, and transcribing would have come on top of that: one 
hour of recorded conversation takes approximately 30 hours to transcribe, check 
and prepare for computer analysis, and the 28 hours of recordings included in 
the corpus I have used thus correspond to almost five months of full-time tran-
scribing. Using already recorded and transcribed material was thus an efficient 
way of saving time for making deeper or broader analyses of the data. 
The recordings of the resulting corpus are described in table 5-1 on the previous 
opening.
The recordings have been transcribed using the GTS/MSO6 standard (Nivre et 
al. 2004; Nivre 1999). Before a transcription is added to the GSLC, it is checked 
by another transcriber, in order to improve the inter-coder reliability. In addition, 
in the course of working with the transcriptions, I adjusted the transcriptions 
when necessary. The excerpts from the transcriptions presented here have been 
somewhat simplified,1 and there should be no significant problems reading them. 
Appendix 1 contains a brief explanation of the standard.
The transcriptions were annotated manually with group decision episodes, i.e. se-
quences of contributions where group decisions are made. After that, a specially 
developed computer program, Clipper, was used to scan the transcriptions for 
episode annotations, creating recording/transcription clips containing the epis-
odes. The set of decision-making episodes could then be studied in greater detail.
Identifying group decisions
One difficulty studying group decisions is identifying the relevant episodes in the 
recordings. The definition set up above (p. 105) is too abstract to be directly use-
ful, so some kind of operationalization of this definition is necessary in order to 
recognize group decision episodes. The criterion that was used in this study was 
that a proposal should be made and verbal consent given, or at least clearly 
sought.2 This operationalization has the drawback that it excludes group deci-
sions that are made quickly, without much reflection, but since this dissertation 
concerns the language and interaction of group decision-making, that is not 
1. For example, comments without relevance for the example have been removed, 
IDT (pronunciation-like spelling) has been used for rendering the words, and 
initial capitals are used for names.
2. N.B. that verbal consent includes consent made with non-vocal, symbolic 
behaviours (e.g. nods).
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much of a problem – there is not very much language or interaction in such 
group decisions. Quick and non-reflected group decisions may be important and 
interesting, but they are not paid much attention in this study.
It is often not obvious what is a proposal and what is not; I do not claim to have 
found all group decision episodes present in these recordings. In particular, short 
and partly non-vocal decisions are likely to have been over-looked. Further, if 
group decisions are possible without proposals, then these are also likely to have 
been left out (see section 5.3.2 below for a discussion of the prominence of pro-
posals in group decisions). However, episodes with a fairly explicit proposal that 
span more than a couple of contributions are unlikely to have been missed. Fur-
ther, uncertain cases were marked as such, and were not ignored.
5.3 Communicative acts in group decision-making
5.3.1 Introduction
The present chapter focuses on interaction during group decision-making, which 
to a large extent is a communicative activity. Communicative activities consist 
mainly of communicative acts (‘speech acts’), therefore, in this section I shall dis-
cuss communicative acts in group decision-making.
The view on communicative acts adopted here is the one described in section 
4.3.6, p. 141, thus, a taxonomy of communicative acts in group decision-making 
must relate to the purpose of the activity. The purpose is to reach/create an ob-
ligation concerning a future action, according to the definition of group decision-
making given on p. 105. In chapter 4, a taxonomy for communicative acts in ar-
guing was developed by predicting a set of acts based on the nature of arguing, 
and then extending and verifying that taxonomy by analyzing arguing in a natur-
ally occurring conversation. I found it more difficult to predict communicative 
acts for group decision-making, which necessitated a more directly empirical 
method: studying the group decision-making episodes of my corpus. In this sec-
tion I shall present the communicative acts that I found this way.
5.3.2 Proposing and accepting
At a sufficient level of abstraction, any communicative act needs to be evaluated 
by the receiver (Allwood 2000:18 ff), in the sense that one has to decide if one 
wants to continue the interaction, has perceived and understood what was said, 
and possibly, if one should react in some way. However, at the heart of group 
decision-making lies a communicative act for which evaluation is a central 
theme, usually called proposal, though I prefer the more event-oriented form pro-
posing or making a proposal. The term proposal will be used here for the description 
of future action that a proposing contains. Proposing can be characterized in the 
following way:
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i) It presents or points out a future or on-going action A as a possibility.
ii) The sender S wants A (not) to take place.
iii) S wants the receiver(s) to agree to A (not) taking place.
Borderline cases may be used to contrast this. An officer giving an order to a 
private soldier is an act that presents a future action as a possibility, and the 
sender wants that action to take place. The soldier must also obey the officer, 
thus, he is obliged to accept the ordered action. However, the soldier is not ex-
pected to evaluate the action on the whole and consider whether he likes it, or if 
he thinks that it is a good idea or an efficient means to achieve whatever the ends 
might be. That is, he is not expected to agree to the action taking place. The sol-
dier is expected to evaluate the utterance and identify it as an order, and prob-
ably also to accept the officer as a person authorized to order the solder about. 
This authorization includes, at least ideally, evaluating the action to find out if 
the officer is authorized to give an order to do just that (for example torture may 
not be allowed). However, given that the officer is authorized to give the order, 
the soldier is not expected to agree with the action, but simply to obey the order.
In some cases this part about evaluation and consent is rather under-specified:
Excerpt 5-1. V321601, line 328: Example of a border-line case of group decision.
A choir has been discussing common issues for a while, and prepares to start the rehearsal. 
The conductor, participant A, is closing the topic, and moves on to the rehearsal, naming 
the song to start with (from #1# to #2#).
$A: ... om ni kommer på fler gånger 
som ni inte / som ni vet att ni inte 
kan / komma under hösten titta på 
de här pappret också // innan ni går 
hem // a / de lägger vi här så länge 
Rosa // #1# In carnatus est // e et 
natulit+ // In carnatus et #2# 
< |21.0 >
@ < event: people preparing to start 
the reherseal and A plays a bit on the 
piano >
$A: ... if you come up with other 
occasions when you can’t / that you 
know that you can’t / come during the 
autumn look at this paper too // 
before you go home // yeah / we put it 
here meanwhile Rosa // #1# In 
carnatus est // er et of cour+ // In 
carnatus et #2# < |21.0 >
@ < event: people preparing to start 
the rehearsal and A plays a bit on the 
piano >
Here, the conductor is closing the previous topic and moves on to the rehearsal. 
The habit in this choir is that the conductor quite naturally decides what to re-
hearse, although it could be called into question. In excerpt 5-1, the conductor 
does not in any way invite explicit consent, and nobody says anything that could 
be interpreted as expressing consent. Since the choir then starts to rehearse the 
proposed piece (finding the written music, putting away drinks, etc.), its behavior 
can be interpreted as implicit consent. However, the behavior of the choir can 
just as well be seen as doing what the conductor has told it to do, that is, the 
choir obeys the conductor’s order (follows his instruction), without considering 
whether the action is a good idea or not. Thus, it is somewhat unclear whether 
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this should be seen as a proposing or an order. In this dissertation, the episode 
has not been treated as a group decision, since the sender does not indicate that 
he seeks agreement, nor does the receiver show any explicit agreement. (See also 
section 5.3.8 for further discussion of this excerpt.)
Another bordering case is that of presenting an alternative without suggesting it. 
This could perhaps be done as a part of giving background information about a 
case, using an alternative action as a means to explain some problem, or as a top-
ic introduction, listing available options. This is discussed more in section 5.3.6.
Sabourin & Geist (1990) write that the essence of proposing is to make the 
group members ‘confer upon’ the action, in the sense of ‘verbal interchange of 
views’ (Sabourin and Geist 1990:414). Although it is true that proposing often 
gives rise to a discussion of the proposal, there are clearly many cases where such 
discussion or conferral is neither necessary nor desired, as in the following 
example:
Excerpt 5-2. A850101, line 60: Example of a group decision without conferral.
A meeting with the board of a rural township in southern Sweden. The chairperson opens 
the meeting, and proposes a minutes verifyer (utterance 1, from #1# to #2#). He elicits 
explicit consent for the proposal (utterance 3), and recieves that consent in utterance 4.
1 $A: Bäckmåla kommun+ / 
kommunalnämnd / behagar 
härmed sammanträda // och #1# 
då har vi på / föredragningslistan 
val av justeringsman / i tur att 
justera / kvällens pro+ / protokoll 
/ skulle vara Bengt Alkvist #2# // 
något annat förslag
$A: Bäckmåla town+ / township board 
/ is hereby gathered for conferral // 
and #1# on the agenda we find 
election of minutes verifyer / the 
person in turn for verifying tonight’s 
min+ / minutes / would be Bengt 
Alkvist #2# // any other suggestion
2 $X: nä $X: no
3 $A: utses Alkvist $A: is Alkvist appointed
4 $X: <1 ja >1 <2 | >2
@ <1 comment: several 
participants >1
@ <2 event: strike of chairperson's 
gavel >2
$X: <1 yes >1 <2 | >2
@ <1 comment: several 
participants >1
@ <2 event: strike of chairperson’s 
gavel >2
The excerpt shows a routine decision of appointing a “minutes verifier”,1 and 
there is no reason to believe that any participant finds the decision unsatisfactory 
due to the lack of conferral.
In Allwood’s (2000:18 ff) terminology, i and ii, according to the characterization 
of proposing on p. 158 above, constitute the main expressive dimension of the 
act, while iii is the main evocative dimension. That is to say, a response to a pro-
1. It is common in Sweden that organizations have statutes that require a “minutes 
veriyfer” to be elected at each formal meeting.
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posing typically requires evaluation of whether one is prepared to commit to the 
proposed action. If the result of such an evaluation is positive, the response is 
likely to be accepting1, characterized in the following way:
i) It concerns a proposed action A.
ii) The sender agrees to A taking place.2
If the result of the evaluation is negative, rejecting is the more likely response; its 
characterization is very similar to that of accepting:
i) It concerns a proposed action A.
ii) The sender does not agree to A taking place.2
In CA contexts, the concept of adjacency pair is often used to describe interaction-
al structure (see p. 38). Proposing-accepting/rejecting can be described as an ad-
jacency pair, in other words, the making of a proposal creates an expectation of 
an accepting/rejecting. Under most circumstances, subsequent contributions will 
be interpreted as being relevant for producing an accepting/rejecting, until an ac-
cepting or rejecting has been performed, or the proposal has been made irrelev-
ant. One way of making a proposal irrelevant is to make a new proposal, either a 
modified version of the first proposal, or a counter-proposal, which is not com-
patible with the first proposal. Normally this implies a rejection of the first pro-
posal, and arguing is likely to occur (see section 5.3.3 below).
Now let’s turn to another aspect of the proposal-accepting phenomenon. Ima-
gine a simple group decision situation with two participants, where the making 
of a proposal is followed by an accepting in such a way that an obligation is cre-
ated. It is important to note that the actual creation of the obligation is neither 
part of the proposing nor the accepting, but rather something that comes from 
the pair of communicative acts. The features numbered ii in the descriptions of 
accepting and rejecting above could have been phrased as ‘S creates/refuses to 
create an obligation to do A,’ but that would have caused problems for the con-
tinued analysis. Proposing something does not cause an obligation, since a rejec-
tion of the proposal cancels the entire decision. Similarly, if there are more than 
two participants in the group, the first accepting does not cause any obligation, 
since a subsequent rejecting could block the decision. Consider the following, in-
vented example:
1. The term accepting is here restricted to accepting proposals. Further, it denotes a 
slightly different sense than in the example with the soldier and the officer above, 
since accepting here includes agreement. 
2. Or, not taking place, if that is the proposal.
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Figure 5-1: Blocked decision.
Three friends, A, B and C, are having a small talk one evening in December. 
Participant A comes up with the idea that they throw a New Year’s party.
1 A: Hey, why don’t we organize a New Year’s party together? We could 
rent Pam’s café.
2 B: Great idea! We could easily fit 20 people in there.
3 C: Well, hrm, I can’t really. I’m going to London to see my brother. 
Maybe next year?
4 A: Yeah, perhaps.
Here, participant A proposes that they all throw a party together and participant 
B accepts. But, that does not create any commitment between A and B to throw 
a party, since participant C has not accepted yet. When C rejects the proposal, he 
blocks the decision, thus, the commitment between A and B is blocked too. Par-
ticipant A and participant B may of course decide to do it on their own, without 
C, but that would require a “separate” decision episode. If participant C a week 
later talks to participant B and says that the trip to London has been cancelled 
and that he wants to go along with A’s party idea, they cannot rely on a commit-
ment from A to do this. It might very well turn out that A by that time has ac-
cepted an invitation to some other party for New Year’s Eve.
In situations where more than one accepting is necessary to make a decision, and 
where a decision actually is made, then it is when the “last” of the relevant parti-
cipants perform his accepting that the obligation is created. Hence, that act could 
be singled out as the decision act or the act that realizes the potential obligations 
expressed by the previous speakers. Sabourin and Geist (1990:406) seem to have 
this view when they speak about ‘the proposal/decision adjacency pair’. I find it 
rather counter intuitive, however, to view a single act by a single participant as a 
group act, and that a single participant could make a group decision. Thus, the 
obligation is something that somewhat mysteriously arises from fact that every-
body agrees. When each individual has said that he wants the decision to be 
made, then the decision has been made. 
In order for the proposing-accepting to become a decision, it is crucial that ex-
pressed dissent (rejecting) is absent. The following excerpt illustrates the import-
ance of this absence: 
Excerpt 5-3. V770301, line 733: Illustration of the importance of the absence of 
rejectings.
A is the chairperson in a committee of municipal administrative officials. They are 
discussing principles for leasing agreements for premises. The chairperson summarizes what 
has been said into a new proposal (from #1# to #2#). X is one of the participants, but it 
is unclear which one.
Communicative acts in group decision-making 161
1 $A: nä å å då då e de olika för ja 
tror att de E så att de varierar #1# 
men kunde vi inte uttrycka som en 
viljeinrikting då va att vi önskar 
skilja // e: lokaldelen från dom 
driftskostnader som uppstår så att 
säja va och att vi använder de som 
princip och att de sen ska framgå 
väldit tydlit då i uthyrningsavtal å 
annat att de är så // å å så 
funderar ni på hur man kan lägga 
upp de va de: #2# < // > #3# ö: 
och sen så tittar vi lite på fritis 
taxer
@ < event: several participants 
nod, mumble and start turning 
papers etc. >
$A: no and and then that is different 
since I think that DOES vary #1# but 
couldn’t we say that the direction of 
our intent right is that we want to 
separate // er: the facility part from 
the running costs that come up so to 
speak right and that that is our 
principle and that we then make it 
clear in the rental agreements and 
things that this is the way it is // and 
and then you think about how to work 
it out right #2# < // > #3# er: and 
then we can look at the recreation 
fees a little
@ < event: several participants nod, 
mumble and start turning papers 
etc. >
2 $X: m: $X: m
The interesting part is the pause at the end of participant A’s utterance (from 
#2# to #3#), where the other participants nod, mumble, start turning papers 
etc. Although some of them, by nodding and mumbling, might be considered as 
explicitly accepting, most of them simply start doing something else. During the 
pause, participant A looks around in the group, clearly checking if anybody has 
anything to object. By doing so (and by the context) he creates a perfect oppor-
tunity for anybody to object, when no one does, the absence of rejection of the 
proposal is significant.
It should be noted that there may be situations where the absence of rejection 
connotes something other than silent consent; in such cases the absence cannot 
be interpreted as accepting (see pp. 204-6 below). 
The analysis above makes proposing the foundation of group decision-making 
interaction (the act is given a similar prominence by Sabourin & Geist (1990)). 
For that reason, other communicative acts must be analyzed in relation to pro-
posing. This is precisely what I shall do now.
5.3.3 Arguing, giving background information, modifying proposals 
and reformulating proposals
If the receiver rejects a given proposal, the participants disagree on what should 
be done, which means that the prerequisites for arguing are set (see p. 132). 
Since the proposal concerns an action that the group should do together (in a 
weak sense of the word), there is also an incentive to turn disagreement into 
agreement. Arguing has already been described as an activity targeted at reaching 
a shared view on an issue, in this case on what should be done. This explains 
why arguing is common in group decision-making, and a typical example is 
shown below:
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Excerpt 5-4. V770201, line 835: Example of arguing in group decision-making.
A company has gathered to discuss its future. The manager, participant A, has compiled 
a list of prospective customers that he wants to discuss as the meeting. In utterance 1 
participant H suggests that they all go through the list, from the top, together; participant 
A objects to this in utterance 2.
1 $H: kan vi inledningsvis gå 
igenom dom kund nummer ett 
här då / kund nummer ett står 
längst upp kund nummer två /
$H: could we start by going through 
them customer number one here 
like / customer number one is at the 
top customer number two /
2 $A: men vi kan ju inte gå igenom 
det här är ju nästan sextio namn 
eller / kan ju inte jobba igenom 
det // inledningsvis // tycker ni 
att det finns frågetecken
$A: but we can not go through this 
is almost sixty names right / can 
not work through that // for a start 
// do you think there are doubts
Here participant H proposes that they should go through the list customer by 
customer, and participant A rejects that idea. Doing so, he provides an argument 
(that it would take too much time), and indeed leaves the actual rejecting to be 
inferred from the giving of the argument.
On a more abstract level, the proposing can be seen as a Suggesting Modification 
of the Shared View (see p. 141), the view on what should be done; this reveals 
the close connection between group decision-making and arguing. The commun-
icative acts found in arguing, therefore, show up in group decision-making as 
well. Further, since the issues that are to be decided on often are quite complex, 
it is not surprising that there is plenty of information giving about background 
issues or about a proposal, moreover, requests for such information are also 
common. These acts can be difficult to distinguish from arguments for or against 
the proposal:
Excerpt 5-5. A792501, line 1292: Illustration of the difficulty distinguishing 
arguments from providing background information.
A committee in an Esperanto association goes through a list of newly published 
Esperanto literature, deciding what to buy. The list is very long, and each participant 
presents the books s/he finds interesting and the remaining books are left without 
comment. Participant A presents a book about Zamenhof, signaling that he is interested 
in buying the book; participant B points out that it includes a horoscope. They all joke 
about this for a while, and then participant A provides an argument for buying the book. 
1 $A: // visst // öh ja sedan är här 
ju då ett par <1 >1 öh <2 
esperantoanknytningar (det är) <3 
Cherpillod igen >3 >2 han 
kommer här med med datoj faktoj 
lokoj om Zamenhof allså [381 eller 
z ]381 (...) [382 samma ]382
$A: // sure // er yes and there are 
also a couple <1 >1 er <2 
associations to esperanto (it’s) <3 
Cherpillod again >3 >2 he is here 
with with datoj faktoj lokoj about 
Zamenhof that is [381 or z ]381 
(...) [382 the same ]382
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@ <1 hesitation sound >1
@ <2 chuckle: C >2,<2 laughter: 
E >2
@ <3 chuckling >3
@ <1 hesitation sound >1
@ <2 chuckle: C >2,<2 laughter: 
E >2
@ <3 chuckling >3
2 $C: [381 m ]381 $C: [381 m ]381
3 $D: [382 öh ]382 $D: [382 er ]382
4 $B: [382 ja just det ]382 ja det 
var ju den med eh horoskop eller 
vad det var
$B: [382 yeah right ]382 yes that 
was the one with er horoscope or 
something
5 $A: // JA / det <1 tror jag det 
stod ja / >1 ja visst / horoskopo 
de Zamenhof ja
@ <1 laughter: C >1
$A: // YES / it <1 said so didn’t it 
/ >1 yes of course / horoskopo de 
Zamenhof
@ <1 laughter: C >1
(... 14 utterances where the participants joke about the horoscope ...)
20 $A: men öh men det här med 
datoj faktoj lokoj är ju [389 
rätt ]389 [390 intressant ]390 
därför att jag tror nog att han 
[391 är e en sån där 
kalenderbitare som ]391 som nä
$A: but er but I think that this 
datoj faktoj lokoj is [389 kind 
of ]389 [390 interesting ]390 
because I think that he is probably 
[391 a er you know a statistics nut 
that ]391 that no
21 $D: [389 (...) ]389 $D: [389 (...) ]389
22 $C: [390 m ]390 $C: [390 m ]390
23 $C: [391 om vi nu få horoskopet 
på köpet så gör det ingenting 
allså ]391
$C: [391 if we get the horoscope as 
well does not matter right ]391
24 $C: nä $C: no
25 $A: så eh / <3 men kanske >3 // $A: so er / <3 but maybe >3 //
In utterance 1, the chair proposes to buy a book about Zamenhof; in utterance 
4, participant B says that that book contains a horoscope of Zamenhof. This can 
be seen as an elaboration of the proposal or giving background information, but 
it is also clear from participant A’s reaction in utterance 5 (a somewhat embar-
rassed admission), and C’s laughter, that the horoscope part is a disadvantage for 
the book. Utterance 4 can be understood as an argument against buying it.
When a proposal has been made it can be elaborated upon and generally modified 
by the original proposer or someone else, sometimes in response to an argument 
against it or a request for elaboration, and sometimes as part of showing accept-
ance. Excerpt 5-6 illustrates:
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Excerpt 5-6. V770301, line 1591: Example of a proposal being modified.
Administrative officials of a City District in a Swedish city are discussing the 
participation in a fair. Different departments of the city administration will see to their 
own participation, and they will get extra money from the central administration for this. 
In utterance 1 participant J asks the chair if they should coordinate the participation.
1 $J: finns de nån anledning å 
samordna de här
$J: is there any reason to 
coordinate this
2 $A: // ja de e väl närmast det så a 
säja ska vi backa upp de på någe 
sätt via samordning eller så #1# så 
att de inte bara rinner ut #2#
$A: // well yes I guess that is the 
question should we back this up 
somehow with coordination or 
something #1# so that it does not 
come to nothing #2#
3 $X: [102 ja de tror ja ]102 $X: yes I think so
4 $C: #3# [102 ja tror de e ]102 bra å 
göra #4# se vilka som e 
intresserade så får man då bedöma 
e de så att var å en tar tar de på 
egen hand eller (väljer å göra något 
gemensamt) // men i alla fall att 
man kanske försöker å se vilka de e 
som ska vara me (...) så vi får en 
överblick på de #5# / ja tar gärna 
på mej de i så fall
$C: #3# I think that would be good 
to do #4# see who is interested 
and then we can judge will 
everybody do do it on their own or 
choose to do something together // 
but anyway that we perhaps try to 
see who it is that is going to 
participate (...) so we get an 
overview of it #5# / I will be glad 
to do that in that case
5 $A: m bra $A: m good
6 $X: m $X: m
7 $X: m $X: m
8 $A: och då återkommer du om vi 
har nåra behov om de finns behov 
så att säja att stödja även de
$A: and then you get back to us if 
we have any needs if it is 
necessary so to speak to support 
that too 
Here participant J makes a proposal,1 and the chair (participant A) reformulates 
the proposal in utterance 2 in a way that shows that he is in favor of it (#1# to 
#2#). Participant C first shows acceptance (#3# to #4#), and then elaborates 
the proposal (#4# to #5#), specifying what should be done and why. The dif-
ference between modifying a previously made proposal and making a new pro-
posal is not obvious. How much can a proposal be modified without being a 
new proposal? In a strict analysis, all modification must be seen as forming new 
proposals, but in actual conversations it may be convenient to view minor modi-
fications of proposals as just that, not new proposals.
One important version of proposal modification is reformulation of a proposal, 
where the original proposal is repeated, but with the inclusion of some modifica-
1. It is difficult to say if it is an ordinary proposal or a non-stanced one (see section 
5.3.6). 
Communicative acts in group decision-making 165
tion and/or elaboration that already has been made, or at least focusing on the 
essence of the proposal.1 A reformulation does not add anything new to a pro-
posal, but simply gathers what has already been said: 
Excerpt 5-7. V770901, line 848: Example of a reformulation.
Participant A is the chairperson in a committee of municipal administrative officials for a 
city in Sweden. They are discussing the recruitment of new personel. In utterance 1 the 
chairperson brings up the question, and it is then discussed for a while. In utterance 121 the 
chairperson makes a summary. Börje is one of the participants (not active in this excerpt).
1 $A: då försöker vi me den < | > och 
e då ha vi de hä me kostchef
@ < clear throat: T >
$A: let’s try that < | > and then 
there’s the issue with a municipal 
nutritionist
@ < clear throat: T >
2 $E: m $E: m
3 $A: // då e egentlien frågan ska vi 
bredda rekryteringssamlingen i 
avvaktan på att [118 (...) ]118 
(beslut)
$A: // the question is really should 
we broaden the recruition set while 
waiting for the [118 (...) ]118 
(decision)
4 $E: [118 m ]118 $E: [118 m ]118
5 $X: m $X: m
6 $E: och de e fy+ de e tre tider e 
inbokade / intervjutider / å en 
fjärde en fjärde som vi prata me 
också men inte fått tid / e sen kan 
beroende på den övergången så 
skulle de kunna bli ytterligare 
någon
$E: and there are fou+ there are 
three interview / dates set / and a 
fourth a fourth one that we spoke 
with too but couldn’t get a time / 
er and depending on that change 
there could be another one as well
114 utterances where the recruiting is discussed
121 $A: okej men de praktiska [1000 
fixa ]1000 ni vid sidan å de 
behöver vi inte tala om [1001 
/ ]1001 utan vi konstaterar då att e 
/ organisationen för // för va vi 
lägger kostenheten är fortfarande 
en öppen fråga och e / den tar vi 
upp vid ett senare tillfälle då när 
den e lite bättre beredd å i 
avvaktan på de så tar Börje över 
huvudansvaret för rekryteringen av 
kostchef
$A: okay but you take care of the 
practical [1000 things ]1000 on 
the side we need not talk about 
them [1001 / ]1001 but we 
observe that er / the organization 
for // for where we locate the food 
unit is still an open question and 
er / we’ll return to it on a later 
occasion when it is a bit better 
prepared and while waiting for 
that Börje takes the main 
responsibility for the recruitment 
of a new municipal nutritionist
1. Some CA researchers would refer to this phenomenon as formulations, as for 
example (Gafaranga and Britten 2004:148). However, formulations, as described 
originally by Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) and also by Heritage and Watson (1980), 
are a kind of meta-comments, describing what is going on in the conversation, 
which makes it a much wider concept than the quite specific concept of 
reformulations, as used here. It is also questionable whether Gafaranga’s and 
Brittens’ uses of the term are really in harmony with Garfinkel and Sacks’ use.
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122 $E: [1000 m ]1000 $E: [1000 m ]1000
123 $E: [1001 nä ]1001 $E: [1001 no ]1001
124 $X: m /// $X: m ///
In utterance 3, the chair proposes that they continue to look for candidates for 
the municipal nutritionist post while waiting for some other decision. The pro-
posal is discussed at length, and in utterance 121 the chair summarizes the out-
come of the discussion into a proposal. The discussion is too long to be presen-
ted here, but the point of the example is that utterance 121 does not add 
anything new; it “gathers” what has already been said and what the chair (parti-
cipant A) believes everybody agrees on.
Reformulations are not necessarily completely neutral summaries of previous 
discussion, but can of course be biased. This can make it difficult to distinguish a 
modification of a proposal from a reformulation of a proposal (see also Summar-
ies, p. 201).
5.3.4 Elicitations
Participants can elicit most kinds of communicative acts explicitly; for example, 
they may ask for proposals, request elaboration of a proposal, or ask for 
acceptance.
Excerpt 5-8. A850701, line 83: Example of an iliciting of proposal.
Meeting with the building committee of the municipality in a rural area in southern 
Sweden. In utterance 1 the chairperson introduces the subject of electing a verifier for the 
minutes (#1# to #2#), and elicits proposals (#2# to #3#).
1 $R: #1# vi ska börja me punkt ett 
de e utseende av justeringsman 
för kvällens protokoll #2# / får ja 
be om förslag #3# //
$R: #1# we shall start with 
paragraph one that is er appointing 
a verifier of tonight’s minutes #2# / 
are there any suggestions #3#
2 $Y: ska vi föreslå e Johansson $Y: should we suggest er Johansson
3 $R: e Erik Johansson är föreslagen 
räcker förslagen
$R: er Erik Johansson is suggested 
are there enough suggestions
4 $X: ja $X: yes
5 $R: väljes Erik $R: is Erik elected
6 $X: < ja >
@ < comment: several 
participants >
$X: < yes >
@ < comment: several 
participants >
7 $R: svaret e ja < | > //
@ < event: strike of chairperson's 
gavel >
$R: the answer is yes < | > //
@ < event: strike of chairperson's 
gavel >
In utterance 1, the chair elicits proposals, and these are provided in utterance 2. 
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Requesting elaboration of a proposal can be a way of objecting to a proposal, but 
it can also be something more neutral; one might simply need more information 
about the proposal before it can be evaluated properly.
Excerpt 5-9. A771101, line 210: Example of a request for background 
information.
Participant A, a communication researcher, is talking to participant B, a company 
manager, about a study performed at the company. In utterance 1 participant A suggests 
that he should be allowed to make recordings at the company. Participant B only gives 
very neutral feeback in utterance 2, which means neither yes nor no, and participant A 
provides arguments for his proposal in utterance 3. 
1 $A: å då ja ja fråga Hed då om vi 
skulle kunna få göra nåra 
inspelningar här
$A: and so I I asked Hed if we could 
do some recordings here
2 $B: m $B: m
3 $A: å vill ja säja också de 
fullständit / < | > betryggande ur 
anonymitetssynpunkt va du tar 
bort / alla identifikationer vi kan 
även ta [21 bort ]21 att de e gjort 
i Meckelstad precis [22 alltså ]22 
me allting [23 va ]23
@ < hesitation sound >
$A: and I would like to say that it is 
completely / < | > satisfactory as 
regards anonymity like you remove / 
all identification we can even [21 
remove ]21 that it has been done in 
Meckelstad right [22 so ]22 with 
everything [23 like ]23
@ < hesitation sound >
4 $B: [21 m ]21 $B: [21 m ]21
5 $B: [22 m ]22 $B: [22 m ]22
6 $B: [23 m ]23 < | > ö // ja 
inspelning me hjälp utav ä 
bandspelare eller ä
@ < inhalation sound >
$B: [23 m ]23 < | > er // yes 
recording with a er tape recorder or 
er 
@ < inhalation sound >
7 $A: ja ur VÅR synpunkt HELST me 
hjälp av video / men om de möter 
stort motstånd så kan vi gå 
tibaks på den va men < | > de vi 
har inga möjliheter att titta till 
[24 exempel ]24 på minspel å 
sånt va å en massa såna saker om 
vi inte har video men // ja kan 
förstå
@ < hesitation sound >
$A: well from OUR point of view 
PREFERABLY with video / but if that 
meets great opposition we can back 
off on that one right but < | > it we 
have no possibility to look [24 for 
example ]24 at facial expressions 
and such right and a lot of such 
things if we do not have video but // 
I can understand
@ < hesitation sound >
Participant B’s question in utterance 6 is a quite simple way of finding out some-
thing which is of importance, namely whether the proposed recordings are video 
or audio recordings. One might speculate whether this is a way of “buying time” 
for participant B to ponder the proposal, or some kind of preparation for a re-
168 Chapter 5: Interaction in group decision-making
jection,1 but on a more direct level it is an elicitation of elaboration of the pro-
posal made in utterance 1.
5.3.5 Proclamation and topic introduction
In formal meetings the start and end of a decision episode is sometimes marked 
quite clearly. Typically, a meeting follows an agenda, and when moving to a new 
point on the agenda the topic is introduced without a proposal being made.
Excerpt 5-10. A850101, line 230: Example of a topic introduction.
A meeting with the board of a municipality in a rural area in southern Sweden. In 
utterance 1 the chairperson brings up an issue about employments at the municipality office 
(#1# to #2#), and then makes sure that all members have received information about the 
issue (#3# to #4#).
1 $A: e: / #1# punkten e // åtta 
angående tjänster på 
kommunalkontoret #2# / vill du / 
#3# di / ni har fått ut dom här / 
skrivelserna va #4#
$A: er / #1# paragraph er // eight 
concerning employments at the 
municipality office #2# / would you / 
#3# they / you have received these / 
papers right #4#
2 $X: m / < ja >
@ < ingressive >
$X: m / < yes >
@ < ingressive >
3 $A: å ni har tagit del uta dom och / 
Allansson kanske / kan närmare 
redogöra för de / varsågoda
$A: and you have read them and er / 
Allansson perhaps / can present 
them in greater detail / please
4 $D: herr ordförande ... $D: mister chairperson ...
In utterances 1 and 3 the chair introduces the topic, and then leaves the propos-
ing to participant D. This kind of topic introduction appears in less formal situ-
ations as well, as in the following excerpt.
Excerpt 5-11. A462701, line 65: Example of a topic introduction in an informal 
context.
A start-up meeting for a research project in the humanities. In utterance 1 participant J 
starts talking about nature and culture, which prompts participant T to bring up the 
question in utterance 2 about which concept of culture they should use in the project.
1 $J: ... åtminstone om man uppfatta 
verkliheten som dikotom / de vill 
säja kultur natur
$J: ... at least if you perceive reality 
as dichotomous / that is culture 
nature
2 $T: a / men vilket kulturbegrepp ska 
vi ha
$T: yeah / but which concept of 
culture should we have
3 $J: / < | > a just de de beror ju på 
hur man uppfattar de
@ < clear throat >
$J: / < | > yeah true that depends on 
how you perceive it
@ < clear throat >
1. This can be compared to the idea of insertion sequences and dispreferred seconds in CA; 
see for example (Levinson 1983:332 ff).
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Here, participant T introduces a topic by asking a question (in utterance 2), 
without proposing anything.
At the other end of the decision episode, formal meetings sometimes contain 
contributions that proclaim the decision that just has been made. Excerpt 5-8 on 
p. 167 above contain such a contribution in utterance 7. The chair declares the 
result of the election/decision, and marks this with a strike of his gavel. I have 
not found any such contributions in informal conversations, although similar 
things are thinkable, as in the following, invented example:
Figure 5-2: Informal proclamation.
A and B are in a grocery store, buying food for a dinner.
1 A: What do you say, should we make a separate dish for the kids? Pasta and 
meat balls?
2 B: Yes, that’s a good idea. 
3 A: Then we’ll do that.
In utterance 3, the decision is simply acknowledged, or proclaimed, analogous to 
the proclamation in utterance 7 in the formal situation in excerpt 5-8.
5.3.6 Non-stanced proposing
Sometimes a participant can present a proposal to the group without revealing if 
he wants the action to be done, or if he wants the receivers to consent to doing it 
(items ii and iii in the characterization of proposing above). An example is given 
in excerpt 5-12:
Excerpt 5-12. A850701, line 98: Example of a non-stanced proposal.
The building permit committee of a municipality in a rural area in southern Sweden has a 
meeting. They are going through applications for building permits. In utterance 1, the 
chairperson presents an application, which is commented on in utterance 2. 
1 $R: ... // (de) / e vi framme vi 
byggnaslovsansökningar / 
industriarbetare Lars Jönsson 
Vektorsvägen tre Lessebo 
enfamiljshus å garage (å tomt 
Berket) Snickarebo ett etthundrasju 
Bäckhult //
$R: ... // (it) / we have reached 
applications for building permits / 
industry worker Lars Jönsson three 
Vektorsvägen Lessebo single family 
house and garage and (and plot 
Berket) Snickarebo one one hundred 
seven Bäckhult //
2 $B: här ligger en lapp i ärendet att 
e de skulle vara en annan 
beteckning / (ett nittitvå) e de en 
annan tomt också då då gäller ju 
inte situationsplanen men vi får ju 
behandla de alleles som föreligger 
vi kan inte behandla nånting som vi 
inte vet nånting om
$B: there a note here about this 
matter that er there should be 
another identifier / (one ninety two) if 
it is another lot then the site plan is 
not valid but we have to take it up as 
it is given to us we cannot take up 
something we do not know anything 
about
3 $R: nähe $R: okay
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4 $B: här e allså den situationsplanen 
som föreligger / å här e ritningarna 
// å där e ingenting att erinra / mot 
de // där föreligger inget hinder för 
byggnadsnämnden att bevilja 
byggnaslovet
$B: so here is the site plan that we 
have / and here are the blue prints // 
and there is nothing to object against 
that // and so there is no 
impediment for the building permit 
committee to grant the building 
permit
In utterance 1, the chair introduces the next topic without revealing anything 
about his own opinion on the subject. Still, the utterance functions as an elicitor 
for evaluation to the other participants. In addition, participant B produces an 
accept in utterance 4. The proposal is quite clear, but participant R is not really 
the one proposing. Rather, participant R presents a proposal that the applicant 
(Lars Jönsson) has made. The communicative act in utterance 1 is called a non-
stanced proposing, with the following characterization:
i) It presents or points out a future or on-going action A as a possibility.
ii) The sender S does not reveal if he wants A to take place.
iii) S wants the receiver(s) to evaluate A.
Utterance 1 is also a topic introduction; a single utterance often serves these two 
functions. However, a topic introduction need not be a non-stanced proposing, 
as excerpt 5-11 and 5-12 show, nor does a non-stanced proposing need to be a 
topic introduction, for example when somebody, while discussing some issue, 
presents an alternative but argues against it.
Note that it might be quite difficult to say whether a proposing is non-stanced or 
stanced, both for the other participants and for the analyst. The attitude towards 
a proposal can be communicated with prosody, gaze and other non-verbal com-
munication, making it less explicit. This ambiguity is probably exploited by parti-
cipants who make the proposals in order to avoid committing themselves too 
strongly to the proposal, while hinting that they are positive to it. See pp. 206-10 
for a discussion of this.
5.3.7 Other acts
The group decision-making episodes in these recordings contain many commun-
icative acts and sequences that are not specific for group decision-making, such 
as feedback, clarifications and own communication management (Allwood 
1995). Episodes may contain longer or smaller segments where participants leave 
the actual decision-making to engage in some other activity. This may be some-
thing directly relevant to decision-making, such as finding some relevant inform-
ation in some papers or setting up technical equipment, but it can also be a di-
version, such as discussing what happened last weekend or commenting 
somebody’s new hair-cut.
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5.3.8 Reflections and expectations
There are interesting cases when a decision episode begins with the group start-
ing to do something (or treating an issue as if a decision has been made on it), 
and then somebody objects to whatever the group is doing:
Excerpt 5-13. V321601, line 125: Example illustrating the importance of 
reflection.
A choir has been invited to participate in a show that an artist is setting up. Information 
has been sent to the choir members some days before, and now, during a rehearsal, 
participation in the show is being discussed. Participant A is the conductor, participant B is 
a member of the choir board, and participant G is a member of the choir who is not a 
member of the board. In utterance 1, participant A presents the situation and invitation, 
and then the choir discusses the details of participation for quite a while. In utterance 23, 
participant A details how each member should report which days he or she can participate in 
the show.
1 $A: ... de är väl förmodligen för att 
Magnus Uggla har nått jubileum // 
och där ska han ha föreställningar 
nu hela hösten på // på Rondo och 
då vill dom ha en / kör som sjunger 
ett e // nått slags barockstycke / 
nyskrivet barockstycke i början av 
den föreställningen / två minuter 
drygt / e långt // e // å de är ju 
asså en förfärlig massa 
föreställningar onsda torsda freda 
lörda // hela hösten från den 
tjugoförsta september / fram ti den 
nittonde DEcember // å då ve de 
var de två körer som fick denna 
förfrågan via musikhögskolan // de 
va <2 Con Sonora >2 och // <3 
Illfyr >3 Britta Krame hon som / 
ledde en afrikan+ // afri+ af+ 
afrikan+ // (...) /// dom kan inte ta 
allting naturlitvis ( <4 fs >4 ) inga 
möjligheter (utan) dom frågade oss 
/ om vi <5 vi+ >5 var intresserade å 
då skickade jag ut de här mejlet / 
(...) fundera på till ida / och dom 
har även frågat // Godehamns 
kammarkör om dom kan ta något 
// å då har vi kommit ner till att / vi 
/ om de e möjligt // #1# om vi vill 
de här för de första #2# // så / får 
vi / i uppdrag att försöka lösa / tre 
stycken veckor / ...
$A: ... it is probably because 
Magnus Uggla has some kind of 
anniversary // and he is going to 
have shows there this entire 
autumn at // at Rondo and then 
they want a / choir singing a er // 
some kind of baroque piece // a 
new baroque piece at the start of 
that show / just over two minutes 
er long // er // and it is a terrible 
lot of shows wednesday thursday 
friday saturday // the entire 
autumn from twenty first of 
september / up until nineteenth of 
DEcember // and then tha were 
there were two choirs that got this 
request via the academy of music // 
it was <2 Con Sonora >2 and // <3 
Illfyr >3 Britta Krame the one who / 
conducted and africa+ // afri+ af+ 
africa+ // (...) /// they can not take 
all of if of course (there is) no 
possibility (but) they asked us / if 
we wan+ were interested and then I 
sent this email / (...) consider until 
today / and they have also asked // 
Godehamn chamber choir if they 
can take something // and then we 
have come up to that / we / if it is 
possible // #1# if we want this first 
of all #2# // then / it will / be our 
task to try to sort out / three weeks 
/ ...
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@ <2 name of choir >2
@ <3 name of choir >3
@ <4 estimated full expression: det 
finns >4
@ <5 cutoff: vill >5
@ <2 name of choir >2
@ <3 name of choirc>3
21 utterances where the choir discusses practical details of participation.
23 $A: < så // så tror ja de e s att // 
de visar sej / har man då // i första 
hand > så skriver man upp sej å ja 
har en sån här // en sån här lista // 
å de e en massa rö:da siffror här 
och under dom / kryssar man i å 
säger att / de där kan ja / å de e 
aså onsda torsda freda lörda / varje 
vecka / vecka fyrtifyra fyrtifem 
fyrtisex /// e / å / tyvärr / eller så / 
så e de så att vi må:ste på nåt sätt 
lämna besked ikväll om de e 
möjligt / s att vi behöver ta en 
stund till detta // så att / kan ni // 
kan ni egentlien göra så här att ni 
// under den här repetitionen nu på 
nåt sätt så kan ni väl göra nån 
anteckning nånstans att jag kan 
inte / (...) vecka den å den å [13 
den dan ]13
@ < event: many people talking and 
laughing >
$A: < and // and that’s the way it is 
I think so / we’ll see / if you got // 
first and foremost > you write your 
name and I have this // this list 
here // and there are lots of red 
numbers here and under them you 
tick the box saying that / I can 
come this time / and it is 
Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Saturday / every week / week 
fortyfour fortyfive fortysix /// er / 
and / unfortunately / or it / it turns 
out that we ha:ve to in some way 
answer the invitation tonight if it is 
possible / so we need to take a 
moment for this // so / you can // 
you can actually do it like this you 
// during this rehearsal in some 
way you can write down somewhere 
that I can’t // (...) week this and this 
and [13 this day ]13
@ < event: many people talking and 
laughing >
24 $G: [13 har ]13 vi sagt att vi ska 
göra de som kör
$G: [13 have ]13 we said that we 
are going to do it as a choir
25 $A: #3# nej de har vi inte gjort / de 
ser vi ju inte förrän e #4# / [14 
eller // jaha en ]14 diskussion om 
vi ska göra de över huvud taget 
#5# |
$A: #3# no we haven’t done that / 
we won’t see that until er #4# / [14 
or // okay a ]14 discussion if we are 
going to do it at all #5# | 
26 $B: [14 men en diskussion eller ]14 $B: [14 but a discussion right ]14
27 $B: a: e styrelsen tyckte att vi skulle 
göra de om de e så att folk vill å 
kan så sa vi vi bara glömde säga de 
< förut >
@ < giggle: several people >
$B: yeah er the board thought we 
should do it if it is the case that 
people want to and have the 
opportunity we said that we we just 
forgot to say that < before >
@ < giggle: several people >
28 $A: [15 ja ]15 / ja men de e ju rätt 
ordet e fritt < | >
@ < event: C raises her hand >
$A: yes / yes but that’s right the 
debate is open
@ < event: C raises her hand >
In utterance 1 the conductor makes a non-stanced proposing, informing mem-
bers about the invitation without really revealing what his attitude towards it is. 
He does specify that the choir should make a decision on whether they should 
participate at all (#1# to #2#), but this is not followed up. In utterance 23, the 
Communicative acts in group decision-making 173
conductor has started to instruct people what to do, as if the choir had already 
decided that participating in the show is a good idea; it seems that it all depends 
on whether or not enough members have enough time to spare. In utterance 24 
a member raises the question of whether the choir should participate at all, inde-
pendent of whether its members can spare the time or not. Participant A first 
misunderstands the question (#3# to #4#), but assisted by participant B in ut-
terance 26, he realizes his mistake (#4# to #5#). The board member B makes a 
kind of apology in utterance 27 for not having put that question to the choir, and 
the conductor invites all members to give their view on the issue. The conversa-
tion continues for several minutes with choir members doing so (mostly argu-
ments in favor of participating in the show).
From an analytical viewpoint, the tricky part here is that although utterance 24 
sparks off a group decision, it is not (obviously) a proposing. So how should it 
be analyzed? One alternative is to base the analysis of the example on presup-
positions, similar to Severinson Eklundh’s (1983:21 ff.) analysis of dialogue, us-
ing the concepts of latent sub-games. For our purposes, a latent sub-game can be 
described as a presupposition that is understood and accepted by the listener:1
A: The king of France is here.
B: Is he? I thought he had gone home for the weekend.
Here the phrase ‘the king of France’ presupposes that there is a person that can 
be referred to with that phrase, and participant A expects participant B to be able 
to identify that person. Participant B readily does so, and the latent sub-game 
stays latent. However, if participant B is not able to identify the person, then the 
latent sub-game becomes a free one, as in the following example:
A: The king of France is here.
B: There is no king of France!
A: Jean-Pierre Dupont, the professor of Philosophy. We call him the king of 
France.
B: Oh. Very funny. He’s bald. But I thought he had gone home for the weekend.
Here participant B misunderstands the reference of the phrase ‘the king of 
France’, and protests against its presupposition. The latent sub-game is then real-
ised into a free sub-game, aimed at identifying the referent of the phrase ‘the 
king of France’. It should be said that there may be many latent subgames in a 
single utterance, and only the ones that the listener questions become realized 
into free sub-games.
Utterance 24 in excerpt 5-13, then, might be the realization of a latent sub-game. 
However, it is tricky to find the precise part of utterance 23 that carries the pre-
position that utterance 24 would be a protest against, especially if that presup-
position should not be carried by any of the previous utterances (2-22, where de-
1. See for example (Levinson 1983) for a detailed discussion of presuppositions.
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tails of the participation is also discussed). One must remember that presupposi-
tions are tied to specific words or phrases, and generally are not very dependent 
on context (Levinson 1983:179). Utterance 24 seems to be a protest against the 
relevance of utterance 23, rather than its validity or intelligibility. One could as-
sume a very general relevance presupposition, that every utterance presupposes 
that it is relevant at its current place in the current conversation, but that would 
overlap with Grice’s maxim of relevance or Allwood’s assumption of goal effi-
ciency (see p. 26-7 ff.), and be better handled as an implicature rather than a pre-
supposition.  
A better alternative is to analyze the situation in excerpt 5-13 in terms of reflec-
tion. A participant in an activity can at any time reflect over the activity structure, 
the language used, the purpose of the activity, or something else in the situation 
and this reflection may lead to communicative behavior, such as utterance 24 in 
5-13. There was no particular phrase or communicative act in the preceding ut-
terances that participant G reacted against, rather, the entire discussion had 
come to concern a level of detail that would only be relevant if the choir decided 
that it would like to go along with the project. The result is essentially that utter-
ance 23 creates an implicature stating that its level of detail is relevant, and thus 
that the choir has decided to participate in the show. One could also say that the 
general behavior of the conductor creates this implicature. However, this im-
plicature is not obvious and it is likely that several participants have not noticed 
it. Further, the amount of time spent on the details is probably crucial, so utter-
ance 23 might have been allowed to pass, had it not been for the fact that the de-
tails had already been the topic for discussion for a while (utterances 2 through 
22). These two factors – that the implicature is non-obvious and that it is con-
nected to the amount of time spent on the issue – make it questionable whether 
to call it an implicature at all. The reflection made by participant G is more 
important. 
Participant G then points out that participation is a possibility, eliciting evalu-
ation from the other members, without really revealing her own attitude towards 
participation. In other words, she makes a non-stanced proposing. 
Another example warrants a similar analysis:
Excerpt 5-14. A462701, line 201: A situation which can be analyzed with the 
concept of reflection.
Some researchers in the humanities have gathered to discuss a common research project 
concerning culture and nature. They have been discussing the concept of culture for a while 
(approximately 40 utterances). In utterance 5 participant M claims that they are talking 
about things they should not talk about (right now).
1 $J: ja / ja precis / asså de / de 
kulturbegreppet som ja e ju fakti+ 
ha ju förekommit rätt ofta i 
$J: yes / yes exactly / you know the / 
the concept of culture that I is actu+ 
has been used quite often i social 
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socialantropologin // de e ju 
liksom de hä breda de kallas ju till 
å me för omnibus: / ibland va /
anthropology // it is like this wide it is 
indeed even called omnibus: / 
sometimes right
2 $S: < omnibus >
@ < quiet >
$S: < omnibus >
@ < quiet >
3 $J: a: jo om ni tittar på Kroebers två 
[26 hundra ]26 kulturdefinitioner 
[27 så förekommer de rätt ofta ]27
$J: yeah yes if you look at Kroeber’s 
two [26 hundred ]26 definitions of 
culture [27 then you will see that it 
occurs quite often ]27
4 $M: [26 men ]26 $M: [26 but ]26
5 $M: [27 a: m: ]27 / men ja har en 
liten ordningsfråga fö ja / upplever 
< | > att de va inte de som vi skulle 
[28 prata om ]28
@ < puff: J >
$M: [27 yea:h m: ]27 / but I have a 
point of order because I / feel < | > 
that this is not what we were 
supposed to [28 talk about ]28
@ < puff: J >
6 $J: [28 nä precis ]28 / å därför ville 
inte ja heller ta upp den fö fem 
minute sen nä detta började
$J: [28 no exactly ]28 / and that is 
why I did not want to bring it up five 
minutes ago when this started
My understanding of this example is that one of the participants, M, reflects on 
the topic of the conversation and finds that he does not like it. In utterance 5, he 
brings this up for discussion, proposing that they change topic. There is nothing 
particular in the immediately preceding utterances to prompt his protests, rather, 
he objects to the entire topic, which has been going on for some 40 utterances.
Excerpt 5-1 above provides an interesting contrast in relation to excerpt 5-13. 
An interesting question concerning excerpt 5-13 is how participation in the show 
almost became a planned action without a (proper) decision. The project was 
quite beneficial for the choir, and the arguments following utterance 28 shows 
that most members considered it a great opportunity (to make money for the 
choir). It was thus a fairly easy and obvious decision, and the conductor is likely 
to have expected the choir to go along with the project. However, in 5-1 the con-
ductor tells the choir which song to start rehearsing, and they all start doing as he 
says. This conductor is not very authoritarian; some member could have objected, 
possibly proposing some other song to start with (such things do happen in this 
choir). The conductor could also have said something like, ‘I think we ought to 
start rehearsing in carnatus et, is that ok with you all?,’ which would have made it a 
straight-forward proposing. But he did not, and nobody objected to the sugges-
ted song. The conductor is likely to have expected everybody to follow his sugges-
tion, so he phrased it as information giving, simply stating the name of the song, 
meaning roughly ‘this is the song I have planned to start rehearsing’. He would 
probably have been quite surprised had anybody objected, just as he was sur-
prised when participant G made her non-stanced proposing in excerpt 5-13. Ac-
tions that everybody is expected to consent to can thus be handled with instruc-
tions (orders) rather than group decisions. (Although there may be other reasons 
to use group decisions.)
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5.3.9 Formal procedures
In formal situations there is typically a set of rules/conventions that the group 
either is forced to adhere to or chooses to follow. Sometimes these rules are 
specified as rules of order for the organization, and sometimes the participants 
simply rely on conventions. Precisely which rules of order exist in Sweden, or 
how well participants in a formal meeting adhere to the written norm, is beyond 
the scope of the present work. However, several of the mechanisms in formal 
meetings can be explained with what has been said about group decision-making 
in general.
A general property of group decisions is that they can be quite elusive; it may be 
unclear if a decision has been made or not, both for the analyst and participants. 
The episodes of this kind that were found in the recordings studied here are all 
too long to be used as illustrations here, but a single utterance from one of the 
recordings serves the purpose:
Excerpt 5-15. V770201, line 4719: Example showing that group decisions can be 
unclear for the participants.
A consultancy company has had a long meeting discussing strategies for the future. 
Reluctantly, participant T has accepted responsibility for organizing an event for prospective 
customers. The question whether to send letters to the prospective customers was discussed at 
some length. When participants are about to leave, T returns to the letters.
$T: får ja fråga / blev de nåra 
brevutskick överhuvudtaget / blev de 
nån som blev beslut / va de nåt 
beslut om brevutskick
$T: can I ask / were there any letters at 
all / was there any that was decided / 
was there any decision on sending 
letters
Participant T’s uncertainty shows that the vague character of group decisions is a 
problem for the analysts, as well as participants. One of the motivations of form-
al procedures seems to be that adhering to a system makes decisions clearer. Ex-
cerpt 5-2 on p. 159 above illustrates this function. The chair first brings up the 
topic, referring to an agenda that everybody can look at, making it clear what the 
topic for decision is. Next, the chair makes a proposal, and asks the rest of the 
group if they have other proposals. Only when it is clear that no proposal has 
been missed, does the chair move on to the actual decision by asking the group 
if the suggested person can be appointed. The verbal report of the members’ ac-
ceptance licenses the chair to proclaim that the suggested person has been elec-
ted, and the decision is sealed with a strike of the gavel. The explicit question to 
the group if the person can be appointed, in combination with the proclamation, 
makes the content of the decision very clear. The final strike of the gavel is also a 
very precise signal of the end of the decision.
However, it should be noted that the use of formal rules in no way guarantees 
the clarity of group decisions. First, the formal procedures may be difficult to 
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understand or follow and may confuse the participants more than they clarify, 
second, it may be difficult in practice to follow them strictly, as illustrated below.
Excerpt 5-16. A850701, line 460: Example showing that formal procedures may 
be difficult to follow.
The board of a municipality in a rural area in southern Sweden has a meeting. In utterance 
1 the chairperson closes issue 10 by proclaiming the result of the acclamation, and striking 
his gavel (#1# to #2#). He then proceeds to issue 11 (#2# to #3#), but is interrupted 
by participant V in utterance 2 (asking permission to talk). In utterance 3 the chairperson 
gives V permission to talk, and in utterance 4, V returns to the previous issue.
1 $R: #1# svaret e ja <1 | >1 #2# // 
elva Bäckhult <2 ik >2 Bäckhult 
byggnad för omklädning med mera 
avstyckning från fastigheten (...) 
ettjugonio Bäckhult / 
förhandsgranskning av 
situationsplan #3#
@ <1 event: strike of chairperson's 
gavel >1
@ <2 abbreviation >2
$R: #1# the answer is yes <1 | >1 
#2# // eleven Bäckhult <2 ik >2 
Bäckhult building for changing 
rooms et cetera partitioning from 
the lot (...) one twenty nine 
Bäckhult / preview of situation 
plan #3#
@ <1 event: strike of chairperson's 
gavel >1
@ <2 abbreviation >2
2 $V: herr ordförande $V: mister chairperson
3 $R: varsågod $R: proceed
4 $V: e får ja bara återkomma ti förra 
ärendet / vi får väl skriva lite om 
konstruktionsritningar där va och /
$V: er could I just return to the 
previous issue / we’ll have to write 
something about the construction 
blue prints as well don’t we and /
5 $R: e de e klart att [49 vi ska ha 
di ]49
$R: er well we obviously [49 need 
to get it there ]49
6 $V: [49 (...) ]49 [50 ja just ]50 [51 
de ]51
$V: [49 (...) ]49 [50 yes yes ]50 [51 
exactly ]51
7 $R: [50 att vi ]50 [51 ska ]51 $R: [50 that we ]50 [51 will ]51
8 $B: [51 har ]51 vi inte fått fått in 
dom
$B: [51 haven’t ]51 we received 
them
9 $V: inte [52 
konstruktionsritningarna ]52
$V: not [52 the construction blue 
prints ]52
10 $R: [52 konstruktionsritningarna ]52 
[53 vävritningar ]53
$R: [52 construction blue prints ]52 
[53 plan drawings ]53
11 $B: [53 men dom måste vi ]53 
skicka in för granskning också eller 
du granskar dom kanske
$B: [53 but we have to send ]53 
those for review too or perhaps you 
can review them 
12 $V: e [54 e ]54 $V: er [54 er ]54
13 $B: [54 dom kan du granska ]54 $B: [54 you can review them ]54
14 $V: de gör ja $V: I’ll do that
15 $B: jaha de vore bra / å skriva nåra 
rader om de bara så e lägga de ti 
ärendet /
$B: okay that would be fins / and 
just write some lines about it er 
add it to the issue /
16 $R: likaså vävritning $R: vävritningar too
17 $V: (arkivritningar) $V: (archive blue prints)
18 $R: < bra > /// $R: fine ///
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In utterance 4 participant V returns to an issue that has already been decided on 
(the start of utterance 1 is the end of that decision episode). However, the clarity 
of the decision is quite lost after the informal additions made in utterance 4 to 
18.
Another phenomenon particular to formal situations is voting, for example, 
cases where decisions have to be made even though consensus has not been 
reached. In some cases, a manager can decide what to do, but in other cases, vot-
ing is used. Note that voting by acclamation cannot always be distinguished from 
ordinary group acceptance (for example utterance 6 in excerpt 5-8).
The third characteristic of formal procedures is that they give the participants a 
chance to be prepared. Using an agenda, notifying those who are to attend one 
week in advance, repeating the proposal before each decision, all work to avoid 
surprises. An example of this is the meeting with the City District Committee 
analyzed below. Each party needs to discuss and prepare the issues that are to be 
decided, and thus only issues that are on the agenda are decided on, normally.
Formal procedures are discussed further on pp. 202-4 below.
5.4 Analyses of each conversation in the corpus
All the studied recordings that contain a substantial number of group decision 
episodes exhibit rather distinct patterns for how a group decision is made. Using 
the communicative acts and concepts described above, it is now possible to ana-
lyze these patterns. In this section the recordings in the corpus will be presented; 
for each of these, typical patterns for decision-making will be shown.
5.4.1 A321001 – Quitting Work, and AXX0101 – Buying a Car 
Each of the two recordings contains a single decision episode, that is, a single is-
sue is discussed throughout the recording. It is thus not possible to make gen-
eralizations about how decisions are made in these groups. However, these re-
cordings are part of the body of recordings that form the basis the general 
observations in section 5.5.
5.4.2 A321601 – Budget Negotiation
A project leader at a large company has made a budget for his project. At this 
meeting his managers are to approve or reject the budget. Although the man-
agers have institutional power over the project leader, they all seem to prefer to 
behave as if the division of power is symmetrical; they try to reach some kind of 
consensus. The managers explain why they disagree with the budget, and the 
project leader is allowed to argue for his view. Still, the inequality of the relation-
ship is clear, as shown in excerpt 5-17:
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Excerpt 5-17. A321601, line 208: Assymetrical power relations between 
participants.
The participants have started to go through the budget. The managers (participants A and 
B) think that the costs that the project leader (participant C) has specified are too high. In 
utterance 1 participant C is objecting to the way the managers are discussing the budget (in 
bundles, #1# to #2#), and proposes another way (#2 to #3#). In utterance 2 he is 
interrupted by participant A, who rejects C’s proposal.
1 $C: #1# men ska vi göra för ja tror 
att de e farlit å ta de liksom klumpvis 
#2# / utan vi kanske ska ta de // del 
för del då va de gäller manualerna 
#3# // för e / börjar vi diskutera 
klumpvis då får vi ju hamnar vi ju // 
[33 (...) ]33
$C: #1# but should we because I 
think that it is dangerous to take it 
like in bundles #2# / but perhaps we 
should take it // part by part when it 
comes to the manuals #3# // 
because er // if we start discussing 
in bundles we will have to we will end 
up // [33 (...) ]33
2 $A: #4# [33 nej ja tror att ]33 de vi 
ska göra e väl egentligen att // att 
diskutera klumpvis vi ansätter en 
nivå som vi tycker e rimli // och sen 
så får vi i så fall hellre säga lägga in 
de som ett / ett < a-spelkort > nån 
risk i så fall / för resursallokering // 
i så fall #5# // vi vi kan inte gärna gå 
ut för / vi vet ju a erfarenhet också 
att / om du får timmar eller pengar / 
så har dom en förmåga att så a säga 
förbrukas #6#
@ < letter: a >
$A: #4# [33 no I think that ]33 what 
we really should do is to / to discuss 
in bundles we set a level that we 
think is reasonable // and then it is 
better we add it as an < a > playing 
card some risk in that case / for 
resource allocation // in that case 
#5# // we we can’t really go out to / 
we know from experience too that / 
if you get hours or money / then they 
have a tendency to be spent #6#
@ < letter >
3 $C: mhm $C: mhm
4 $A: och de måste vi också hålla emot 
//
$A: and we have to resist that too //
In utterance 1 the project leader makes a suggestion on how to go through the 
budget, and the manager (participant A) then quite bluntly refuses (#4# to 
#5#), arguing that participant C spends money unnecessarily (#5# to #6#). 
This shows the unequal relationship between the participants.
The budget can be viewed as a proposal from the project leader; therefore, when 
the managers object to some part in it, then that is a rejection of (a part of) the 
proposal. The general pattern of what counts as a group decision in this conver-
sation is that a decision has been made when nobody argues about it anymore; at 
that point, the decision is what the managers want. Excerpt 5-18 illustrates this.
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Excerpt 5-18. A321601, line 283: Example of what counts as a decision. 
The participants have started to go through the budget. The managers (A and B) think that 
the costs that the project leader (C) has specified are too high. Participant C has been 
arguing for quite some time that the costs are well motivated, and he continues to do so in 
utterance 1. In utterance 2 and 3 the managers state that they still think the costs are too 
high.
1 $C: men detta har inte varit så lätt 
tidigare // vad det gäller 
förändringarna i < xojn > // för Dekos 
/ att kunna identifiera skillnaderna // 
det har inte varit så lätt för oss att 
göra det // och jag eh // hoppas att 
det blir lättare i det här projektet men 
det har inte varit det //
@ < abbreviation: xoj >
$C: but this has not been easy 
before // regarding the changes 
in the < xjo > // for Dekos / to be 
able to identify the differences // 
it has not been easy for us to do 
that // and I er // hope that it will 
be easier in this project but it has 
not been so //
@ < abbreviation: xoj >
2 $A: nej / men på nåt sätt så måste vi 
få ner den till till en rimlig [43 
nivå ]43 / den här // det här paketet 
och
$A: no / but in one way or 
another we have to get it down to 
a reasonable [43 level ]43 / this 
// this bundle and
3 $B: [43 m ]43 $B: [43 m ]43
4 $C: vad tycker ni är rimligt då // vad 
hade eran bild av / ett 
dokumentationspaket varit då
$C: So what do you think is 
reasonable then // what would 
your picture of / a documentation 
bundle have been then
5 $B: ja $B: yes
6 $A: jag skulle [44 säga ]44 två 
tredjedelar av det //
$A: I would [44 say ]44 two thirds 
of it //
7 $B: [44 ja ]44 $B: [44 yes ]44
8 $B: ja det är fyra+ / +tusen timmar $B: yes it is four / thousand hours
9 $A: m /// $A: m ///
10 $B: det det det det har väl jag också 
som // känsla då då att det skulle // 
kunna räcka så att säga
$B: that that that that is also like 
my // feeling like that it could // 
be enough so to speak
11 $C: men ska vi ta tillbaka det här och 
så för jag en diskussion igen med // 
< PA > och // Ulf Svensson // om 
timmarna ///
@ < abbreviation >, < name >
$C: well should we take this back 
and I will discuss this with / 
< PA > and // Ulf Svensson // 
about the hours ///
@ < abbreviation >, < name >
In utterance 4 the project leader (participant C) seems to have realised that it 
does not matter how much he argues for his costs, and simply asks the managers 
what they think the total cost should be. They provide this information in utter-
ances 6 to 10, and participant C then accepts that proposal in utterance 11, say-
ing that he will work on the budget to make it shrink to the level that the man-
agers have specified. 
Considering the discussion in 3.5.1 and the definition of group decision, one may 
ask if this is really an example of group decision at all. Is it not just the managers 
telling the project leader what to do? (It is of course a group decision in the 
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sense that the managers decide together, but on the other hand it seems like they 
have made that decision beforehand.) I consider it a somewhat unclear case, but 
since it has the form of a group discussion, and the project leader is allowed to 
argue for his case, the conversation has been included in the study.
5.4.3 A322501 - Budget Revision
The project leader from the recording Budget Negotiation has gathered his pro-
ject members to revise the budget. The discussion is centered around the budget 
document, which is being edited on the project leader’s computer. Typically the 
project leader proposes things, or asks for proposals on specific issues, some-
times by reading parts of the document, and the other participants accept or pro-
pose something else. Excerpt 5-19 shows a typical decision episode:
Excerpt 5-19. A322501, line 861: A typical decision episode. 
In going through of the budget, the participants have reached a certain part. In utterance 1 
the project leader, participant A, asks the other members if they can predict any costs for 
that particular part of the project.
1 $A: ja // har vi nåra kostnader 
|18.0
$A: yes // do we have any costs 
|18.0
2 $B: i arbetspaketet så står de va 
står de här står de att man måste 
göra de flera gånger ///
$B: in the job package it says what 
does it say it says here that it must 
be done several times ///
3 $A: du menar att de (här skulle 
levereras) flera [95 gånger ]95 nä 
de står de finns ett eget 
arbetspaket på de
$A: you mean that this (should be 
delivered) several [95 times ]95 no it 
says there is a separate job package 
on that
4 $B: [95 m: ]95 $B: [95 m: ]95
5 $B: ja fast de fick vi ju inte ha eller 
hur va de
$B: yes but we were not allowed to 
have that or were we
6 $A: jo de e en reserv precis som 
ö: / a den har ja kallat slutgiltig 
< ipl > på den (punkten) /// så
@ < abbreviation >
$A: yes it is a backup just like er / 
well I have called it final < ipl >on 
that item /// so
@ < abbreviation >
7 $B: mhm // men i detta så 
behöver man inte hålla på me 
längd vikt bredd å höjd å 
natokodningar å allt tjosan
$B: mhm // but in this there is no 
need to worry about length weight 
width and height and nato codes and 
all that stuff
8 $A: nä / gör de de i Vinsler $A: no / is it so in Vinsler
9 $B: a $B: yeah
10 $A: okej vi låter den / dära vara 
då
$A: okey we’ll leave that / one as it 
is then
In utterance 1, the project leader, participant A, prompts the other participants 
to evaluate what is already written in the text. During the 18-second pause, the 
participants probably read the relevant text. After some arguing, participant A 
agrees in utterance 10 to leave the written text as it is. 
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Even though the project leader probably has institutional power to decide what 
to write in the budget, the other participants’ opinions seem to be equally im-
portant. Not once does the project leader ignore the others’ objections; all deci-
sions are made in consensus. However, the project leader is the one who leads 
the discussion, and he is usually the one who brings up a topic. He decides when 
to proceed to the next part of the budget, and he is almost always the one who 
formulates the text. Thus the general key to what counts as a decision in this 
group is that the project leader proposes something, and unless the others expli-
citly reject the proposal, it is considered as accepted. The rejections are also 
counter-arguments rather than counter-proposals, and the project leader is typic-
ally the one who phrases the new proposal, or modifies the first proposal to ac-
commodate the objections.
5.4.4 A462701 - Culture-Nature Project
In this recording some researchers have gathered to discuss a common research 
project concerning culture and nature. They are all equals in terms of institution-
al power. This decision group is a bit peculiar, in that all the decision episodes 
found in the conversation concern what to discuss. Quite early in the conversa-
tion the question of which culture concept to use arises; some group members 
want to discuss it and some do not. The general rule seems to be that an issue 
will be discussed as long as at least one participant wants to discuss it. Here is an 
example:
Excerpt 5-20. A462701, line 210: Example of how a single participant “forces” the 
other ones to keep discussing an issue.
The participants have been discussing the concept of culture for a while. In utterance 1 
participant M proposes that they stop talking about that.
1 $M: a: m: / men ja har en liten 
ordningsfråga < | > fö ja / upplever 
att de va < inte de > som vi skulle 
[28 prata om ]28
@ < sigh: J >
$M: yeah m: / but I have a question 
of procedure < | > because I feel that 
it was not that that we should [28 
talk about ]28
@ < sigh: J >
2 $J: [28 nä precis ]28 / å därför ville 
inte ja heller ta upp den fö fem 
minute sen nä detta började
$J: [28 no exactly ]28 / and that was 
why I did not want to bring it up five 
minutes ago when this started
3 $M: / då ha vi konstaterat att vi har 
dessa skillnade:r / å så [29 kan vi 
ta ]29
$M: / so we have established that 
we have these differences / and [28 
now we can look at ]29
4 $S: [29 å sen t+ ungefär som e ]29 
som min information / så ja tycker 
de vi ska va [30 tacksamma ]30 fö
$S: [29 and so t+ about like er ]29 
like my information / that’s what I 
think we should be [30 grateful ]30 
for
5 $M: [30 a: ]30 < | > / så vi kan 
liksom: komma tibaka ti de nä de 
bli relevanta nä vi börja formulera 
våra frågeställningar ja tror [31 att 
om v+ ]31
$M: [30 yeah ]30 < | > we can come 
back like to it when it is relevant 
when we start to formulate our 
research questions I think [31 that if 
w+ ]31
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@ < inhalation sound > @ < inhalation sound >
6 $T: [31 men e vi ]31 medvetna om 
att vi har lite olika kulturbegrepp /
$T: [31 but if we ]31 are aware that 
we have somewhat different 
concepts of culture /
7 $S: ja $S: yes
8 $T: så räcker de för att 
diskussionen ska kunna få (...)
$T: then it is enough for the 
discussion to (...)
9 $S: a ja $S: yeah yes
10 $J: men åtminstone asså va ja 
kommer eftesom de nu e fatist 
eftesom vi ta upp de va / 
begreppet SYMBOL e inte 
oproblematist va /
$J: but at least I mean what I will 
since now it is acutally since we 
bring it up right / the concept 
SYMBOL is not unproblematic right /
11 $S: nä: $S: no
In utterance 1, one of the participants proposes that they stop talking about the 
concept of culture, and two of the other three participants agree. Even the 
fourth participant, J, seems to accept at first (in utterance 2), but turns around in 
utterance 10 and continues the discussion of culture. The other ones do not pro-
test against this, but simply follow J in the discussion. This is perhaps a peculiar-
ity for this kind of conversational decision (choosing topic), that all participants 
have a veto for leaving a topic. The same pattern is repeated several times in the 
conversation.
5.4.5 A792501 - Esperanto Foundation
There are four participants in this meeting, one of whom is the chairperson. 
Most of the meeting involves going through lists of newly published books in or 
about Esperanto and deciding which books to buy. The formal rules of the 
foundation allow differences in opinion to be settled by voting, but that is never 
used in the present recording. Rather, the degree of unity is massive; comprom-
ise is rarely ever necessary. Excerpt 5-21 shows an example:
Excerpt 5-21. A792501, line 1266: Example of a decision episode.
The participants are going through a list of books, deciding which books to buy. In utterance 
1 participant A points out a new book by an author called Markheden.
1 $A: ja e: m och sen finns de ju då 
ytteliare en ett svenskt // litet verk 
nämligen Markheden som kommer 
me < Svedaj // [375 birdoj > 
(här) ]375
@ < other language: Esperanto >
$A: yes er m and there is also 
another a Swedish // little book 
that is Markheden that is 
releasing < Svedaj [375 birdoj > 
(here) ]375
@ < other language: Esperanto >
2 $C: [375 å då e de en 
förbättrad ]375 utgåva av den 
< Svedaj birdoj > som vi redan [376 
har ]376
@ < other language: Esperanto >
$C: [375 and that is an 
improved ]375 edition of the 
< Svedaj birdoj > that we already 
[376 have ]376
@ < other language: Esperanto >
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3 $D: [376 vi ]376 har redan den ja har 
för mej ja
$D: [376 we ]376 already have 
that one I think yes
4 $A: ha: $A: okay
5 $C: vi har den gamla e: nu vet inte ja 
hu den här ser ut om den har en: 
snyggare omslag eller nånting sånt 
där frågan är då elle om till å me e 
så att s:aker som va felaktia i den 
gamla e [377 tillrättade ]377 eller e 
dom [378 e kompletterade ]378 / så 
frågan e om vi ska bry oss elle om vi
$C: we have the old one er I do not 
know how this one looks if it has a 
prettier cover or something like 
that the question is or if even it is 
the case that things that were 
incorrect in the old one are [377 
corrected ]377 or are they [378 er 
added ]378 / so the question is if 
we should care or if we
6 $D: [377 < a > ]377
@ < ingressive >,< quiet >
$D: [377 < yeah > ]377
@ < quiet >
7 $A: [378 a ]378 $A: [378 yeah ]378
8 $A: nä de man man kan väl säga om 
vi // om de e nån som visar intresse 
för den gamla så kunde man ju då 
kan de ju vara intressant [374 å 
skaffa den nya ]374 men de e inte
$A: no I guess we could say that if 
we // if there is anybody who 
shows an interest in the old one 
then perhaps we could then it 
could be interesting [374 to get 
the new one ]374 but that isn’t
9 $C: [374 å de ha ingen gjort < skulle 
ja vilja säga > ]374
@ < giggling >
$C: [374 and nobody has done 
that < if you ask me > ]374
@ < giggling >
10 $C: nä [379 ska vi stryka den 
då ]379
$C: no [379 we leave that one 
then ]379
11 $A: [379 de e inte de så ]379 kan vi 
[380 ju låta ]380 vara då
$A: [379 nobody has then ]379 we 
can [380 let it ]380 be then
12 $C: [380 a ]380 $C: [380 yeah ]380
13 $C: < a >
@ < ingressive >,< quiet >
$C: < yeah >
@ < quiet >
14 $A: // visst // ... $A: // sure // ...
Utterance 1 is a non-stanced proposing to buy a book, where participant A does 
not say anything about his own opinion in the matter. In utterance 5 participant 
C elaborates on the proposal without explicitly revealing her opinion, but the 
tone in the last part, ‘so the question is if we should care or if we,’ is quite scep-
tic. In utterance 8, the chair (participant A) quickly picks up where C left off and 
continues the sceptic tone, being a little bit more explicit, and C then supports 
A’s sceptic attitude in utterance 9. In utterance 10, we see the first explicit opin-
ion, rejecting the proposal, and A immediately supports that in utterance 11.
The careful probing of attitudes that is done in the first few utterances is quite 
characteristic for the activity as a whole; if opinions are made explicit, the parti-
cipants can be quite sure that there will be no disagreement.
The significant pattern for what counts as a decision in this group is that there is 
general agreement about the proposal. When agreement is unclear, the decision 
is unclear too. In excerpt 5-21 above the outcome of the discussion is not obvi-
ous. The chair, participant A, still expresses a positive attitude towards the book, 
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but there is no significant immediate support from the others (participant A 
quickly moves on to the next book). The uncertainty of the outcome is verified a 
couple of minutes later, shown in excerpt 5-22:
Excerpt 5-22. A792501, line 1604: Evidence that the outcome of a previous 
decision episode was unclear to the participants.
A couple of minutes after the sequence in excerpt 5-21 the same book (by Cherpillod) is 
discussed again. In utterance 1, participant A brings up the topic and asks what the 
decision was, suggesting that it was to buy the book. In utterance 2, participant D provides 
a positive reply, as does participant E in utterance 3. Participant D also reminds 
participant A what the main argument against buying the book was. 
1 $A: vi sa vi vi ö sa ja ti Cherpillod va 
/ [452 öum: ]452
$A: vi sa vi vi ö sa ja ti Cherpillod va 
/ [452 öum: ]452
2 $D: [452 ö1 jo: ]452 $D: [452 ö1 jo: ]452
3 $E: [452 jaja ]452 / trots horoskopet $E: [452 jaja ]452 / trots horoskopet
4 $A: m ja $A: m ja
The reason for A’s question in uttterance 1 is somewhat unclear – it could be 
that he did not understand what the decision was, that he does not remember, or 
a combination of those reasons. In any case, the decision made earlier was not 
clear enough for A to remember it as a definite accept. The analytically unclear 
agreement in excerpt 5-21 is thus unclear for (at least one of) the participants 
too. 
It is important to note that the issues they are deciding on are of little personal 
importance. The foundation has a substantial amount of money in comparison 
to the number of books available and the number of participants. If somebody 
wants a certain book it is not a great sacrifice for the others to agree to it, even if 
they do not particularly like that book. 
5.4.6 A850101 - Bäckmåla Municipality Council
There are eight participants in this meeting, several of them speak a significant 
amount and disagreement is relatively common. The chair often proposes to 
table a matter that there is no agreement about, but quite long sequences of ar-
guing and modified proposals are also allowed, in order to reach agreement.
The chair makes most of the proposals, but other participants make some as 
well. Formal procedures are used quite consistently to clarify what is decided. 
Excerpt 5-23 is an example of this:
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Excerpt 5-23. A850101, line 230: Example of how a formal procedure is used to 
clarify a decision.
The meeting is discussing employments in the municipality office, and the core issue is a raise 
in salary for one of the secretaries, miss Odner. In utterance 1 the chair introduces the topic, 
and then the participants discuss the issue for quite a while. In utterance 61 the chair 
summarises the discussion and proposes that the paragraph is tabled. This proposal is 
accepted in utterance 62.
1 $A: eh / punkten eh // åtta angående 
tjänster på kommunalkontoret / vill 
du / de / ni har fått ut dom här / 
skrivelserna va
$A: er / paragraph er // eight 
concerning employment at the 
municipality office / do you want 
to / it / you have received these / 
papers right
... 59 utterances where paragraph 8 is discussed ...
61 $A2: jag tror nog att det vore 
förståndigt att vi bordlägger denna 
frågan / och diskuterar / dels med 
fröken Odner om hon eh / själv är 
intresserad att ta på sej ett eh / 
högre ansvar genom eh / de här 
sekreterarskapen et cetera och sedan 
att vi bedömer eh / vi bedömer / eh / 
vårt ställningstagande an+ / att eh / 
eh / eh / ta / vissa mera / flera 
arbetsuppgifter här på / 
kommunalkontoret eller också / att 
betala de olike / ordförandena i 
nämnderna en / något högre arvode 
/ det är väl så vi får se det här va / 
< ja > / och därför så tycker jag nog 
att vi kanske s+ / borde fundera på 
den här frågan till nästa 
sammanträde för det är ju ingen 
brådska med / det #1# kan vi 
bordlägga det #2#
@ < inhalation sound >
$A2: I think it would be wise to 
table this matter / and discuss 
both with miss Odner if she / is 
interested herself to take on er / 
more responsibility through er / 
these secretary position et cetera 
and also that we evaluate er / we 
evaluate / er our standpoint con+ 
/ to er / er / er / put / some more 
/ more job tasks here on / the 
municipality office or else / to pay 
the respective chairpersons in the 
committees a / somewhat higher 
fee / that is how we have to look 
at it right / < yes > / and because 
of that I think that maybe we sh+ 
/ ought to consider this matter 
until next meeting since there is 
no hurry with / it #1# should we 
table it #2#
@ < inhalation sound >
62 $X: <1 ja >1 <2 | >2 <3 | >3 /
@ <1 comment: several 
participants >1
@ <2 strike of chairperson's gavel >2,
@ <3 clear throat: A >3
$X: <1 yes >1 <2 | >2 <3 | >3 /
@ <1 comment: several 
participants >1
@ <2 strike of chairperson's 
gavel >2,
@ <3 clear throat: A >3
Here the participants discuss employment at the office at some length, resulting 
in tabling the matter. This is made clear in the last part of the chair’s utterance 25 
(#1# to #2#), the group acceptance in utterance 62 and the strike of the gavel, 
all of which constitute a formal procedure.
The meeting is a textbook example of a formal meeting, containing formalities 
such as agenda, disciplined turn-taking (asking for permission to speak) and use 
of the gavel, but with vivid discussions and serious attempts to find solutions 
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that everybody can agree on. However, some decisions seem to be of too little 
importance deal with formally. For the analyst, the suspicion arises that the ef-
fort to reach consensus only applies to some of the participants. Excerpt 5-24 
shows a sequence where one participant’s view seems to be of little importance:
Excerpt 5-24. A850101, line 171: Example of a decision that is not handled 
formally.
Participant C has proposed that a certain kind of information should be sent to the 
committee members in advance, to speed up the meetings. It was decided that the matter 
should be investigated. In utterance 1, participant A makes the final, summarizing 
proposition that is agreed upon. 
1 $A: men vi kan väl ta upp dom där 
frågan me / i samarbetsnämnden å 
så får vi fråga hur de gör [4 för e ]4 
de så att det är på detta sättet att 
dom trycker upp dom som 
Gunnarsson [5 säger här ]5 då e de 
ju enkelt för dom å [6 (...) ]6 / ja:
$A: but I we could bring up those 
question with / in the cooperation 
committee and so we will ask how 
they do [4 because if ]4 it is in this 
way that they print them like 
Gunnarsson [5 says here ]5 then it is 
easy for them to [6 (...) ] / yes
2 $C: [4 ja ]4 $C: [4 yes ]4
3 $C: [5 ja ]5 $C: [5 yes ]5
4 $G: [6 m de gör dom ]6 $G: [6 m they do that ]6
5 $C: [6 m ]6 $C: [6 m ]6
6 $C: får jag fråga ska inte det till 
protokollet //
$C: can I ask shouldn’t that be in the 
minutes //
7 $A: det behövs nog inte $A: I don’t think that is necessary
Here the chair (participant A) leaves a decision outside the minutes, in addition, 
he refrains from repeating the proposal and asking for general acceptance. When 
participant C asks that the decision should be included in the minutes in utter-
ance 6, participant A turns the suggestion down with little motivation. 
5.4.7 A850401 - Bäckmåla Health Committee
This committee has the same chairperson as the municipality council, and the 
conversation is similar to the one from that meeting. Consensus seems to be re-
quired at least among a core of active members. However, the chair sometimes 
pushes his own opinion through, using an interesting method, as shown in ex-
cerpt 5-25:
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Excerpt 5-25. A850401, line 1819: The chair pushing his own opinion through.
The chair (participant Ö) has presented an application from the army to build a particular 
type of temporary lavatory. A member has also raised the question of where the waste gravel 
(used as a filter) will be put, and the chair does not know. The uncertainty about the waste 
gravel has caused several members to express negative attitudes towards the application. In 
utterance 1, the chair proposes that the application be granted (ignoring the question about 
where to put the waste gravel). Participant C approves of this in utterance 2, but in 
utterance 3, participant D insists that the gravel question is solved first, and gets support 
from participant B in utterance 5. Some arguments for and against are presented, and in 
utterance 15 the chair puts the proposal forward again (#1# to #2#). He gets acceptance 
in utterance 18, and proclaims the decision in utterance 19.
1 $Ö: [480 < ja > så var ]480 de i 
korthet // vad säjer ni vill ni 
godkänna de
@ < loud >
$Ö: < well > that is the matter in 
summary // what do you say do you 
approve of it
@ < loud >
2 $C: ja [481 de e klart ]481 $C: yes [481 of course ]481
3 $D: [481 a dom ]481 borde väl i 
alla fall ö1 tala om var dom ska 
lägga de där gruset
$D: [481 well I think ]481 they 
ought to declare where they are 
going to put that gravel at least 
4 $Ö: < m >
@ < quiet >
$Ö: < m >
@ < quiet >
5 $B: ja de ska di frågat om å få plats 
anvisad
$B: yes they must ask about having 
a location alloted to them
6 $Ö: m $Ö: m
7 $E: (av) kommunen här eller [482 
(...) ]482
$E: (by) the municipality here or 
[482 (...) ]482
8 $X: [482 (...) ]482 $X: [482 (...) ]482
9 $Ö: [482 men de kommer 
dom ]482 de kommer dom å (ändå) 
di de va kanske de beslutet [483 
som vi ]483 fattade [484 förra 
gången så då lägger dom de väl på 
tippen ]484
$Ö: [482 but they are going to ]482 
they are going to do that and (yet) 
they that was perhaps the decision 
[483 that we ]483 made [484 last 
time and then they’ll put it on the 
dump ]484
10 $C: [483 ja ]483 $C: [483 yes ]483
11 $A: [484 (...) ]484 [485 di vet ]485 
inte vad de [486 va för nåt ]486
$A: [484 (...) ] [485 they don’t ]485 
know what kind of [486 thing that 
was ]486
12 $C: [485 m ]485 $C: [485 m ]485
13 $Ö: [486 skulle ]486 [487 
misstänka de ]487
$Ö: [486 I would ]486 [487 guess 
so ]487
14 $D: [487 a men då ]487 fyller dom 
ju tippen / [488 på en liten tid ]488
$D: [487 yeah but then ]487 they 
are going to fill up the dump / [488 
in a short while ]488
15 $Ö: [488 jae de bli+ ]488 a de blir 
inte mycke ser du de kan inte bli 
mer än / två [489 kubikmeter 
va ]489 (...) e på två ställen fyra 
$Ö: [488 nah that wo+ ]488 no that 
won’t be much you see that cannot 
be more than / two [489 cubic 
meters per ]489 (...) is on two places 
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kubikmeter om [490 året ]490 / nej 
/ #1# ha de tillstyrkes #2#
four cubic meters per [490 
year ]490 / no / #1# okay is that 
approved #2#
16 $C: [489 fyra ]489 $C: [489 four ]489 
17 $C: [490 ja ]490 $C: [490 yes ]490
18 $X: < ja >
@ < comment: several 
participants >
$X: < yes >
@ < comment: several 
participants >
19 $Ö: svaret e ja < | >
@ < event: strike of chairperson's 
gavel >
$Ö: the answer is yes < | >
@ < event: strike of chairperson's 
gavel >
Here participants B and D are clearly negative to the application, while parti-
cipant Ö (the chair) and participant C are positive. The arguments that Ö 
provides for his proposal do not seem to convince B and D, but Ö ignores this, 
and acts as if there is general agreement on the issue. B and D’s opinions do not 
seem to be of much importance. Since there is no video recording of this meet-
ing, we cannot be rule out that B and D accept non-vocally, but from the audio 
recording it seems that Ö pushes his own opinion through, despite the fact that 
consensus is not reached.
There is apparent prestige connected with proposing something that the other 
members accept, and corresponding embarrassment with proposing something 
that is rejected. Excerpt 5-26 shows an example of the latter:
Excerpt 5-26. A850401, line 2472: A proposing being rejected.
A person has helped the committee on a few occasions to catch fish for testing the content of 
pollutants. The committee is now discussing if this person should be given a fee, and if so, 
how large that fee should be. In utterance 1 participant C requests permission to speak, and 
in utterance 3 he proposes that the fee should be at least 100 kronor.
1 $C: herr ordförande $C: mister chairperson
2 $Ö: ja $Ö: yes
3 $C: #1# ska vi bevilja nånting så e 
de ju inte lönt å bevilja UNDER 
hundra kronor // då me ma å 
alltihop #2# < ///5.0 > #3# anser 
anser ja annars så ska vi ju avslå 
dom // allså hänvisa till // att han 
får göra opp de me 
fiskeriföreningen (...) / ligga i deras 
eget intresse #4# men de tycker ja e 
småaktit å göra #5#
@ < uncertain belonging of pause >
$C: #1# if we are to grant something 
then it is not useful to grant LESS 
than hundred kronor // with feed and 
everything #2# < ///5.0 > #3# that’s 
that’s my opinion otherwise we 
should reject them // that is refer to 
// that he must settle this with the 
fishing association (...) / be in their 
own interest #4# but I think that 
would be a petty thing to do #5#
@ < uncertain belonging of pause >
4 $D: de går ju å göra en 
överenskommelse me: // 
fiskeriföreningen också // dela 
kostnaden
$D: another option would be to strike 
a deal with // the fishing association 
too // share the cost 
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In utterance 3, participant C starts by proposing that a fee of (at least) 100 
kronor should be paid (#1# to #2#). The five seconds silence that follows (#2# 
to #3#) is most notably an absence of support – none of the other members 
provides additional arguments, positive feedback or other support. This clearly 
makes C a little nervous, and he goes on to provide what he thinks is the second 
best alternative (#3# to #4#), not to pay any fee at all but to claim that it is the 
fishing association that ought to pay the fee. However, he also argues that such 
an approach would be petty-minded (#4# to #5#). I understand the silence as a 
tactful way of rejecting the proposal by the other members, and that tact is re-
quired due to the loss of prestige connected with the rejection. In utterance 4, 
participant D presents a compromise between C’s expensive proposal and the 
small-mindedness paying a smaller sum would exhibit, which can be seen as a 
way to save C from the embarrassment of having his proposal bluntly rejected.
Decisions are marked in a formal way, just as they were in the Municipality 
Council recording, and are quite clear.
5.4.8 A850701 - Bäckmåla Local Housing Committee
Much of this meeting is concerned with applications for different kinds of build-
ing permits, and one of the participants, B, seems to be far superior to the others 
in terms of knowledge of the rules and regulations governing the committee. 
The typical pattern is that the chair, participant R, introduces the topic, B ex-
plains why it should be approved or rejected, and then the formal decision is 
made though acclamation. Excerpt 5-27 is an instance of this:
Excerpt 5-27. A850701, line 163: Typical decision episode.
The local housing committee is going through applications for building permits. In utterance 
1, the chair (R) introduces the next application. Participant E asks for clarification in 
utterance 2, and receives it in utterance 3. In utterance 5, participant V provides an 
argument for accepting the application, while participant B tries to break into the discussion 
(utterance 4). In utterance 6, participant B gets to speak, and complements the argument 
made by participant V, providing the precise requirements. In utterance 9, he proposes that 
the application be granted under a certain condition; this is restated by the chair in utterance 
11, and generally accepted in utterance 12.
1 $R: ja // fyra tjänsteman Sven 
Torstensson Risinge Bäckhult 
tillbyggnad av enfamiljshus å förråd 
till Lundagård två tjugofyra Risinge 
Bäckhult
$R: [8 yes ]8 // four the Clerk Sven 
Torstensson Risinge Bäckhult 
extension to single family house 
and storehouse for Lundagård two 
twentyfour Risinge Bäckhult
2 $E: ska bygga till (ett rum där) $E: are they going to build on 
(another room there)
3 $V: ja $V: yes
4 $B: [9 det vill ju till att kunna ]9 $B: [9 that would require to ]9
5 $V: [9 ja nä ]9 jag tror bara det 
finns tio / minst tio meter te te 
granntomten (...) //
$V: [9 well no ]9 I just think there is 
ten / at least ten meters to to the 
neighbour plot (...) //
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6 $B: ja under förutsättning att de 
inte kommer närmare tomtgränsen 
fyra å en halv meter så finns de 
ingenting å erinra / de e en sån där 
tillbyggnad som vi kanske kan klara 
oss utan
$B: well provided that it doesn’t 
come any closer than four and a 
half meters then there is nothing to 
object / it’s that kind of extension 
that we can do without perhaps
7 $R: ja $R: yes
8 $B: huset finns [10 ju redan ]10 $B: the house is [10 already 
there ]10
9 $R: [10 vi vi ]10 kan ju ta me de i 
protokollet [11 att ]11 det e under 
den förutsättningen
$R: [10 we we ]10 can take it to the 
minutes [11 that ]11 it is under 
that condition
10 $B: [11 ja ]11 $B: [11 yes ]11
11 $R: kan byggnadslov bevilj+ / +jas 
på punkt fyra där m me 
förutsättning att e / tillbyggnaden 
icke kommer närmare grannens 
gräns än fyra å en halv meter
$R: can building permit be grant+ / 
+ted for item four where m 
provided that er / the extension 
does not come closer to the 
neighbour’s border than four and a 
half meter
12 $X: < ja >
@ < comment: several 
participants >
$X: < yes >
@ < comment: several 
participants >
13 $R: svaret e ja < | > // ...
@ < event: strike of chairperson's 
gavel >
$R: the answer is yes < | > // ...
@ < event: strike of chairperson's 
gavel >
The pattern described above is seen in the excerpt: participant R introduces the 
topic in utterance 1, participant B gives reason for accepting in utterance 6, and a 
decision is made through acclamation in utterances 11-13. 
Most of the decisions are handled formally in the same way as in the Municipal-
ity Council and the Health Committee, but additions are made after the formal 
decision has been gaveled more often, as illustrated in excerpt 5-16 on p. 178 
above.
5.4.9 A851501 - Patent Office
In this recording the participants discuss applications for patent that have been 
sent to the office; these are either accepted or rejected. The number of applica-
tions discussed in the recording is a bit too small to make proper generalizations, 
but it can be noted that the chair makes sure that each participant explains his 
view on the matter for each application. In all cases consensus is reached after 
some discussion; therefore, it is not evident how more serious disagreements are 
handled.
The meeting is quite formal, with an agenda and a chairperson who controls the 
turn taking quite rigorously, but he uses no gavel. Further, the chair does not re-
peat proposals or ask for general acceptance (acclamation), rather, he states the 
decision as if he has made the decision, as shown in excerpt 5-28:
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Excerpt 5-28. A851501, line 147: Typical decision episode.
The members of the patent committee have discussed an application for some time. The chair 
(participant B) then closes the issue with the following utterance:
$B: ja för mej framstår de klart #1# 
att de här måste vara dock så 
mycket funktionella moment 
inblandade i: e formgivningen att ja 
INTE tycker att de kan anses besitta 
tillräcklig särprägel för att va 
registrerbart #2# / så vi får säja nej 
#3#
$B: well for me it is quite obvious #1# 
that in this case there have to be so 
many functional elements concerned 
with er the design that I do NOT think 
that it can be considered as having 
enough distinctive character to be apt 
for registration #2# / so we have to say 
no #3#
Here participant B gives reasons for his standpoint (#1#-#2#), and pronounces 
the decision (#2#-#3#), but it is unclear if the decision is B’s own or the way he 
interprets the group’s opinion. I have not been able to find out whether he has 
institutional power to make the decision on his own.
5.4.10 V321801 - City Distric Committee
This is a very formal, political meeting. The members, elected representatives 
from political parties and the ruling block (a three-party coalition), are not very 
interested in gaining the acceptance from the opposition. In most cases, the pro-
posals are prepared in advance and the members seem to know fairly well what 
will happen. If the opposition does not like a proposal from the ruling block, 
they sometimes demand voting (each member answers yes or no to the proposal, 
the answers are noted in the minutes, and the majority decides). Since the oppos-
ition members know that they are in minority, they must know that these votes 
will go against them. The assumption I make is that there must be some other 
motivation for requesting the vote, perhaps it is a tactical maneuver.
When the opposition proposes something they either do that as a display, per-
haps of independence, such as when they put forward an alternative budget for 
the city district, or they must persuade the ruling block that the proposal is good 
for both sides. An example of such a situation in shown in excerpt 5-29:
Excerpt 5-29. V321801, line 921: Example of a proposal from the opposition.
Participant J (Johan), a representative for the opposition, has briefly touched on the matter in 
paragraph 31 earlier, and the chair, participant K of the ruling block, saying it was 'not 
quite that easy' and deferred it to later, according to the agenda. Now that item in the 
agenda has been reached. In utterance 1 participant K introduces the topic, and gives 
participant J the right to speak. Participant J does so in utterance 2, obviously referring to a 
previous discussion, and a proposal he has made earlier. In utterance 5 participant F 
(Fredrika, member of the ruling block) is positive to J’s proposal, but suggests that it should 
be investigated more carefully. Participant J accepts this in utterance 6, 7, 8 and 10. In 
utterance 12, the chair returns to the original proposal and elicits acceptance for that.
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1 $K: ... // då går vi vidare till 
nummer trettiett å de e delegation 
av beslutanderätt // ha nämden 
nåra fråger i detta ärende förutom 
Johan // < Johan varsegod >
@ < chuckle: several participants >
$K: ... // now we are moving on to 
number thirty-one, and that is 
delegation of the power of decision 
// does the council have any 
questions in this matter except 
Johan // < proceed Johan >
@ < chuckle: several participants >
2 $J: nä men e // du säjer de e inte 
så enkelt ja // ja tror inte de e ju 
egentlien bara ett penndrag // å 
(vända på) delegationen // < e så 
att i // > ja har (...) eller ha [32 
ja ]32 // har ja fel
@ < event: F raises her hand, looks 
at K, who looks back and nods >
$J: no but er // you say that it isn’t 
that easy well // I don’t think it’s 
really just a stroke of a pen // to 
(turn) the delagation // < er så that 
in // > I have (...) or am [32 I ]32 // 
am I wrong
@ < event: F raises her hand, looks 
at K, who looks back and nods >
3 $K: [32 men ]32 $K: [32 but ]32
4 $X: ja: $X: yes
5 $F: a asså // penndrag // i all ära 
// (...) ka ma ju faktist tillåta sej å 
göra de lätt fö sej // men // ja ja 
skulle nog vilja att vi kunde // 
bereda frågan lite innan e va 
beredda å gå ti beslut [1001 
// ]1001 de va ju mer en tanke 
som kom upp på utskottet å de 
känns väl / som att den // kanske 
måste < landa i oss / att vi > 
behöver diskutera de [33 mer ]33 
// ja skulle gäna vilja vänta me de 
// till (vi har haft möjlihet å kolla) 
igenom de
@ < gesture: J nods >
$F: well // stroke of a pen is all well 
and good // (...) one might be 
allowed to simplify things // but // I 
I think I would like us to // prepare 
the matter somewhat before er be 
prepared to decide [1001 // ]1001 
that was more of a thought that 
came up in the committee and I feel 
like / like it // perhaps has to 
< settle in us / that we > need to 
discuss it [33 more ]33 // I would 
really like to wait a while with it // 
until (we have had the chance to go) 
through it
@ < gesture: J nods > 
6 $J: [1001 m ]1001 $J: [1001 m ]1001
7 $J: [33 < m > ]33
@ < gesture: nods >
$J: [33 < m > ]33
@ < gesture: nods >
8 $J: < (gö de) >
@ < gesture: nods >
$J: < (do so) >
@ < gesture: nods >
9 $F: å hur uppföljningen kan ske 
istället då
$F: and how the follow up can be 
done instead 
10 $J: a de va inget (utarbetat) // < de 
va bara ett [34 // (...) (de va en) 
tanke // ]34 en tanke på 
(Fredrikas tanke) >
@ < gesture: J moves his hands 
around each other >
$J: well it was nothing (prepared) // 
< it was just a [34 // (...) (it was a 
thought) // ]34 a thought on 
Fredrika’s thought
@ < gesture: J moves his hands 
around each other >
11 $K: [34 a / nä de va TÄNKT ]34 $K: [34 yeah / no it was 
THOUGHT ]34
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12 $K: ja // ha nämden nåra andra 
fråger kring delegationen av 
beslutanderätt // då finns de bara 
ett tjänsteutlåtande kan vi bifalla 
de < | > // ...
@ < event: several participants 
says yes, K strikes her gavel >
$K: yes // do the council have any 
other questions concering the 
delegation of the power of decision 
// in that case there is only one 
official report can we consent to that 
< | > // ...
@ < event: several participants says 
yes, K strikes her gavel >
In utterance 2, the opposition representative, J, makes a proposal (obviously re-
ferring to something that the others already know). His attitude is quite serious 
and open; the final phrase about him being wrong signals modesty. When the 
ruling block in utterance 5 expresses a somewhat positive attitude, J immediately 
agrees with that, makes his commitment weaker by calling it ‘a thought’, and al-
lows the matter to be deferred. This is typical for a proposal from the opposi-
tion; in order to avoid a situation where accepting the proposal would be a loss 
of prestige for the ruling block, the opposition tries to down-grade their own re-
sponsibility for the proposal, making it appear to be the result of a cooperation.
The formal decision made here is that the official report is approved, but in-
formally it has also been decided that they will look at participant J’s proposal in 
more detail. It seems to be the practice that proposals that are prepared in ad-
vance so that everybody knows they will be accepted are treated formally. While, 
in contrast, the proposal that came up without having been prepared as properly, 
was treated informally. The effect is that the proposals that people already know 
are going to be accepted go through a very clear decision process, while propos-
als that are more uncertain receive more vague treatment.
These meetings seem to be a formality fundamentally. The ruling block politi-
cians have already decided on the matters, and deviation from previously made 
plans is unwanted. Thus, the purpose of these meetings is not so much to decide 
(interpersonal decisions) as to make already made decisions public and clear (in-
stitutional decisions). Because of this, it is not strange that we find so few ar-
guings and reformulations in the recording.
The chairperson is very much in charge of the meeting and the few “real” (inter-
personal) decisions made always have her approval. Excerpt 5-30 provides an 
illustration:
Excerpt 5-30. V321801, line 1004: Example of an interpersonal decision, and how 
the chair determines the outcome of it.
Towards the end of the meeting the agenda specifies 'other matters', and participant J 
(Johan) of the opposition has a motion. In utterance 1 he asks permission to present it.
1 $J: jag har ett // ett e yrkande om // 
ett uppdrag till stadsdelschefen // få 
ja lov å läsa 
$J: I have a // a er motion about 
// a task for the city district 
manager // may I read
2 $K: varsego $K: proceed
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3 $J: a // de hanlar om att säkerställa 
en // rättvis // likvädi{g} bedy+ 
betygssättning // ... (reading the 
proposal, 2:41) ... // och även 
beskriva rutinerna för hur 
betygsättningen // kvalitetssäkras //
$J: yeah // it is about securing a 
// fair // equal gra+ grading // ... 
(reading the proposal, 2:41) ... // 
and also to describe the 
procedures for how the quality // 
of the grading is secured //
4 $K: tack Johan $K: thank you Johan
5 $J: varsågo $J: your welcome
6 $K: e de så att du < begär 
bordläggning på detta >
@ < event: J gets up and hands C 
some papers >
$K: < is it the case that you 
require tabling of this >
@ < event: J gets up and hands C 
some papers >
7 $J: om du vill så okej $J: if you like then sure
8 $K: ja tycker att de e rätt bra [41 att 
vi (...) ]41 // få hon (skickat) ut ett 
< sånt >
@ < event: K gestures towards the 
papers J just gave C >
$K: I think it is quite good [41 that 
we (...) ]41 // can she arrange to 
(send) out one of < those >
@ < event: K gestures towards the 
papers J just gave C >
9 $J: [41 då gö vi de då ]41 (...) $J: [41 then we’ll do that ]41 (...)
Six utterances irrelevant for the example
16 $K: ha // men då gö [42 vi så att vi 
bodlägger ]42 // de ärenden som e 
lagda från Moderatena kan vi göra så 
< | > ...
@ < event: several participants says 
yes, K strikes her gavel >
$K: okay // but then we’ll [42 do 
so that we table ]42 // those 
matters that have been put 
forward by the Conservatives can 
we do that < | > ...
@ < event: several participants 
says yes, K strikes her gavel >
17 $J: [42 (...) ]42 $J8: [42 (...) ]42
In utterance 3, participant J makes his proposal, and the chairperson, participant 
K, then proposes that J requires the matter to be tabled. Participant J clearly 
takes that as a positive sign (confirmed in utterance 8) and accepts the tabling. 
Participant K does not worry about checking what the other participants think, 
neither from her own party nor any others, but simply states that she thinks the 
proposal looks good and that it is worth looking at more closely (I understand 
the purpose of tabling as getting time to look closer at the proposal). 
5.4.11 V770201 - Strategy Meeting
A consultancy company has a meeting where strategies are to be developed. The 
manager, participant A, has organized the meeting and planned a way of working 
on the strategy, but the actual proposals come from the other participants, who 
sometimes work in smaller groups. Several different participants make proposals, 
and all proposals are open for criticism. Proposals are generally used as a starting 
point for a discussion, not as fixed suggestions that can be accepted or rejected. 
On a more general level, the manager, A, pushes the other participants to come 
up with ideas and to accept responsibility for different projects that are planned, 
but he never actually orders anyone to do anything. 
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In this recording, it is often difficult to discern what is actually decided, which 
seems to be a problem for the participants (see excerpt 5-15 on p. 177 above). 
The key to what counts as a decision seems to be that a proposal is made, 
nobody argues against it, and the discussion is allowed to move on to the next 
topic. Excerpt 5-31 illustrates this:
Excerpt 5-31. V770201, line 3452: Typical end of a decision episode.
The meeting has covered how to approach a certain group of potential customers, whether or 
not it is a good idea to send a letter to these customers, and when that could be done. 
Participant F har said that it will take several weeks to write the letter in question, which 
was called into question: how can it take weeks to write a letter? In utterance 1 participant 
F replies to this. In utterance 7 participant E introduces a new topic, without there having 
been any clear conclusion to the issue about a letter to potential customers.
1 $F: ja jo de tar ju en tie minuter 
kanske / men eh /// ja tror de tar en 
stund å formulera /
$F: well okay that takes some ten 
minutes perhaps / but er /// I think 
it takes a while to formulate /
2 $T: ska vi ha som målsättning å 
genomföra ett sånt seminarium / a 
då får vi besluta om de nu för att de 
måste ju också planeras så att säja / 
eller så [136 lägger vi ner ]136
$T: if our objective should be to hold 
such a seminar / well then we have 
to decide about that now because 
that has to be planned so to speak / 
or else [136 we drop ]136
3 $F: [136 a men ]136 vi tar bara (å 
genomgår här) (...)
$F: [136 yeah but ]136 we can just 
( go through here) (...)
4 $T: ja okej $T: well okay
5 $X: m: $X: m:
6 $X: (...) // $X: (...) //
7 $E: <1 >1 <2 >2 a Trollhä+ / 
Trollhättan energi hade vi också 
skrivit upp
@ <1 clear throat >1
@ <2 snuffle >2
$E: <1 | >1 <2 | >2 yeah Trollhä+ / 
Trollhättan energy was also put on 
the list
@ <1 clear throat >1
@ <2 snuffle >2
Here, the question about sending the letter is left without any clear decision, and 
the discussion moves on to the next topic. It is difficult to say what was decided.
5.4.12 V770301, V770901 - Board of City District 1 & 3
This is a group of the top administrative officials of a City District in a Swedish 
city. The two meetings have approximately the same participants and structure, 
and can be analyzed together. The chair, participant A, makes almost all propos-
als. The exception is proposals that are written and prepared in advance and 
have a number in the agenda and a few proposals that are phrased as questions 
to the chair. An example of such a “question proposal” is shown in excerpt 5-32:
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Excerpt 5-32. V770301, line 1591: A proposal which is not made by the chair. 
The participants are discussing participation in a fair. In utterance 1 participant J asks if 
the others think the participation should be coordinated, and the chair (participant A) 
repeats this question in utterance 2.
1 $J: finns de nån anledning å 
samordna de här
$J: is there any reason to coordinate 
this
2 $A: #1# // #2# a de e väl närmast 
de så att säja ska vi backa upp de 
på någe sätt via samordning eller 
#3# så så att de inte bara rinner ut 
#4#
$A: #1# // #2# well that is probably 
what it is about so to speak should we 
back it up somehow through 
coordination or #3# something to 
make sure it doesn’t come to nothing 
#4#
3 $J: a de tror ja $J: yeah I think so
4 $C: ja tror de e bra å göra se vicka 
som e intresserade så får man då 
bedöma e de så att var å en tar tar 
de på egen hand eller väljer å göra 
något gemensamt // men i alla fall 
att man kanske försöker å se vilka 
de e som ska vara me (...) så vi får 
en överblick på de / ja tar gärna på 
mej de i så fall
$C: I think it would be good to do that 
see who is interested and then judge 
should it be that each person do do it 
on their own or chooses to do 
something together // but in case that 
you perhaps try to see who it is that 
will participate (...) so we get an 
overview of it / I’d be glad to accept 
that in that case
5 $A: m bra $A: m good
Here participant J makes a proposal (utterance 1), phrasing it as a question to the 
chair, who needs some time to consider it before he answers (the pause in #1# 
to #2# and the repetition of the question in #2# to #3#). The answer is some-
what positive (the argument in #3# to #4#), and J and C support it 
immediately. 
The more common pattern, however, is that the chair makes a proposal and that 
he tries to elicit comments and acceptance from the others, as in excerpt 5-33: 
Excerpt 5-33. V770301, line 1086: A typical decision episode, where the chair 
makes the proposal.
Participants are discussing policies for computer support. In utterance 1, the chair 
summarizes what has been said, adding his own views and arguments, and makes a 
proposal. In utterances 4 and 8, he asks for the others’ attitudes, and gets acceptance in 
utterance 5, possibly in 6, 7 and 9, too. Utterance 10 is probably some kind of argument for 
the proposal, although that is unclear. In utterance 12, the chair asks participant L 
specifically for acceptance, and receives it in utterance 13.
1 $A: men kan vi inte göra så att vi 
skickar me den frågan om vi gör de 
till vårt adb-råd eller någonting 
sådant va att e: de för nu de e ju en 
rätt stor investering vi gör här va s 
att ja tycker de känns viktit att som 
$A: but can’t we do it like this we 
pass the question to out computer 
council or something like that right 
that er because this is a rather big 
investment that we are doing right 
to I think that it feels important that 
198 Chapter 5: Interaction in group decision-making
vd ha ett grepp ungefär va befinner 
vi oss nu va och e: att även dom 
inte (kraftfulla) rösterna s att säja vi 
ser dom va // e att man då e 
fundera på NÅGON form av mer 
systematisk om de e i enkätform 
eller va de e men INTE bara s att 
säja sätta ihop de man har sett å 
hört utan att vi faktiskt hör EFTER 
hos på varje ställe där de står en 
terminal eller en pc så vi får en bild 
av används den / fungerar grejerna 
va e de för grejer som inte fungera 
å va e de mer för stöd man behöver 
va å så att vi får en chans att göra 
nån analys av de [147 läget 
tisammans här va ]147 //
as ceo have an understanding of 
approximately where we are now 
right and er also the not (powerful) 
voices so to speak we see them right 
// er and that SOME kind of more 
systematic is considered be it in the 
form of a questionnaire or what it is 
but NOT just so to speak put 
together what has been seen and 
heard but that we actually CHECK 
with each place where there is a 
terminal or a pc so we get a picture 
of is it used / do the things work 
and what other kind of support is 
needed right and so we get a chance 
to do an analysis of that [147 status 
together here right ]147 
2 $L: [147 m m ]147 $L: [147 m m ]147
3 $B: (...) // $B: (...)
4 $A: < eller e >
@ < gesture: opens his arms and 
looks around >
$A: < or er >
@ < gesture: opens his arms and 
looks around >
5 $C: de tror ja e jätteviktit $C: I think that is really important
6 $X: (...) $X: (...)
7 $X: (...) $X: (...)
8 $A: ni e me $A: you are with me
9 $C: (...) $C: (...)
10 $I: (...) på två år de e INTE 
användarproblem skulle ja vilja säja 
(...) användaren som har samma 
problem de kan inte bero på 
användarproblem (...)
$I: (...) in two years that is NOT a 
user problem I would like to say (...) 
the user that has the same problem 
that can’t be due to user problems 
(...)
11 $L: ja $L: yes
12 $A: okej < | >
@ < gesture: looks at L and makes 
a fist with the thumb pointing 
upwards in an "ok-gesture" >
$A: okay < | >
@ < gesture: looks at L and makes a 
fist with the thumb pointing 
upwards in an “ok-gesture” >
13 $L: < okej >
@ < gesture: looks at A and nods >
$L: < okay >
@ < gesture: looks at A and nods >
In utterance 1, the chair makes a proposal, partly based on the previous discus-
sion, and then looks around for reactions from the others. Utterance 3 is very 
quiet and short, and in the time between the end of utterance 1 and the start of 
utterance 4 the chair mostly looks around at the others. Utterance 4 and 8 show 
more explicit ways of getting reactions, as does utterance 12, which contains dir-
ected eliciting.
For longer discussions, the chair almost always repeats or summarizes the pro-
posal towards the end, making sure it is clear for everybody. Thus, the key to 
knowing what is a decision becomes that the chair makes a proposal (or refor-
Analyses of each conversation in the corpus 199
mulates one) and at least one person displays acceptance, though this can be by 
nodding or mumbling. Strong agreement from the chair can also function as a 
decision marker, as in excerpt 5-32 above.
The other participants rarely reject proposals made by the chair, but I can only 
speculate on the reasons for this. Perhaps his authority is great, or his proposals 
are good and well-prepared.
One can note the chair’s use of va, translated as ‘right’ in the transcriptions 
above. Va is usually a feedback elicitor, but used here in a way that rather pre-
vents feedback, since he never waits for the feedback but assumes that the ac-
ceptance is there.
5.5 Some general observations
Looking back at the previous section and the analyses of the recordings in the 
corpus, a number of more general observations can be made. These general ob-
servations will be presented in this section.
5.5.1 Proposal-Acceptance is fundamental
All group decision-making episodes in the investigated groups were oriented 
around the conceptual pair proposal-acceptance: a proposal was somehow 
presented, then, discussion followed concerning whether or not to accept the 
proposal. Proposals can be stanced or non-stanced (see 5.3.6 above), and accept-
ance may never be given, but the conversation is still oriented around these 
things.
Note that no other method of group decision-making was found in the corpora 
studied, though the observation of this fact might seem trivial.
5.5.2 Arguing is common
Arguing occurs in all of the groups studied, although the character of argumenta-
tion varies considerably. In Culture-Nature Project (A462701), the style is direct 
and almost ruthless, while in Esperanto Foundation (A792501) it is gentle and 
careful. 
The presence of arguing in group decision-making can be explained by efficiency 
demands – if all participants do not agree on an issue (or at least if the majority 
do not agree), then that proposal is not accepted, and no decision is made. This 
is likely to be inefficient for the group (assuming that the group has tasks to do), 
and may cause social-emotional tension within the group. Arguing is a way to 
reach agreement on an issue (or at least an attempt to reach agreement), which, 
in turn, increases efficiency and decreases social tension (ideally). 
This is not to say that arguing is necessary in group decision-making activities. 
Group decision-making may look quite different in some other cultural context. 
I also find it plausible that there is a cultural tendency to avoid disagreement in 
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general in Sweden. This tendency would make arguing more likely since it might 
be used in an attempt to come to a consensus even when a minority is in 
disagreement. 
5.5.3 Summaries
In situations where an issue is discussed at length, and several arguments and 
proposals occur, it is common for a participant (typically the chairperson), to 
summarize the discussion and reformulate the proposal that seems to have the 
strongest support. The chairperson for the Board of City District (V770301 and 
V770901) does this quite regularly; his summaries function as as a way to con-
clude the discussion and make a decision. His summaries (with reformulated 
proposals) usually receive immediate acceptance from the other participants, and 
the group moves on to next topic. Excerpt 5-7 on p. 166-7 is an example of this 
behavior.
The summaries seem to have two main functions. The first is to collect the argu-
ments and modifications that have been given during the discussion. This is not 
necessarily a completely neutral contribution to the discussion, obviously, but the 
summarizer may choose to ignore some given arguments or suggested modifica-
tions, and he may phrase the summary and reformulation in ways that make his 
preferred alternative look better.
The other function of the summaries is to “put the discussion back on track,” or 
in other words, make participants focus on the most important part of the issue, 
and strengthen the obligation to evaluate the proposal. This obligation stems 
from the evocative function of proposing, and the obligation may have weak-
ened if the discussion has been going on for a while. Readers more familiar with 
Conversation Analysis might note that this also may be analyzed as an adjacency-
pair of proposal-accept/reject, as mentioned above (see p. 160). Arguings, elab-
orations etc. that follow the initial proposing are insertion sequences, that is, oth-
er adjacency pairs that are used to prepare the second part of the main adjacency 
pair (Levinson 1983:304 ff). When the insertion sequences become too long and 
too numerous, the accept/reject can get lost, and the first part of the adjacency 
pair has to be repeated. This is the function of summarizing that the aforemen-
tioned chairperson of the Board of City District seems to be most interested in, 
and in his case, it has the effect of actually getting acceptance from the others.
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5.5.4 Formal procedures
Formal procedures are used extensively in the studied dialogues, although the 
dialogues vary as far as how many formal procedures are used, and how often. 
The City District Committee (V321801) uses formal procedures most of the 
time, while such procedures can hardly be perceived at all in Budget Revision 
(A322501). 
Some examples of formal procedures are use of an agenda, acclamation and voting. 
Agendas, when followed, lend the discussion a structure where only one issue is 
discussed at a time, making it possible to dispose the available time more effi-
ciently. There may be other reasons for using an agenda as well, such as allowing 
participants to prepare themselves for discussion topics. The agenda structure 
also makes the beginning and end of each topic clear, and that includes the end 
of decision episodes. Thus, decision episodes that are part of the agenda usually 
have clear conclusions and results.
The majority of the groups studied use an agenda. Two of the other groups 
(Budget Negotiation and Budget Revision) follow other written documents, in 
practice creating an agenda which they follow. Most of these groups adhere 
strictly to the agenda, leaving it only occasionally. Recording V321801, City Dis-
trict Committee, is the prime example of agenda use. Recording V770201, 
Strategy Meeting, is the one that most clearly shows how not using an agenda 
can cause decisions to be unclear. 
Acclamation, a formalized proposing-accepting pair of, is used to close an issue. 
The chairperson (or other leader) puts the proposal to the group, phrasing it as a 
yes/no question, then, the other participants give simultaneous accept by saying 
yes. (Often, the procedure is not implemented completely, in the sense that not 
all participants actually say yes.) For issues where the group has managed to 
reach consensus (or near consensus), acclamation works fine, but if consensus is 
not reached and the group still has to make a decision (or a majority wants to 
make a decision), then voting can be used. Voting procedures may vary some-
what, but in general, each member of the group says yes or no to the proposal in 
turn, and the alternative supported by most participants wins. The votes of the 
participants may be weighted, so the chairperson might have 1" vote; in addi-
tion, there may be participants in the activity who are not entitled to vote. An ex-
ample of voting can be found in appendix 6.
It is interesting to note that although several of the groups studied could have 
used voting, only one group did so: the highly formalized City District Commit-
tee (V321801). It is clear that consensus is preferred in these groups, and voting 
is only used to make a decision when agreement cannot be achieved (cf. Dead-
locks and stance strength on p. 206 ff.). Although equal voting (one person, one 
vote) is widely accepted in Sweden as a fair and good way to make group deci-
sions, it is not perfect: if simple majority decision is used (which is common), 
there may be a large minority whose opinion is disregarded. This may not be de-
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sirable, for ethical or other reasons, and it is probably at least one of the reasons 
for why voting is not used often.
Another observation about formal features is that most of the groups studied 
use a chairperson of some kind. This may be a part of the institutional require-
ments of the group, as for the City District Committee or Bäckmåla Municipality 
Council, or it may be a more or less natural consequence that the person who 
has called for the meeting also leads it. The tasks of the chairperson may vary 
somewhat, but common tasks include distributing the right to speak, controlling 
what is discussed and for how long, and formulating final proposals in connec-
tion with acclamations. The chairperson typically has more power than the oth-
ers do, in the sense that he can influence the conversation quite easily. In addi-
tion, the chairperson is able to prepare issues in advance, giving him a better 
opportunity to prepare arguments, and he can often choose how issues are 
presented.
Sometimes there is one formal chairperson and one “informal leader” of the 
group, that is, a person who has a high status and who influences the other parti-
cipants heavily. The reasons for this division may vary; in Bäckmåla Local Hous-
ing Committee, the only one of the groups studied with an obvious informal 
leader, the informal leader clearly is more competent and experienced than the 
other participants, which makes his opinion very important. This kind of situ-
ation creates some difficulties, since there may be ambiguity about which tasks 
each of the two leaders performs. In the Housing Committee, the division of 
labor is that the formal leader introduces topics and makes non-stanced propos-
als, then, the informal leader gives his opinion on the issue; see excerpt 5-27 on 
p. 191-2 for an example of this.
A last thing to note about formal features of the groups studied is that there 
seems to be a kind of formal bias in the informal groups as well. The corpus 
contains a large proportion of comparably formal meetings, and this is by no 
means sure to be a reflection of the proportions of formal meetings for group 
decision-making in general. However, the formal concepts of agenda, chairper-
son, gaveling, etc. seems to be wide spread, and there seems to be a tendency for 
groups to “fall back” on formal procedures when discussions become difficult, 
at least when the groups are fairly large. An example is the Strategy meeting dis-
cussed on pp. 196-7. The meeting is informal – there is no agenda, no proper 
chairperson, no gavel or structured turn-taking – but still the participants “bor-
row” formal words and behavior every so often, as in the following excerpt:
Excerpt 5-34. V770201, line 3875. Example of formal words being used in an 
informal context.
Participant T is going through a list of tasks that may be done in order to get new 
customers.
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1 $T: ska vi börja me ansvarsbiten 
då // 
stadsdelsnämndsseminarium // 
Lena måste ju va me för att hon 
har ju haft kontakter me den här 
e // va hette hon
$T: should we start with the 
responsibilities then // seminar for city 
district committees // Lena has to 
participate since she has been in 
contact with this er // what was her 
name
2 $L: Åse $L: Åse
3 $T: [322 Åse ]322 $T: [322 Åse ]322
4 $U: [322 ordningsfråga ]322 / hur 
lång tid pratar vi om framåt nu /
$U: [322 question of order ]322 / what 
is the time scope of this discussion / 
5 $X: m: $X: m:
Here participant U in utterance 4 uses the word ordningsfråga (‘question of order’) 
when he interrupts to pose a slightly off-topic question. The term originally be-
longs to a formal context where questions of order take precedence over other 
topics, and it is doubtful that U’s question would have passed as a question of 
order in a formal context. However, it shows that U (and probably most of the 
other participants) are aware of the formal procedure of dealing with questions 
of order first, and they use such procedures when they feel a need to. Thus there 
seems to be a certain bias towards formal procedures in group meetings.
5.5.5 Silence
Sometimes proposals are met with silence from one or more of the participants. 
Of course, in these cases non-verbal/non-vocal communication may be used in-
stead of words; most of the recordings in the present corpus either are not video 
at all or the video image is not detailed enough to study non-vocal communica-
tion. In the recordings that do allow for some study of non-vocal communica-
tion (for example Board of City District 1 & 2), it clearly plays a role. In fact, 
some of the situations that seem like tacit consent are non-vocal consent; nods, 
looks and facial expressions signal acceptance.
However, non-vocal communication does not explain all silences that follow 
proposings, rather, silence itself is sometimes interpreted as consent or dissent. 
Often silence is interpreted as acceptance, as in excerpt 5-29 on pp. 193-5, where 
not everybody utters accept in utterance 12. This interpretation seems rational in 
many situations. In a meeting, it may be difficult for all participants to be well in-
formed and involved in each issue, and by simply not saying anything about a 
proposal the ones who do not know or care much about it leave the decision to 
others, trusting them to make a proper decision. Further, when participants can 
rely on this interpretation, it is possible for them to be “lazy” – a specific parti-
cipant may listen to the ongoing discussion, and as long as he agrees with the 
other participants’ statements, there is simply no need to say anything, so he can 
just as well remain silent. 
Interpreting silence as consent may be a problem, for example, it might mean 
that a large share of the participants do not actively participate in a decision, 
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since it diminishes the number of people actually making the decision. This may 
be a problem for democracy, for decision quality, for shared responsibility, or for 
some other aspect of the decision context.
In other situations, silence is interpreted as dissent, as for example in excerpt 
5-26 on p. 190, from #2#-#3#. One explanation for this is that it seems to be 
more difficult socially, or less preferable, to object openly to a proposal than to 
simply not agree, which leads to the principle that absence of acceptance means 
rejection.
Obviously, these two interpretations clash. One resolution of this clash is to say 
that a proposing gives an opportunity to object to the proposal, at the same time 
as it demands that the evocative function of the proposing be satisfied. This 
means that when a typical proposing is made, at least one accept has to be given 
in order to satisfy the evocative function of the proposing. Once that has been 
done, any further silence can be interpreted as, ‘I do not make use of this oppor-
tunity to object,’ which means that the silent person accepts. As a result, if a pro-
posing is met with complete silence, this will be interpreted as reject, while if the 
proposing receives explicit accept from at least one participant, silence from oth-
er participants will be interpreted as accept.
In some cases the phrasing of the proposing or the elicitation of consent could 
be made in a way that causes silence to mean consent. The evocative function of 
the proposing will then be to make the receivers stay quiet for a while. The most 
obvious example of this is perhaps during a wedding ceremony in some tradi-
tions, when the officiator says something like, ‘If there be anyone who objects to 
this union, let him speak now or forever hold his peace.’ 
However, this analysis of the interpretation of silence is not water-tight. First, 
previous interaction and stances may create expectations among the participants, 
and it is possible that these expectations override the demand to satisfy the evoc-
ative function of the proposing. Let us say a group has been discussing some 
general question for a while, and reached consensus. Some formal decisions need 
to be made after that, and the chairperson goes through them quickly, one by 
one. If these decisions are simple consequences of the general consensus, ex-
pectations are strong that everybody agrees on the decisions. In such a case, it is 
likely that silence is interpreted as consent without any explicit consent. No clear 
example of this was found in the recordings studied.
Another possible problem for this analysis concerns status. It is likely that status 
relations play a part in the interpretation of silence: explicit consent may be 
needed when a lower status person proposes something to a person with higher 
status, but not the other way around. Unfortunately, the material used in this 
study is not sufficient to answer such a question. 
One might imagine that an authoritarian chair in a group could use the ambiguity 
of silence to push decisions through without acceptance from the others, by in-
terpreting a silence as consent. No such case was found in our corpus. However, 
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the behavior of the chair in the Board of City District 1 & 2 could be a way of 
avoiding clashes. The chair is quite dominant, and his proposals are usually ac-
cepted without question. To ensure that the silence his proposals meet is due to 
general acceptance rather than general rejection, he spends quite some time eli-
citing explicit feedback.
It should be said that silence following a proposal can be interpreted in ways 
other than dissent or consent. For example,silence can mean that the proposal 
was not understood or not perceived, or perhaps that the listener has not made 
up his mind yet. These options have to be ruled out in order to understand si-
lence as consent or dissent, so the latter interpretations are likely to occur only as 
a part of an activity that has already started and where communication in general 
(perception and understanding) has been shown to work. Further, non-verbal 
communication is likely to play an important role in signaling perception, under-
standing and hesitation.
5.5.6 Deadlocks and stance strength
The Esperanto Foundation recording displays an interesting phenomenon that 
could be labeled probing and hinting. When a proposal appears, the participants 
seem to be reluctant to reveal their opinion on a certain issue, probably fearing 
that there may be disagreement. Instead of responding directly, they probe the 
attitudes of other participants, and provide hints to their own view until they feel 
fairly safe that the other ones agree with them. This probing and hinting can be 
carried out with requests for background information, with alternative, non-
stanced proposings, with feedback, or with other acts. Excerpt 5-21 on p. 184-5 
is an example of this behavior. The effect of this behavior is a “ketchup bottle 
effect” for proposals and accepts/rejects: first, a long period of time without 
anybody taking a clear stance, and then suddenly everybody does so. 
An explanation for this phenomenon is that there is a tendency that once a per-
son has actually expressed a view on an issue, it takes a lot to change that stance. 
This has the potential for creating deadlocks, where conflicting opinions cannot 
be resolved. It is possible that because of this many decision episodes have sev-
eral “neutral” contributions (eliciting and giving background information, feed-
back) at the start, since such neutral contributions can be used to probe the at-
titudes of other participants without needing to take explicit stance. When a 
participant then actually expresses an opinion, he may be quite certain that the 
others will agree, and acceptance comes readily from the others.
The need to avoid deadlocks can be satisfied with means other than probing and 
hinting, such as voting, used in City District Committee (V321801). This meeting 
has a very different structure compared to Esperanto Foundation. It includes 
two political blocks arguing against each other and, as long as one block has 
more votes than the other does, there is no risk of deadlock. 
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The participants in the Culture-Nature recording (A462701) do not use voting, 
and deadlocks are quite possible, but there seems to be no fear of taking a 
stance. There are a small number of decision episodes in the recorded part of the 
meeting, and so the bravery could be a coincidence, but the researchers are prob-
ably used to arguing due to their participation at academic seminars, and it is 
likely that they bring this habit to the project discussion they are having. They 
show no reluctance taking stances on an issue, and argue strongly for or against 
it. The Patent Office recording (A851501) is another exception, although the 
small number of decision episodes is a problem for analysis of that recording 
too. Even so, conflicting views seem to be a small problem in the Patent Office. 
The recording is characterized by long utterances where advanced lines of argu-
mentation are laid out, and everybody is expected to explain his views on the 
matter, in some detail. As mentioned above (p. 192), serious disagreements do 
not appear in the recording studied, so we cannot know how deadlocks are 
handled.
The most common strategy for handling deadlocks seems to be to somehow 
vary the strength of stances taken in the discussion. Excerpt 5-35 shows an ex-
ample of this:
Excerpt 5-35. A851501, line 139. Example of a participant who explicitly weakens 
her stance strength.
During a meeting with the Patent Office, the participants discuss whether a certain item is 
shaped in a way that is original enough to grant a patent. Participant C gives her view on 
the issue.
$C: ja: ja vet inte heller om de e inte 
alls så tokit tycker ja när den inte e 
de e lite räffling upp å ner de lite 
prydnad tycker ja no / de förvånar 
mej att dom va så deciderade på att 
man inte skulle ta den // alldeles 
omöjlit tycker ja inte att de e men ja 
e kan också va me om att man 
försöker å säja nej till // de / fast ja 
e inte så negativt inställd
$C: well I do not know either if it is not 
all that bad I think when it is not there 
are some grooves up and down they 
some decoration I think probably / it 
surprises me that they were so 
pronounced that one should not take it 
// I do not find it completely impossible 
but I er could also participate in trying 
to say no to // it // but I am not all that 
negative to it 
Here participant C is quite explicit in saying that she is prepared to change her 
stance if need be. Another, less explicit weakening is shown in excerpt 5-36.
Excerpt 5-36. A792501, line 847. Example of a participant who implicitly weakens 
his stance strength.
During a meeting with the Esperanto Foundation the participants discuss whether to buy a 
certain book series. Here participant A proposes that they do not buy the books (#1# to 
#2#), but he also says that he is prepared to buy them if the others want to (#2# to 
#3#). 
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$A: ja / ö: ja vet inte men de de 
komme väl / nån sorts samlad 
recension elle nåt sånt där i i ö om 
dom här ö: så de svårt å veta va man 
ska göra me dom ännu så länge 
kanske va #1# vi kanske kan låta 
dom anstå #2# om de inte e nån 
som e / särskilt sugen på nånting 
#3#
$A: well / er I do not know but I guess 
there will come / some kind of common 
review or something like that in in er 
about these er so it is hard to know 
what to do with them so far maybe what 
we #1# maybe we can let them be 
deferred #2# if there is not anybody 
that is / particularly interested in 
something #3#
Here participant A expresses the opinion that the foundation should leave the 
books for now and return to them when a review of them has been published. 
The use of kanske (‘maybe’) in the actual pronunciation of what to do (let them 
be deferred) signals that the stance is not “carved in stone.”
Similarly, a participant may want to strengthen a stance, as illustrated in excerpt 
5-37.
Excerpt 5-37. V770301, line 1144. Example of a participant who makes his stance 
stronger.
The board of City District Committee are discussing a policy for rental contracts.
$A: <1 ha >1 å de de så e de ju i 
mängder av verksamhetsfrågor va e 
de viktia e ju tycker ja att #1# den 
formella bindingen få inte göras #2# 
å å de här ståndpunkten har vi efter 
de att vi upptäckte att vi hade 
trygghetsavtal tecknade till år 
tvåtusentvå va till en fruktansvärd 
kostnad så att #3# ja släpper inte de 
här me långa avtal längre utan allt 
som är över ett år vill ja ha sett innan 
de går iväg #4# (...) // #5# så e de 
#6# // e #7# å därför tycker ja att de 
e viktit att den punkten finns me #8# 
men däremot så e de när de blir så 
me hyreskontrakt ti xempel också att 
dom e ju ofta tänkta att fungera 
under många år va #9# men e de 
långsiktia bindningar i de så vill ja ha 
sett hur villkoren ser ut va de #10#
@ < ingressive >
$A: yeah and it it that is the way it is in 
lots of operational questions right er 
the important thing is I think that #1# 
the formal binding must not be done 
#2# and and we have this standpoint 
since we discovered that we had safety 
agreements signed until two thousand 
two right for a terrible cost so #3# I 
will not let go of this thing with long 
term contracts but everything that is 
more than a year I want to see before it 
is sent away #4# (...) // #5# that is the 
way it is #6# // er #7# and because of 
that I think that it is important that 
that item is included #8# but when it 
comes to it is like that with rental 
contracts for example that they are 
often meant to work for many years 
right #9# but if it is long term bindings 
in it then I want to see what the 
conditions look like right it #10#
Here participant A makes his stance stronger, first by speaking at some length, 
repeating his standpoint several times (#1# to #2#, #3# to #4#, #7# to #8# 
and #9# to #10#), and second by phrasing it as something that he is not willing 
to compromise with (#3# to #4#). The short phrase between #5# and #6#, så 
e de (‘that is the way it is’), is very definite. 
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The question of stance strength is obviously related to that of task-oriented vs. 
social-emotional acts that Bales and his followers have been so preoccupied with 
(see p. 10 ff.). When two members in a decision group have conflicting opinions, 
there are only so many ways out of the situation. One way is to simply stop dis-
cussing it, leaving the matter aside. In Bäckmåla Municipality Council (A850101) 
this happens a few times, issues are tabled. The interval until the subsequent 
meeting can be used for informal contacts and negotiations, during which one of 
the parties can yield in a socially acceptable way. If there is no hurry deciding the 
matter, this is a reasonable way of dealing with it. 
As mentioned above, another way to handle conflicting opinions is to vote. The 
City District Committee (V321801) is an example of a group where this solution 
is taken to an extreme – the meeting is highly formalised, and voting is used sev-
eral times to force the opposition to accept the opinion of the majority. Since 
this is a political forum where this behavior has a long tradition, it does not cause 
much tension. Further, in a political meeting of this kind the socially important 
groups are probably the party groups, and the social-emotional climate within 
these party groups is what matters, not so much the the climate between the 
members of different parties. 
However, voting was not used in any group but the very formal City District 
Committee, which is a sign that consensus is favored immensely in Swedish 
groups.1 However, when two participants have conflicting views, consensus can 
only be reached if one party yields,2 and having to yield bluntly seems to be 
harmful to a person’s prestige or self-esteem. Each matter to be decided is there-
fore potentially harmful to the social-emotional atmosphere. Making stances 
weaker or stronger provides a way of maneuvering the group towards consensus, 
and gives participants a chance to probe the opinions of others before making 
their own stance overtly strong. Yielding from a weakly expressed stance is less 
harmful to the persons prestige than yielding from a strongly expressed stance. 
To analyze this aspect of face-to-face communication, Erving Goffman (1967:5 
ff.) picked up the concept of face and made it known to a larger audience of lin-
guistic and sociological researchers. A person’s face is, according to Goffman, 
the image of himself that the person wants to present to others and himself, typ-
ically consisting of positive values like friendly, intelligent, wise and beautiful. Ut-
terances (or communicative acts) that challenge this image are face-threatening, and 
when a person is about to say something that he thinks is potentially face-threat-
ening, he may use face-saving strategies to avoid the face-threat. In this terminology, 
participants in group decision-making activities can be said to apply face-saving 
strategies when they express weaker and stronger stances in order to avoid 
harming a person’s prestige or self-esteem. 
1. See 7.2.1 for a discussion of the scope of the results of this study.
2. Assuming that compromises are not possible.
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What is obvious here is that social-emotional acts and task-oriented acts cannot 
really be separated, as suggested by the IPA scheme (see section 2.2.5). Moving 
towards consensus is necessary for completing the task (making a decision), but 
affects the social-emotional atmosphere as well. 
Making a proper investigation of management techniques for social-emotional 
tension in decision groups would require quite another type of empirical material 
than what we have at hand here, but certain observations can be made from the 
material we do have. The first is that humor seems to be a common way of re-
leasing tension created in a discussion (or preventing it from being created); the 
Patent Office was the only recording without any joking. The second is simply 
leaving the matter aside and doing something else for a while in order to release 
tension. Tabling an issue is a formal method that can be used for this purpose, 
but informal groups use this principle as well. Excerpt 5-5, seen in combination 
with 5-22, is an example of this; the decision about buying the book is deferred 
for a while, for no obvious reason except that there was tension (or risk of 
tension). 
5.5.7 Status
It would hardly come as a surprise to anyone today to say that in most groups 
there are differences in status among the members, and that this difference is 
reflected in the interactional patterns of the group. Nevertheless, in the material 
used for this study there is very little independent evidence for status relation-
ships between the participants, which makes status difficult to analyze. One 
might say that people with higher status speak a lot and get their proposals ac-
cepted, but if the knowledge about which people have high status is based on 
who speaks a lot and gets proposals accepted, then one is guilty of circular 
reasoning.
However, the material does reveal that participants do not speak equally: the 
least active third of the participants in the recordings contributed with only 1.3% 
of the utterances. Note also that decisions are very rarely made while the chair 
(or a more informal leader of the activity) objects openly. Only two such cases 
were found (one in Bäckmåla Municipality Council and one in Budget Revision). 
It is likely that there are other persons in the recordings whose consent is also 
needed, but that their roles are less obvious, making it difficult to say how strong 
the demand is for their agreement. Excerpt 5-25 perhaps shows an example of a 
difference in status: J’s request to add the previous decision to the protocol is 
turned down, without any (proper) motivation having been given.
5.5.8 Ordering and volunteering
In several of the recordings studied here, for example Board of City District 1 & 
2 and Strategy Meeting, there is a manager present who has the formal power to 
more or less order the other participants to do as he says. However, such behavi-
or is rare; primarily, the managers try to convince somebody to take on the task 
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voluntarily instead. Even the weaker form of politely giving somebody a task to 
do is rarely used. One of the few cases can be seen in excerpt 5-38:
Excerpt 5-38. V770301, line 1784. Example of a manager laying a task on an 
employee.
The Board of City District Committee is discussing setting up a certain kind of crisis team, a 
'posom' group. Participant H (Helga) has given much of the background, and in utterance 1 
the chair (participant A, Arne) makes a kind of conclusion or summary (#1# to #2#), and 
says that H should be in charge of creating a posom group (#2# to #3#).
1 $A: #1# ja / de som förväntas av 
oss här de e egentlien bara att 
peka ut e: tre personer som ska bli 
informerade om de hela #2# sen 
tar du initiativ // e: för bildandet 
av en posomgrupp // och du 
funderar då på va för utbildning å 
sånt dom behöver va #3#
$A: #1# yes / what is expected from us 
now is really just to point out three 
people who are to be informed of this 
whole thing #2# and then you will initiate 
// er the formation of a posom group // 
and then you think about what kind of 
training et cetera they need right #3#
2 $H: // du ger mej uppdraget att $H: so you commission me to
3 $A: // a de ligger väl e: lagt de på 
Gun [302 så att säja ]302 så att de 
ligger ju på ditt delområde
$A: well I guess it lies er laid on Gun [302 
so to speak 302 so it lies in your subarea
4 $H: [302 m ]302 $H: [302 m ]302
5 $H: ja // m $H: yes // m
6 $A: // för de kan ju inte va en 
ledningsfråga så att säja å ta i 
utbildningsdelarna å de utan de // 
[303 de ]303 e väl egentlien 
information [304 // ]304 om läget 
å så noterar vi att de här bildas va 
[305 / e ]305 och sen jobbar du 
vidare me de enlit de uppdrag du 
har å sen har vi då att fundera på å 
kanske så småningom fästa ett 
protokoll på // tre lämpliga 
personer som som // kan gå in i 
detta å de kan väl // du fundera på 
Helga å så kan vi // byta nåra ord 
om så så noterar vi bara (...) //
$A: // because it can not be a question 
for the management so to speak to deal 
with the training parts and all that but it 
// [303 it ]303 must be really information 
[304 // ]304 about the situation and then 
we observe that this is formed right [305 
/ er ]305 and then you continue to work 
on this according to the commission you 
have and then it lies on us to think about 
and perhaps after a while attach a 
protocol to // three suitable people who 
who // can come into this and I guess you 
can // think about this Helga and then we 
can // exchange some words about and 
and we just observe that (...) //
7 $H: [303 m ]303 $H: [303 m ]303
8 $H: [304 m ]304 $H: [304 m ]304
9 $H: [305 m ]305 $H: [305 m ]305
In utterance 1, the manager, participant A, asks participant H to lead the forma-
tion of the posom group (#2# to #3#). In utterance 2, participant H asks him to 
be more precise about the task, while pointing out that this is a commission laid 
on her by A. Participant A then checks with H that she agrees with him that she 
is the appropriate person to handle this task, and then proceeds to explain his 
view on why it is her task. He is obviously concerned that she should accept the 
task more or less freely.
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It is difficult to know the precise reason managers are so reluctant to give orders, 
but there are several likely motives. One is that it is simply impolite to order 
people around; this comes from a more general ethical principle that one should 
not force people to do things against their will. It is perhaps not specific for 
Swedish culture to consider this impolite in general, but it may be specific that 
managers in these situations are expected to be polite.
Another possible motive for avoiding ordering others around is that obligation 
to the task increases if one has taken it on voluntarily, rather than having been 
ordered to do it. (This may also be culturally dependent, connected to the 
Swedish emphasis on doing one’s duty.) A commitment seems to be a stronger 
incentive than an obligation created by somebody else (all other things being 
equal). This is clearly not a binary distinction; a person can be more or less in-
volved in a decision. In addition, the more involved a person is in the decision, 
the greater the commitment and responsibility for the task are. Thus, when the 
chairperson in the Board of City District Committee elicits explicit acceptance 
from the other participants, this can be seen as a way to increase the others’ ob-
ligation. Similarly when the manager of the consultancy company in the Strategy 
Meeting refuses to commission one of the consultants to handle a task, it can be 
seen as a way to uphold commitment to the task:
Excerpt 5-39. V770201, line 4037. Example of a manager abstaining from giving 
orders to employees.
The participants have decided that they should organize a seminar for some of their potential 
customers (energy plants). Now, they are to decide who will be responsible for it. Participant 
A (Adam) is the manager, and in utterance 1 he asks for volunteers.
1 $A: a då får vi ta energi // vicka 
ta på sej de //
$A: well then we have to take the 
energy bundle instead // who can 
take that on
2 $T: där föreslår ja Fredrik å Ellen 
/
$T: I suggest Fredrik and Ellen for 
that
3 $F(redrik): de har inte ja tid me //
/ föreslår Ulf istället
$F(redrik): I do not have time for that 
/// I suggest Ulf instead
4 $E(llen): de f+ bör va nån som har 
lite erfarenhet från de / ja kan 
hjälpa till [191 och (...) /// ]191
$E(llen): it m+ should be someone 
that has some experience from that / 
I can help out [191 and (...) ]191
Twelve utterances where the participants explain why they can not take on responsibility for 
this, and what limited responsibility they can take on.
17 $A: < ja men / ta på er ansvaret 
att ta fram seminarie / de e de / 
de handlar om de / [196 ja elle 
nej ]196 >
@ < mood: irritated >
$A: < yeah but accept responsibility 
to organise seminar / that is what it 
is / it is about / [196 yes or no ]196 >
@ < mood: irritated >
18 $E: [196 ja ]196 ja kan ha me mej 
en bit då / å samla in lite 
information //
$E: [196 I ]196 I can bring one part / 
gather some information //
19 $A: m: / $A: m: /
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20 $E: en till då / två stycken [197 
(...) ]197
$E: one more / two people [197 
(...) ]197
21 $H: [197 Ellen å Ulf ]197 $H(ans): [197 Ellen and Ulf ]197
22 $A: Ellen å Ulf $A: Ellen and Ulf
23 $E: Ellen å Ulf / ja okej / Ulf $E: Ellen and Ulf / well okay / Ulf
24 $A: (...) använda dom resurser 
som finns
$A: (...) use the resources there are
25 $E: så får vi / fråga dom andra 
sen ///
$E: and then we can / ask the others 
later |
26 $A: vi lever på de här // (...) // 
< om vi nu inte lever gott så > // 
ändå så
@ < chuckling >
$A: we live off doing this // (...) // < if 
we don’t live well then > // even so
@ < chuckling >
The manager, A, tries to make one (or two) of the consultants volunteer for the 
task, but they refuse. In utterance 17, he shows some frustration, and Ellen takes 
on responsibility, followed by Ulf after a while (who accepts by not refusing). In 
utterance 26, the manager actually scolds the other participants for being so un-
cooperative. Even so, he does not use his formal power to order anyone. In ut-
terance 22, he comes close to making an order, but the wider context suggests 
that it is not understood by the others as A having given an order, rather that he 
repeats the proposal made in utterance 21. This wider context includes the fol-
lowing situation, which had occurred earlier:
Excerpt 5-40. V770201, line 4019. Another example of a manager abstaining 
from giving orders to employees.
The participants have decided that they should organise a seminar for some of their potential 
customers; they are now trying to decide who will be responsible for planning it. Participant 
A (Adam) is the manager, and in utterance 1 he asks for volunteers. Participant T 
(Tommy) feel the pressure, and replies to this in utterance 2.
1 $A: (men de e ju plan+ planera) / 
vicka kan ta på sej ansvaret å 
planera // så de blir nåt av 
$A: (but it is to pla+ plan) / who can 
take on responisbility for plannning 
// so that it does not come to nothing
2 $T: ja ja vill ju naturlivis ja kan ju 
inte göra de själv va
$T: well of course I do not want I can 
not do it on my own right 
3 $A: nä men de e inte samma [189 
sak ]189 < /// >
@ < uncertain belonging of 
pause >
$A: no but that is not the same [189 
thing ]189 < /// >
@ < uncertain belonging of pause >
4 $T: [189 nä ]189 $T: [189 no ]189
5 $A: som att göra de själv $A: as doing it alone
6 $U: a ja kan hjälpa me hjälpa till 
också
$U: well I can help with help out too
7 $A: men de måste drivas å 
samordnas å så /
$A: but it has to be pursued and 
coordinated and so on /
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8 $E: å så rätt kontaktpersoner 
skulle vi ha också då på / energi+ 
/ +verken // de [190 gäller 
stasdelsnämdena också ]190 (...) 
vi inte riktar oss ti ekonomichefer 
å*
$E: and we should have the right 
contacts too at / the energy / 
companies // that [190 applies to the 
city district committees too ]190 (...) 
we do not address the financial 
managers and
9 $X: [190 (...) ]190 $X: [190 (...) ]190
10 $T: ja nä nä / ja säger / ja bara 
säger att ja
$T: well no no / I am just saying / I 
am just saying that I
11 $A: Tommy tar på sej de $A: Tommy takes on that
12 $T: nä ja tar inte me+ på mej 
båda dom / som ansvari person 
nej /
$T: no I do not take wi+ on both of 
those / to be the responsible person 
no /
13 $A: ett $A: one
14 $T: a ja kan va me å driva / < sdn-
grejen > < // >
@ < abbreviation: sdn >
@ < uncertain belonging of 
pause >
$T: yes I can participate in pursuing 
/ the sdn thing > < // >
@ < abbreviation: sdn >
@ < uncertain belonging of pause >
15 $A: a då får vi ta energi // vicka 
ta på sej de //
$A: well then we have to take energy 
// who take on that //
In utterance 11, Adam, the manager, tries to make Tommy take on a task, but 
Tommy refuses (utterance 12). Note the phrasing ta på sig (‘take on’) the task; it is 
not really possible to order somebody to ta på sig something, even though the 
manager’s way of speaking is actually more “order-like” in utterance 11 here than 
it is in utterance 22 in excerpt 5-39.
Ordering does not really seem to be an option for the manager here.1
A third possible motive for asking employees to volunteer for the task rather 
than ordering them to is that the manager’s responsibility for the task then di-
minishes. When an employee takes on the task voluntarily, that implies that the 
employee claims to be able to perform the task, that he has time for it, etc. The 
manager can then rely on that claim, rather than making the judgment himself. 
(Formally, the manager may still be required to make the judgment, but in prac-
tice this mechanism seems to reduce responsibility for the manager.)
5.5.9 Unstructured argumentation
Argumentation is common in the investigated recordings, but it is seldom very 
well structured. In argumentation analysis one often gets the impression that ar-
guing is a simple case of claims being put forward and then arguments for or 
against these claims, and this may be the case in many written, argumentative 
1. It should be said that it is not absolutely clear that A really has formal power to 
order the other participants to do things; the background information is not 
perfect. However, it seems very likely that A has this power. 
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texts. However, in spoken group decision-making, the argumentation is usually 
blended with other things. For example, since arguments and rejections are po-
tentially threatening to the social-emotional atmosphere (as discussed above), 
communicative acts can be “disguised” in different ways. Excerpt 5-5 on pp. 
163-4 illustrates this. The question put by participant B in utterance 4 might be a 
way to give information about the proposed book, but it could also be a way to 
argue against the proposal to buy the book made in utterance 1.
What is more, participants often discuss several proposals at the same time; argu-
ments may be directed against one proposal and for another simultaneously, and 
it is sometimes difficult to know at which proposal arguments are directed. Dif-
ferent kinds of background information are often intermingled with arguments, 
and it may be difficult to know what the intended function of an utterance is. 
This is perhaps not very surprising – conversation is often like that – but at times 
there is a tendency to overlook this fact.
5.6 Activity description
The (sub) activity of arguing was described in chapter 4 in terms of purpose, 
roles, rules etc., and the same kind of description can be made for group deci-
sion-making. 
Purpose
The definition of decision-making made in chapter 3 provides us with the pur-
pose of the activity: choosing one future action and either performing that action 
or creating an obligation to perform that action.
Group decisions are always public, since at least the other people in the group 
know about them. This means that unless communication of the choice also per-
forms the chosen action (which is a rather special case, see pp. 103-4), a group 
decision will always create an obligation to act according to the choice.
Procedures
A very general procedure for making group decisions is as follows:
1. A participant makes a proposal.
2. The proposal is discussed.
3. The proposal is accepted by the other participants.
It is common that step 2 leads to a new proposal being made, which takes the 
procedure back to step 1.
As shown above, this is not the only way to make a group decision; rather, there 
are a number of different ways. However, a proposal has to be put forward, and 
others must accept the proposal after that. Other things may happen before, 
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between and after these steps, but the proposal and accept have to occur in that 
particular order.
Roles
As with arguing, there is only one role required by group decision-making: parti-
cipant. However, other roles may be assigned to participants by other structures 
(for example, chairperson, which seems to be mandatory in formal meetings).
During the course of decision-making, more temporary roles may also appear. 
The participant who makes a proposal becomes a proposer. The participants who 
are to accept or reject the proposal should be given a corresponding name; I 
have found no existing word that captures this, but perhaps proposal target can be 
used for this.
Since several proposals can be made during the same decision episode, a parti-
cipant may very well be a proposer and proposal target at the same time, and 
these roles may shift during the episode.
Rules
The basic rule for group decision-making is the same as for arguing:
The Foundation Rule: Each participant should be a rational, motivated agent, 
trying to fulfill the purpose of the activity.
This is the only strictly necessary rule, but in many cases the ethics rule also 
applies:
The Ethics Rule: The participants should take each other into ethical 
consideration.
Both the foundation rule and the ethics rule were discussed in section 4.3, 
pp. 133, 136 above.
Instruments, artefacts and media; and physical environment
As regards instruments, artefacts and media, there are no particular require-
ments, or special demands on the physical environment. Group decision-making 
can be performed in face-to-face spoken interaction, on the telephone, in writing 
or any other way that allows detailed interaction.
Social-emotional environment
Like arguing, group decision-making is probably culturally dependent on a social-
emotional level. Different cultures are likely to have different ways of making 
group decisions. The present study is not concerned with cross-cultural compar-
ison, but the author of this study is Swedish, as are the participants of the ana-
lyzed activities, so, the analyses have been made from a Swedish perspective. 
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5.7 Comparison with previous research
As mentioned above (p. 25), one of the few researchers who has tried to use lin-
guistic methods to study group decision-making is Marjan Huisman (2000; 
2001). It is worthwhile to make a closer comparison between her work and the 
present study. Huisman made video recordings of meetings with three manage-
ment teams in three Dutch organizations as well as performing interviews and 
participant observations. Using a combination of methods including a large share 
of Conversation Analysis, the recordings were analyzed.
Huisman works with Dutch data, and although the Dutch and Swedish cultures 
are fairly similar, there are likely to be at least some cultural differences between 
Dutch and Swedish decision-making. Consequently, comparison between Huis-
man’s work and mine must be made with caution, even though such comparison 
cannot be dismissed altogether on grounds of cultural differences.
Huisman makes several claims that are relevant for the present work. Firstly, she 
argues that group decisions are not clear-cut, well-defined events (Huisman 
2001:70). Rather, she stated that ‘decision-making is an incremental activity in 
which members of an organization move their agendas forward, step by step’ 
(Huisman 2001:70). As an illustration of this, Huisman presents an excerpt from 
a transcription of a meeting, where the participants discuss whether or not to 
buy a copy machine (Huisman 2001:73-74). The excerpt spans some 30 contri-
butions, starting with the secretary suggesting that the company needs to pur-
chase a copy machine. The two participants with most formal power agree with 
her argumentation, and no participants expresses disagreement. Huisman writes 
During the episode, the commitment of [the three participants with most formal power] 
emerges. We cannot attribute the decision to one specific utterance. The decision 
encompasses the whole episode in which the future state of affairs is introduced and 
commitment to create this state of affairs emerges.
(Huisman 2001:75)
However, at the very end of the excerpt, one of the members with most formal 
power utters eenmaal andermaal, and looks around at the other participants. The 
utterance is translated by Huisman as once twice, and understood by me as refer-
ring to the auction phrase eenmaal, andermaal, verkocht! (Eng: going once, going twice, 
sold!). As far as I understand, that is a very clear border to the decision, probably 
created by the speaker with the precise intention of making the decision (more) 
clear-cut. Though it is clear that the last utterance does not make up the entire 
decision, it does not seem to be quite accurate to say that the decision emerges 
vaguely during the whole episode. (However, I do not have access to the record-
ing or the full transcription, or competence to analyze Dutch culture, making my 
analysis somewhat speculative.) The recordings studied in this dissertation dis-
play variation in how decisions are made. Sometimes they start as prepared pro-
posals that the participants have received before the meeting, and though they 
may be discussed at length during the meeting, they are accepted or rejected 
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without modification. In other episodes, a problem may arise in the situation and 
several proposals be put forward and modified before one is presented that gains 
general support.
Further, Huisman defines decision as a ‘commitment to future action’, which I 
consider a bit unsatisfactory (see p. 102). However, apart from decisions, Huis-
man also talks about ‘decision-making episodes’ in conversations, episodes 
where ‘participants recursively (1) formulate states of affairs, which can consist 
of events, situations, and actions (...), and (2) assess those states of affairs’ (Huis-
man 2001:72). It is unclear whether this is meant to be a definition of how deci-
sions are made in conversations, but it seems so. One thing to note about this is 
that the 'formulation of future states of affairs' has to be understood quite 
widely – any reference to a possible future action is a formulation of a future 
state of affairs. 
Another, more problematic issue is that Huisman implies that assessing a formu-
lated state of affairs is enough for a decision. It is a little unclear exactly what she 
means with this word, but assessing is unlikely to be enough – it is necessary to 
report the result as well (although silence can be used for that; see pp. 161-2). 
Further, if assessing a state of affairs entails something other than simply under-
standing it, it does not seem to be necessary in order to accept a proposal – I 
might for example trust the proposer and choose to accept his formulation 
without evaluating it.
The fourth part of Huisman's description that I am opposed to is that the for-
mulation and assessment of states of affairs must be recursive. Excerpt 5-2 on p. 
159 above shows a simple decision-making episode. A proposal is made by parti-
cipant A in the first utterance, Huisman would call this a ‘formulation of future 
state-of-affairs’, namely that Bengt Alkvist will be the person responsible for 
checking the minutes. Participant A asks the committee members if they have 
other proposals, to which they answer no. Participant A then asks them if Bengt 
can be elected, and they answer yes, and so A declares that Bengt has been elec-
ted and proclaims the decision by striking his gavel. There is nothing recursive in 
this.
Huisman writes that it can be quite difficult for the analyst to decide when and 
whether a decision has been made (Huisman 2001:70), which I agree with (see 
p. 197). However, a natural question is then how the participants ever know that 
a decision has been made, in other words when enough commitment has been 
shown. Huisman claims that different groups use different norms for establish-
ing the existence of a decision (Huisman 2000:93ff), and the present study points 
in the same direction, although it should be said that formal procedures provide 
a common norm that many groups make use of: the chair repeats the proposal, 
elicits and receives agreement, and finally declares the result. 
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5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have investigated interaction in group decision-making. A gen-
eral conclusion is that group decisions can be quite complex interactionally. 
Many patterns and strategies are used to reach agreement, and the basic pattern 
of proposal-acceptance shows considerable variation.
One of the most striking things about the recordings studied is the great varia-
tion in handling decisions between the groups. As Huisman also found (see 
p. 218), each group creates its own patterns for how decisions are handled, a res-
ult that strengthens the claim that group decision-making research needs to be 
done on real-world groups dealing with real issues, not ad-hoc groups with artifi-
cial tasks, set up for the purpose of the study.
A number of general observations about the interaction of group decision-mak-
ing were presented in section 5.5 above, but not as many as I would have expec-
ted based on experience from the language of other social activities, such as auc-
tions, travel agency interactions, or interaction between customers and cashiers 
in shops. It seems like much of the interaction occurs in ways that do not have 
an obviously discernible pattern, which indicates that the activity of group deci-
sion-making is not very structured, or that the degree of conventionalization is 
low. Why is that so? One explanation lies in the very general nature of the cat-
egory ‘group decision-making.’ As the concept determination showed (see p. 83 
ff.), people can decide about almost anything, and group decision-making can 
appear in many situations. Such a wide variety of topics and situations works 
against conventionalization. 
Another thing to note is that the analysis of formal procedures in section 5.5 
could have been more extensive by following up all traces of formal procedures. 
However, such patterns are not focused in this thesis; perhaps the title ought to 
be ‘interpersonal group decision-making – language and interaction’.
The activities discussed in the previous sections occur in different types of 
groups and activity types, although all the participants in all the activities sit 
down to discuss certain things. They all belong to the public sphere of life, since 
the recordings in the corpus from the private sphere contained too few decisions 
from which to form generalizations. Thus, the general observations made here 
hold for public sphere meetings, while group decisions in the private sphere and 
in other kinds of activities might be different. However, the level of formality in 
for example Budget Revision or Esperanto Foundation is quite low, and I sus-
pect that the principles governing the interaction there also hold for activities in 
the private sphere. 
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6. Word Frequencies
6.1 Introduction
With the advent of computers and the ability to store and process large amounts 
of text (including transcriptions) electronically, linguists have been able to make 
their research quantitative to a much larger degree than what was possible in the 
past. The method to use electronically stored corpora to study language was 
pioneered by European Anglicists in the 1960s and -70s (Leech 1991; Svartvik 
1992), and in its simpler and more straight-forward versions (concordances, ex-
ample search) it is by now a standard tool for many, perhaps most, linguists. 
More advanced uses of corpora are not as wide spread a method for language re-
search, but are quite established even so. 
The largest written language corpora in the world contain billions of words (e.g. 
the German Mannheim corpus), while the largest spoken language corpora are 
several orders of magnitude smaller – the largest, British National Corpus, con-
tains 10 million spoken words. In comparison to these, the corpus used here is 
quite small, and this means that the results gained from it will be less reliable 
than comparable results from other, larger corpora. Further, the methodologies 
for quantitative corpus studies are still being developed, and although I intend to 
resolve a few of the methodological problems in this study, others will remain.
There is one thing that should be pointed out to readers inexperienced with cor-
pus linguistics: in the traditional division of language into expression and con-
tent, only the expression part is included in the transcriptions. This is not entirely 
true, since transcribers interpret the sounds into words, a process that includes 
understanding and thus language content, and there may also be some limited 
annotation of the contents, such as parts-of-speech tagging. But on the whole, 
the meanings of words and utterances are not included in the corpus. This 
means that questions that may seem obvious for a quantitative analysis of group 
decision-making language – how many proposals are made? how many accepts 
are produced? how often do participants disagree? etc. – cannot be answered in a 
corpus study.1
Still, there are many questions that can be answered in a corpus study, and some 
quantitative results can be interesting in themselves, as for example some distri-
butions of a particular word or expression can be. However, many times quantit-
ative studies are more interesting as complements to qualitative ones, rather than re-
placements. This complementing can be done in two ways: either by verifying/
falsifying results from qualitative analyses, or by posing questions about language 
(asking, ‘why this difference?’). In this chapter, I shall attempt both types.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 General
A number of computer programs for processing transcriptions have been de-
veloped at the Department of Linguistics, Göteborg University, primarily by Leif 
Grönqvist, and to a limited extent by Magnus Gunnarsson (some of these are 
described in (Allwood et al. 2003)). The output from these programs includes 
word frequency lists, n-gram frequency lists2 and vocabulary richness measures 
along with many other measures. Among all these lists and measures a subset has 
been selected that will be used to describe the activity type examined here, group 
decision-making. 
6.2.2 Verified programs
When using computers for research, one must keep in mind that there might be 
errors in the programs. Some procedure must be used to ensure the quality of 
the computer generated measures. I have identified four general stages in the 
generation of measures and lists, collection, encoding, calculation and presentation. Er-
rors can be introduced in each of these stages.
• Collection (From language to source file)
When dealing with spoken language, it is necessary to first record and then 
transcribe activities in order to get machine readable texts, and there may 
also be additional annotation to be done, for example of communicative 
acts3. Different kinds of errors can appear in this stage. The recording can 
fail or be low quality in different ways, but generally, the recordings are ac-
curate. It is more problematic that the person doing the transcribing and 
annotating may render a particular activity incorrectly. This is a well-
1. Unless, of course, the corpus is annotated with communicative acts etc.
2. See 6.8 for explanation.
3. Both transcription and annotiation includes certain analysis, but in the context of 
measure generation, it is all part of the collection.
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known issue, and inter-coder reliability has been discussed widely 
(Lampert and Ervin-Tripp 1993:196ff; Cucchiarini 1996). 
No transcription is necessary when working with written language, so 
inter-transcriber reliability is not a problem in such cases, although the col-
lection stage can still be identified. The texts used in the corpus have to be 
collected and, most often, converted to some format other than the origin-
al one, for example, from PDF to some XML-based text format. During 
this process, errors, such as duplicate entries or missed files may occur.
• Encoding (Consistency of source file)
The texts in the corpus usually have to be in a specific format. This format 
includes the file format (for example text files with Latin-1 character en-
coding) as well as the text format. In our case the transcriptions needed to 
be in GTS format (see appendix 1). In many cases, there are computer 
programs that can be used to verify that a corpus source file fulfils the re-
quired format. For a sufficiently rich text format, such as GTS, there are 
numerous checks that could be made using a sufficiently sophisticated 
checking program. However, there is no way to ensure that all relevant 
checks have been implemented in a given checking program. Crucial er-
rors types in the source files can only be discovered by using the corpus, 
calculating lists and measures for it. At this point, the necessary checks can 
be added to the checking program. 
Of course, there may be errors in the checking programs, basically of three 
types: i) a format error can be reported even when there is no error, ii) the 
wrong type of format error may be reported, or iii) a format error may not 
be reported even though there is one. The first two types are easily dis-
covered, since the corpus source file that is being checked will be scrutin-
ized in order to search for the reported error. If no such error is found, 
then attention is turned to the checking program. The third type of error is 
more difficult to discover, but not more so than discovering which error 
checks to implement, as discussed above.
• Calculation
The programs that generate the lists and measures that are used to analyze 
the corpus can of course contain errors, in the same way any other pro-
gram might. This is perhaps the most obvious kind of error when consid-
ering the correctness of corpus lists and measures. 
• Presentation
The final step is often overlooked, especially by end users who do not al-
ways separate the calculation of a measure from the presentation of it, and 
frequently, these steps may indeed be indistinguishable. Commonly 
though, the measures and lists are first calculated and stored in a way that 
is not so convenient to read, and then collected and put into some kind of 
report file. This stage may also introduce errors at times, and sometimes 
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quite subtle ones. If, for example, a measure is calculated for men and wo-
men separately, and the presentation mixes these numbers up, it may take 
quite some time to discover the mistake. Another kind of error occurs 
when the presentation is simply misunderstood by the analyst. Let’s say 
frequency lists of 4 different types are generated for 30 sub-corpora. The 
lists are likely to be quite similar; an analyst may accidentally mistake one 
list for another.
The list above shows that many of the possible errors in the generation of cor-
pus measures are not actual program errors, but results of usage mistakes. Still, 
program errors cannot be ignored. I have identified three types of methods for 
obtaining correct programs, proof, code review and testing.
• Proof
Starting in the 1960’s, software developers tried to make programs that 
could be proven to be without errors, in the same way as mathematical 
theorems can be proven (Fischer and Grodzinsky 1993:313). Develop-
ment has continued, to some extent, and some programs can be proven to 
be correct. However, the process of specifying, writing and proving a pro-
gram is cumbersome, and mistakes in the specification or proving can res-
ult in programs not behaving as expected.
• Code Reviewing
In programs where errors can be fatal, code review is often used to pre-
vent errors. There are different versions of this, for example tandem pro-
gramming, where two programmers sit together to write the program, or 
more traditional reviews, where a second programmer reads through the 
program code.
• Testing
The most widely used method for discovering program errors is testing. 
One simple way of testing a program is to give it to end-users and see 
what they say, essentially this is the same thing as beta testing. Another 
way is to use documented, well described test cases as a basis for testing, 
that are designed to capture the central/crucial functionality of the pro-
gram. If the expected output is well defined (there is a ‘gold standard’), 
automated (automatic) testing can be used. Here, specially designed test 
programs run the programs that are to be tested. 
These three methods can of course be combined – parts of a program can be 
proven and other parts tested, and programs that have been code reviewed are 
usually tested too.
Keep in mind that all changes to a program may potentially introduce new er-
rors, and that the testing, proving and code review in principle have to be redone 
each time the program has changed. This means that if an error is found during 
testing and the programmer corrects it, then the test has to start all over again. In 
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practice, this requires systematic version management, that is, a system for keep-
ing track of changes to the program.
6.2.3 Applications to the present material
The transcriptions used in the present study have all been checked by a person 
other than the transcriber, in order to improve reliability. This is a way to ensure 
quality in the collection stage. It also improves quality during the encoding stage, 
since the checker also corrects encoding errors made by the transcriber. The en-
coding was further improved by checking the source files with tran2ctl, a program 
developed by Leif Grönqvist. This program has been used to check GTS tran-
scriptions since 1994, amounting to over a decade of beta testing1. Further, all 
transcriptions in the group decision-making sub corpus have also been checked 
by GTSEditor, a completely separate program2 developed by Magnus Gun-
narsson in 2002. Apart from the increased quality of the files in this specific sub-
corpus, GTSEditor has also worked as a way to test tran2ctl – transcription er-
rors found by GTSEditor, but not by tran2ctl, would indicate errors in tran2ctl3.
Most of the programs used for this study to generate measures and lists have 
been used (tested, in effect) in different research projects for several years. Each 
list was also verified with a method that amounts to very much the same thing as 
using a ‘gold standard’: two random values were calculated for each list “by 
hand”, that is, small scripts or third-party programs (such as Emacs) were used 
to calculate the values from the source files. The same method was used to test 
each of the measures – the measure was calculated “by hand” for two random 
groups. The tested values were taken from the report files, in order to test the 
presentation stage at the same time.
6.2.4 Comparison
One of the most difficult things about interpreting statistical measures for a cor-
pus is knowing what to compare your statistics with. Let’s say we find out that 
the word kanske (‘maybe’) has a frequency of 342 in the group decision-making 
corpus. Is this a large or a small value? We would like to know what the “nor-
mal” frequency is for kanske, but that is not easy to get. We could try to compile 
some kind of reference corpus, a “normal” corpus, and see what frequency 
kanske has there, but what is a “normal” corpus? There have been attempts to 
create such reference or balanced corpora, containing texts of different kinds 
(Francis and Kucera 1964; Dewe et al. 1988; Källgren 1990). However, the first 
thing one has to ask when trying to put together a balanced corpus is ‘what (rel-
evant) types of language are there?’, and the second question is ‘what are the pro-
1. Although changes have been made in tran2ctl continuously during this period.
2. By ’completely separate program’ is meant that no code or design has been 
reused.
3. For this particular study, no errors in GTSEditor or tran2ctl were found.
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portions between these types in “normal” language?’. Considering the list of pos-
sibly influencing parameters on language – activity type, culture, social 
institution, gender, social class, geographic location, etc. – the number of types 
of language is not only enormous, it is also very difficult to specify, since it is far 
from obvious how many activity types/cultures/social institutions/social classes 
etc. that should be distinguished.
Of course, one could compile a “pseudo-balanced corpus”, a corpus that is as 
balanced as possible, containing as many types of language use as possible, but 
that is problematic. Before we have a proper understanding of what a “normal” 
corpus is, we will not be able to estimate how close the pseudo-balanced corpus 
is to that corpus.
In the present work, the activity type group decision-making is studied, and one 
could argue that in this case a reference corpus only has to be balanced with re-
spect to activity type. I agree with that. Many parameters influence language, and 
in order to study one of them we need to keep the other parameters (reasonably) 
constant, but not necessarily “normal”. Activity type is assumed to be one of the 
most important factors for language, and as long as the reference corpus is bal-
anced with respect to activity type, the other parameters (culture, social institu-
tion, gender, etc.) have to be approximately the same as in the group decision-
making corpus, but they need not reflect “normal language”. The problem with 
this is the same as for a general balanced corpus, although to a lesser degree: we 
do not know how many activity types there are, nor do we know their propor-
tion in “normal language”.
In this work, rather than forming comparisons to any “normal” language, they 
will be made with other activity types. Two such activity types are included, in-
formal conversation (IC) and professional/official (P/O); these are described in section 
6.3 below. The transcriptions for these activity types were taken from the Göte-
borg Spoken Language Corpus (Allwood et al. 2003).
6.2.5 Significant difference
When finding a quantitative difference between two corpora, one must ask 
whether or not the difference is significant. What does this mean, precisely? If 
the corpora were complete in the sense that they contained all instances of the 
language that they are meant to be corpora of, then every measured difference 
would be significant in the sense that it reveals a difference in the target data. A 
difference may be a small one, but that is beside the point. Usually, however, the 
corpus only contains a small amount of the kind of language that the researcher 
wants to investigate. In such cases the interesting question is: If the corpus were 
expanded to include substantially more material of the same kind, what are the 
chances that the difference would remain?
The corpus is a sample, but it is not obvious what it is a sample of, what the 
“language population” is. In the case of the group decision-making corpus, one 
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might ask if it contains ‘all words/utterances that have ever been produced in 
GDM’ or ‘all words/utterances that have ever been produced in GDM and all 
words/utterances that will ever be produced in GDM’, or perhaps ‘all words/ut-
terances that have been, or could be, produced in GDM’. (More restrictions 
should of course be added. For example, that the group decision-making should 
be performed in Swedish, by adult speakers, in modern times, etc.)
This insecurity about what the corpus is makes it seem like corpora cannot be 
used for quantitative studies at all, but that judgment is too harsh. With a proper 
awareness of what kind of texts the corpus contains, the results from a quantitat-
ive study can be meaningful. A corpus is a perfect sample of the kind of language 
that is in the corpus, and the challenge for the analyst is then to understand the 
difference between the language of the corpus and the kind of language that the 
analyst would like to study (in this case, the language of group decision-making). 
This also means that a difference between two corpora that are intended to cap-
ture two language types does not necessarily mean that there is a difference 
between these two language types. The conceptual step from corpus to language 
type will have to be qualitative.
Now, let’s return to the question at the start of this section – how do we know if 
a quantitative difference between two corpora is significant? If it can be assumed 
that the measure in question follows a normal distribution (‘the bell curve’), a 
whole set of standard statistical methods can be used to extract information 
about the sampled language from the corpus, including methods to test statistical 
significance1. I do make this assumption, and two such tests for statistical signi-
ficance are used in this study, the t-test and the !2-test (‘chi square’, /kai skw?'/)2. I 
will not go into the mathematical details about these statistical tests, since there 
are plenty of textbooks on the subject, such as (Djurfeldt et al. 2003), but I shall 
describe the tests here briefly.
• The t-test
The t-test is a way to test a difference between two populations, while 
1. If we believe in some other distribution than the normal one, other statistical 
methods can be used.
2. A third test that could be used is the Mann-Whitney ranks test, advocated by 
(Kilgarriff 2001). There are some difficulties with Mann-Withney, however. First, 
it requires samples of the same size, and for the small corpora used here it would 
be difficult to construct samples that respect transcription boundaries (i.e. not 
splitting any transcriptions onto two different samples), and it is far from obvious 
how the test would be affected if these boundaries are not respected in the 
samples. There is simply not a natural way of dividing the corpus into equal-sized 
samples. Further, the word frequencies would be quite low in many of the 
samples, which would make the test unusable for many words. Thus, Mann-
Whitney ranks test is not used in this study, although a comparison would be 
interesting. 
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taking the variation within a population into consideration. Lets say we 
sample men and women from a certain category, ten of each, measuring 
their heights. The result is that the men are 183 cm on average, and the 
women are 166 cm on average. If the variation within these groups is very 
small (the men are between 180 and 186 cm and women are between 165 
and 168 cm), this difference in average height is quite stable. The t-test 
would then say that the probability is high that the difference is real. In 
other words, it would show that even if we sampled many more men and 
women, men would still be taller than women, with a probability of, for 
example, 99.9%. If, on the other hand, the variation within the two groups 
is high – the men are between 143 and 211 cm, and the women are 
between 144 and 193 cm – then the t-test would say that the probability is 
much lower that the difference is real, for example 75%. If the variation 
within each group is large, the average value is less reliable; the t-test takes 
this into consideration.
• The !2-test
The !2-test is less sophisticated, and does not concern itself with intra-
group variation. Let’s say we pick 10 married heterosexual Canadian 
couples, and 10 married heterosexual French couples, and measure who is 
the taller, the husband or the wife. The result of this measurement is that 
in 8 of the Canadian couples the husband is taller, and in 10 of the French 
couples the husband is taller. The !2-test will tell us what the probability is 
86% that this difference between French and Canadian couples will 
remain if we measure many other couples.
It is worth stressing that both the t-test and the !2-test concern only whether 
there is a difference at all, not the size of the difference. They only test state-
ments like ‘x is more common in A than in B’. A statement like ‘x is twice as 
common in A as in B’ requires other statistical tests.
It is not obvious how the statistical tests should be applied to the corpus data, 
therefore, it is necessary to discuss statistical significance in relation to the meas-
ures more closely. I have identified four kinds of measures:
Activity Measures
A measure like ‘number of speakers per activity’ is obviously related to the activ-
ities in the corpus, and each recording can be seen as a sample. A corpus is then 
a series of samples, and the variation within this series can be calculated. A t-test 
can be performed to see if a difference in number of speakers per activity for 
two corpora is statistically significant. Thus, the t-test can be used for any meas-
ure that can be applied to each activity, and such measures are called activity 
measures.
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Utterance Measures
Other measures, for example ‘average number of words per utterance’ (MLU, 
mean length of utterance), can be seen as being related to each utterance in the 
corpus. Each utterance is a sample, therefore, t-tests can be performed to exam-
ine statistical significance on the difference in MLU between two corpora. 
However, MLU can also be seen as an activity measure (average MLU for the 
activities in the corpus), and I consider this a more reasonable view. When each 
utterance is seen as a sample, the order between the utterances is completely dis-
regarded. When MLU is seen as an activity measure, in contrast, the utterances 
“remain” within their respective activities. An activity with many exceptionally 
long utterances will be treated as an exceptional activity, rather than allowing all 
exceptionally long utterances blend in with utterances from the other activities.
Under other circumstances it might be better to see MLU as an utterance measure, 
but not in this case. I have not found any measures that were fit to be treated as 
utterance measures.
Word (Token) Measures
Word frequencies can be seen as activity measures – for example, the relative 
frequency of a certain word1 can be calculated for each activity in a corpus, and 
the average value can then be calculated and compared with that of another cor-
pus. This would be the average relative frequency for a word type. Another way 
to do this is to look at the relative frequency of the word in the corpus as a 
whole, disregarding the distribution of the word among the activities. This would 
be the total relative frequency. These values are often quite close to each other, 
but they may be very different, particularly if the sizes of the activities in the cor-
pora differ a lot. As an example we can look at the words någonstans (‘some-
where’) and typ (‘type’) in the group decision-making (GDM) corpus compared 
to the informal conversation (IC) corpus (see section 6.3 for a description of the 
IC corpus):
Table 6-1: Example of total relative frequency compared to average relative 
frequency.
Corpus Abs. freq. Total ppm ppm/recording
någonstans
GDM 73 278 278
IC 33 338 366
typ
GDM 62 236 156
IC 54 554 620
1. The relative frequency for a word in a corpus is the number of occurrences of 
that type divided by the total number of tokens. 
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For någonstans the average relative frequency (ppm/recording) and the total relat-
ive frequency (total ppm) are about the same, while these frequencies differ 
greatly for typ, especially in the GDM corpus. This means that for typ there is one 
or more activity that is considerably larger than average that has relative frequen-
cies that are considerably different (higher) than average. 
Should we care about the total relative frequency or the average relative fre-
quency? Well, that depends on the word and the explanation we give for the dif-
ference. If we say that the word could appear in this activity, then the total relative 
frequency is what matters. If we say that the word must appear in this activity, 
then we should consider at the frequency as an activity measure, at which point, 
the average relative frequency is more interesting.
If we decide to look at the total relative frequency, the !2-test can be used to test 
for statistical significance. Each word is then a sample that has two possible val-
ues: någonstans (if that is the word we are interested in) or some other word. Dif-
ferences between activities within the same corpus are ignored. 
Measures that apply to each word in this way are called word measures.
Corpus Measures
Some measures are related to the corpus as a whole rather than to each activity 
or word. An example is ‘number of words covered by bigrams that occur more 
than once’.1 This measure indicates how stereotypical the corpus is, but it is diffi-
cult to predict how the measure will behave when comparing corpora of differ-
ent sizes. In addition, the measure calculated for an individual activity can be 
quite different from the corpus as a whole. In this case, the corpus can not be 
seen as a series of samples, so a test of statistical significance is impossible. Such 
measures are called corpus measures.
6.3 Basic properties
The group decision-making (GDM) corpus used in this study primarily contains 
recordings from meetings (project groups, committees, etc.), and few casual con-
versations (e.g. three friends planning a vacation together). Further, most of the 
speakers are male, and although precise information about their age is unavail-
able, the impression is that few of them are below 30 or above 65 years of age. 
All participants speak Swedish, and there is no indication that any of them have a 
foreign background. Most of the recordings have been made in and around the 
1. First a frequency list of all bigrams is generated. Then all bigrams in that list with 
a frequency of 1 are stripped away. After that the corpus is processed again, and 
each word is compared to the list: if the word occurs in a bigram that is 
represented in the list, then the word is counted.
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Gothenburg area between 1989 and 2004. The recordings were described in 
more detail in section 5.2 above.
The activity types informal conversation (IC) and professional/official (P/O) 
have been chosen in order to contrast group decision-making. Informal conver-
sation (‘small talk’) is a somewhat elusive activity type, and can perhaps be char-
acterized as lacking a clear purpose. Participants change topics rather freely, the 
conversation can be interrupted almost at any point without rendering the con-
versation incomplete and there seems to be no particular structure for the con-
versation to follow. At the same time, it seems unreasonable to assume that hu-
man beings would spend as much time as they do on informal conversation if it 
was completely useless. A possible explanation is that the purpose of informal 
conversations is indirect – what we talk about matters less than the fact that we 
talk. Another possibility is that there are so many topics and purposes under the 
heading informal conversation that it is difficult to generalize.
Whatever the purpose of informal conversation, people often engage in it, and as 
an activity type, it has been studied quite a lot1. It is less common for informal 
conversations to contain group decision-making episodes, and any informal con-
versations in the present case that contain a considerable amount of group deci-
sion-making have been excluded in order to make the contrast to the GDM cor-
pus clearer.
Professional/Official is chosen as the name for a rather wide group of activities, 
which all have at least one participant who performs the activity as a part of her 
profession, or at least in an official role, such as board member. It includes talk 
between bus driver and passenger, customer and shop assistant, customer and 
travel agent, hotel guest and reception clerk, as well as talk in non-deciding board 
meetings, in courts, and at trade union meetings.
We shall now look at the basic properties of the three corpora.
1. The reason for this is not entirely clear, but it seems to be a wide-spread idea that 
informal conversation is more “natural” than other kinds of conversation. In the 
literature, however, there is only argumentation for ’naturally occuring conversa-
tion’ as opposed to written language or elicited speech, but there seem to be some 
kind of conceptual slide from ’naturally occurring conversation’ via ’natural con-
versation’ to ’informal conversation’; see for example (Sacks 1984) or 
(New Zealand Ministry of Education 1998).
I do not see what would make this activity type so special. I see nothing abnorm-
al, non-standard or advanced (as opposed to “basic”) about a conversation be-
tween a customer and an assistant in a shop, or between two fishermen making 
plans for the day. 
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Table 6-2: Basic properties of the corpora Group Decision-Making, Informal 
Conversation and Professional/Official.
GDM IC P/O
Recorded activities 18 21 108
Tokens 265927 98435 190949
Tokens/Activity 14 774 4 687 1 768
Duration (hours) 29.47 9.111 26.952
Speakers/Activity 9.9 4.1 7.3
Table 6-2 shows the basic properties of the three corpora GMD, IC and P/O. 
Compared to the other two corpora, GDM contains few, very long activities. 
The t-test shows that there is less a than 0.05% risk that the difference in mean 
tokens/activity does not reveal a true difference in the normal distribution. In 
other words, there is little risk that if the corpora grew considerably, the differ-
ence would disappear. As mentioned above, this calculation is based on the as-
sumption that the tokens/activity has a normal distribution within each activity 
type. The number of speakers per activity is also larger for GDM than for IC 
and P/O, and the differences are statistically significant on the 99.9% level or 
better. 
The difference in length of the activities between the three corpora is not 
surprising. Several of the GDM activities are board or committee meetings (see 
section 5.2 for details), which often last between one and three hours. The IC 
activities are usually friends having a cup of coffee together, phone conversa-
tions between friends, or something similar, and do not usually last as long. The 
P/O activities, finally, include rather brief interactions between a customer and 
sales person at a car rental service, travel agency, or some other business institu-
tion, and the activities are often just a few minutes long.
1. Time information was unavailable for one recording (6% of the tokens), and its 
duration was estimated by assuming the same speed (tokens/minute) for it as for 
the recordings in IC that do have time information.
2. Time information was unavailable for 28 recordings (10% of the tokens), and its 
duration was estimated by assuming the same speed (tokens/minute) for it as for 
the recordings in P/O that do have time information. 
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6.4 Simple words and utterances
6.4.1 Speed, word length and utterance length
Table 6-3: Average speaking speed and lengths of utterance and word.
GDM IC P/O
Mean Length of Utterance (MLU) per Activity 18 11 7.7
Average Speed (tokens/minute) 158 185 117
Word Length per Activity
(letters per word)
4.05 3.76 3.83
Table 6-3 shows the average lengths of utterances and words, as well as the av-
erage speaking speed, for activities in the three corpora. The differences have 
been tested for statistical significance as activity measures, using the t-test, and all 
differences are significant. However, the difference in word length between IC 
and P/O is only significant on the 95% level.1 The remaining differences are sig-
nificant at least at the 99.5% level.
The utterance length is considerably larger in GDM than in the other two activ-
ity types. There are several explanations for this. First, many of the activities in 
GDM are meetings with quite a few participants (see table 6-2). This situation 
probably prevents verbal feedback, which causes utterances to be longer. The 
long utterances are an effect of little verbal feedback.2 Another explanation is 
that sometimes a member of a group makes very long presentations about some 
issue, giving extensive background information; these situations cause very long 
utterances. 
The third explanation to the long utterances during group decision-making is 
that arguments and proposals often require fairly long utterances, because future 
acts, consequences, and argument structures are described.
The long words in GDM can be explained largely by the fact that many of the 
recordings come from the area of public administration, where there are quite a 
few long, descriptive terms. In Swedish, compounds are written as single words, 
which create fairly long words, such as samarbetsnämnden (the council of coopera-
tion), fastighetsförvaltningen (‘real-estate management’), and bostadsbyggnadsprogram 
(‘program for building dwellings’).
1. That is, there is a 5% risk that the difference in the sample does not reflect a 
difference in the activity type.
2. See also p. 245.
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6.4.2 Overlaps
Table 6-4: Overlap statistics. Not all differences are statistically significant. The 
numbers for which there are no significant differences compared to GDM have 
been stricken through. The significance level is 99.5%.
GDM IC P/O
Avg. amount of overl. tokens per tok. and rec. (%): 9.2 11.7 7.5
Avg. amount of overl. per utterance and rec. (%): 26.5 20.2 13.1
Table 6-4 shows the number of overlaps in the three corpora. When counting 
overlapped tokens (i.e. where the length of each overlap occasion is considered), 
there are no statistically significant differences. However, when ignoring the 
length of the overlaps, we see that GDM and IC contain considerably more 
overlaps than P/O. One would perhaps expect that the formality of the meet-
ings that many of the GDM activities are taken from would prevent overlaps, 
but that does not seem to be the case. 
Table 6-5: Overlap type distribution. Not all differences are statistically signific-
ant. The numbers for which there are no significant differences compared to GDM 
have been stricken through. The significance level is 99%.
Overlap types % of all overlaps,
in average
Name Description Illustration GDM IC P/O
Initial-
Complete
A and B start speaking at the 
same time, then B stops and A 
continues.
A:
B:
4.5 9.6 6.1
Final-Initial A starts speaking alone, then B
starts speaking, then A stops 
speaking and B continues 
alone.
A:
B:
32.1 36.9 35.1
Complete-
Complete
A and B start speaking at the 
same time and then stop 
speaking at the same time.
A:
B:
0.8 0.9 3.6
Medial-
Complete
A starts speaking alone, then B
starts speaking, then B stops 
speaking and A continues 
alone.
A:
B:
40.3 42.5 40.6
Final-
Complete
A starts speaking alone, then B
starts speaking, and then A and
B stop speaking at the same 
time.
A:
B:
6.6 6.1 10.2
234 Chapter 6: Word Frequencies
More than 2 More than two speakers speak 
at the same time.
A:
B:
C:
12.2 2.01 0.6
Other Cases where the analysis 
program has not managed to 
analyze the overlap type, either 
due to unusual situations, or 
due to the transcription not 
following the specified format 
(GTS).
3.7 2.0 4.0
Total 100.22 100 100.22
There are a number of different types of overlaps; table 6-5 provides statistics 
for some of the most common types. Comparing GDM and IC we see that 
GDM has more overlaps with more than two speakers, but fewer initial-com-
plete overlaps. IC activities often consist of few speakers who make short utter-
ances, giving a lot of verbal feedback (cf. p. 245), and who speak on a compar-
ably equal basis (cf. verbal equality p. 238 ff.). This creates many situations where 
one speaker has stopped talking and it is somewhat unclear whether he will con-
tinue, or if he is waiting for feedback from the listener. Initial-complete overlaps 
are to be expected. Here is an example:
Excerpt 6-1. A320602, line 545.
Two speakers, A and B, are having some sandwiches and engaging in small-talk. They have 
now come to talk about the love life of a mutual friend.
1 $A: [148 ja de ]148 har varit slut / 
flera gånger om vet [149 du ]149
$A: [148 yes it ]148 has been over 
several times you [149 know ]149
2 $B: [149 å ]149 börjat på nytt $B: [149 and ]149 started again
3 $A: ja // $A: yes //
4 $B: [150 var e han ]150 nu då $B: [150 where is he ]150 now then
5 $A: [150 men nu ]150 $A: [150 but now ]150
6 $A: ja nu har han flyttat tillbaka till 
sin före detta
$A: well now he has moved back in 
with his ex
Here, overlap 150 is initial-complete. After A’s yes in line 3, it is somewhat un-
clear if A has more to say, then A and B start talking at the same time.
In GDM, overlaps involving more than two participants involved are more com-
mon than in the other two corpora. The explanation is probably that, in the 
GDM activities, there are often more than two participants discussing the same 
issue, and they are often actively involved in the discussion. In IC, there are few-
er participants in general, which is true to a lesser degree for P/O as well. In P/
1. Only significant on the 95% level.
2. The total of these figures exceeds 100 due to rounding to the nearest tenth.
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O one might also expect that the participants are somewhat less involved in the 
activities; the P/O corpus consists largely of short, business-like encounters, 
which rarely are long enough for the participants to become involved enough to 
produce many overlaps. In contrast, excerpt 6-2 below shows how several parti-
cipants in a group decision activity can discuss a subject.
Excerpt 6-2. A850701, line 243.
Meeting with the building committee of the municipality in a rural area in southern Sweden. 
In utterance 1, the chair, R, introduces a topic, an application for a building permit. This is 
discussed for a while, and in utterance 24, the chair proclaims the decision.
1 $R: ... // sju elektriker Knut 
Eriksson Axelssonsvägen 
hundrasex Lessebo garage å tomt 
på Berket Snickarebo ett sjuttitre 
Bäckhult ///
$R: ... // seven electrician Knut 
Eriksson Axelssonsvägen one 
hundred six Lessebo garage and lot 
at Berket Snickarebo one 
seventythree Bäckhult ///
2 $B: (...) garaget här / $B: (...) the garage here /
3 $V: ja allså [21 byggnadslovet ]21 
har han tidigare på själva 
bostadshuset men de [22 
gäller ]22 inte garaget
$V: well yes he has [21 the building 
permit ]21 since before for the house 
but that does not [22 include ]22 the 
garage
4 $R: [21 ja ]21 $R: [21 yes ]21
5 $R: [22 mm ]22 $R: [22 mm ]22
6 $B: han söker för garaget nu $B: he is applying for the garage now 
7 $V: ja just [23 de ]23 $V: yes that is [23 right ]23
8 $Z: ja [23 de e bara de ]23 ja $Z: yes [23 that is the only thing ]23 
yes
9 $B: e:u: här e ju också närmare 
gränsen än fyra å en halv meter
$B: er it is also closer to the border 
than four and a half meters
10 $V: < ja just de >
@ < very quiet >
$V: yes that is right
@ < very quiet >
11 $B: men grannens medgivande 
finns här / dom har ingenting å 
erinra så att / då behöver inte 
byggnadsnämden heller ha de
$B: but the neighbour’s permission is 
here / they have nothing to object so 
/ in that case the building committee 
does not need to have that either
12 $V: < nähä >
@ < very quiet >
$V: no okay
@ < very quiet >
13 $R: e: ligger inte de på samma 
område de då / som den [24 förra 
här ]24
$R: er is not that in the same area as 
that / as the last [24 one here ]24
14 $E: [24 näej ]24 $E: [24 no ]24
15 $V: [24 nä ]24 de var (...) $V: [24 no ]24 it was (...)
16 $R: jasså e de de // jaha du $R: okay is that so // okay
17 $B: men här e0 inget hinder för 
byggnaslov
$B: but there is no impediment for 
building permit
18 $R: e hur var det me [25 
grannens ]25
$R: er what about [25 the 
neighbor’s ]25
19 $V: [25 de ]25 finns $V: [25 it is ]25 here
20 $R: de finns $R: it is here
21 $V: ja $V: yes
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22 $R: vi k+ då: kan vi bevilja 
byggnadslov då
$R: we c+ in that case we can grant 
building permit then
23 $X: < ja >
@ < comment: several 
participants >
$X: < yes >
@ < comment: several participants >
24 $R: svaret e ja < | > ...
@ < event: strike of chairperson’s 
gavel >
$R: the answer is yes < | > ...
@ < event: strike of chairperson’s 
gavel >
In this short decision episode, no less than five participants join in, even though 
the issue is quite simple.
P/O contains more complete-complete overlaps and more final-complete over-
laps than GDM. For complete-complete a possible explanation is that the P/O 
activities are often part of social activities with fairly well-defined activity struc-
tures, such as activities in shops or travel agencies. In such situations several par-
ticipants can guess what is about to happen, and talk at the same time. One ex-
ample of this is when customer and agent in a travel agency greet each other at 
the same time:
Excerpt 6-3. A790605, line 44.
I is a customer, and B is an assistant in a shop for computer games. This is the start of the 
recording.
1 $I: [11 hej ]11 $I: [11 hi ]11
2 $B: [11 hej ]11 $B: [11 hi ]11
3 $I: e: (...) ha ni nittonhundra+ e 
nittonhundranittis+ / +fem //
$B: er (...) do you have nineteen 
hundr+ er nineteen hundred ninety / 
five //
4 $B: m: $B: m:
5 $I: de dä kan ja ja [12 (...) ]12 $I: I can do that [12 (...) ]12
6 $B: [12 ska du ha ]12 fem+ femte 
utgåvan / ska du ha eller
$B: [12 do you want ]12 the fif+ fifth 
edition / is that what you want 
7 $I: a $I: yes
Here it is overlap 11 that is complete-complete. There is no video recording of 
this activity, and so we cannot know for sure what is happening, but it is likely 
that participant B has just finished doing something, and is turning his attention 
to participant I. The hi from participant I is used to signal that he is ready to help 
participant B, and B has probably already guessed this, anticipates the greeting, 
and says hi at the same time participant I does.
There are also more final-complete overlaps in P/O than in GDM, but in many 
of these cases, one or both of the utterances are unfortunately inaudible, and it is 
very difficult to find an explanation for this pattern.
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6.4.3 Equality and dominance
The distribution of tokens and utterances between speakers in an activity can be 
captured with the measures equality and dominance. Equality for a recording is 
based on the participation for each participant p:
For example, if speaker A contributes 340 out of 2141 words in a recording, 
then A’s participation is 340/2141 = 0.16.
The average participation, always 1 divided by the number of participants, is 
used to calculate the participation deviation for each participant p: 
The sum of all participation deviation is used to define equality:
The theoretical maximum for the total participation deviation occurs when a 
single participant makes all utterances. A little algebra reveals that this boils 
down to
The final definition of token equality is as follows:
where P is the set of participants, Tokp is the number of words uttered by P, Tok 
is the total number of words, and N is the number of participants. This results in 
a value between 0 and 1, where 1 means absolutely equal and 0 means not equal 
at all. The definition of utterance equality is the same, with the exception that the 
number of tokens is replaced with the number of utterances.
Dominance is a little easier: it focuses on the participant that speaks most, and 
how much more that participant speaks than the average speaker, expressed in 
percent:
where Tokmax is the number of words uttered by the participant who speaks the 
most, and Toktot is the total number of words in the recording.
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Table 6-6: Equality and dominance. Not all differences are statistically significant. 
The numbers for which there is no significant difference compared to GDM have 
been stricken through. The significance level is 99.5%.
GDM IC P/O
Average Equality
token 0.535 0.684 0.586
utterance 0.623 0.857 0.720
Average Dominance
token 248% 54% 189%
utterance 228% 32% 151%
Table 6-6 shows that group decision-making is less equal than informal conver-
sation in all cases, while the difference between GDM and P/O is smaller, and 
not statistically significant except in the case of equality of utterances. In the 
GDM activities there is almost always a chairperson or similar who typically 
makes all other utterances, which causes low equality and high dominance. There 
are also more participants in general in GDM, also making equality less likely, es-
pecially at the utterance level (in an activity with only two participants, which is 
not uncommon in neither IC not P/O, the participants quite naturally make the 
same number of utterances). 
6.5 Lexical variation
6.5.1 Introduction
Some activity types may be less lexically varied than others in the sense that 
words and phrases may be repeated more often. There are different ways of 
measuring this, but it is difficult to say what the statistical significance would be 
in this case, since we usually see lexical variation as a property of an entire corpus 
rather than of individual activities or utterances. An activity type that follows a 
very strict schema may be lexically varied within each activity instance, but the 
instances may be very similar to each other, and may then consider the lexical 
variation low in that activity type1. 
However, looking at three different measures for lexical variation – theoretical 
vocabulary, stereotypicality, and hapax share – we can get a general idea of the differ-
ences between the three corpora.
6.5.2 Theoretical vocabulary
Theoretical vocabulary (Muller 1964) is based on the type-token ratio (TTR), the 
number of word types divided by the number of tokens. The problem with TTR 
1. Under other circumstances the lexical variation for each activity may be more 
interesting, but that would probably require more homogeneous activities than 
the ones in present case.
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is that it is sensitive to corpus size: adding 1000 tokens to a corpus of 1000 
tokens will perhaps add 300 new types, while adding 1000 tokens to a corpus of 
1000000 adds perhaps 30 new types, since most of the types in the 1000 token 
addition are already represented in the existing, 1000000 word corpus. Theoret-
ical vocabulary means that a fixed size sample is drawn from the corpus, and the 
number of types is calculated for that sample. In fact, all possible samples of the 
fixed size are made, and the average number of types is calculated. In detail:
To calculate theoretical vocabulary (vocab), we observe that the average fre-
quency that a certain word type will have in a sample of m token is the same as 
the probability that at least one of its tokens will be part of that sample. The 
probability for a single token not to be part of the sample is:
where Ntoken is the total number of tokens in the corpus and m is the size of the 
sample.
The presence probability for a type, the probability that at least one token of a type 
is part of the sample, is the complement of the probability that not a single token 
of the type is part of the sample. This is calculated as the product of the probab-
ilities for each of the tokens of the given type:
where fw is the number of tokens of the type in the corpus. Here, the size of the 
corpus is adjusted for each multiplication, since it represents the removal of a 
word (the one that is sampled).
The number of types in the sample, on average, will be the sum of the presence 
probability for each of the types in the corpus:
or, more elegantly:
where Types is the set of all types in the corpus, and Ntype is the number of mem-
bers in that set.1
1. Muller (1964) makes the assumption that the size of the sample is considerably 
smaller than the corpus, and approximates sampling without replacement (which 
is the case here) as sampling with replacement (which yields a somewhat simpler 
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Table 6-7: Theoretical vocabulary.
GDM IC P/O
Vocab 10 000 2157 1999 2060
Table 6-7 shows the theoretical vocabulary for the three corpora with the sample 
size set to 10000. As seen in the table, GDM is lexically more varied than the 
two other corpora.
6.5.3 Stereotypicality
Turning to stereotypicality (developed by Leif Grönqvist), we define it using the-
oretical vocabulary:
where Vocabmax is the largest possible value for vocab, usually the same as the size 
of the sample (10000 in table 6-7 above). If the variation is very high, Vocab will 
come close to Vocabmax, the quotient close to 1, and stereotypicality will come close 
to zero. The stereotypicality for different n-gram lengths shows how stereotypic-
al the corpus is.
Figure 6-1: Stereotypicality. The Y-axis shows the square root of the stereotypical-
ity for the different n-gram lengths on the x-axis.
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
N-gram length
Length  GDM    IC      P/O
1       5.431   5.369   5.307
2       1.003   2.492   2.329
3       1.049   1.004   0.934
4       0.098   0.271   0.096
5       0.028   0.033   0.030
6       0.01    0.014   0.014
7       0       0.010   0.010
8       0       0       0.010
9       0       0       0.010
10      0       0       0
GDM
IC
P/O
Figure 6-1 shows the stereotypicality profile for the three corpora. In order to 
see the differences more clearly, the square root of the stereotypicality has been 
formula). I do not make that assumption.
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used on the y-axis instead of the raw stereotypicality value.1 The general principle 
is that the steeper the curve is, the less stereotypical the corpus is. We see that 
the general tendency is, as with theoretical vocabulary, that GDM is lexically 
more varied than the other two corpora. For trigrams, however, the GDM curve 
makes a leap and is more stereotypical than the other corpora. It is difficult to 
say what causes this. 
6.5.4 Hapax share
A third measure of lexical variation is the hapax share (developed by Leif Grön-
qvist and Magnus Gunnarsson); the share of n-grams occurring only once. The 
number of hapaxes can be compared to the total number of tokens (of the given 
n-gram length) to get a percentage. The higher the percentage of hapaxes, the 
higher the lexical variation.
A problem with this measure is that the size of the corpus affects the amount of 
hapaxes. The share of hapaxes for an average sampling of a corpus can be calcu-
lated similarly to the method used in the case for theoretical vocabulary. Assume 
a corpus K0 with s0 number of tokens, and that we select a sample of s1 tokens 
from this into a sub corpus K1. An n-gram type W can get the frequency 1 in K1 
in many different ways (normally). One of these is as follows:
The first n-gram that is selected for K1 is of type W, i.e. it belongs to the subset 
W. After that, an n-gram is selected for K1 that is not of type W, i.e. it belongs to 
"W. Then another n-gram from "W is selected, etc. until s1 tokens have been se-
lected. The probability for this to happen is
which, more precisely, is
where fw is the frequency of type W.
This is thus the special case where the single occurrence of W is selected first. 
The order of the selection of the tokens in K1 is not important, however, so 
there are s1 occasions where the single occurrence of W can be selected. This 
means that the probability of W to be a hapax in K1 is
1. Using the square root results in a more narrow range: a range from 1 to 100 is 
reduced to a range from 1 to 10. The diagram then becomes lower, and in our 
case that means that it can be presented with greater detail.
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The number of n-gram types in K1 with frequency 1 will be the sum of their 
probabilities:
This can also be generalized to calculate the number of n-grams with frequency 
g:
Using this formula, the share of hapaxes in the three corpora can be compared.
Table 6-8: N-grams with frequency 1, in percent of the total number of n-grams 
of the specified length.
N-gram
Length
Total tokens Hapaxes in GDM Hapaxes in IC Hapaxes in P/O
1 97427 6.05% 4.79% 5.15%
2 88288 37.23% 33.74% 35.39%
3 81119 74.52% 72.40% 73.97%
4 74494 93.35% 92.29% 92.87%
5 68401 98.77% 98.16% 98.27%
6 62918 99.74% 99.60% 99.43%
7 58093 99.92% 99.87% 99.68%
8 53821 99.95% 99.95% 99.76%
9 49989 99.97% 99.98% 99.79%
10 46560 99.97% 99.99% 99.82%
Table 6-8 shows the share of hapaxes with a length of 1-10 for the three cor-
pora. The IC corpus is the smallest one, and for the other two corpora the values 
are calculated assuming a sample size equal to that of the IC corpus, shown in 
column 2.
The differences are small, but the general tendency is that GDM has more 
hapaxes than the other corpora, with the exception of n-grams longer than 8 
words, where IC has more hapaxes. N-grams of this length are rarely repeated 
(as the numbers in table 6-8 show), and the repetitive nature of some of the 
GDM activities (e.g. moving on to the next item on the agenda) generates some 
repeated, long n-grams, which apparently show up in this measure.
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6.5.5 Comparison
Theoretical vocabulary and stereotypicality measures thus show that the lexical 
variation in group decision-making is larger than in informal conversation and 
professional/official. The values for hapax share are somewhat more difficult to 
interpret, but it could mean that group decision-making has a larger variation of 
single words than the other corpora, and also a set of fixed phrases that are used 
more than once. 
6.6 Parts-of-speech distribution
Transcription tagging was done using the parts-of-speech tagger developed by 
Nivre & Grönqvist (2001). The tagger has an error rate of 3%, and uses the tra-
ditional nine parts-of-speech (nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, pronouns, con-
junctions, interjections, numerals and prepositions), in addition to feedback words 
and own communication management words. Feedback words are words used primarily 
for feedback, ‘the giving or eliciting of information concerning contact, percep-
tion, understanding and attitude, by regularised linguistic means’ (Allwood 
1993b). (The term back channelling has been used for a part of the feedback phe-
nomenon, but with a different analysis.) 
Own communication management includes a number of phenomena that can be 
grouped under two main headings: choice and change (Allwood 1995). Choice-re-
lated OCM concerns how a speaker can signal that she is planning what to say 
(typically manifested in “hesitation sounds”). Change-related OCM concerns 
how speakers can change things in an utterance that they have already made. 
This includes removing a word, replacing a word with another one, and adding 
new words. Self-corrections are examples of phenomena under this header. 
Words used primarily for OCM are called own communication management 
words (OCM words).
Table 6-9 shows the distribution of parts-of-speech in the three corpora. These 
numbers have been considered activity measures, and the differences between 
GDM and the other two corpora have been tested for statistical significance us-
ing the t-test1. When the significance level for this is less than 99%, the numbers 
have been grayed out.
1. Since the part-of-speech tagger has an error rate of 3%, and since it could be the 
case that the tagger performs better with transcriptions from one activity type 
than another, the significance level could be lower than 99%. The most common 
error type comes from words that the tagger does not have in its lexicon, and 
usually the default part-of-speech in such cases is noun.
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Table 6-9: Distribution of parts-of-speech in the three corpora. Values whose 
diffference to GDM has a statistical significance less than 99% (t-test) have been 
printed in gray.
Part of speech GDM IC P/O
adjectives 3.5% 4.0% 3.0%
adverbs 16.7% 17.4% 14.7%
conjunctions 8.9% 7.7% 5.8%
feedback words 4.9% 6.3% 8.5%
interjections 0.1% 0.5% 2.4%
nouns 12.6% 11.2% 11.8%
numerals 1.3% 0.9% 4.7%
own communication management words 2.3% 1.2% 1.7%
prepositions 7.4% 6.2% 5.9%
pronouns 21.9% 23.1% 20.6%
verbs 19.3% 20.4% 18.2%
inaudibles1 1.3% 1.3% 2.6%
total: 100% 100% 100%
Table 6-9 shows that GDM contains more conjunctions and prepositions than 
IC and P/O. Since the utterances are longer in GDM than in the other two cor-
pora, it is not surprising that more conjunctions are used, to join the phrases in 
the utterances. Prepositions are not as directly connected to utterance length, but 
indirectly via clausal complexity: the large number of prepositions signals many 
prepositional phrases, which leads to longer utterances. Other phenomena be-
sides long and complex utterances can of course cause an abundance of conjunc-
tions and prepositions, but considering the activity type of group decision-mak-
ing, with lines of argumentation and descriptions of solutions to problems, the 
given explanation is reasonable. 
Long and complex utterances can also be the cause of OCM-word frequency, 
since the speaker will need more time to plan her speech, and will more often 
want to change something already said, compared to informal conversation.
The abstract events and solutions that are discussed in GDM may also make it 
more difficult to use pronouns for referring, and nouns are needed more often. 
This would explain the difference between GDM and IC, but P/O has fewer 
pronouns than GDM without having more nouns. However, P/O has much 
more numerals than GDM, and it is possible that the dates and prices that are 
1. When the transcriber cannot hear what is said.
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often discussed in the P/O recordings function as referents, rather than phe-
nomena referred to with nouns and pronouns.
Feedback is discussed on pp. 267-11 below.
6.7 Constructions
Using frequency lists for words and n-grams (see sections 6.8 and 6.9 below), a 
number of constructions that are especially common or uncommon in group 
decision-making were revealed. These constructions are presented coherently in 
this section, and the underlying frequency lists are presented in the following two 
sections.
The concept of constructions (as well as the term) has been used in linguistics 
for a long time, but during the 1980’s and -90’s it received renewed interest 
through the works of Charles J. Fillmore, Paul Kay and Adele Goldberg (Fill-
more 1988), (Fillmore and Kay 1995), (Goldberg 1995), (Kay 1997). A lot could 
be said about constructions, but for our purposes, a simplified explanation will 
be enough: a complete construction is a syntactical pattern with a certain holistic 
meaning. It differs from a mere n-gram by a) allowing not only words, but also 
word generalizations (parts of speech etc.), and by b) requiring a sense of com-
pleteness (holistic meaning). We will not worry about incomplete constructions 
here. 
The constructions that were found are quite different and are on different levels 
of generality. They have been grouped here under six headings: reflections of activity 
procedure, presenting argumentation and opinions, referring to abstract phenomena, interjection-
al constructions, lexicalized phrases, and other constructions. This is by no means meant 
to be a complete categorization of all possible constructions, simply a convenient 
way of presenting the constructions found here.
Notation
The constructions should be read from left to right, and lines represent possible 
connections. Round brackets ( ) surround optional components, and slashes / 
separate alternatives. Category names (e.g. parts-of-speech) are surrounded by 
angle brackets < >.
Reflections of activity procedure
Some of the formal meetings that occur in the GDM corpus follow a fairly strict 
procedure, and some constructions are used to move (or attempt to move) the 
activity on to a new step in the activity procedure.
Moving on to the next paragraph
In the n-gram lists, several variations of då är vi på ärende (‘then we have reached 
item’) were found:
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då på
är vi (då)
går vi in
går vi
(nummer)
vidare till
ärende <numeral> <description>
Examples:
! då gå vi vidare ti ärende numme sju: e information om klagomålshantering
! då e vi på ärende numme tretton / uppföljning av revisonsredogörelsen
! then we proceed to paragraph number seven er information about complaints 
administration
! then we have reached paragraph number thirteen follow-up of revision report
This construction is used by the chairperson of the City District Committee 
(V321801) to move on to the next paragraph on the agenda.
Summary and elicitation of accept
Several long n-grams were found that come from a rather long construction with 
comparably little variation:
då
ett förslag till tjänsteutlåtande
ett tjänsteutlåtande
däremot
också
där
finns (det)
bara
ett förslag och det är ordförandeförslaget kan vi bifalla det
ett förslag och det är tjänsteutlåtandet
förslag på ett tjänsteutlåtande 
-
Examples:
! då finns de bara ett föslag å de e tjänsteutlåtande kan vi bifalla de
! dä finns också ett tjänsteutlåtande kan vi bifalla de
! där finns de föslag / på ett tjänsteutlåtande kan vi bifalla de
! then there is just one proposal and that is the official report can that be 
approved 
! there is also an official report can that be approved
! there is suggestion / of an official report can that be approved
This construction is used by the chairperson of the City District Committee 
(V321801) to close a discussion and get verbal accept for the proposal.
Elicitation of questions I
The 6-gram har nämnden nåra frågor i detta (‘does the committee have any questions 
about this’) has close relatives too, and these can be generalized to the following 
construction:
har nämnden (några) fler frågor
(i
(på
detta ärende)(eller synpunkter)
du
ni
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Examples:
! ha nämden nåra fler frågor
! ha nämden nåra fler frågor i detta ärendet
! ha ni nåra fler frågor elle synpunkter
! does the committee have any other questions
! does the committee have any other questions on this issue
! do you have any other questions or comments
This construction is used by the chairperson of the City District Committee 
(V321801) to check if the other members have more questions on an issue, and 
to signal that she is prepared to move on to acclamation and closing the topic.
In Bäckmåla Municipality Council (A850101), the chairperson uses a similar 
construction:
(är det) någon (mer) som vill (fråga eller) yttra sej (över
den här promemorian)
framställningen här)
protokollet)
Examples:
! e de någon som / vill fråga eller yttra sej över / protokollet
! e de någon som vill yttra sej
! någon mer som vill yttra sej
! is there anybody who would like to ask or say anything about the minutes
! is there anybody who would like to say anything
! anybody else who would like to say anything
These two constructions seem to have more or less the same function in the two activities, 
but they are strictly confined to their respective meetings and speakers.
Elicitation of questions II
The 7-gram jag är beredd att svara på frågor (‘I am ready to answer questions’) is the 
most common instantiation of a construction used by one of the administrative 
officials present at the City District Committee meeting, when he invites the 
committee members to ask him questions about a presented proposal.
beredd(a)
(direkt) att svara på frågor
på frågor från nämnden
vi är
vi är
jag är
är jag
förvaltningen är
är jag
jag ärmen
och i övrigt så
då
och jag tror att
där också
Examples:
! å i övrit så e ja beredd å svara på frågor
! fövaltningen e beredd å svara på frågor
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! å ja tror att vi e beredda direkt att svara på <frågor
! and apart from that I am prepared to answer questions
! the administration is prepared to answer questions
! and I think we are prepared immediately to answer questions
All the constructions presented here are idiosyncratic, by which I mean that they 
are used by a single person only. Further, all of them come from quite formal 
meetings. This type of construction, constituting a complete communicative act 
at the level of activity procedure, seems to have difficulties getting started across 
speakers and kinds of group decision-making.
Presenting argumentation and opinions
Argument linking
One common bigram is så att (‘so that’), which can be used in constructions for 
linking a statement with a conclusion or a reason, or, an argument is linked to a 
claim.
< claim > < argument >så att
Group decision-making contains plenty of argumentation; one example is shown 
here:
! $H: e / ja skulle gärna villa veta hur / e gammal e / fröken Odner / och e / 
bruka de vanligt å avkorta / avkorta deras befordrings+ / +tid // nu / kanske 
nu tror ja nog att hon e mycke mycke kvalificerad / så att de ente av den or-
saken / men ja skulle gärna villa veta om de är bruklit / hur gör ni i skolan /
! $H: er / I would very much like to know how / er old miss Odner is / and er / 
is it common to shorten / shorten their time / to promotion // now / perhaps I 
am quite sure that she is very very qualified / so that it is not for that reason 
/ but I would very much like to know if it is customary / how do you do in 
school /
Here H puts a question about Odner’s age, and to make sure that his question is 
not taken as a criticism of her competence, he first asserts that he believes Odner 
to be qualified. Using the bigram så att he then links that statement to the conclu-
sion that his question cannot be motivated by doubts of her competence.
Here is another example:
! $A: ... och de e klart de e väl en angelägenhet för // kommunen i sin helhet 
att e // å samhället här / i synnerhet // att e asfalteringen kommer te stånd / 
på gatona / så att de blir nån likställighet // över de hela // ...
! $A: ... but of course I suppose it is a matter for // the municipality as a whole 
that er // and the village here / in particular // that the asphalting is made / 
on the streets / so that there is some kind off uniformity // for all this /...
Here the argument is that there should be uniformity as regards the asphalting in 
the municipality, and the claim is that asphalting is a matter for the municipality 
as a whole.
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Fact-comment
The next construction has its root in the complex questions that are often dis-
cussed in the GDM recordings, and that call for linguistic tools for information 
structuring. The construction is a kind of comment construction:
< fact > < comment >
First some fact or line of argument is presented, and then this is commented 
upon, typically an evaluation, an interpretation or an explanation.
Examples:
! blir de vettigt om vi skriver så // rekommenderad reservdelslista innehåller 
dom som (...) vi har försökt denna lista innehåller få data per produkt å så be-
höver man precisera de kanske / vilka data som ska me // å de e väl dom 
data som vi alltid haft me i rekommenderade reservdelslistan / på nåt sätt
! ... sen / har de kommit / nya bestämmelser / å de e ju aktuellt för oss här / 
det gäller entrepenadavtal mellan kommun å renhållningsentreprenörer / där 
har man inte haft några enhetliga såna bestämmelser att följa här i landet tidi-
are men det har man fått fram nu / å de e väl tacknämlit å ha dessa nya // 
avtals+ / +bestämmelser å rätta oss efter när vi skall göra upp nu / här inom 
de närmsta månaderna / ...
! men de skulle väl innebära att de e inget problem s att säg i den nya utrust-
ning vi skaffar då va de e marginell summa s att säg i sammanhanget va och 
de dröjer väl inte så länge om många ställer dom här kraven så dröjer de inte 
länge innan alla skärmarna e där va å de e väl positivt i sej va
! is it reasonable to write like that // recommended list of spare parts contains 
those that (...) we have tried this list contains little data per product and then 
we have to be more precise perhaps / which data should be included // and I 
guess that is the data that we always have included in the recommended list 
of spare parts /one way or another
! ... then / there have also come / new regulations / and there it is topical for 
us here / it concerns outsourcing contracts between the municipality and 
waste contractors there have not been any unified such regulations to follow 
in this country before but that has been produced now / and I guess that is 
praiseworthy to have these new contract / regulations for us to adhere to 
when we are going to strike a deal now / in course of the next few months
! but I guess that would mean that there is no problem so to speak in the new 
equipment we acquire then right that is a marginal amount so to speak in this 
context right and I guess it does not take long if many people make these de-
mands then it won’t take long before all screens are there right and I guess 
that is positive in itself right
As we see, the link is often the conjunction och (‘and’), and the comment has the 
clause adverb väl, which weakens the commitment by the speaker to the com-
ment, much like English ‘I guess’. It seems to be important that the first part is a 
“fact” and the last part is an “opinion”, in the sense that the speaker intends the 
first part to be uncontroversial and the last part to be what the listener should 
evaluate and hopefully agree with. Needless to say, this categorization of the 
presented claims is not necessarily objective.
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Scope narrowing
The last construction in this section is used to narrow the scope of a statement 
from the general to something more specific:
för < possessive > del
! detta löne+ / +ärende e ju delvis beroende på i vilken löneklass eller lönegrad 
vi inplacerar / vederbörande när dom kommer hit första gången / nu har ju 
fröken Odner varit ute tidiare men e / kommunalkamrern sa ju de att / de e 
liksom på prov dom sätter dom i denna / lönegrad för å se va dom går för å 
då har han ju funnit att han / tycker att hon bör flyttas upp på grun av sin / 
kvalificerade arbete å tjänstgöring / så för min del tror ja vill / tillstyrka 
framställningen
! sen så: för min del skulle vi lika gärna kunna strunta i å jobba i Access // allt-
så // men e // de vet vi ju att de blir mycke enklare för alla om vi gör de
! nä ja tror de e så att nu har vi snackat ihop oss om en lösning som e e rätt lätt 
å köpa politist och som löser dom akuta behoven för våran del
! this issue about / salary is partly dependent on in which salary category or 
salary degree we place / the person concerned when they come here first time 
/ miss Odner now has been out before but er / the Municipal Clerk said that / 
it is kind of a test when they are put in this salary degree in order to see what 
they can do and then he has discovered that he / /thinks that she should be 
elevated because of her / qualified work and performance / so on my behalf I 
think I would like to approve of the presentation
! and then on my behalf we could just as well stop working in Access // like // 
but er // we know so much that it will be much easier for everybody if we do 
so
! no I think it is like this that now we have reached an agreement on a solution 
that is quite easy to accept politically and that solves the most pressing needs 
on our behalf.
This construction is quite common in GDM, and one explanation for this is that 
one often seeks general solutions to problems, and that it is then necessary to se-
parate the general from the particular. 
Referring to abstract phenomena
Since group decision-making concerns future actions and states-of-affairs, there 
is often a need to refer to abstract entities (such as actions and states-of-affairs). 
This is reflected in some of the constructions found in several of the recordings 
in the GDM corpus.
Keyword referral
This construction uses a keyword to refer to a more complex question. 
det här med < keyword >
Examples:
! ja men sen får du också så ta reda på me facket hur de blir de här me 
pengarna
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! ja skulle vilja se de här me granskningen
! men vi gör så att vi går bakvägen från de här me seminarier / å bakåt ska vi 
då göra nåra brevutskick / som vi föreslår
! yes but after that you also have to find out with the union what is going to 
happen with this thing with the money
! I would like to see this thing with the review
! but we will do like this that we use the backdoor from this thing with seminars 
/ and backwards if we should send any mails then / like we are suggesting
This is a quite simple way to refer to a question that has been discussed earlier.
Meaning extraction with ‘så’
Another complication arising from complex referring phrases is that they are dif-
ficult to integrate to super-ordinate clauses. The bigram så att, discussed above 
with the function of linking an argument with a claim, can also be used to make 
complex referents fit more easily into a super-ordinate clause structure:
< ... > så att < ... >
main clause
sub clause
Examples:
! ja men de e ju verkligen tycker ja e viktiga grejer för att ja menar den dan nu 
nä de här allt e klart va å hon säger upp sej då va så måste du ju gå å å prata 
med chefen så småningom /// men då då får ju också vara som så att ni inte 
// beblandar er me varandra å liksom så att de framgår liksom
! men / om de nu e så att vi e överens om dom här abstrakta // problem-
ställningarna va / så: / se vi då att de dyker upp då vissa: / problem /...
! a: e styrelsen tyckte att vi skulle göra de om de e så att folk vill å kan så sa vi 
vi bara glömde säga de förut
! yes but it really is I think er important questions because I mean the day when 
all this is finished right and she resigns right then you have to go and talk to 
the manager anyway sooner or later /// but then then it has to be the way 
that you do not // mix with each other and like so that it is clear like
! but / if it is like this that we agree about these abstract // problems right / 
then / if we see that certain problems / arise /...
! yes er the board though that we should do it if it is the case that people want 
to and have the possibility then we we just forgot to say that before
In all these examples the word så (translated ‘the way’, ‘like this’ and ‘the case’ re-
spectively) functions as a kind of proxy in the main clause for the meaning of the 
sub clause. This “meaning extraction” makes it easier to refer to the sub clause as 
a whole.
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Interjectional constructions
A number of constructions found in the corpora function mainly to express an 
attitude of the speaker, this can be called interjectional constructions. 
The ‘how’ interjection
The first of these is vad <property>, which has a straight-forward correspondent 
in the English how <property>, as in the following example:
! du kom upp till < bb > å va alldeles knäckt för att hon hade fått ett dödfött 
barn e hon med barn igen då va rolit me de e klart de kanske inte e så rolit
@ < letter >
! you came up to the hospital and were completely broken because she had had 
a stillborn child is she pregnant again how fun but then again perhaps it is 
not all that fun
This expression is a quite simple interjection. 
Heller interjection 1
The construction <invective> heller is also largely an interjection, although it also 
functions as a rejection (a no answer). The following example illustrates this:
! vänta här du nä vänta nu det e inte god natt inte / fasen heller här finns två 
frågeformulär // å dom skall man fylla i // ...
! wait here you no wait now it is not good night / heck no there are two ques-
tionnaires // and you are meant to fill them out // ...
Fasen heller (and variations with other swear words) is used here both as an inter-
jection and as a rejection of the (implicit) suggestion that the task is completed 
(‘it is good night’). 
Heller interjection 2
The third interjectional construction is väl <negation> ... heller: 
! ... men ja tycker inte man skall bli hon e väl inget biafrabarn heller
! ... but I do not think there is reason to she is no Biafra child is she
This construction strongly elicits supportive feedback, namely that the listener 
should also deny whatever it is that is negated. The word heller is optional, and 
when present the utterance takes on the character of an exclamation, which is 
why the construction is called interjectional here.
All these interjectional constructions were less common in the GDM corpus 
than in the other two corpora, probably as result of the GDM activities being 
more formal than the others are, in general. Exclamations of this kind are 
avoided in formal situations.
Lexicalized phrases
Some constructions found are best explained as phrases corresponding to single 
words. These are listed in the following table.
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Table 6-10: Lexicalised phrases more common found in GDM than in the other two 
corpora.
Parts-of-speech Common phrases Uncommon phrases
Adverbs så att säga (‘so to speak’)
och så vidare (‘and so on’)
i alla fall (‘anyway’)
Feedback du vet (‘you know’)
Own Communication
Management
vad heter det (‘what is it called’)
Pronouns det/den/de här (‘this/these’)
Verb gå igenom (‘go through’) vara tvungen (‘to have to’)
komma ihåg (‘remember’)
The adverb phrases så att säga (‘so to speak’) and och så vidare (‘and so on’) are 
more common in GDM than in the other two activity types. Så att säga can be 
used to cushion another phrase somewhat, signaling that it should not be taken 
too literally, as in the following example:
! de de de de har väl ja också som // känsla då då att de skulle // kunna räcka 
så att säga
! that that that that is my feeling too // kind of then then that it could / be 
enough so to speak 
Here it is the expression kunna räcka (‘be enough’) that is being cushioned. 
Sometimes the phrase så att säga also seems to be used only to gain time for plan-
ning or perhaps to add a formal touch to the utterance:
! nej // nej å kostnaderna kan vi väl kanske inte göra så mycke åt mer än att 
ändra så att säga antalet / lärare över tiden
! no // no and I guess we cannot do very much about the costs but to change so 
to speak the number of / teachers over time
Så att säga has a clearly formal ring, and cushioning is probably performed in oth-
er ways in less formal situations, which explains the high frequency of the phrase 
in GDM.
The phrase och så vidare (‘and so on’) has a function similar to that of så att säga, 
where the speaker signals that a phrase just uttered is only a part of what the 
speaker has in mind. The listener is instructed to infer a longer range of pheno-
mena than what has been said. The following example illustrates:
! sen saknar ja ju e // granskning / vem kallar ti granskning (vilka kallas ti) 
granskning å så vidare på denna
! and then I miss er // review / who makes the call for review (who is called to) 
the review and so on at this
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Here the speaker does not list all activities associated with reviewing, but lets the 
listener infer what other activities are intended. The phrase och så vidare is also 
moderately formal, which explains its high frequency in the GDM corpus.
The phrase i alla fall (‘anyway’), is uncommon in GDM compared to the other 
corpora; it is often used to return to a previous subject after some deviation 
(Ottesjö 2005). To a large degree, group decision activities seem to stick to one 
topic at a time, without much deviation; thus, there is not much need for such 
return phrases.
The feedback eliciting phrase du vet (‘you know’) is also uncommon in GDM; 
again, this is probably due to its quite informal connotations. 
The phrase vad heter det (‘what is it called’) is less common in GDM than in the 
other corpora. It is typically used to signal that the speaker is searching for a 
word and need more time, which makes it a case of own communication man-
agement. It is possibly a sign of low concentration – in group meetings the parti-
cipants are perhaps more focused, or maybe conversations do not change topics 
as often as in informal conversations. Here is an example from IC:
! men då när ja sitter vet du så röker ja först en cigarett själv // ja sen så sitter 
ja då å ö: virkar eller nej inte virkar gör ja ju inte va heter de stickar eller syr 
eller nånting eller läser en bok // sen så kommer Karin Linjöns vid tie i sju
! but then when I am sitting you know I first smoke a cigarette myself // and 
then I sit there like and er crochet or no not crochet I do not do that what is it 
called knit or sow or something or read a book // and then Karin Linjöns 
come around ten to seven
A similar explanation can be made for the infrequency of the phrasal verb komma 
ihåg (‘remember’) in GDM. In group meetings most issues are probably fairly 
well prepared, hence, there is no problem in remembering things, and the parti-
cipants do not have to speak about it. Here is an example from an informal 
conversation:
! nä men så blev de så att då fortsatte ja som svetsare då sen så börja ja jobbet 
tillsammans med han Runar Styrbord om du kommer ihåg han
! no but that was how it was so then continued as welder and then I started the 
job with that bloke Runar Styrbord if you remember him
The demonstrative pronoun phrase det/den/de här (‘this/these’, in singular neuter, 
singular uter, and plural) is more common in GDM than in the other corpora. Its 
high frequency could be due to the fact that participants in the GDM recordings 
often look at maps or written papers together, and refer to places in these docu-
ments with demonstrative pronouns. Another reason is the rather complex con-
cepts that are discussed during group decision-making, and which are referred to 
using a simple ‘this/those’ (cf. the previous section Referring to abstract phenomena). 
An example from GDM:
! de de e väl så att denna ut+ uthyrningstaxan så den e att // den e // i i de in-
går att hyresgästen själv städa efter sej // så e de ju och de här e ju inte me 
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nån städning så då kommer de ju ovanpå i så fall // bortsett från typ storstäd-
ning å så
! it it is probably like this that this rent+ rental fee like it is that // it is / it it is 
part of it that the tenant does the cleaning // so it is and this is not with any 
cleaning so that will come on top in that case // apart from like thorough 
cleaning and things 
Here, det här refers to the way that a city arranges for lease of its premises, an is-
sue that has been discussed for 5-10 minutes.
The phrasal verb gå igenom (‘go through’) is used frequently in the GDM activit-
ies, where the participants go through agendas, item lists, etc., and to present or 
explain issues. Example:
! $T: a: en del e exempel men / sexti kunder att gå igenom de för varje grupper 
plus dom man ha själv då va de de blir ganska mastit / ja
! $T: yes some of them are examples but / sixty customers to go through that 
for each groups plus the ones everybody has by themselves like that that can 
be quite heavy / yes
Here, a proposal has been made that the group should split up into sub groups, 
and each such sub group should go through a list of customers and come up with 
ideas of how to work on them.
The phrase vara tvungen, ‘to have to’ is less common in GDM, and this could be 
due to the fact that the GDM activities are group activities. In the corpora it 
seems like it is used primarily for individuals, and not for groups. It is difficult to 
say if there is simply another word that is used for group obligation, or if it is in-
deed the case that groups do not ‘have to do’ things. It is perhaps more reason-
able to say that group obligations (for example the ones that appear after group 
decisions) are uncomplicated and need not be discussed.
Other constructions
The ‘as regards’ construction
There is one construction common in GDM that is used for focusing on a cer-
tain aspect or part of something more complex:
när det gäller < referring phrase >
När det gäller (‘as regards’, ‘when it comes to’) starts a sub clause, and makes what 
is said in the main clause apply to the referring phrase. An example is given here:
! ... / så att ja lutar över här åt att man skulle registrera / märket utan någon 
disclaimer // i de andra fallet när de gäller Wasa lilla runda // så e ja också // 
tveksam / ...
! ... / so I am leaning towards saying that one should register / the brand 
without any disclaimer // in the other case when it comes to Wasa lilla runda 
// then I am doubtful // as well /
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The phrase is used in this case to make the doubt expressed afterwards apply to 
Wasa lilla runda. It is a quite formal way of focusing on a particular aspect, which 
explains its relatively high frequency in GDM.
The ‘I dont know’ construction
The last construction discussed here is the phrase jag vet inte (‘I do not know’), 
which is significantly less common in GDM than in the other corpora, but it is 
not obvious why. It is sometimes used as a kind of hedge, to decrease the speak-
ers responsibility for what is said:
! $B: ja de tycker ja e väldigt vanligt också ja vet inte de kanske kan bero på 
rökningen att man får riktig man får hosta å grejer /...
! $B: yes I think that is very common too I don’t know perhaps it is because of 
the smoking that you get real you cough and stuff / ...
This kind of backing away from one’s own statement is perhaps too informal for 
most group decision activities, following the principle if you do not feel certain, do not 
say it.
6.8 N-grams
6.8.1 Introduction
The term bigram refers to two words occurring next to each other here, three 
words next to each other is called a trigram, etc; the general term is n-gram. The 
term is somewhat unfortunate, since gramma means letter rather than word. 
However, the terminology is established, and the alternative word collocation 
(which has also been suggested) is already “taken” – it is often used for n-grams 
that occur more often than expected (e.g. strong tea as opposed to powerful tea).
We shall now have a look at the most common n-gram types. N-grams in the 
corpora have low frequencies; for that reason, the lists have been limited to the 
20 most common types of for each n-gram length, in any of the three corpora. 
In order to make the lists explicit and concentrate on the words that stick out for 
GDM, the lists include only n-grams that are significantly more common in 
GDM than in both the other two corpora, or that are less common in GDM 
than in the other two corpora. Frequencies have been considered word meas-
ures; thus, the !2-test has been used to test significance, with a significance level 
of 99.5%.
Translating n-grams is very tricky, and the English translations given in the tables 
below are to be read with some discretion.
N-grams 257
6.8.2 Bigrams
Table 6-11: Bigrams that are significantly more or less common in GDM than in IC 
and P/O, and belong to the twenty most common bigrams in any of the three cor-
pora. Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O GDM IC P/O
så att (‘so that’) 4865 1688 3701 ja det (‘yes it’) 3028 4168 4104
att det (‘that it’) 4683 3137 3476 det var (‘it was’) 2947 6082 4044
det här (‘this’) 4581 1484 3061 var det (‘was it’) 1261 2356 1593
och det (‘and it’) 3888 1665 2369 vet du (‘you know’) 134 1744 799
att vi (‘that we’) 3268 442 1374 nä det (‘no it’) 738 1688 1172
vi har (‘we have’) 3 081 759 1 741
har vi (‘have we’) 2 128 294 1 267
att eh (‘that er’) 1 772 408 793
The most common bigrams are largely simple combinations of the most com-
mon words: vi har, har vi, det var, var det, att vi, att eh, och det, vi har and har vi. These 
are discussed in the word section below. Similarly, we have already seen that 
feedback words in general are uncommon in GDM; this holds true for ja (‘yes’) 
and nä (‘no’) too. Since det (‘it’) is a common word with which to start a main 
clause, the frequency of the bigrams ja det and nä det will follow the frequency of 
the words ja and nä.
The list also contains support for some of the constructions discussed above. Det 
här (‘this’) is the most common demonstrative pronoun, and vet du (‘you know’) 
is an informal feedback eliciting phrase. 
Så att participates in three principal constructions, which were all discussed in the 
construction section above. The first is the adverb phrase så att säga (‘so to 
speak’). The second links an argument with a claim, and the third helps fit a sub 
clause into a main clause. All these uses have their natural place in GDM.
6.8.3 Trigrams
Table 6-12: Trigrams that are significantly more or less common in GDM than in 
IC and P/O, and belong to the twenty most common trigrams in any of the three 
corpora. Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O GDM IC P/O
att det är (‘that it is’) 1416 986 1041 ja det är (‘yes it 
is’)
1097 1516 1597
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och det är (‘and it is’) 1297 481 776 i alla fall 
(‘anyway’)
549 1368 847
så att det (‘so that it’) 902 296 601 jag vet inte 
(‘I don’t know’)
544 1122 782
det här med 
(‘this thing with’)
608 160 142 det var ju 
(‘it was’)
391 937 621
när det gäller 
(‘as regards’)
574 49 136
att vi har 
(‘that we have’)
570 62 149
och så vidare 
(‘and so on’)
561 234 142
The trigram list shows some of the constructions discussed above: jag vet inte (‘I 
do not know’), det här med (‘this thing with’), och så vidare (‘and so on’), när det gäller 
(‘as regards’) and i alla fall (‘anyway’). We also see trigrams consisting of some of 
the bigrams discussed above and one common word, att det är (‘that it is’), och det 
är (‘and it is’), så att det (‘so that it’), att vi har (‘that we have’), det var ju (‘it was1’) 
and ja det är (‘yes it is’). 
6.8.4 4-grams
Table 6-13: 4-grams that are significantly more or less common in GDM 4-grams 
in any of the three corpora. Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O
är det så att (‘is it so to/that’) 214 0 85
så att säga va (‘so to speak right’) 156 0 35
och det är väl (‘and I guess that is’) 138 0 14
The phrase så att säga, here followed by the feedback elicitor va (‘right’), was dis-
cussed in the construction section above.
The 4-gram är det så att contain the most common bigram that is particular to 
GDM, så att, together with the second most common bigram overall in all cor-
pora, är det. Så att was discussed in the section about constructions above, and är 
det så att is a consequence of the use of så att and the fact that är det is a common 
bigram. 
1. Ju is difficult to translate. It is a sentence adverb and a kind of “consensus 
claimer”, saying that what is claimed is common knowledge or self evident.
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The 4-gram och det är väl is a trace of the construction fact – comment discussed 
above, p. 250.
6.8.5 N-grams of length 5 to 10
The n-grams that are 5 or more in length have quite low frequencies; it is not 
meaningful to compare them between the activity types (the statistical signific-
ance is too low). However, seen more holistically, the lists clearly bear marks of 
the activity type.
Table 6-14: The twenty most common n-grams of lengths 5 and 6, with frequency 
of 3 or more, in GDM.
5-grams 6-grams
det är ju så att 
(‘the way things are is’)
det är ju det som är 
(‘things are as they are’)
är det ju så att 
(‘the way things are is’)
och så vidare och så vidare 
(‘and so on and so on’)
det är ju det som 
(‘that is what’)
det är ju det är ju 
(‘it is it is’)
ja men det är ju 
(‘yes but it is’)
ett tjänsteutlåtande kan vi bifalla det 
(‘an official report can that be 
approved’)
jag tror att det är 
(‘I think it is’)
och då är det så att 
(‘and then it is like this that’)
det är ju inte så 
(‘it is not like that’)
är väl i och för sej 
(‘is in and of itself’)
jag vet inte om det 
(‘I do not know if it’)
det är väl i och för 
(‘it is in and of’)
är det så att det 
(it is like this that’)
då finns det bara ett förslag 
(‘then there is just one proposal’)
det är ju det är 
(‘it is it is’)
då går vi vidare till ärende 
(‘then we proceed to issue’)
och det är ju det 
(‘and it is what’)
då är det så här att 
(‘then it is like this that’)
så att säga va och 
(‘so to speak right and’)
ett två tre ett två tre 
(‘one two three one two three’)
det är klart att det 
(‘of course it’)
har nämnden nåra frågor i detta 
(‘does the committe have any 
questions about this’)
då är det så att 
(‘then it is like this that’)
i och med att vi har 
(‘since we have’)
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då är vi på ärende 
(‘then we have reached issue’)
nä då finns det bara ett 
(‘no then there is only one’)
för att det är ju 
(‘because it is’)
är beredd att svara på frågor 
(‘am ready to answer questions’)
ja just det det är 
(‘yes right it is’)
är det någon som vill yttra 
(‘is there anybody who would like to 
say’)
jag tycker att det är 
(‘I think that it is’)
det någon som vill yttra sej 
(‘there anybody who would like to 
say something’)
men det är klart att 
(‘but of course it’)
det är det jag tänker på 
(‘that is what I am thinking of’)
och så vidare och så 
(‘and so on and so’)
där är det ju så att 
(‘it is like this that’)
så att det är ju 
(‘it is like that’)
då är det ju frågan om 
(‘then the question is’)
Table 6-15: The twenty most common n-grams of lengths 7 and 8, with frequency 
of 3 or more, in GDM.
7-grams 8-grams
det är väl i och för sej 
(‘it is in and of itself’)
det är ju riktigt det är ju riktigt
(‘that is correct that is correct’)
jag är beredd att svara på frågor 
(‘I am ready to answer questions’)
då finns det bara ett förslag och det 
(‘then there is only one proposal and 
that’)
nä då finns det bara ett förslag 
(‘no then there is only one proposal’)
finns det bara ett förslag och det är
(there is only one proposal and that is’)
är det någon som vill yttra sej 
(‘has anybody got anything to say’)
kan vi bifalla det då är vi på
(‘can that be approved then we have 
reached’)
att det är ju det är ju 
(‘that it is it is’)
nä då finns det bara ett förslag och
(‘no then there is only one proposal and’)
det bara ett förslag och det är 
(‘it is just a suggestion and it is’)
är ju riktigt det är ju riktigt det
(‘is correct that is correct it’)
det är ju riktigt det är ju
(‘that is correct that is’)
då finns det bara ett förslag och 
(‘then there is just one proposal and’)
N-grams 261
då går vi vidare till ärende nummer 
(‘then we proceed to issue number’)
ett tjänsteutlåtande kan vi bifalla det då 
(‘an official report can that be 
approved then’)
ett två tre ett två tre ett 
(‘one two three one two three one’)
finns det bara ett förslag och det 
(‘then there is just one proposal and 
that’)
för asfaltering av Parkvägen från 
Stenslandavägen till 
(‘to put black top on Parkvägen from
Stenslandavägen to’)
har nämnden nåra fler frågor i detta 
(‘does the committe have any other 
questions about this’)
har nämnden nåra frågor i detta ärendet 
(‘does the committe have and 
questions about this issue’)
jag lämnar ordet fritt med anledning av 
‘I open the floor for debate because 
of’)
ju riktigt det är ju riktigt det 
(‘correct that is correct it’)
kan vi bifalla det då går vi 
(‘can that be approved then we 
proceed’)
kan vi bifalla det då är vi (‘can that be 
approved then we have’)
två tre fyra fem sex sju åtta (‘two three 
four five six seven eight’)
Table 6-16: The twenty most common n-grams of lengths 9 and 10, with fre-
quency of 3 or more, in GDM.
9-grams 10-grams
det är ju riktigt det är ju riktigt det
(‘that is correct that is correct it’)
nä då finns det bara ett förslag och det är
(‘no then there is only one proposal and 
that is’)
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då finns det bara ett förslag och det är
(‘then there is only one proposal and 
that is’)
nä då finns det bara ett förslag och det
(‘no then there is only one proposal 
and that’)
The lists contain many longer version of the n-grams discussed previously; the 
longer n-grams show support for the constructions discussed above (see p. 246 
ff.).
The n-gram det är ju riktigt appears in certain variations in the lists above, and it 
stems from a single utterance where the phrase det är ju riktigt (‘that is correct’) is 
repeated four times in a row.
6.9 Word types
6.9.1 Introduction
We shall now look at the most common words for each part-of-speech. Indi-
vidual words have much higher frequencies, generally, than n-grams, so we shall 
look at the 50 most common words with a frequency of 10 or more, for each 
part-of-speech and corpus. As for n-grams, the !2-test has been used for the sig-
nificance test, 99.5% level, and only words that are significantly more or less 
common in GDM compared to both IC and P/O are considered. 
Kilgarriff (2001) criticizes the !2-test for setting off many false alarms, in other 
words, claiming significant difference where there is none. This is true, but it ap-
plies to Mann-Whitney (which Kilgarriff recommends) as well, although in a 
lesser degree. In this study, the effect of the false alarms is lessened somewhat by 
the requirement that only cases where a word is significantly more or less com-
mon in GDM than in IC and P/O are considered.
6.9.2 Adjectives 
Table 6-17: Adjectives that are significantly more or less common in GDM than in 
both IC and P/O, and belong to the fifty most common adjectives in any of the 
three corpora. Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC PO GDM IC P/O
olika (‘different’) 980 328 357 bra (‘good’) 778 1427 1235
nästa (‘next’) 545 246 314 sådan (‘such’) 732 1755 1070
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själva (‘-selves, own’) 481 174 197  själv1 (‘-self’, 
‘own’)
309 482 543
vissa (‘some, certain’) 473 164 144 jävla (‘bloody’) 19 370 293
viktigt (‘important’) 316 41 80 god (‘good’) 50 216 282
intresserad/intresserade 
(‘interested’, sing/pl)
309 51 69 tvungen (‘have 
to’)
23 123 96
intressant (‘interesting’) 236 51 37 sjuk (‘ill’) 11 72 117
övriga (‘other’, 
‘remaining’)
156 31 37
ytterligare (‘more, 
another’)
110 10 32
The table above suggests that the GDM corpus contains more formal language 
than the other two corpora: viktigt (‘important’) and intressant/intresserad/intresser-
ade (‘interesting/interested’) are formal, positive evaluations that correspond to 
the more informal bra (‘good, well’) and god (‘good’). Similarly, the swear word 
jävla (‘bloody’) is avoided in formal contexts, and the word ytterligare (‘more, an-
other’) is rarely used in informal language. Vissa (‘some, certain’) is also some-
what formal, which could explain its high frequency in GDM.
Nästa (‘next’) is common GDM, probably because of the discussions about up-
coming meetings (next week), and the next paragraph on the agenda.
Övriga (‘other’) is used in the phrase övriga frågor or övriga ärenden (‘other issues’), 
which is a standard item on agendas for formal meetings; this seems to be the 
explanation for its high frequency in GDM.
The plural själva (‘-selves, own’) is more common in GDM, while the singular 
själv (‘-self, own’) (with lower certainty) is less common. This is probably an ef-
fect of the group functioning as a subject, like in the following excerpt:
! dom gör de ju också men vi gör de ju väldigt bra själva
! they do it too but we do it very well ourselves
The word sjuk (‘ill, sick’) is naturally used in private contexts, referring to people 
who are ill. It is not surprising that it is more common in IC than in GDM, but 
more so that it is even more common in P/O. It turns out that 17 of the 22 oc-
currences in P/O came from the exact same recording, in which sick leave is 
discussed.
The word tvungen was discussed on p. 256 above.
1. Significant difference on the 99.9% level compared to P/O; but only on the 
97.5% level compared to IC.
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The word olika can be used either to specify that things differ, but also as a kind 
of plural article:
! ... // sen få vi se på de hela å vi vet / erfarehetsmässit att // vi behöver olika 
alternativ för att / de kan stöta på patrull av olika anledningar // 
överklaganden / miljöproblem elle va de nu e fö nått / ...
! ... // then we have to look at the whole thing and we know / from experience 
that // we need several alternatives because / it can be checked for several 
reasons // appeals // environmental problems or what have you / ...
It seems that this use of olika is more common in GDM than in the other two 
corpora; the reason is probably the formality – this use of the word has a clearly 
formal ring.
The word sådan (‘such’) is less common in GDM than in the other corpora; the 
reason seems to be that it often is used in a construction that comes close to 
OCM, and can be used in situation where the speaker cannot find a word (note 
that sådan is pronounced sån here):
! jaså du har en sån där // kassettbandspelare som går runt
! oh you have like a // cassette recorder that goes around
It can also be used to prepare the listener that an unusual word is coming, or 
perhaps rather something that the speaker is not used to:
! jaha de e en sån där live upptagning
! okay it is like a live recording
Both these uses are quite informal, and it is not surprising that they do not ap-
pear often in GDM.
6.9.3 Adverbs
Table 6-18: Adverbs that are significantly more or less common in GDM than in 
both IC and P/O, and belong to the fifty most common adverbs in any of the three 
corpora. Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O GDM IC P/O
här (‘here’) 14675 7267 10205 bara (‘just’, ‘only’) 2384 3993 3311
väl (‘probably?’) 4748 3890 2396 igen (‘again’) 400 944 729
alltså (‘so, thus’) 3028 2309 1682 aldrig (‘never’) 229 1067 415
egentligen (‘really’) 1056 431 463 heller (‘neither’) 297 616 474
vidare (‘further’) 843 287 208 hem (‘home’) 111 554 410
sedan (‘then’) 839 164 341 precis (‘exactly’) 309 523 474
med (‘with’) 786 380 367 hemma (‘home’) 80 472 314
därför (‘because 
of this, so’)
728 441 330 ihåg (‘remember’) 92 421 341
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redan (‘already’) 439 133 197 tillbaka (‘back’) 217 431 905
igenom 
(‘through’)
385 113 181
In the adverbs, we see traces of argumentation in group decision-making. Därför 
(‘because of this, so’), alltså (‘thus, so’) and vidare (‘further’) are all words that can 
be used to link arguments to standpoints or other arguments.
Väl is translated as ‘probably’ in the table above, but there is no proper English 
correspondent. It can be used to admit or consent something (e.g. ja, det kan vi 
väl göra, ‘yes, I guess we can do that’), but also as a kind of interrogative or elicit-
ing particle corresponding to an English tag question (du har väl varit i Finland?, 
‘you have been in Finland, haven’t you?’). This last use seems to be the most 
common use of the word in the GDM corpus, although in a weaker form, as 
more of a feedback elicitor:
! men de e ju // eftersom ni e me på listan så är ni väl me i i diskussionen 
! but it is // since you are on the list you take part in in the discussion don’t you
In this use, väl can be a polite way of presenting an opinion or an argument, 
since it is quite open for objections. Similarly, the word egentligen (‘really, to be 
precise’) can be used to weaken the strength of a taken stance, as discussed on 
p. 206 ff:
! yes några andra synpunkter kommentarer // < | > principfrågorna har vi väl 
egentlien knäckt förra gången
@ < cough: X >
! yes any other views comments // < | > we cracked the principal questions last 
time didn’t we
@ < cough: X >
The temporal adverbs sedan (‘then’) and redan (‘already’) are used when locating 
events in time, typically when reporting a previous sequence of events, which is 
not uncommon in group decision-making, as a part of giving background 
information.
However, the reason for the high frequency of the word här (‘here’) in GDM is 
somewhat unclear. One explanation is that the word is often part of a phrasal 
demonstrative pronoun den/det/de här (‘this/these’), discussed on p. 256 above.
Med is usually seen as a preposition (‘with’), and when tagged as an adverb it is 
typically the particle of a phrasal verb. In such phrasal verbs med usually has a 
meaning of inclusion: vara med någon (‘to be with somebody’), komma med (‘to ac-
company’), ta med (‘bring’). The presence of this kind of expressions could be an 
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effect of the negotiation and putting of proposals that are part of group deci-
sion-making:1
! ja: ja vet inte heller om de e inte alls så tokit tycker ja när den inte e de e lite 
räffling upp å ner de lite prydnad tycker ja no / de förvånar mej att dom va så 
deciderade på att man inte skulle ta den // alldeles omöjlit tycker ja inte att 
de e men ja e kan också va me om att man försöker å säja nej till // de / fast 
ja e inte så negativt inställd
! yes I don’t know either if it really is not all that bad I think when it isn’t there 
are some grooves up and down it’s some decoration I think / I am surprised 
that they were so convinced that it should not be taken // I don’t think it’s 
completely impossible but I er can also partake in trying to say no to // it / 
but I am not all that negative to it
Igenom is usually used in the phrase gå igenom (‘go through’), which in Swedish, as 
in English, can mean either to pass through (a doorway) or to scrutinize (a docu-
ment). In the GDM corpus it is the latter meaning that is more common, and it 
is used for example when referring to the scrutinizing of a list of issues, or a pro-
posal (see p. 256).
The two forms of home, hemma and hem, are obviously part of the private sphere, 
and are not common in GDM. Their presence in P/O is explained by the fact 
that there are many travel agency dialogues in P/O, where return trips are often 
discussed. On the way back, the original departure location is often referred to as 
‘home’.
Some less common adverbs in GDM appear to have an important share of usage 
in informal phrasings. The word bara (‘just, only’) can be used to add dramatic 
effect:
! men de tycker ja e så äckligt dels för dom som kommer efter å känner de dä 
stanken dels för en själv de e ju sånt lite utrymme så rukt+ lukt+ eller röken 
bara pyr in i en va // ...
! but I think that is so gross both for those what come after and sense that 
stench and for yourself it is such a small space so the smul+ smel+ or the 
smoke just smolders into you right // ...
The use of the verb pyra (‘smoulder’) is somewhat unusual here, but is probably a 
development of the participle inpyrd (‘ingrained, reeking’), and means that the 
smoke enters and stays in the clothes and hair of the person. The adverb bara 
adds the effect that there is no end to this entering, the process can go on 
without obstruction. This “dramatic” use of bara is quite informal.
Similarly, aldrig (‘never’) is often used in exaggerations for something that is un-
likely; such exaggerations are informal: 
1. The written phrase vara med is pronounced va me here.
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Excerpt 6-4. A320201, line 767.
Two speakers are talking about the children av a common friend.
1 $B: e de den lille Sune $B: is that the little one Sune
2 $A: ja $A: yes
3 $B: kan aldri lära mej de ja de e 
den lille
$B: I never learn that yes that is the 
little one
4 $A: den lille heter Sune $A: the little one is called Sune
A parallel to this is the word precis (‘exactly’), which can be used as a kind of “un-
derstatement mark”:
!  ... men vinden som sagt var den ha vart så kall så bada har ju inte varit precis 
det största nöjet denna sommar // ...
! ... but the wind as I said before it has been so cold that swimming has not ex-
actly been the most enjoyable experience this summer // ...
The implication is that swimming has been far from the most enjoyable experi-
ence; this kind of sarcasm is also rather informal. 
Ihåg was discussed on p. 255 above, and interjectional phrases containing heller 
were discussed on p. 253.
The word igen (‘again) is less common in GDM, but the reason for this is not ob-
vious. It can be explained partly by the fact that a more formal synonym is used 
in more often in GDM, ytterligare, but that does not explain the entire difference. 
The word igen seems to appear mostly in descriptions of what has happened, or 
some more or less ongoing event; however, GDM concerns itself primarily with 
future events (see also the verb section below).
Tillbaka (‘back’) is used in IC in descriptions of how people have moved around, 
typically as parts of descriptions of previous events. Example:
! jo / hon kom dit i eh / i november eller någonting sådant där och så skulle 
hon stanna hon hade visum för tre månader / och så nu över jul och nyår så 
hade dom varit / och / på / öarna där någonstans vid TRINIDAD hade dom 
varit / och när dom kom tillbaka nu och skulle in på trettondagsafton skulle in 
i igen i < ca+ > < ca+ > kom nu i Caracas landa där / 
! yes / she came there in er / in November or something like that and then she 
should stay for she had a visa for three months / and now for Christmas and 
New Year they had been / and / on / the islands there somewhere at TRINID-
AD they had been / and when they came back now and were going in on Epi-
phany were going in again in Ca+ Ca+ come now in Caracas land there /
In P/O the most common use is when a customer receives change from a cash-
ier or other sales person. 
! tackar < | > då blir de sex kroner tillbaka varsego vill du ha en påse å ta de i 
@ < event: the till opens and closes >
! thank you < | > and there is six crowns back here you are would you like a 
bag for that
@ < event: the register opens and closes >
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Neither of these two types of episodes is common in the GDM activities.
6.9.4 Conjunctions
Table 6-19: Conjunctions that are significantly more or less common in GDM than 
in IC and P/O, and belong to the fifty most common conjunctions in any of the 
three corpora. Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O GDM IC P/O
och (‘and’) 29697 26193 24009
att (‘to’, ‘that’) 28175 17572 17562
As discussed above (p. 245), conjunctions in general are more common in GDM 
than in the the other two corpora, so it is not surprising that the most common 
conjunction och (‘and’) is more common in GDM.
The word att can either be a subjunction (‘that’) or the infinitive marker (‘to’), 
but it is the former use that is more common in GDM. The reason for this is 
probably the use of verbs such as think, suggest, say, claim etc., which take that-
clauses as complements. These verbs are abundant in GDM (see below ‘verbs’).
6.9.5 Feedback words
Traditionally, feedback words have not received much attention, most likely be-
cause of the fact that traditionally spoken language has been ignored by linguists, 
to a large extent. Feedback words are uncommon in most written language 
genres; these have a primarily monological character. Thus, there is no accumu-
lated knowledge of the finer distinctions between different kinds of feedback 
words, as there is for many other words. Consider the sounds [ja:], [a:], [ja#a], 
[a:a "], [m:], and [m:m"]. Which of these are words and what difference in meaning is 
there? A linguist giving this problem some attention may come up with an ana-
lysis of it, but the transcribers who produced the texts in the corpora have not 
had any special training in this, and they have used somewhat different strategies 
for rendering these sounds. This means that the precise rendering of the feed-
back words cannot always be trusted. Therefore, abroad grouping of the feed-
back words has been made here, and all the words with a frequency of 10 or 
more are presented here:
Table 6-20: Feedback words in the three corpora. Numbers are given in parts per 
million (PPM). Numbers that are printed in gray are not significantly different 
compared to GDM.
Word Translation/Explanation GDM IC P/O
ja/ah/jaa/a/jaja variations of ‘yes’ 21879 26512 32419
m/mm like in English 6669 5871 10533
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nä/nej/näeh/näej/
neej/nää/ne/nee
variations of ‘no’ 5901 11949 9480
va feedback elicitor, ‘right’ 5013 3442 4705
jo/jovisst/jodå/jojo/joo variations of jo, the contrastive 
yes comparable to the French si
1582 2677 1992
jaha/aha ’okay, is that so’ (positive) 1517 1633 1899
just ’exactly’ 880 806 1288
okej ’okay’ 830 465 2167
visst/javisst ’sure, of course’ 783 631 1315
kanske ’maybe’ 498 486 431
jaså/jasså ’is that so’ 425 837 442
precis ’exactly’ 355 176 1032
ha ’okay’ 313 393 666
bra ’good’ 127 103 404
hm like in English 120 2357 791
nähä/nähej/nehej ’okay, so’ (negative) 120 207 295
nja/mja/naej/njae ’well’ (mild disagreement) 100 217 115
yes English borrowing 85 21 142
se ’look’ 42 21 76
Most of the words with significantly different frequencies are less common in 
GDM, suggesting that feedback words are less common in general in GDM than 
in IC and P/O. The parts-of-speech table above shows that this is the case for 
P/O, but the difference compared to IC is not statistically significant. However, 
looking a bit closer at the numbers we see that the significance level is just 
slightly below the threshold of 99.5%, and the significance test used for the part-
of-speech distribution above is the t-test, while the less strict !2-test is used for 
the individual words. Further, there are more participants, and listeners, in 
GDM, so there are more people who could give feedback. Despite this, there is 
less feedback in the GDM corpus. 
Accordingly, it is likely that many of the differences in table 6-20 are due to a 
generally lower degree of verbal feedback in the GDM activities. This is not 
surprising, since there are more participants in these activities, and we can as-
sume that feedback in groups tends to be less verbal, for practical reasons. 
The exception to this is the feedback elicitor va, which is more common in 
GDM than in IC (and has about the same frequency in P/O). GDM and P/O 
evidence a lot of information giving, arguing or other kind of explanation, where 
the speaker often has rather large pieces of information to present. This informa-
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tion is often split up in chunks using va, enabling listeners to give feedback, while 
packaging the information in a way that is easier to receive. Here is an example:
! men kan vi inte göra så att vi skickar me den frågan om vi gör de till vårt <1 
adb-råd >1 eller någonting sådant va att e: de för nu de e ju en rätt stor in-
vestering vi gör här va s att ja tycker de känns viktit att som ledning ha ett 
grepp ungefär va befinner vi oss nu va och e: att även dom inte (kraftfulla) 
rösterna s att säja vi ser dom va // e att man då e fundera på NÅGON form av 
mer systematisk om de e i enkätform eller va de e men INTE bara s att säja 
sätta ihop de man har sett å hört utan att vi faktiskt hör EFTER hos på varje 
ställe där de står en terminal eller en <2 pc >2 så vi får en bild av används den 
/ fungerar grejerna va e de för grejer som inte fungera å va e de mer för stöd 
man behöver va å så att vi får en chans att göra nån analys av de läget tisam-
mans här va
@ <1 acronym: adb >1
@ <2 acronym >2
! but couldn’t we do like this that we pass that question if we do so to our com-
puter council or something like that right that er it because now it is a rather 
big investment that we are doing here right to I think it feels important that 
we as management have control of roughly where we are now right and er 
that also the not (strong) voices so to speak that we see them right // er that 
they er consider SOME kind of more systematic be it in shape of a question-
naire or what have you but NOT just so to speak put together what has been 
seen and heard but that we actually find OUT on at each place where there is 
a terminal or a <2 pc >2 so we get a picture of is it used / does the stuff work 
what kind of stuff doesn’t work and what other kind of support that is needed 
right and so we get a chance to make an analysis of the situation together 
here right
@ <2 acronym >2
Here, A makes a summary of what has been said during a discussion, and 
phrases it as a proposal, along with arguments. The result is a large piece of in-
formation, which is split up in small chunks using va.
6.9.6 Interjections
Table 6-21: Interjections that are significantly more or less common in GDM than 
in both IC and P/O, and belong to the fifty most common interjections in any of 
the three corpora. Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O
hej (‘hi’) 61 339 2406
oj (‘oops’) 57 400 149
fan (‘damn’) 11 760 266
hallå (‘hello’) 23 174 176
aj (‘ouch’) 8 123 112
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Interjections in general are less common in group decision-making than in the 
other two corpora, as discussed above (p. 245), indicated clearly here. Occasions 
where words like hej (‘hi’), hallå (‘hello’), oj (‘oops’) and aj (‘ouch’) could be used 
do not come frequently in group meetings. As stated in connection with other 
parts-of-speech, swear words like fan (‘damn’) are usually considered informal.
6.9.7 Nouns
Table 6-22: Nouns that are significantly more or less common in GDM than in IC 
and P/O, and belong to the fifty most common nouns in any of the three corpora. 
Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O GDM IC P/O
frågan, fråga, frågor 
(‘question’)
1991 339 1054 fan (‘bastard’) 19 565 250
sätt, sättet (‘way, manner’) 1201 647 681 klockan (‘clock, 
time’)
172 380 309
del (‘part’) 900 359 479 dagen (‘the day’) 149 318 282
timmar (‘hours’) 442 113 160 tur (‘turn; luck’) 88 216 234
förslag (‘suggestion, 
proposal’)
420 650 16 bilen (‘the car’) 65 174 421
kommunen (‘the 
municipality’)
389 0 0
ordförande (‘chairperson’) 381 10 0 fel (‘error, 
wrong’)
69 174 224
nämnden (‘the 
committee’)
358 0 0
kontakt (‘contact’) 294 10 64
ärende, ärendet (‘issue, 
paragraph’)
526 0 21
synpunkter (‘views, 
comments’)
267 10 59
herr (‘mister’) 256 21 5
papper (‘paper’) 251 62 96
uppdrag (‘mission’) 229 10 16
antal (‘number’) 206 0 64
grupp (‘group’) 206 41 80
konflikt (‘conflict’) 206 0 5
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nummer (‘number, 
figure’)
202 0 75
beslut (‘decision’) 385 0 21
The fact that most of the recordings in the GDM corpus are from formal meet-
ings is clearly visible here: frågan/frågor/fråga (‘the question/questions/question’), 
förslag (‘proposal, suggestion’), ärende/ärendet (‘issue/issues, paragraph/para-
graphs’), papper (‘paper’), synpunkter (‘views, comments’), ordförande (‘chairperson’), 
uppdrag (‘mission’), grupp (‘group’), nummer1 (‘number’), konflikt (‘conflict’), beslut 
(‘decision’) and kontakt2 (‘contact’) all have to do with meetings. 
Several of the recorded groups are associated with public administration; words 
like nämnden (‘the committee’) and kommunen (‘the municipality’) naturally show 
up in such contexts.
The words herr (‘mister’) and ordförande (‘chairman, chairperson’) are usually used 
in the phrase herr ordförande (‘mister chairperson’), when starting to talk in a form-
al meeting. The formality of the activities also explains why fan (‘bastard’), and tur 
(‘luck’; ‘turn’) all are uncommon in GDM, since these belong to the informal and 
private sphere. Antal (‘number’) usually occurs in the phrase ett antal, a rather 
formal way of saying ‘some’ or ‘several’.
The word sätt, and iits definite form, sättet, mean ‘way’ or ‘manner.’ These are of-
ten used when talking about proposals or parts of proposals: på något sätt (‘in 
some way’), på det sättet (‘in this way’), på annat sätt (‘in another way’), på samma sätt 
(‘in the same way’), på det ena eller andra sättet (‘one way or another’).
Most of the occurrences of the word timmar (‘hours’) come from the two budget 
activities (A321601 and A322501), where the cost of the project is measured 
primarily in man-hours.
The word del (‘part’) often occurs in the phrases like för min del, discussed on 
pp. 251 above.
The word klockan is used primarily for time (hour) references – vad är klockan 
(‘what time is it’), klockan två (”two o’clock”), etc. – these kinds of references do 
not seem to be common in GDM. The participants in IC discuss what they have 
done and what they will do, and time references are sometimes made for that. In 
the P/O corpus there are quite a few bookings made (travel agencies and car hire 
companies), and time references are prominent there too. However, in GDM the 
future actions discussed are usually only referred to using the date, not hour. It is 
really only when discussing the next meeting that exhibit references to the hour. 
1. Typically used to refer to paragraphs on the agenda.
2. Often used as a formal version of ’talk to’: I will contact the applicant.
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The word bilen (‘the car’) occurs in the P/O corpus because the travel agency and 
car hire companies, while in IC, the participants talk about their cars, which seem 
to play a prominent role in their lives. In GDM, however, there are few oppor-
tunities to talk about cars, since the groups themselves rarely have cars of their 
own, and transportation is seldom an issue.
Dagen (‘the day’) can be used either to contrast evening/night, or for the 24-hour 
calendar unit. It is less common in GDM than in the other corpora, and there 
seem to be several reasons for this. Evening or night activities are rarely men-
tioned in the GDM recordings, since these conversations mostly deal with public 
and official matters, which are – broadly speaking – dealt with during daytime, 
while private matters are dealt with during evenings and nights. This explains 
why dagen is more common in IC than in GDM, but not why it is more common 
in P/O as well. The reason for this is that there are several recordings of court 
room interactions (trials) in the P/O corpus, where dagen in the sense of calendar 
unit is used often (‘that day’, ‘during the day’, ‘the day before’, etc.).
The word fel (‘wrong, error, fault’) does not occur many times in the three cor-
pora (18 times in GDM, 17 in IC, and 42 in P/O); it is difficult to see any clear 
pattern in the uses.
6.9.8 Numerals
None of the individual numerals sticks out; an automatic categorization of the 
numerals in the corpora was made. 
Table 6-23: Numeral types in the three corpora. Numbers without statistically 
significant differences compared to GDM have been printed in gray.
Type GDM IC P/O
Cardinal 0-9 4647 3690 9442
Cardinal 20-99 2096 1096 5676
Ordinal 0-9 1733 1178 2723
Cardinal 10-19 1339 961 3613
Cardinal 1000-999999 1212 83 666
Cardinal 100-999 984 424 2199
Ordinal 10-19 363 165 1555
Ordinal 20-99 239 31 862
Cardinal 1000- 162 83 224
As shown in table 6-23, cardinal numbers are more common than ordinal ones, 
in general. For all types but cardinal numbers from 1000 to 999999, P/O has the 
most and IC has the fewest. P/O contains quite a few business related activities, 
where prices and costs are discussed. GDM also contains conversations that 
concern money, but to a lesser degree. In IC, finally, money is discussed more 
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rarely. This explains the distribution of cardinal numbers, but money is seldom 
spoken of in ordinal terms. Dates, however, are often referred to using ordinal 
numbers. As mentioned, dates are often referred to in P/O (see discussion of da-
gen in the noun section).
The exception to this pattern, cardinal numbers 1000-999999, is due to the fact 
that the groups recorded in GDM corpus often discuss costs associated with 
their respective organizations, and these numbers often fall into this interval. In 
P/O, the amounts mentioned are usually to be paid by private persons, and they 
are smaller.1
6.9.9 Own communication management
There are two distinct types of OCM words found in the corpora: hesitation 
sounds and interrupted words,2 shown in the table below.
Table 6-24: Types of OCM words, in PPM. Numbers with no significant difference 
compared to GDM have been printed in gray.
GDM IC P/O
hesitation sounds 1.7 0.7 1.4
interrupted words 0.6 0.5 0.4
There are considerably fewer hesitation sounds in IC than in GDM, which could 
be an effect of the long utterances in the GDM activities. The difference in inter-
rupted words between GDM and P/O is harder to explain.
6.9.10 Prepositions
Table 6-25: Prepositions that are significantly more or less common in GDM than 
in IC and P/O, belonging to the fifty most common prepositions in any of the three 
corpora. Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O
i (‘in’) 15564 13744 12303
med (‘with’) 9050 7390 7165
om (‘about’) 4496 2966 2928
av (‘of, off’) 3924 2238 2124
utan (‘without’) 892 565 479
under (‘under, below’) 858 534 532
1. 1 euro ! 9 Swedish crowns.
2. To be more precise, the parts-of-speech tagger only recognizes these two types of 
OCM words.
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utav (‘of’) 854 359 245
inom (‘within’) 423 154 117
angående (‘concerning’) 191 9 32
kring (‘around’) 183 31 21
utifrån (‘from outside’) 168 10 16
beträffande (‘concerning’) 107 0 27
Prepositions are more common in general in GDM than in the other two cor-
pora, as discussed above (p. 245). Some of the prepositions have a clearly formal 
ring, such as utav (‘of’), angående (‘concerning’), beträffande (‘concerning’) and, to 
some extent, kring (‘around’).
6.9.11 Pronouns
Table 6-26: Pronouns that are significantly more or less common in GDM than in 
IC and P/O, and belong to the fifty most common pronouns in any of the three 
corpora. Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O GDM IC P/O
vi/oss/vår/våra 
(we/us/our)
25975 8848 18244 jag (‘I’) 18820 30443 20889
en/ett (‘a, an, one’,
common/neuter)
17852 13990 14879 du, dej (‘you’, 
subject form,
object form)
6437 19533 17062
som (‘that, which, 
who’)
11704 8109 8097 vad (‘what’) 4134 6405 5403
detta, denna (‘this’, 
common/neuter)
3039 482 548 han (‘he’) 3440 9587 5015
annat/andra 
(‘other’, sing/
plural
1495 872 873 ingen 
(‘nobody, 
no’)
770 1252 1171
The words denna and detta are demonstrative pronouns that are used mostly in 
southern Sweden; some recordings in the GDM corpus are made in that area, 
which explains the high frequency.
En and ett are primarily indefinite determiners (‘a, an’), for common and neuter 
gender, and their presence signals indefinite noun phrases. A possible, but quite 
speculative, explanation for this is that the descriptions of past or future events 
occurring in GDM include references to things that are not referred to again a 
number of times. The frequencies of en and ett are boosted by such references, 
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since the indefinite form typically is used only the first time a reference is made 
to a certain phenomenon.
Som (‘that, which, who’) is tagged as pronoun primarily in relative clauses, mannen 
som sitter på bänken (‘the man who is sitting on the bench’), and signals a more 
complex clause structure, something that has been mentioned before.
The group functions as an agent in GDM, which results in high frequencies for 
plural pronouns like vi (‘we’), oss (‘us’), vår (‘our’, sing.), våra (‘our’, pl.), and low 
frequencies for singular pronouns like jag (‘I’), du (‘you’, sing. subject form), dej 
(‘you’, sing. object form) and han (‘he’).
When vad is tagged as a pronoun, it is usually used in the interjectional construc-
tion vad <property>, discussed on p. 253 above.
The word ingen (‘no, nobody, none’) is less common in GDM than in the other 
corpora, but it is difficult to say why. It is possibly a parallel case to the adverb 
aldrig (‘never’) discussed above, or that it is used in exaggerations that are more 
common in informal situations:
! nej men inte om gå upp klockan fyra varje morgon de orkar ju ingen män-
niska va
! no but not about going up at four o’clock every morning nobody can put up 
with that
Even more mysterious is the fact that annat,andra (‘other’) is more common in 
GDM than in the other corpora. I have not been able to find a reasonable ex-
planation for this.
6.9.12 Verbs
Table 6-27: Verbs that are significantly more or less common in GDM than in IC 
and P/O, and belong to the fifty most common verbs in any of the three corpora. 
Numbers are given in parts per million (PPM).
More common Less common
GDM IC P/O GDM IC P/O
är (‘be’, pres.) 29480 27610 2576 var (‘be’, past) 6010 12820 7549
har (‘have’, pres.) 16704 13107 14118 ha (‘have’, inf.) 2761 3490 3476
kan (‘can, be able 
to’, pres.)
8398 7483 6761 vet (‘know’, 
pres.)
1960 4598 3077
säga (‘say’, inf.) 3257 1375 1874 hade (‘have’, 
past)
1937 4700 3077
finns (‘be, exist’, 
pres.)
3127 1211 1810 sade (‘say’, 
past)
671 1150 1437
göra (‘do, make’, 
inf.)
2932 2238 1645 gick (‘go’, past) 221 1109 783
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gäller (‘concern’, 
pres.)
1098 154 405 gjorde (‘do, 
make’, past)
381 944 708
kunna (‘know, be 
able to’, inf.)
1075 544 474 blev (‘be, 
become’, past)
278 862 495
lägga (‘put, lay’, 
inf.)
465 216 218 såg (‘see’, past) 126 831 383
heter (‘be 
called’, pres.)
416 718 751
åka (‘go’, inf.) 118 698 783
brukar (‘have 
the habit of’, 
pres.)
149 595 325
kom (‘come’, 
past or imp.)
370 1334 729
A general tendency regarding verbs is that present tense is more common in 
GDM – är (‘am/is/are’), har (‘has/have’), kan (‘know/knows/can/is able to’), 
finns (‘is/are,exists’), gäller (‘hold/holds, concern/concerns’) – while past tense is 
less common in GDM – var (‘was/were’), hade (‘had’), sade (‘said’), gick (‘went’), 
gjorde (‘did, made’), blev (‘became’), såg (‘saw’), kom (‘came’). Future tense, includ-
ing conditional future, is formed with the infinitive and certain auxiliaries, which 
explains the high frequencies of lägga (‘lay, put’), göra (‘do, make’) and säga (‘say’) 
in GDM. Further, ha (‘have’, inf.) is used in some more complex, past tense verb 
constructions, such as kunde ha gjort, borde ha gjort, måste ha gjort (‘could have done’, 
‘should have done’, ‘must have done’). Group decision-making is concerned with 
future actions, so this pattern is not surprising.
Kunna, with the present tense form kan, is a cognate of the English ‘can’, but is 
also used for ‘know’ and ‘to be able to’. In the GDM corpus, it is usually used to 
present possible future actions: 
! just de // s att fundera / vi kan ju också göra så här att vi låter den gå runt 
men för guds skull gå inte härifrån ikväll utan ha fyllt i den // för ni måste 
fylla i den
! exactly // so considering / we can also do like this that we pass it around but 
for heaven’s sake do not do not leave tonight without having filled it out // be-
cause you have to fill it out
Here, the speaker presents a possible solution to a problem (passing the thing 
around), which is a possible future action.
The high frequency of säga can be explained by its infinitive form (see above), 
but it is also commonly used in the phrase så att säga (‘so to speak’), discussed on 
p. 254 above, the same goes for gäller, discussed on p. 256-7.
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Vet and heter are present tense, which makes it a little surprising that it is uncom-
mon in GDM. Vet can be explained by its presence in the feedback eliciting 
phrase du vet discussed on p. 255 above. The word heter means ‘has/have the 
name of’, like the German heißen. As discussed on p. 255 above, it is part of the 
phrase vad heter det (‘what is it called’), which is used when searching for words, 
and is perhaps a sign of low concentration – in group meetings the participants 
are perhaps more focused, or maybe the conversations do not change topics as 
often as in informal conversations. The frequency of the verb in the P/O corpus 
can be explained by the fact that many names are exchanged, of people, places 
and companies.
The word åka (‘go’) is frequent in the P/O corpus because of the travel agents 
asking where the customer wants to go. In IC it is used because the participants 
discuss what they are going to do, but that holds for the GDM corpus as well. 
However, the group meetings in GDM rarely discuss transportation. It might be 
that this is a consequence of the groups being social entities, and that physical 
transportation is handled by the individual group members without group 
decisions.
The word brukar, translated as ‘have the habit of’ in the table, is a kind of auxili-
ary that often corresponds to simple present tense in English (jag brukar gå till bib-
lioteket ganska ofta, ‘I go to the library quite often’). It is less common in GDM 
than in the other corpora, but it is difficult to say why. It is possible that this is a 
parallel case to the adverb aldrig (‘never’) and the pronoun ingen (‘no, nobody’) 
discussed above, and that it is used in a type of generalization that is avoided in 
formal situations:
! ja // å ja kika runt omkring den du vet att de brukar alltid växa svamp runt 
den stenen
! yes // and I looked around it you know that it always grows mushroom 
around that stone
6.10 Conclusions
In this chapter, a study of word frequencies in a corpus of group decision activit-
ies was presented. The results provide a lot of support for claims made in previ-
ous chapters: in chapter 5 it was claimed that group decision activities contain 
proposals, and traces of this have been shown several times by the word fre-
quencies (long utterances, p. 233; long n-grams, p. 263 ff; adverbs, 
p. 266-7; nouns, p. 273). Similarly chapter 5 claimed that arguments are com-
mon, while chapter 4 is based on the assumption that arguing is an important 
part of group decision-making. It is in this chapter that traces of arguing ap-
peared many times (long utterances, p. 233; complex utterances, p. 245; con-
structions, p. 249-51 ff; adverbs, p. 266; feedback, pp. 270-1).
The definition given on p. 105 stipulates that decisions concern future actions, 
an idea that is supported in the verb section, where future and present tense 
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were shown to be common in group decision-making. In chapter 5, the need to 
make stances in debates stronger or weaker was discussed, and traces of this was 
found in the word frequencies (adverbs, p. 266). Further, chapter 5 also claimed 
that different groups develop different patterns for how decisions are made, a 
claim that was supported in the frequency study (p. 249).
Although quite a few reflections of group decision-making were found in the fre-
quency lists and measures, there were not as many as one could have expected as 
compared to other activity studies (e.g. Allwood 1996b; Allwood 2001b). In-
stead, many of the traits found derive from the fact that most of the recordings 
in the GDM corpus come from formal meetings. Group decisions need not be 
made in formal meetings, however, so the imbalance between formal and in-
formal conversations is a weakness of the corpus. On the other hand, this also 
shows that group decision-making is not so much a social activity type as a sub 
activity type – the recorded activities that were both formal meetings and group 
decision making activities mostly exhibited formal meeting traits. The social 
activity type formal meeting and the public administration domain were visible in 
the distribution of parts-of-speech (few interjections), in constructions (e.g. så att 
säga p. 254), n-grams (e.g. bigrams p. 258), words (e.g. ärende p. 273), the number 
of participants, and the length of the activities. The dominance measure was also 
affected by the structure of many of the groups, containing one chairperson and 
a number of other members. 
The fact that group decision-making is a sub activity is probably also the reason 
behind the high degree of lexical variation that was found in GDM – the activit-
ies are collected from several social activity types, making the range of subjects 
wide and boosting lexical variation. 
The frequency study also provides some new information about the language of 
group decision-making. The activity includes presenting and explaining present 
problems and possible future actions, as well as arguing for and against alternat-
ive solutions. Problems and actions are typically abstract and complex entities, 
which prompts use of complex clauses (pp. 245, 277), long utterances (p. 233), a 
high degree of OCM (p. 245), and general linguistic mechanisms for referral 
(pp. 251-2). All in all, the results is difficult language, and it must be expected 
that great communicative ability – both to understand others and to make one-
self understood – is vital for successful group decision-making.
One last comment concerns methodological issues. The threshold for differ-
ences to be counted as statistically significant has been set to 99.5% most often. 
This means that 1 difference out of 200, on average, is wrong. Kilgarriff’s (2001) 
criticism (see p. 263) also makes it likely that the error rate is even higher. Thus, 
some of the differences that form the basis of the conclusions made here are 
likely to be false. However, this will hardly affect the overall picture. (The signi-
ficance level is in many cases much better than 99.5%, so the average signific-
ance level is higher.)
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7. Concluding discussion
7.1 A holistic description of the dissertation
Each of the chapters 2 through 6 differ considerably in character, and I shall 
now attempt to bring them together to form a more coherent view of the subject 
of this dissertation. In the sections that follow, I shall try to draw conclusions, 
and sketch out how future research could build on this work.
As shown in chapter 2, considerable research has been done on group decision-
making. Social psychologists and communication scholars have established a re-
search field concerned with group decision-making, and they have often been in-
terested in what makes group decisions good or bad. There has been a strong 
preference for experimental methods, and only recently have any attempts been 
made to study naturally occurring decisions in groups that exist independently of 
research. The present work supports this late development. The chapter on argu-
mentation showed that arguing cannot be separated from the context in which it 
occurs, and the chapter on the interaction of group decision-making (chapter 5) 
showed that each group develops its own conventions for what counts as a deci-
sion and how decisions are made. Huisman (2000; 2001) reported similar results, 
while Frey (1994) and Putnam & Stohl (1990) based their arguments for a natur-
alistic approach on a more general understanding of groups. It should come as 
no surprise that I am a strong supporter of this naturalistic development, and 
chapters 4, 5 and 6 use recordings of naturally occurring activities for their em-
pirical basis. However, this is not to say that experimental research on group 
decision-making is completely meaningless. Experimental studies have been used 
in the past with considerable success, and will continue to do so. However, 
groups that are put together for research experiments are a particular kind of 
group, and the differences and similarities between this type of groups and other 
types must be understood before it is possible to transfer research results from 
one kind of group to another.
When I started looking at existing research on group decision-making, I expec-
ted a close connection to argumentation analysis, and was surprised to find how 
separate these research fields are. Attempts have been made to bring the fields
together (see p. 35 ff.), but they are still fairly isolated from each other. This dis-
sertation constitutes an attempt to bring the two fields together. The example 
study of argumentation in naturally occurring spoken interaction that was 
presented in chapter 4 can be compared to the analysis of group decision-making 
activities in chapter 5. It is obvious from these examples that argumentation and 
group decision-making can be studied with very much the same methods and in 
close connection with each other. 
One of the reasons that argumentation analysis and group decision-making re-
search have been kept apart is probably that argumentation has largely been 
studied in order to find out which argumentation is good. The investigations 
have been very much connected with logic and the concept of truth. Further, ar-
gumentation analysis has concentrated largely on written or at least monological 
argumentation. For that reason, the connection to spoken, interactive and often 
unstructured group decision-making has not been obvious. In chapter 4, one 
school of argumentation analysis, pragma-dialectics, was discussed and modified 
to better suit the needs of group decision-making research, and to show how lin-
guistic methods can be used to study argumentation. Pragma-dialectics is funda-
mentally open to pragmatics and thus to conversational aspects of argumenta-
tion, and for that reason, it was well suited for this kind of adaptation. Four 
modifications were made to the pragma-dialectical model: i) the underlying prag-
matic theory, taken from Grice, Austin and Searle, was replaced with Allwood’s 
more modern theory; ii) normative aspects were separated from descriptive ones; 
iii) the set of overlapping rules was replaced with a set of non-overlapping ones; 
and iv) the analysis of unexpressed premises was modified somewhat.
The basic attitude towards argumentation analysis, captured in the key terms ex-
ternalization, functionalization, socialization and dialectification, remains un-
altered in the version of pragma-dialectics suggested here, as do the reconstruc-
tion and analytical overview. Similarly the analysis of fallacies as breaches of a set 
of rules remains, although the rule set has been altered.
The kind of detailed study of interaction in naturally occurring activities that is 
used in chapters 4 and 5 is similar to the works of Huisman, Jacobs & Jackson, 
and others who have employed Conversation Analysis to study group decision-
making and argumentation respectively (see sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.5). However, 
as shown in chapters 4 and 5, a detailed study of conversation need not assume 
the theoretical framework or methods of CA. The theoretical basis for the ana-
lyses made here has been Allwood’s view of communication as action and co-
operation (see section 2.4.2); the methods used can be classified mostly as ‘gen-
eral linguistic methods’. These methods and Allwood’s theory may seem to be a 
major change compared to previous work in group decision-making (as well as 
CA theory and method), but although their roots are quite different, Giddens’ 
Structuration Theory (ST) is roughly compatible with Allwood’s view, in that it 
views language and communication as a part of human social interaction. Note 
that although there are considerable differences, the development oriented 
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branch of group decision-making research (see section 2.3.3) is akin to the work 
done here. Differences between the methods lie in the fact that this work studies 
groups on a more detailed level than ST, and in that there is no attempt here to 
describe the surrounding social structures to the extent that ST does.
Since the present work finds itself in the cross roads of several scientific discip-
lines – a linguistic study of phenomena that traditionally belong to social-psycho-
logy, communication research and argumentation analysis – considerable care 
was taken to specify the object of study. The concept determination in chapter 3 
is an effort to make an empirically grounded description of what a group deci-
sion is, conceptually speaking. The risk of disregarding some important aspect of 
the concept of decision was minimized by investigating how the central words 
are used, and by systematically going through different aspects of concepts. The 
analysis concluded in a (somewhat stipulative) definition of decision in general 
and group decision in particular. This definition was used as a basis for selecting 
the empirical material used in the more direct studies of the language of group 
decision-making in chapters 5 and 6.
Communicative acts is one subject that has been prominent in the research done 
by social psychologists and communication scholars as well as the pragma-dialec-
ticians (although they have not been called communicative acts); considerable 
space has been used in this dissertation to show how this is dealt with by lin-
guists. The way communicative acts are handled by social psychologists and 
communication scholars strikes a linguist as naïve, while the way they are 
handled by the pragma-dialectitians comes across as outdated and inefficient. In 
chapters 4 and 5 communicative acts were identified that are related to the goals 
of arguing and group decision-making respectively. These taxonomies make it 
possible to analyze and increase the understanding of arguing and group deci-
sion-making in general. 
It should be noted that the communicative acts presented in this dissertation are 
not really intended to replace the communicative acts of Interaction Process 
Analysis, and are only meant to replace the ones used in pragma-dialectics to an 
extent. Rather, they are meant to show that the set of communicative acts used 
in the analysis of spoken interaction must depend on the activity type of the in-
teraction and the purpose of the analysis since the range of possible human ac-
tions are more or less infinite. Both the IPA coding scheme and Searle’s speech 
act taxonomy are attempts to create general sets of communicative acts that may 
be used for all kinds of interactions. Unfortunately, this only hides the underlying 
purpose of the analysis. In the case of IPA, the underlying purpose seems to be 
to study social-emotional tension in small groups, while the purpose in the case 
of Searle’s speech acts is more difficult to capture (though the relation to truth 
seems to play an important role). For people interested in studying social-emo-
tional tension in small groups, the IPA coding scheme may be a good choice; in 
the same way, Searle’s taxonomy may be useful for some other analytical pur-
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pose. However, trying to use one single taxonomy for all kinds of interactions is 
hardly likely to produce interesting results.
Chapters 5 and 6 were general investigations of the language in group decision-
making activities, using corpus linguistic methods. Chapter 5 described a qualitat-
ive, detailed study of interaction in several types of group decision-making activ-
ities, and the analysis was based largely on communicative acts. It was similar in 
character to Huisman’s study of decision-making in meetings (see section 5.7); in 
fact, both studies came up with the result that different groups employ different 
patterns for making decisions. There were also differences between the two stud-
ies, concerning the analysis of the decision-making episodes as well as in the ma-
terial. Huisman used recordings of meetings in three Dutch organizations, and 
did not try to capture decision-making in informal groups. Further, she reaches 
the conclusion that group decisions are episodes where participants recursively 
formulate states-of-affairs and assess these, which is somewhat different from 
the basic view of group decisions presented in this dissertation. Here, group 
decisions are oriented around the communicative acts proposing and accepting. 
Chapter 6 investigated the same recordings that were studied in chapter 5, but 
originated from a quantitative study of word frequencies, comparing group deci-
sion-making with two other activity types. To the best of my knowledge, nothing 
similar has been done before in group decision-making research. There are con-
siderable methodological limitations concerning word frequency studies of this 
kind, but quantitative, empirical results also bring a kind of stable basis to the 
analysis, which is a great advantage. In combination with qualitative studies such 
as the one in chapter 5, word frequency studies can make considerable contribu-
tions to the understanding of verbal interaction.
As mentioned at the start of this section, the purpose of this chapter is to bring 
together the previous chapters of the dissertation, and to discuss and draw con-
clusions from the work as a whole. I shall also discuss what could have been 
done instead, and what kinds of studies can be made in the future as follow-ups 
to this one.
7.2 Results
In this section, the most important general findings from the previous chapters 
will be presented. These are not presented in order of importance.
7.2.1 The scope of this study
The group decision-making (GDM) corpus used in this study primarily contains 
recordings of meetings of different kinds (project groups, committees, etc.), and 
only a few casual conversations (e.g. three friends planning a vacation together). 
Further, most of the speakers are male, and although precise information about 
their age is unavailable, the impression is that few of them are below 30 or above 
65 years old. All participants speak Swedish, and there is no indication that any 
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of them have a foreign background. Most of the recordings are made in and 
around the Gothenburg area between 1989 and 2004. 
The size of corpus is considerable when compared to many other corpora used 
in research (see for example (Huisman 2000:32 ff.)), but when considering how 
many different types of decision-making groups there are in the world, it is tiny. 
In addition, even if one only considers groups that fit the description above, the 
corpus cannot be said to be representative enough to make any strong claims 
about this subset of decision-making groups. However, what can be said about 
decision-making groups based on this study is that what occurs in the recordings 
used here also occurs in decision-making groups (of course). We know then with 
certainty for example that there is variation in the decision patterns of decision-
making groups in general. When it comes to the distribution of certain phenom-
ena in decision-making, generalizations have to be made with greater caution. 
For example, the formal bias that was displayed in these recordings seems likely 
to exist in most decision-making groups that fit the description at the start of 
this section, and the orientation around proposing-accepting is probably valid for 
all group decision-making, at least in western culture. However, these two last 
generalizations are based on general intuition for Swedish and Western culture, 
so more definite claims will have to wait until comparable studies have been 
made for other cultures and groups.
7.2.2 What is group decision-making?
A number of findings from the previous chapters relate to the nature of group 
decision-making, and how we shall conceive of it. The most important of those 
findings are presented and discussed in this section.
Group decision-making is about obligations for future action
Chapter 3 contained an empirically based investigation and determination of the 
concept of decision; in addition, it set out definitions of decision in general and 
group decision in particular:
A decision is an event where a set of agents A chooses one out of at least 
two alternative future actions, and either performs that action, or forms 
an intention to make that action happen. If a decision is made public 
(becomes known to others), an obligation to follow the decision arises 
for a set of agents B.
Group decisions are decisions where the set of choosing agents (A) contains 
more than one member. Often, the obligation primarily holds between these 
members. Such self-imposed obligations are usually called commitments, and 
group decision-making is then often about setting up commitments. It is hard 
to say anything about the proportions between decisions with different 
configurations of members in A and B, but it is reasonable to believe that the 
increased popularity of democracy in Sweden (and as far as I know this is a 
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general trend in the Western society) has increased the proportion of 
decisions where A and B are the same and contain more than one member. 
Put simply, the people affected by the decision should also participate in the 
decision. The Patent Office recording discussed on page 190 ff. is interesting 
in this aspect. It is an old recording (late 1960’s), and follows a rather different 
pattern than the other recordings studied here. There is no proper background 
information about the recording, but it is at least similar to situations where a 
manager listens to advisors, and then makes an individual decision on the 
issue. It is possible that such situations were more common in the past (say, 
50 years ago), and that the high frequency of “commitment oriented” 
decisions is a recent development. To answer this question properly empirical 
material rather different from that which I have at hand would be necessary; 
certainly, it would be interesting to compare the two.
Group decision-making is a sub activity
Both the qualitative study in chapter 5 and the word frequency study in chapter 6 
point out that group decision-making is not so much a social activity as a sub 
activity. Group decision-making can occur in many different types of social 
activities, and the conventions involved in decision-making are likely to vary with 
the activity type. The present study does not reveal precisely how social activity 
affects the decision-making of groups, but only that decision-making patterns 
vary with the studied groups. Another kind of material is necessary to find pat-
terns connected with specific activity types (cf. Causes for decision patterns, p. 301 
ff.).  
If group decision-making is different in different social activities, one may ask 
whether it is reasonable to make studies of group decision-making in general, as 
opposed to focusing on group decision-making in specific activity types. What is 
group decision-making like in family meal-time conversations? In company 
board meetings? Non-profit associations? Project meetings in manufacturing in-
dustry? With such a “particularist” approach to group decision-making, the de-
scription of properties of group decision-making in general will have to wait until 
group decision-making in different activity types can be compared.
A more cautious conclusion is to say that great care has to be taken when trans-
ferring results from group decision-making in one activity type to group deci-
sion-making in another activity type. A proper understanding of the activity 
types is necessary, in addition to an understanding of the relevant aspects of 
group decision-making. Moreover, the validity of the result transfer has to be 
shown. 
Arguing is a part of group decision-making
Already in chapter 2, arguing was presented as a part of group decision-making; 
chapter 4 was devoted entirely to arguing. Thus, it is not very surprising that the 
result of the studies made here show that arguing is common in group decision-
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making. Traces of arguing are visible in the word frequency data (chapter 6), and 
closer scrutiny of group decision-making recordings in chapter 5 also revealed 
that arguing was common in these recordings. However, when argumentation 
has been studied elsewhere, it has often been studied in isolation, even though it 
is clear that – at least for argumentation occurring in group decision-mak-
ing – arguing always has a higher purpose (for example to make a decision). 
People do not argue for the sake of arguing (usually), but to achieve something 
else. In some cases there may be exactly two well-defined, well-known, mutually 
exclusive alternatives that participants must choose between, and participants 
have clear and explicit opinions on which of the alternatives should be chosen 
from the start. In such cases, the arguing that occurs is likely to be clearly for or 
against these alternatives, and hopefully the party who has the best arguments 
wins. However, there are also many cases, perhaps most, where the problem area 
is less well-defined. The participants are then likely to try to find a solution to the 
problem, but not necessarily by arguing each other into accepting their own 
opinion. Considerable time and effort may be spent on finding acceptable com-
promises, finding ways of rejecting proposals without offending anyone, discuss-
ing and trying to understand the possibilities and limitations for the issue at 
hand, etc. Arguing for and against proposals, negotiating between conflicting in-
terests, and investigating current, future and past situations may become inter-
mingled and mutually dependent in intricate ways. Analysis of the argumentation 
by itself is bound to have considerable gaps.
Another consequence of the fact that arguing is a means to an end is that it is 
part of a more general social context, where the quality of an argument contains 
other aspects than logical validity. The participants in the Esperanto Foundation 
recording described in chapter 5 (see p. 184 ff.) are very cautious about committ-
ing themselves to a certain position on an issue before they are sure that this po-
sition is not in conflict with other participants’ opinions. “Good arguing” for 
them seems to include avoiding conflicts and generally retaining a nice atmo-
sphere in the group. Similar considerations can be found in other recordings. 
This connects directly to Bales’ two main parameters in his model of small 
groups – the tension between social-emotional aspects and task-oriented aspects 
(see p. 12) – although I have found no research that show in detail how (task-ori-
ented) argumentation interacts with social-emotional aspects.
Further, argument strength is related to this issue. Two arguments may be logic-
ally valid and still work in opposite directions concerning a certain claim. Then 
how are we to know which argument is more important? Pragma-dialectics does 
not provide any model for handling this, and I have not proposed any such 
model either. It is possible, however, that in actual arguing people combine the 
logical “weight” of an argument with other aspects of it, in order to avoid social-
emotional tension. 
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7.2.3 What is communication in group decision-making like?
I shall now turn to the communication found in group decision-making, which is 
indeed the focus of this dissertation, and present the most important results 
from this area.
Group decision-making is oriented toward proposing-accepting
The interaction in group decision-making is oriented toward the communicative 
act of proposing, and its desired counterpart, accepting. Standard proposing can 
be characterized as follows:
i) It presents or points out a future or on-going action A as a possibility.
ii) The sender S wants A (not) to take place.
iii) S wants the receiver(s) to consent to A (not) taking place.
The eliciting function in III is what connects proposing to accepting, and al-
though there may be many communicative acts produced before an accepting 
occurs, and although accepting may indeed never come, it is still sought by the 
proposer, and a proposing is always an attempt to elicit accepting.
An important, quite common variation of proposing is called non-stanced proposing 
here, and it differs from standard (stanced) proposings in that the sender does 
not reveal whether or not he wants the action to take place. This also has con-
sequences for the eliciting part, which is changed from seeking acceptance to 
seeking evaluation:
i) It presents or points out a future or on-going action A as a possibility.
ii) The sender S does not reveal if he wants A to take place.
iii) S wants the receiver(s) to evaluate A.
Other communicative acts in group decision-making (rejecting, arguing, eliciting 
information, etc.) are somehow dependent on the pair proposing-accepting – ar-
guments are for or against proposals, giving and requesting information has the 
purpose of enabling proposings or acceptings, etc. 
Accepting can be, and is often, done implicitly, but the accept still has to be 
communicated in some way. A group decision can only be made if a proposal is 
put forward (non-stanced or stanced) and an accept is given (explicitly or 
implicitly).
Different groups, different standards
The study of interaction in group decision-making in chapter 5 showed clearly 
that different groups develop different standards for how decisions are made and 
what counts as a decision. These standards differ concerning who makes the 
proposals, whose accept is necessary, how proposals are made, how turn-taking 
is managed, whether and how decisions are delimited, and so on. This result is 
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supported by Huisman’s study (Huisman 2000), and by the studies of phase 
models done by social-psychologists (see p. 8-9, 12).
This has consequences for how group decision-making can be studied – ad hoc 
groups that are put together for the sake of a group decision-making study will 
not necessarily say much about how real-world groups make decisions. This con-
stitutes support for the naturalistic paradigm (p. 22 ff.), but also raises questions 
about how generalizations concerning group decision-making can be made. My 
hope is that further research will reveal which parameters are important for these 
patterns (meeting frequency? social activity? leader strength? following an 
agenda? group size?), and different types of decision-making groups can then be 
constructed according to these parameters. This is discussed further below (p. 
301 ff.).
Advanced language
Group decision-making concerns future actions, and how these actions relate to 
the present situation. There is plenty of argumentation, and sometimes rather 
complex relations between abstract entities have to be explained and motivated. 
This means that the language used in group decision-making often is quite ad-
vanced. Utterances are typically long, which means that interaction is sparse, that 
is, a speaker communicates large pieces of information without synchronizing 
the communication with the receiver. Further, there are indications that the 
clause structure often is more complex during group decision-making than in 
other situations. Further, since group decision-making often is found in formal 
situations, the formal words, phrases and constructions used there can make the 
resulting language even more complex. One conclusion is that participants who 
are less skilled at using the language in question will be disadvantaged in group 
decision-making. Second language speakers, people with little training in talking 
and arguing about abstract matters and people who lack linguistic proficiency for 
other reasons will have difficulty participating fully in such discussions. If no 
compensatory measures are taken, a system that relies heavily on group decision-
making will discriminate against these groups (which may or may not be desired).
Participants vary their position strength
There is a certain tendency that once a person has actually expressed an opinion 
on an issue, it takes a lot to change that position. Bluntly yielding from a position 
to which a participant has committed himself seems to be harmful to a person’s 
prestige or self-esteem. This could easily create deadlocks, in which conflicts can-
not be resolved; some kind of strategy may be necessary to deal with this. Voting 
is one way to avoid deadlocks, (see p. 179), but the most common strategy for 
handling deadlocks seems to be to somehow vary the strength of stances taken 
in a discussion. Expressing stances more weakly or strongly provides a way of 
maneuvering the group towards consensus, and it gives participants a chance to 
probe the opinions of the others before making their own stance strong. Yield-
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ing from a weakly expressed stance is less harmful to a person’s prestige than 
yielding from a strongly expressed stance. 
Participants use different techniques for signaling how strongly they commit 
themselves to the expressed position, such as phrasing proposings as questions 
rather than expressing them more directly. Compare the following two 
proposings:
a) I think it would be a good idea to buy a new photo copier.
b) Wouldn’t it be a good idea to buy a new photo copier?
Both a) and b) express the same proposal, but the commitment by the speaker to 
the proposal is weaker in b).
Further, participants can use hedge phrases and words to diminish their commit-
ment to what they have just said, sometimes stating explicitly that they are pre-
pared to change their opinion. On the other end of the scale, participants can 
signal that their commitment to a position is strong, for example by repeating it, 
but also by stating explicitly that they are not prepared to change their mind.
The question of stance strength is obviously related to task-oriented vs. social-
emotional acts, which Bales and his followers have been so preoccupied with 
(see p. 10 ff.). Because of the connection between loss of prestige and yielding 
from a stance, each matter to be decided is potentially harmful to the social-emo-
tional atmosphere. Making a proper investigation of how social-emotional ten-
sion is managed in decision groups would require quite another type of empirical 
material than what is at hand here, but certain observations can be made from 
the material that is available. The first is that humor seems to be a common way 
of releasing tension that has been created in a discussion (or preventing it from 
being created). The second is that simply leaving the matter aside and doing 
something else for a while also seems to release tension. Tabling an issue is a 
formal method that can be used for this purpose, but informal groups use this 
principle as well. 
Considering the way participants vary their stance strength, and the different 
strategies used to maneuver the group towards consensus, it becomes clear that 
social-emotional acts and task-oriented acts cannot really be separated, as sugges-
ted by the IPA scheme (see p. 11). Moving towards consensus is necessary for 
completing the task (making a decision), but affects the social-emotional atmo-
sphere as well. 
Consensus is preferred
There seems to be a general preference for consensus in group decisions; a de-
sire for all participants to agree on the solution, without the need for voting or 
making orders. This is perhaps most obvious in the Budget Negotiation record-
ing (see p. 179 ff.), where the managers obviously have decided beforehand what 
the outcome of the discussion should be, but they still allow the project leader to 
argue his case, and they put forward arguments for their view too. They could 
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have simply told the project leader that the budget was too expensive, but they 
prefer to make it into something that at least looks like consensus. Further, all 
but one of the recordings that were investigated, voting is never used. The 
groups keep talking until everybody agrees, not only until there is a majority for 
one proposal. The exception to this is the very formal and political meeting with 
the City District Committee, where the ruling block shows little interest in gett-
ing support from the opposition, rather, it pushes its proposals through by 
voting.
This preference for consensus may be particularly strong in Swedish culture, 
which often is characterized as consensus-oriented, collectivist, conformist, etc; 
but there may also be a more universal tendency for consensus. In a group of 
motivated, rational agents who take each other into ethical and cognitive consid-
eration (see section 2.4.2), alternatives that everybody supports are naturally pre-
ferred. First, because it is unethical to make somebody unhappy unless it is ne-
cessary, and second, because such behavior is irrational in the long run, since 
dissatisfied people do not tend to participate in the decided action or its con-
sequences with much enthusiasm.
Formal bias
The corpus used for the empirical basis of chapters 5 and 6 contains a large pro-
portion of comparably formal meetings, which is by no means guaranteed to be 
a reflection of the proportions of formal meetings in group decision-making in 
general. However, the formal procedures (agenda, chairperson, gaveling, etc.) 
seem to be wide spread, and there seems to be a certain tendency for groups to 
“fall back” on formal concepts and procedures when discussions become diffi-
cult, at least when the groups are fairly large. One example of this is the Strategy 
meeting discussed on p. 196 ff. The meeting is informal – there is no agenda, 
proper chairperson, gavel, or structured turn-taking – yet the participants some-
times use words and behavior from formal discussions.
The reason for this bias is probably a combination of the existence of formal, 
general procedures and the absence of informal, general procedures. Different 
groups develop their own patterns for how to make decisions; general, informal 
procedures for group decisions do not arise easily (or so it seems). At the same 
time, formal procedures (and words and phrases associated with these) are 
widely known. It is easy for participants to adopt procedures from formal deci-
sion-making in informal situations since there are no competing procedures that 
fit the level of formality better.
It is unclear what consequences this bias for formality has. One possible negative 
consequence is that it causes groups to use formal procedures where it is not ne-
cessary, and serves to make the decision-making more cumbersome. This is pure 
speculation, however.
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7.2.4 What is current research on group decision-making like?
This dissertation not only contains new studies, but also a survey of the existing 
research on group decision-making. The survey revealed that this research is di-
vided into several academic disciplines, which have little contact with each other. 
Social psychology and communication research do have some connections to 
each other, but argumentation analysis is relatively isolated (although attempts 
have been made to bring these fields together). 
The research is also largely normative in the sense that the basic goal of the re-
search is to find out how to make good decisions, or how to avoid making bad 
ones. This applies to social psychology and communication research, as well as 
to argumentation analysis. This is not strange, since normative conclusions are 
often desirable and are an important motive for doing research. But, understand-
ing how group decision-making actually works has value in itself, and is a neces-
sary basis for drawing proper normative conclusions. Simply describing the 
mechanisms that control group interaction in general and group decision-making 
in particular, without dismissing some phenomena as bad or irrational is there-
fore an important over-all objective for this scientific field.
Since naturalistic data usually is so complex that they necessitate descriptive 
studies, the naturalistic paradigm that has become popular during the last decade 
or so will probably lead to a more descriptive attitude in group decision-making 
research. Experimental methods are good, since they allow researchers to control 
important parameters, but like other methods, these have limitations. In this 
case, the primary limitations concern validity – What have ad hoc groups per-
forming invented tasks got in common with bona fide groups performing real 
world tasks?
Researchers from linguistics doing research on spoken interaction have been 
aware for many years of the limitations of experimental methods when studying 
natural, human interaction. Methods have been developed for dealing with these 
problems, and it is my belief that those researchers studying group decision-mak-
ing (and of interaction in small groups in general) could benefit greatly from 
bringing linguistic methods and theories into their respective fields.
Another characteristic of current research on group decision-making is that it 
seems to be dominated by US American researchers and studies, which naturally 
results in US centricism. I do not claim to have investigated group decision-mak-
ing research in all countries of the world, since I read only English and the main 
Scandinavian languages fluently. Theoretically, there could be considerable re-
search going on in France, Italy and Japan without my knowing anything about 
it. However, the Anglophonic literature I have found on group decision-making 
refers very rarely to any research outside the USA (the exception being psycho-
social research on small groups, in which a number of German researchers are 
active), and so it is more likely that the US American researchers are simply quite 
alone in this field. 
292 Chapter 7: Concluding discussion
7.3 Practical consequences (normative conclusions)
Although this dissertation is oriented towards describing the language of group 
decision-making, it is generally desirable that such a description be suitable to 
put to practical use. One way of doing this is to draw normative conclusions 
from the results, which is what I shall do in this section.
Efficient arguing
Traditional research on arguing has focused on the epistemological soundness of 
argumentation, and has been construed as a kind of competition where one side 
wins and the other side looses. However, when arguing occurs as a part of deci-
sion-making in groups that try to solve problems, it is often reasonable to as-
sume that the participants share the same goal, and that they conceive of each 
other as co-players rather than as opponents. Arguing that is oriented towards 
confrontation may lead to social-emotional tension, a breakdown of cooperation 
and ultimately create a dysfunctional group (see also Bales’ concept of social-
emotional demands vs. task demands, p. 10). Good arguing will include not only 
epistemologically sound argumentation, but also procedures for putting forward 
arguments in a manner that does not threaten anybody’s prestige, but rather pro-
motes solution-oriented discussions. 
Researchers working on computer support for group decision-making (GDSS, 
Group Decision Support Systems) have addressed these issues to some extent. 
One common feature of these systems is the ability to input proposals and votes 
anonymously (Olson and Courtney Jr 1998:49 ff). This has been shown to in-
crease idea generation (Connolly et al. 1990). 
Another interesting phenomenon is the Japanese method for making group deci-
sions, usually referred to as nemawashi (Watabe et al. 1992). This method is used 
in many Japanese organizations, and it has five steps: 
1. Information collection (joho shyushyu), where a coordinator collects information 
and preferences from the relevant people.
2. Data analysis and plan generation (ritsuan), where the coordinator analyzes the 
information he has gathered and creates a number of possible solutions.
3. Plan selection (sentaku), where the coordinator chooses, possibly with the 
help of external experts, one of the created solutions as the proposal.
4. Negotiation and persuasion (nemawashi), where the coordinator presents his 
proposal informally to the other participants, and negotiates with them. If 
the coordinator fails to reach consensus around the proposal, he creates a 
new proposal and tries again.
5. Document circulation (ringi), where the coordinator sets up a formal document 
with all details of the proposal that received support during sentaku. This 
document is circulated among the participants, from low levels to top 
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levels. Each participant signs the document, indicating accept or reject. If 
the document does not receive enough accepts, the plan is abandoned.
With nemawashi, the risk of social tension due to opposing positions is minim-
ized, since the participants in the negotiations do not even meet until consensus 
has been reached. There may be other problems with this method (it is slow, a 
skilled coordinator can gain a lot of power, all participants do not hear all argu-
ments for and against, etc.), but it constitutes an interesting alternative regarding 
how social-emotional tension can be managed in arguing.
Documenting decisions
Institutional decisions (and sometimes interpersonal ones) are usually docu-
mented somehow, typically in meeting minutes. This is done to provide answers 
to several questions – What was said last time? Who decided this, and when? Ex-
actly what was decided? etc. For a person who has participated in a recent meet-
ing, much of the background information for the decision may seem obvious; 
for that person, only a short note is necessary to explain the decision. However, 
for a person who reads the documentation afterwards, perhaps several months 
or years later, and who has not participated in the meeting, such a short descrip-
tion of a decision may be most unsatisfactory. In other words, it may be difficult 
to document a decision so well that the documentation serves all the different 
purposes that it is meant to serve. One strategy for this could be to set up a 
checklist for how decisions should be documented, and to base that checklist on 
the semantic roles identified in chapter 3. The following is sketch of such a 
check list:
• Decider
Who made the decision (which members were present)?
• Input
What material constituted the input for the decision? Which were the 
alternatives? This should include a description of the background for the 
decision.
• Content
What was decided?
• Motive
Why was the chosen alternative picked?
• Circumstances
Which were the conditions at the time, and what was the situation like? 
Where and when was the decision made?
• Implementation
How should the decision be implemented, and by whom?
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• Communication
How should the decision be communicated to affected parties, and by 
whom?
In many cases, some of these items will be trivial (e.g. implementation and com-
munication), and some may be controversial (e.g. motive and input). Still, under-
standing of the decisions will most likely improve if these items are not left com-
pletely undocumented
If decisions are followed up, other semantic roles can be described as well:
• Implementation
How was the decision implemented, and by whom?
• Communication
How was the decision communicated, and by whom?
• Consequences
Which were the consequences of the decision?
• Attitudes
What did people think about the decision, and how were the expressions 
of attitude handled?
• Change and cancellation
Was the decision changed or cancelled, and if so, how?
Naturally, not all difficulties connected to the documentation of decisions are 
handled with this kind if check list. For example, it will probably take some prac-
tice to find out what to write as input and content. However, it could be a simple 
start; for example used as guidelines for people unused to writing minutes.
As formal as necessary
The degree of formality in the studied recordings varies a lot. Sometimes meet-
ings seem to be too informal to be efficient (e.g. the Strategy meeting, p. 196 ff.), 
and sometimes the high level of formality seems to be more of a nuisance (per-
haps the City District Committee, p. 193 ff.). Too much formality may cause 
decision-making to be cumbersome, difficult to understand and participate in. 
Too little formality may cause confusion about what has been decided, who has 
made the decisions, and who is responsible for implementing them.
Consequently, there is an ideal level of formality for group decision-making, and 
it is reasonable to believe that this ideal is different for different groups. A reas-
onable strategy for a group is then simply to pick such formal procedures as they 
find necessary for the group to function well. In a small group where people 
know each other fairly well and conflicts are rare, the main difficulty may be clar-
ity of the decisions. In that case it could be sufficient to go through the decisions 
at the end of the meeting, making sure that there are no misunderstandings. In 
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another group there may be occasional power struggles between different frac-
tions, in which case voting procedures may be crucial.
Recognition of differences in status
The definition of decision-making used in this dissertation (see p. 105) can, if 
used without caution, lead to the idea that the two sets of agents (A, the ones 
who decide, and B, the ones who perform) always are well-defined and uncom-
plicated. This is not the case. It may be unclear who is responsible for imple-
menting a decision, and there may be ambiguity about which people are really 
part of the deciding group. Further, membership in these sets is not always as 
simple as member or not member; the degree of membership may vary. In Bäck-
måla Municipality Council (p. 186 ff.), for example, there are obvious differences 
in status between the members, and, clearly, it is more important that the high-
status members agree about some issue than that the low-status members do. 
Similarly, it is likely that the responsibility for the decisions rests more heavily on 
the high-status members than on the low-status members. If the difference in 
status between members is considerable, and if the institutional structure does 
not reflect this in any way, then the result may be that the member or members 
who actually make the decisions do not have to take responsibility for bad con-
sequences of those decisions. In the worst-case scenario, people can use such 
situations to hide from demands of sharing their power by disguising individual 
decisions as group decisions.
Accordingly, it is important that the institutional structure reflects the status 
structure of a group. For this reason, different mechanisms may be needed either 
to decrease the importance of status during group decision-making, or to assign 
institutional responsibility (and power) to the members who actually make the 
decisions. Examples of mechanisms that would fill the second purpose could be 
making a distinction between voting and non-voting members, or separating 
counseling groups (where a single person listens to what the group has to say, 
and then makes the decision on his own) from deciding groups (where each 
member is responsible for each decision). Examples of mechanisms for decreas-
ing the importance of status could be use of anonymous voting for all decisions, 
or to make proposals anonymous when they are presented.
Increased awareness of decision patterns
Since different groups develop different patterns for how decisions are made, it 
is difficult to give general advice for how groups can work better. However, in 
many groups, there is a clear, general goal, and members can be expected to be 
genuinely interested in making the group work as well as possible in relation to 
this goal. In such groups, the members can be expected to want to improve the 
behavior of the group; it is possible to give general advice for how this could be 
done. The members of a group are most likely not aware of the patterns that 
they have developed, and because of this, it may be difficult to reflect on and im-
prove the way the group functions. One way of stimulating such awareness and 
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reflection could be to use video recordings in combination with self-confronta-
tions; meetings are video recorded and then shown to the members, separately 
and/or in groups. The members can then discuss issues like ‘what counts as a 
decision?’, ‘who makes the proposals?’, ‘what are we spending time on?’, etc. 
Such discussions are likely to raise awareness of decision patterns, and to give 
opportunity for finding ways of improving group performance.
Decreasing language dependency
Since the language in group decision-making is often difficult, it may be difficult 
to set up structures where people with different levels of linguistic skill have the 
same degree of influence. If such equal influence is desired, special methods may 
be necessary to decrease the dependency on advanced language in decision-mak-
ing. One way of doing this could be to give all group members time to get ac-
quainted with the issues that are to be dealt with, perhaps by sending out inform-
ation in advance, or by informing attendees about an issue at one meeting and 
deciding about it at the next. Another thing that could facilitate participation is 
to make the alternatives and arguments for and against these clearer and easier to 
grasp by displaying them on white boards or overhead projectors, similar to 
storyboarding.
7.4 Further Research
In the previous sections of this chapter I have hinted at what kind of further re-
search could be done in connection to this dissertation. In this section I shall de-
velop these hints, and introduce other possible areas for continued research.
Non-vocal communication in group decision-making
The recordings used in this dissertation have either had no video support at all, 
or a somewhat distant, overview video image with comparably few detail images. 
This has made it impossible to study non-vocal communication in any systematic 
way. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that non-vocal communication 
plays an important role in several of the phenomena that have been dealt with 
here, such as probing and hinting (p. 206 ff.), interpretation of silence (p. 204 ff.) 
and status (p. 210).
A study of how gestures and body communication are used in group decision-
making would require several cameras for each recording in order to capture all 
participants. Considerable resources would be necessary for the recording as well 
as for transcription and analysis, but it would also be an exciting contribution to 
the field.
Cultural variation
As mentioned above, the scope of this study is limited to Swedish culture. An 
obvious continuation of this study would be to compare this material with re-
cordings from other cultures. Theoretically, all the results from this study could 
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be particular for Swedish culture, although some are more likely to be so than 
others. Is the endeavor toward consensus (p. 209, 290-1) particular for Swedish 
culture or is it universal? What about avoidance of giving orders to subordinates 
(p. 210 ff.)?
A study that compared group decision-making in different cultures would re-
quire recordings from different cultures, and the activity type in all these record-
ings would have to be approximately the same. Further, the analysis of the re-
cordings would also require a working knowledge of the languages and cultures 
in question. These requirements would most likely turn into a need to make the 
research project a joint project with researchers from all (both) the investigated 
cultures.
Gender variation
Many people that I have come in contact with during my work with this disserta-
tion have asked if I see any gender differences. However, the empirical material I 
have does not allow any generalizations in this regard, since the group decision-
making corpus is too small, too varied in activity type, and not varied enough as 
regards participant gender configuration. However, a corpus systematically col-
lected with the aim of studying gender differences in group decision-making is 
far from impossible, and a possible future research project. 
Quantitative studies on communicative acts
Communicative acts have been paid considerable attention in this dissertation. In 
previous research on group decision-making, quantitative studies on communic-
ative acts have been frequent (see p. 18, 21). For quantitative studies, these 
would have to be developed further so they allow reliable coding in order to be 
useful for studying the types of communicative acts that have been developed 
here (see section 4.3.6 and 5.3). This development would include precise opera-
tionalization of the acts, and schemes would probably need to be set up for what 
kind of training the coders would need, as well as for testing inter-coder 
reliability. 
Formal procedures
In general, formal procedures have been left out of this dissertation, but it is 
clear that, in many groups, formal procedures play an important role. However, 
exactly which formal procedures are used and how these are applied varies a lot. 
In a US American context, Robert’s Rules of Order is a well-known set of formal 
procedures, but a glance at http://www.rulesonline.com [2006-05-18], for ex-
ample, reveals that this collection is far too large and complex for most groups. 
In Sweden, there is no corresponding well-known and widely spread set of form-
al procedures, but different organizations have their own sets (although there is 
usually a common core of roughly the same procedures). In some feminist and 
non-violence groups, alternative procedures have been developed in order to 
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overcome some perceived weaknesses in the traditional formal meetings 
(Herngren 1999:182 ff).
Collecting and comparing formal procedures from different cultures and organ-
izations could be a first step in understanding more about them. In a second 
step, formal meetings could be studied to find out how formal procedures are 
used. Some research questions could be:
• Which formal procedures do people actually use?
• Why do groups use a particular set of formal procedures?
• How well does a particular formal procedure satisfy the purpose for which 
it was chosen?
• Assuming that there are different sets of formal procedures that are suit-
able for different kinds of groups, which are these sets of procedures and 
groups?
Strength of arguments
The importance of argument weight has been mentioned above (p. 151, 287). A 
natural, interesting continuation of the argument study in chapter 4 would be 
finding ways to analyze the relative importance of arguments. The theoretical 
field often referred to as ‘judgment and decision-making’, deals with studying 
methods and theories for selecting among several competing alternatives. These 
theories are an interesting staring point for an examination of argument weight; 
see for example (Gigerenzer 2004) and several other articles in the same volume. 
This field is primarily interested in mathematical models for selecting the best 
alternative among a number of options; the values, injuries and probabilities of 
these options must be quantified. However, the precise location of the difficulty 
is in quantifying the values, injuries or probabilities of the alternatives, which 
makes mathematical models like these useless even though the questions are im-
portant and interesting. Thus, there is a need to find out how rating and compar-
ison are actually done by people in natural group decision situations. In addition, 
methods need to be developed that help people rate and compare conflicting ar-
guments in a rational way. An outline of one possible such method is presented 
below. Note, this is not a serious attempt setting up such a method, merely a 
rough example of how an analysis of argument weight might be done:
• Categorize arguments according to the feature they attack/support (esthet-
ics, functionality or ethics).
• Relate the arguments to the overall purpose of the action. For example, es-
thetic arguments may be more important when the decision concerns 
which evening gown to buy, than when deciding the kind of foundation 
for building a house. 
• Categorize arguments according to their degree of impact. For example, a 
couple is discussing which TV to buy, and one kind of TV has the disad-
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vantage of being very heavy. Now, if the couple does not intend to move 
the TV around, this argument does not have a very high impact, since it 
will only be a problem on the few occasions they have to move the TV. If, 
on the other hand, the couple intends to move the TV between the living 
room, the kitchen and the bedroom quite often, the weight of the TV will 
have a great impact.
• Categorize arguments according to the probability that each argument will 
apply. In the TV example above, the probability that the argument about 
the TV weight will apply is 100%, since the weight of the TV is known be-
fore hand. In comparison, another argument against the TV may be that it 
may break down, but the probability for this is, say 10%. Thus, “break 
down” is less likely to apply than “weight”. 
• The combination of impact and probability (often called risk), will say 
something about the weight of the argument. The higher the degree of im-
pact, and the higher the probability of the argument, the higher the weight 
of the argument is.
Better analysis of arguing
The model for analyzing arguing presented in chapter 4 is, in my opinion, a good 
start, but more work needs to be done to make it really useful. The way I see it, 
argumentation analysis can be done for two main reasons – either to find out 
how people ought to reason (or ought to have reasoned) about some question, 
and which decision is the right one; or to find out how people have reasoned (do 
reason) about some question, and how they reached (reach) a decision. Neither 
of these two objectives is satisfied in the presented model, so the model should 
be extended.
The first deficiency in the model is that the analytical overview lacks some per-
spicuity: it presents many arguments, but fails to point out which ones are im-
portant. This is related to the issue of argument weight discussed above; both in 
the normative case (some arguments could be discarded as less relevant or bad) 
and in the descriptive case (some arguments are given little weight by the 
participants). 
A second problem with the analytical overview is that the temporal (sequential) 
ordering of arguments is lost in the analytical overview; this order may be im-
portant for understanding what it is that makes people choose one option or 
another.
The third thing that would improve the argumentation model here is something 
that takes argumentation analysis closer to decision theory. When finding out 
how people ought to reason about something, analyses should not only be con-
cerned with which of the present arguments are good and bad, but also with 
which other arguments should have been given. A good model for argumentation 
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should include methods for comparing two alternatives and generating argu-
ments for why one is better than the other one.
Causes for decision patterns
As mentioned above, different groups develop different patterns for how to 
make decisions. A natural attendant question, then, is what it is that causes these 
patterns? Some examples of factors that may influence the development of 
group-specific patterns are listed here:
• Leadership
Are there certain patterns that develop in connection with a strong/dom-
inant leader, and other patterns that develop in connection with a weak/
unobtrusive leader? Leadership research has received attention from so-
cial-psychologists (see p. 7); interactional patterns associated with leader-
ship could be investigated in the light of this research.
• Formality
Which patterns are consequences of formality? Of course, there are pat-
terns that are formal per se, but there may also be other patterns that arise 
as a consequence of formality.
• Implementer
Are there different patterns for decision episodes when people propose 
that somebody else should do something, compared to episodes when 
people propose that they should be allowed to do something themselves? 
• Fear of conflicts
How do groups with participants who are afraid of conflicts compare with 
groups with participants who enjoy arguing? 
If the underlying causes of decision patterns can be discovered, then these pat-
terns can be used to “diagnose” decision-making groups. Let’s say a group dis-
plays a certain pattern P, and that it can been shown that P usually is a con-
sequence of fear of criticism. Then, even if the participants are reluctant to admit 
that they are afraid of criticism, or simply fail to see that they are, actions can be 
taken to try to reduce fear of criticism and possibly improve group performance.
Ordering vs. volunteering
As discussed on p. 210 ff., the managers in the recordings studied were reluctant 
to order the employees to do things, but preferred that employees took on tasks 
voluntarily (although the managers could exert strong pressure on the employ-
ees, reducing the amount of voluntariness). The precise reasons for this still need 
to be investigated, as well as the consequences of this behavior. Why is it done? 
Is it good or bad? Is there a need to make the motivation for the chosen man-
agement style explicit?
This issue is also likely to be culturally dependent; comparisons between cultures 
as regards ordering vs. volunteering would also be interesting. If it turned out 
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that some cultures are more oriented toward ordering while some are more ori-
ented toward volunteering, then it would also be interesting to investigate what 
happens in decision groups that include people from both ordering-oriented cul-
tures and from volunteering-oriented cultures.
Undecided action
After I spent some time investigating group decision-making, I started suspect-
ing that the basic research question ‘how do groups make decisions?’ was badly 
phrased. Decisions are only interesting as methods for selecting actions, and 
there may be other ways to make these selections. People can perform tasks in a 
coordinated fashion without any decision having been made about it. Such co-
ordination is perhaps more interesting than when decisions are made and groups 
act according to these. So, the more interesting question is perhaps, ‘what makes 
groups act as they do?.’ There are great methodological difficulties concerning 
how this should be studied, but it is possible. A start could be to outline some 
possible mechanisms for “undecided action”:
• It is well-known that decision-making bodies can be manipulated in differ-
ent ways, such as controlling which topics are decided on, when decisions 
are made, which alternatives are presented, etc.. Even if there were no per-
son manipulating a group, there are obviously many situations that could 
have been decided on, but were not. What or who controls which issues 
are put before a deciding body? What or who controls how issues are 
presented, and when?
• In some situations an organization has not made any decision on a particu-
lar issue, and a person acting on behalf of the organization has to choose 
an action in the issue. Let’s say a company has invited a customer from 
over-seas, and when the customer arrives, the receiving secretary discovers 
that no hotel has been reserved, although it is clearly needed. There are 
many hotels to choose from, with varying standards and prices. There is 
also the option to ignore the problem and let the customer deal with it 
himself. Whatever the secretary chooses to do, some kind of action will be 
performed by the company (where ignoring the problem is counted as an 
action). However, it will be “undecided” in the sense that it has not been 
decided on by the relevant people in the organization (assuming that the 
secretary is not the one who decides such things normally). One possible 
basis for how the secretary acts is an estimation of what decision would 
have been made, which means that he will try to figure out what some im-
portant people would prefer, and then act according to that guess. The 
question is then what or who creates expectations on what decisions will, 
or would be, made?
• Habits and traditions are of course important factors for the behavior of 
any human agent, individual or group. Some of these habits and traditions 
may be quite exposed and conscious, making them similar to decisions. 
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Other habits may be more difficult to notice, and when asked about them, 
people may not acknowledge that they exist at all. Following habits and 
traditions is a common, generally accepted reason for action, which means 
that in many organizations it is safe to “do as we usually do” in situations 
where there are no clear instructions on what to do (cf. item ii). However, 
in order to use that strategy it is necessary to categorize the current situ-
ation according to previous types of situations, and sometimes to general-
ize previous situations in order to form categories. This is not a completely 
objective process. What aspects of a situation do people consider when 
comparing it to other situations in order to find out if it is of the same 
type? How many instances of a perceived situation type are necessary to 
be able to claim that it is the “usual” way to act?
• In formal settings, like the one in the City District Committee (p. 193 ff.), 
the institutional decisions made may be seen very much as being a formal-
ity, while the “real” decisions are made elsewhere. In the particular case of 
City District Committees these “real” decisions are probably made in party 
meetings that precede the committee meeting, and are thus quite well-de-
fined. However, in other situations there may be a general opinion that an 
agreement has already been made (among the important people), and that 
the institutional decision is a formality. What creates such an opinion? 
What makes people expect that a certain decision will be made? An inter-
esting example of this occurred in a choir I had personal experience with. 
The choir had been rehearsing on Sunday evenings, but a survey made one 
December revealed that many people wanted to move the rehearsals to 
Mondays, which would include changing the location for rehearsals. It 
turned out that there were about as many Sunday supporters as Monday 
supporters. The chairperson of the choir then proposed that the choir 
should move the rehearsals to the new location starting in January, and 
then make a decision about rehearsal day in September. Further, people 
were instructed to keep Mondays free from other activities the following 
autumn. The argument given for this proposal was that a change of re-
hearsal day should be possible also in practice in September, if the choir 
should decide to change day. This proposal was accepted by the choir 
(during a somewhat chaotic meeting). For other reasons, the entire change 
of location and day was cancelled, but had it not been, it is likely that so 
many steps had been taken towards changing the rehearsal day by Septem-
ber that most people would have expected the change of day to be de-
cided. The choir would have started to act as if a change of rehearsal day 
had been decided, which could have created the conception that a decision 
about change of day had already been made, and the institutional decision 
could then have been perceived as a formality.
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7.5 Final words
In this dissertation I hope to have shown how linguistic methods can be used to 
study group decision-making. Recording bona fide groups and studying the re-
cordings carefully is a powerful method. If large collections of such recordings 
could be created, I believe that the understanding of group decision-making 
could be increased greatly.
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Appendix 1 – Brief guide to the Göteborg Transcription 
Standard (GTS)
Introduction
GTS, formerly known as MSO, consists of two parts: one language independent 
part (GTS-G) and one language specific part, which in this work has been Modi-
fied Standard Orthography version 6 (MSO6). GTS is described in detail in 
(Nivre et al. 2004) and MSO6 in (Nivre 1999), and only a brief introduction is 
given here, in order to make the excerpts used in this dissertation legible. In this 
guide GTS and MSO6 have not been separated, but are explained as one.
Utterances and comments
Utterance lines start with $ and a speaker initial, followed by a colon. An utter-
ance continues until the speaker does not speak and another participant speaks, 
that is, long silences or topic changes do not interrupt an utterance.
Comment lines start with @, and (almost) always applies to the preceding 
utterance.
Example:
$A: you do not know her < do you >
@ < gesture: turning towards B >
As shown in the example, angle brackets < > surround the comment, both the 
comment line and the relevant part of the utterance.
If necessary, comments are numbered:
$A: well <1 | >1 you do not know her <2 do you >2
@ <1 cough >1
@ <2 gesture: turning towards B >2
Spelling
The basic idea of how to spell words in GTS is to use standard orthography 
when there is no variation in the pronunciation of the word, and to adjust the 
spelling no more than necessary when variation in pronunciation is to be de-
scribed. For example, the name of Sweden is spelled Sverige in written language, 
but pronounced [!"#$%#], and there is no common variation of that pronuncia-
tion. In GTS this is thus written Sverige. In contrast, the first person pronoun jag 
(‘I’) is often pronounced [%$&], but sometimes also [%$&']. In GTS proper this word 
is written jag when pronounced [%$&'] and ja{g} when pronounced [%$&]. In this 
dissertation, however, the curly brackets and what is inside them have been re-
moved, rendering what is known as IDT (non-disambiguated spoken language), 
i.e. the word is written ’as pronounced’: ja. Here are some examples:
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Pronounciation Transcription Standard orthography English translation
[(#] de det it, that
[)*] ha har has, have
[+*,"-&!] natvis naturligtvis of course
[#&] e är am, is, are
["%$./0&+] verklien verkligen really
[+',&] nåt något something
Some exceptions to this principle have been allowed in order to improve readab-
ility: if leaving out ’optional’ letters is likely to cause considerable confusion for 
the reader, the spelling has been modified to more accurately describe pronunci-
ation. E.g. when lastbil (‘lorry’) is pronounced without the t – [/*!&1-&/] – it is writ-
ten lassbil rather than lasbil.
Overlaps
When two or more participants speak at the same time, it is called an overlap. 
Hard brackets [ ] are used to indicate overlapped speech, and numbers indicate 
which parts overlap:
$A: hi Bert [1 good to see ]1 you sit down sit down this is Cindy [2 you have 
not ]2 met have you
$B: [1 hi Albert ]1
$B: [2 how do you do ]2
$C: [2 hieraya ]2
Here A starts speaking, and when he says ‘good to see’, B simultaneously says ‘hi 
Albert’. A then continues to speak, and when he says ‘you have not’, B and C 
simultaneously say ‘how do you do’ and ‘hierya’, respectively.
Special characters in the utterance line
CAPITALS
In GTS proper, capital letters are used only for contrastive stress. In this dis-
sertation, however, it is also used to for the first letter of names, as in standard 
orthography, and in the first person singular pronoun I.
Example
$A: I am on TUESDAYS yes but not on FRIDAYS / John is captain on 
fridays
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+
Words interrupted by the speaker are marked with plus +.
Example:
$A: sit down sit down this is Cel+ Cecilia
:
When sounds are lengthened by the speaker, the colon : is used.
Example:
$A: sit down this is Cecilia: Johnson
/
Short pause is marked with a single slash /, intermediate pause is marked by 
double slash //, and long pause is marked with tripple slash ///.
Example:
$A: sit down / this is // Cecilia
|
Silences that are not pauses are marked with a vertical bar |. The length of the 
silence may be indicated, typically in seconds.
Example:
  $A: well lets see what we can do < |37 >
@ < event: A reads the paper >
( )
Round brackets indicate that the transcriber is uncertain of what is said.
Example
  $A: please come in < | > (have a seat please)
@ < event: A looks down in his papers, B enters the room, then A looks 
up ands sees B standing >
(...)
Ellipsis in round brackets indicates that the transcriber has not been able to 
make out what is said.
Example:
  $A: please come in < | > (...)
@ < event: A looks down in his papers, B enters the room, then A looks 
up ands sees B standing >
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Dashes are used when standard orthography so requires, for example in 
double names (e.g. Sten-Åke), and for enclitics like -n (‘him, it’) and -na (‘her’): 
$A: ja tycker du ska ge -na en blomma
$A: I think you should give her a flower
Common, non-obvious comments
Ingressive
When a participant breathes in and speaks at the same time, this is commen-
ted as ingressive. This is also used for the bilabial, rounded ingressive, associ-
ated with Northern Swedish dialects, and with no letters to indicate 
pronunciation.
Example:
  $A: you going to Lundström tomorrow
$B: < >
@ < ingressive >
Letters and abbreviations
When abbreviations that should be pronounced letter by letter are mentioned, 
this must be commented
Example:
$A: what do you think the < un > are going to do about it
@ < abbreviation >
When speakers mention letter names, and it is not an abbreviation, the letter 
comment must be used.
Example:
$A: then we proceed to item < f > three
@ < letter >
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Appendix 2 – Frequencies for some word forms in 
spoken and written Swedish and English
In this appendix frequencies for the most relevant forms of besluta, bestämma and 
decide are presented. The sources are the corpora used in chapter 3: GSLC, GP-
HD, BNC Written, and BNC Spoken.
If all word forms containing the root beslut- or bestäm- should be included, the 
Swedish frequency list would be several thousand rows long, due to all com-
pounds. Even with the exception of clear-cut compounds, the list would be very 
long; for those reasons only immediate noun and verb forms were included.
Since the morphology between Swedish and English differ somewhat, the words 
in the table are not translated, but only given a morphological characterisation. 
For verbs, the active is default. For nouns, nominative case is default.
Swedish – beslut
Written Spoken
Word Explanation Freq. PPM Word Explanation Freq. PPM
beslut noun indef. 82 806 244.70 beslut noun indef. 104 75.50
beslutet i) noun sing 
def.
ii) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
neut. 
(‘resolved’)
33 731 99.68 besluta i) verb inf.
ii) verb imp.
21 15.25
beslutat i) verb sup.
ii) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
neuter
19 269 56.94 beslutet i) noun sing 
def.
ii) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
neut. 
(‘resolved’)
21 15.25
beslutade i) verb past 
ii) verb past 
prtc. pl.
iii) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
def.
16 530 48.85 besluten i) noun pl. 
def.
ii) verb past 
prtc. sing. uter
(‘resolved’)
16 11.62
beslöt verb past 15 384 45.46 beslutar verb pres. 11 7.99
besluta i) verb inf.
ii) verb imp.
6 182 18.27 beslutat i) verb perf.
ii) noun sing. 
past prtc.
11 7.99
beslutar verb pres. 5 729 16.93 beslöt verb past 11 7.99
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besluten i) noun pl. 
def.
ii) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
uter 
(‘resolved’)
5 701 16.85 beslutade i) verb past 
ii) verb past 
prtc. pl.
iii) verb past 
prtc. sing. def.
4 2.90
beslutande i) verb pres. 
prtc.
ii) noun 
(deriv. of 
verb) sing. 
indef.
1 451 4.29 beslutande verb pres. 
prtc.
3 2.18
beslutades i) verb past 
pass.
ii) verb past 
prtc. pl. gen
iii) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
def. gen
1 342 3.97 beslöts verb past 
pass.
3 2.18
beslutas i) verb pres. 
pass.
ii) verb inf. 
pass.
1 033 3.05 beslutas i) verb pres. 
pass.
ii) verb inf. 
pass.
2 1.45
beslöts verb past 
pass.
964 2.85 besluts noun indef. 
gen.
2 1.45
beslutats verb sup. 
pass.
737 2.18 beslutad verb past prtc.
sing. uter
1 0.73
beslutad verb past 
prtc. sing. 
uter
293 0.87 beslutades i) verb past 
pass.
ii) verb past 
prtc. pl. gen
iii) verb past 
prtc. sing. def.
gen
1 0.73
beslutna i) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
def. 
(‘resolved’)
ii) verb past 
prtc. pl. 
(‘resolved’)
276 0.82 beslutena noun pl. def. 1 0.73
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beslutets noun sing. 
def. gen.
61 0.18
besluts noun indef. 
gen.
47 0.14
beslutens noun pl. def. 
gen.
34 0.10
beslutit verb sup. 13 0.04
beslutandet noun (deriv. 
of pres. prtc)
sing. def.
6 0.02
beslöto verb past pl. 
(arch.)
6 0.02
beslute verb pres. 
subjunctive1
3 0.01
beslutning noun (deriv. 
of verb) sing.
indef.
3 0.01
beslutandes verb pres. 
prtc.
2 0.01
beslutningen noun (deriv. 
of verb) sing.
def.
2 0.01
beslutandets noun (deriv. 
of pres. prtc)
sing. def. 
gen.
1 0.00
beslutena noun pl. def. 1 0.00
beslutits verb sup. 
pass.
1 0.00
besluter verb pres? 1 0.00
1. This is a very uncommon form, and it is likely to be a misprint of some more 
common form.
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Swedish – bestämma
Written Spoken
Word Expl. Freq. PPM Word Explanation Freq. PPM
bestämt i) verb sup.
ii) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
neut.
28 172 83.25 bestämma verb inf. 104 75.50
bestämma verb inf. 13 677 40.42 bestämt i) verb sup.
ii) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
neut.
86 62.44
bestämde i) verb past
ii) adj. sing. 
uter def. 
masc.(‘firm’)
12 202 36.06 bestämmer verb pres. 64 46.46
bestämmer verb pres. 12 106 35.77 bestäm-
melser
noun (deriv. 
of verb) pl. 
indef. 
(‘regulations’)
19 13.79
bestämd i) verb past 
prtc. sing. uter.
indef.
ii) adj. sing. 
uter indef. 
(‘firm’)
2 962 8.75 bestämde i) verb past
ii) adj. sing. 
uter def. masc.
(‘firm’)
18 13.07
bestäm-
melser
noun (deriv. of
verb) pl. indef. 
(‘regulations’)
2 789 8.24 bestämda i) verb past 
prtc. pl.
ii) adj. pl. 
positive 
(‘firm’)
iii) adj. sing. 
def. positive 
(‘the firm 
(ones)’)
16 11.62
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bestämda i) verb past 
prtc. pl.
ii) adj. pl. 
positive 
(‘firm’)
iii) adj. sing. 
def. positive 
(‘the firm 
(ones)’)
2 710 8.01 bestämd i) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
uter. indef.
ii) adj. sing. 
uter indef. 
(‘firm’)
13 9.44
bestäm-
melserna
noun (deriv. of
verb) pl. def. 
(‘the 
regulations’)
1 739 5.14 bestäms verb pres. 
pass.
10 7.26
bestäms verb pres. 
pass.
1 712 5.06 bestäm-
melsen
noun (deriv. 
of verb) sing. 
def. (‘the 
regulation’)
4 2.90
bestämdes i) verb past 
pass.
ii) adj. sing. 
uter def. masc. 
gen. (‘firm’)
1 009 2.98 bestäm-
melserna
noun (deriv. 
of verb) pl. 
def. (‘the 
regulations’)
3 2.18
bestämmas verb inf. pass. 501 1.48 bestämmas verb inf. pass. 2 1.45
bestämts verb sup. pass. 452 1.34 bestäm-
melse
noun (deriv. 
of verb) sing. 
indef. 
(‘regulation’)
2 1.45
bestäm-
melse
noun (deriv. of
verb) sing. 
indef. 
(‘regulation’)
434 1.28 bestäm-
ningar
noun (deriv. 
of verb) pl. 
indef.
2 1.45
bestäm-
melsen
noun (deriv. of
verb) sing. def.
(‘the 
regulation’)
309 0.91 bestämdare adj. 
comparative 
(‘firmer’)
1 0.73
bestämd-
aste
adj. superlative
(‘firmest’)
177 0.52 bestäm-
melsera
i) regional 
form of 
bestämmelserna
ii) misspelled 
bestämmelserna
1 0.73
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bestäm-
mande
i) verb pres. 
prtc.
ii) noun (deriv.
of verb) sing. 
indef.
169 0.50 bestämts verb sup. pass. 1 0.73
bestämning noun (deriv. of
verb) sing. 
indef.
98 0.29
bestäm-
ningar
noun (deriv. of
verb) pl. indef.
55 0.16
bestäm verb imp. 38 0.11
bestäm-
ningen
noun (deriv. of
verb) sing. def.
26 0.08
bestäm-
mandet
noun (deriv. of
verb) sing. def.
22 0.07
bestämdare adj. 
comparative 
(‘firmer’)
14 0.04
bestäm-
ningarna
noun (deriv. of
verb) pl. def.
9 0.03
bestäm-
melsernas
noun (deriv. of
verb) pl. def. 
gen. (‘the 
regulations’ ’)
8 0.02
bestämmes verb pres. 
pass.
8 0.02
bestämdt i) verb sup.
ii) verb past 
prtc. sing. 
neut.
5 0.01
bestäm-
melsens
noun (deriv. of
verb) sing. def.
gen. (‘the 
regulation’s ’)
2 0.01
bestämdast adj. superlative
(‘firmest’)
1 0.00
bestämme verb 
subjunctive1
1 0.00
1. This is a very uncommon form, and it is likely to be misprints of some more 
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bestämmm
a
misspelled 
bestämma
1 0.00
bestämder adj. sing. uter. 1 0.00
English – decide
Written Spoken
Word Freq. PPM Word Freq. PPM
decision 15 512 171.88 decision 1 007 96.38
decided 14 208 157.43 decided 913 87.39
decisions 6 886 76.30 decide 705 67.48
decide 5  815 64.43 decisions 382 36.56
deciding 1 842 20.41 deciding 69 6.60
decides 818 9.06 decides 61 5.84
common form.
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Appendix 3 – Entries in Bring (1930) where beslut, 
besluta and bestämma occur
These are the entries in the Swedish thesaurus (Bring 1930) that contain any of 
the words beslut, besluta or bestämma. Only the entry words have been translated.
Beslut
# 462 svar (‘answer’)
besked, upplysning, utläggning, utredning, tydning, uttydning, gissning, utgiss-
ning, tolk, tolkning, lösning, solution, redogörelse, berättelse, utlåtande, deklara-
tion, bekräftelse, accept, bejakning, bekännelse, utslag, dom, reskript, beslut, 
orakel;
# 480 omdöme (‘judgment’)
uppskattning, uppmätning, värdering, värdesättning, taxering, prövning, 
granskning, granskare, recension, recensent, censur, censurering, censurförord-
ning, censurhinder, censurtvång, censor, dom, domare, domslut, utslag, skilje-
dom, skiljedomstol, skiljedomare, skiljeman, prisdomare, konstdomare, 
utlåtande, betänkande, avgörande, beslut, gottfinnande, besked, utgång, ber-
äkning, avräkning, tilldelning, betyg, vitsord, videtur, testimonium, orlovssedel;
# 600 vilja (‘will’)
viljeakt, viljeansats, viljekraft, viljeliv, viljeriktning, viljeyttring, uppsåt, uppsåt-
lighet, berått mod, avsikt, avsiktlighet, avsiktssats, avsiktsbisats, avsiktskonjunk-
tion, föresats, intension, beslut, beslutsamhet, önskan, önskemål, önskning, ön-
skningsmål, åstundan, gottfinnande, förgottfinnande, befallning;
# 604 beslutsamhet (‘resolution, determination’)
klarsynthet, rådighet, omdöme, bestämdhet, beslut, parti, avgörande steg, slag i 
saken, målmedvetenhet, planmässighet, självförtroende, självförtröstan, självtillit, 
mod, förtvivlans mod, kurage, viljekraft, vilja, egenvilja, järnvilja, fasthet, kraft, 
kraftfullhet, karaktär, karaktärsfasthet, karaktärsstyrka, obeveklighet, okuvlighet, 
oböjlighet, orubblighet, energi, ståndaktighet, ihärdighet, uthållighet, envishet, 
styvsinthet, hårdnackenhet, morskhet, katighet, egensinne, egensinnighet, för-
stockelse, förhärdelse, skinn på näsan;
# 609 val (‘choice’)
valfrihet, urval, utkorelse, option, optionsrätt, utletning, eklekticism, eklektiker, 
utdrag, excerpt, axplockning, utplockning, kompilation, kompilator, kompilering, 
urklipp, valda stycken, utsyning, utsyningsman, alternativ, dilemma, avgörande, 
avgöranderätt, avgörande steg, slag i saken, parti, bestämmanderätt, förkärlek, 
preferens, företräde, bifall, tycke, tycke och smak, tyckesak, smak, fråga, frågado-
mare, gottfinnande, förgottfinnande, skön, godtycke, godtycklighet, adoption, 
prövning, urskillning, urskillningsförmåga, omdöme, dom, rättsskipning, utslag, 
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beslut, beslutanderätt, beslutförhet, beslutmässighet, självrådighet, företrädesrätt, 
företrädesrättighet, envälde, bestämmelse, kreering, tillsättning, utnämning;
# 611 förutbestämmelse (‘predestination’)
förutseende, förtänksamhet, förberedelse, förberedelsetid, anordning, anordnare, 
inövning, instudering, plan, planläggning, beräkning, avsikt, uppsåt, intension, 
disposition, berått mod, moget övervägande, förslag, preliminärer, prelim-
inäravtal, preliminärfråga, preliminärundersökning, fundering, benägenhet, 
förslagenhet, klokhet, beslut, predestination, nådval, fatalism, fatalist, öde, ödets 
bok, spådom, orakel;
# 620 syfte (‘purpose’)
syftemål, plan, planmässighet, teleologi, mål, ändamål, ändamålsenlighet, mening, 
akt och mening, dessäng, uppsåt, uppsåtlighet, intention, beräkning, avsikt, 
avsiktlighet, avsiktssats, avsiktsbisats, avsiktskonjunktion, berått mod, vilja, vett 
och vilja, viljeriktning, mogen överläggning, föresats, beslut, diktan och traktan, 
månhet, bestämmelse, förutbestämmelse, fundering, företag, målmedvetenhet, 
strävan, strävande, biavsikt, tanke, baktanke, anslag, stämpling, lurpassning, span-
ing, spejare, aspirant, utkik, utsikt, vaksamhet, studium, åtrå, ambition, ambition-
ssak, streber, lycksökare, önskan, begär, begärelse, benägenhet, tendens;
# 626 planmässighet (‘regularity, systemacity’)
uppsåt, berått mod, beslut, anstalt, föranstaltning, anordning, anordnare, mått 
och steg, förfarande, förfaringssätt, utväg, medel, arrangemang, arrangör, tågord-
ning, processionsordning, dagordning, föredragningslista, memorandum, recept, 
matsedel, tillställning, tillställare;
# 696 rådsförsamling (‘council’)
sammanträde, sammankomst, session, seans, sittning, plenum, plenarförsamling, 
föredragande, föredragning, föredragningslista, stämmobeslut, säte och stämma, 
proposition, japroposition, kontraproposition, nejproposition, remiss, remissde-
batt, remisshandling, debatt, adressdebatt, revision, inspektion, konventikel, 
världsskautmöte, jamboree;
# 737 myndighet (‘authority’)
jurisdiktion, domare, domsrätt, beslut, beslutanderätt, resolution, avgörande, 
avgöranderätt, utslag, utslagsröst, lag, lagstiftare, lagstiftning, föreskrift;
# 741 befallning (‘command’)
bud, budord, påbud, maktspråk, diktamen, förständigande, åläggande, föreskrift, 
kommendering, kommando, kommandoord, kommandorop, order, dagorder, 
förhållningsorder, regel, förhållningsregel, tillsägelse, instruktion, reglemente, 
kungabrev, edikt, ukas, reskript, dekret, dekretal, dekretering, ferman, bulla, en-
cyklika, kungörelse, förordnande, förordning, stadga, stadgande, bestämmelse, 
beslut, besked, resolution, depesch, budskap, utslag, dom, domslut, slutdom, lag, 
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lagbestämmelse, lagbok, lagbud, lagparagraf, lagrum, lagskipning, lagstadgande, 
lagstiftning, balk, lagbalk, byggningabalk;
# 769 avtal (‘contract, deal’)
förbund, separatförbund, fördrag, traktat, traktatenlighet, traktatmässighet, alli-
ans, allianstraktat, entent, kartell, kartellbildning, liga, konkordat, fredsfördrag, 
fredsförening, fredsförslag, fredskongress, fredspreliminärer, fredsslut, fredstrak-
tat, separatfred, biläggning, förlikning, uppgörelse, reglering, kompromiss, kom-
promissarie, underhandlare, underhandling, förhandling, negociation, negociatör, 
negociering, klausul, bestämmelse, bifall, godkännande, avgörande, beslut, fast-
ställelse, stadfästelse, ratifikation, underskrift, signatur, kontrasignation, beseg-
ling, sigill, signet, sanktion, pragmatisk sanktion, författning, konstitution, diplo-
mat, diplomati;
# 969 domstolsförhandling (‘court negotiation’)
beslut, utlåtande, uppskov, åläggande, hämtning, hämtningspåföljd, hämt-
ningeäventyr, vite, vitesföreläggande, vitesbrott, vitesförbud, inmaning i häkte, 
häktning, utslag, recit, decision, dom, dombrev, domslut, tredskodom, vad, ap-
pellationsdomstol, appellering, libell, replik, duplik, besvär, besvärshandling, bes-
värshänvisning, besvärsmål, besvärspunkt, besvärsskrift, besvärstid, besvärsväg, 
klander, klandertalan, klandertid;
Besluta
# 462 svar (‘answer’)
förklara, redogöra, klargöra, åskådliggöra, meddela, deklarera, upplysa, upptäcka, 
uppspåra, utfinna, utgrunda, utreda, tyda, uttyda, tolka, uttolka, gissa, utgissa, 
avslöja, dechiffrera, lösa, lösa knuten, solvera, deducera, förvissa, övertyga, 
bevittna, avgöra, besluta, bringa till slut, tillfredsställa;
# 480 omdöme (‘judgment’)
döma, bedöma, fråndöma, tilldöma, pröva, jugera, värdera, värdesätta, taxera, 
akta, mena, förmena, uppskatta, anse, tycka, tolka, kommentera, granska, krit-
isera, censurera, skärskåda, undersöka, examinera, avväga, överväga, taga i be-
traktande, väga för och emot, betänka, eftertänka, övertänka, beräkna, ordna, 
klassificera, överlägga, rådgöra, syna, avsyna, penetrera, mönstra, inspektera, re-
videra, inventera, konstatera, utröna, utreda, taga reda på, förvissa sig om, fun-
dera, utfundera, deducera, sluta till, draga slutsats, upptäcka, uppfinna, anses för, 
gälla för, passera för, rannsaka, bestämma, avgöra, besluta, frånkänna, frikänna, 
tillerkänna, sakfälla;
# 600 vilja (‘will’)
vilja, hava i sinnet, sätta sig i sinnet, föresätta sig, åsyfta, åstunda, eftertrakta, ön-
ska, lysta, vånna, falka efter, falka efter på, begära, besluta, befalla, bestämma, 
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förordna, vidhålla, envisas, trilskas, behaga, tycka, finna för gott, täckas, värdigas, 
föreslå, hemställa, proponera, projektera, motionera, erbjuda, bifalla, samtycka, 
tillåta, bevilja;
# 604 beslutsamhet (‘resolution, determination’)
besluta, bestäma, avgöra, decidera, taga sitt parti, sätta sig i sinnet, kasta tärnin-
gen, dra till, dra på, ingripa, göra kort process, taga tjuren vid hornen, fastslå, 
fastställa, besegla, bekräfta, hålla fast vid, vidbliva, framhärda, hålla stånd, härda 
ut, rida ut stormen, envisas, morska sig, förhärda, förstocka;
# 609 val (‘choice’)
välja, omvälja, invälja, utvälja, utkora, utleta, utmärka, utplocka, utse, utsyna, ut-
söka, utsöndra, excerpera, kompilera, kora, kooptera, sortera, sortera sig, rensa, 
gradera, skilja agnarna från vetet, föredraga, adoptera, knäsätta, upptaga, antaga, 
omfatta, fästa sig vid, taga parti för, taga sitt parti, avgöra, besluta, decidera, be-
stämma, instämma, kasta tärningen, gå över Rubikon, inlåta sig på, inlåta sig på 
med;
# 611 förutbestämmelse (‘predestination’)
förbereda, planera, planlägga, preparera, anordna, instudera, inöva, predestinera, 
prevenera, förutse, beräkna, överväga, övertänka, fundera, besluta, hava i sinnet, 
sätta sig i sinnet, veta vad man vill, ämna, ämna sig, ärna, ärna sig, tillämna, 
tillärna, åsyfta;
# 626 planmässighet (‘regularity, systemacity’)
planlägga, organisera, systematisera, schematisera, arrangera, ordna, anordna, 
gestalta, inrätta, anlägga, anstalta, föranstalta, tillställa, bringa till mognad, bana 
väg, preparera, förutse, förbereda, upptänka, uppgöra, utfundera, uttänka, ber-
äkna, uträkna, överräkna, överslå, kalkylera, koncipiera, skissera, uppfinna, 
uppspinna, ruva på, tillämna, tillärna, projektera, proponera, föreslå, motionera, 
föresätta sig, besluta, förfara;
# 741 befallning (‘command’)
stadga, lagstifta, reglementera, bestämma, regelbinda, instruera, bemyndiga, in-
skärpa, mana, uppfordra, dirigera, intimera, signalera, anvisa, ordinera, berama, 
disponera, anordna, förfoga, resolvera, dekretera, besluta, kungöra, promulgera, 
sanktionera, kontramandera, avlysa, inhibera;
# 769 avtal (‘contract, deal’)
avtala, kontrahera, överenskomma, uppgöra, berama, ackordera, bortackordera, 
inackordera, utackordera, enas, slå till, gå in på, bifalla, godkänna, avsluta, en-
gagera, reengagera, stipulera, tinga, betinga, borttinga, påtinga, upptinga, beställa, 
abonnera, subskribera, prenumerera, förskriva, underteckna, signera, kontrasign-
era, besegla, avgöra, bestämma, besluta, stadfästa, ratificera, reglera, likvidera, ac-
ceptera, reversera, förbinda sig, tillförbinda sig, endossera, handla, köpa, 
köpslaga, köpslå, inropa, sälja, försälja, leja, städja, städsla, hyra, förpakta, up-
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plåta, arrendera, bortarrendera, utarrendera, befrakta, negociera, förhandla, un-
derhandla, vidtala, mäkla, medla, pruta, bilägga, förlikas, kompromissa;
# 963 laglighet (‘legality’)
lagfästa, lagföra, lagstifta, stadga, påbjuda, förordna, föreskriva, statuera, 
dekretera, kungöra, legalisera, formulera, sanktionera, kodifiera, oktrojera, gälla, 
preskribera, förbjuda, processa, besluta, döma, tillerkänna, ogilla, straffa;
Bestämma
# 60 reglering (‘regulation’)
reglera, ordna, organisera, rangera, arrangera, anordna, disponera, planera, inreda, 
inrätta, stadga, förordna, bestämma, fastställa, fixera, berama, uppgöra, utsätta, 
utstaka, systematisera, forma, formera, gestalta, rätta, ställa till rätta, justera, 
rucka, placera, bänka, bänka sig, bänkas;
# 62 förhand (‘in the lead’)
dirigera, förestå, leda, gå i täten, anföra, anföra dansen, gå i spetsen, angiva 
tonen, taga upp psalmen, öppna, öppna balen, bestämma, bestämma modet, 
bringa å bane, åvägabringa, överträffa;
# 79 särskildhet (‘separateness’)
specificera, detaljera, designera, determinera, utpeka, utmärka, karakterisera, be-
stämma, individualisera, realisera, nationalisera;
# 150 varaktighet (‘duration’)
stadga, fixera, avgöra, ordna, stadfästa, tillförsäkra, förvissa, bestämma, befästa, 
bekräfta, bestyrka, stifta, grunda, grundlägga, hjälpa på fötter, sätta på fötter, 
komma på fötter;
# 152 bestämmelse (‘regulation’)
bestämma, förutbestämma, predestinera, förestå, skola, stunda, tillstunda, stå för 
dörren, draga sig tillhopa, ligga i luften, hota, hänga över huvudet, nalkas, stå i 
beredskap, tränga sig på, föreligga, förbereda, koka ihop, ämna, avgöra besegla;
# 153 grund (‘basis’)
förmå, förmå till, uppegga, uppliva, bestämma, avgöra, hava handen med i spelet, 
hava en finger med i spelet, tynga ned vågskålen, giva utslag på vågen;
# 175 lnflytande (‘influence’)
inverka, influera, göra till saken, göra något, göra slag i saken, göra susen, gälla, 
göra sig gällande, betyda, tynga i vågskålen, lägga sitt ord i vågskålen, hava något 
att säga, hava ett ord med i laget, göra sin röst hörd, spela en roll, slå igenom, 
påverka, gripa, betaga, mäkta, förmå, dominera, predominera, förhärska, taga led-
ningen, taga med i räkningen, tagas med i räkningen, bestämma modet;
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# 278 riktning (‘direction’)
syfta, tendera, planera, bestämma sig för, stiga, falla, sjunka, utstaka, rätta, ställa, 
inställa;
# 474 visshet (‘certainty’)
förvissa, försäkra, konstatera, ådagalägga, fastslå, fastställa, bevisa, överbevisa, 
icke lida tvivel, utreda, klargöra, åskådliggöra, övertyga, avgöra, decidera, stadga, 
förordna, lagstifta, bestämma, gälla, legitimera, auktorisera, garantera, gå i god 
för, ansvara för, attestera, bevittna, intyga, vidimera, tro, förtrösta;
# 480 omdöme (‘judgment’)
döma, bedöma, fråndöma, tilldöma, pröva, jugera, värdera, värdesätta, taxera, 
akta, mena, förmena, uppskatta, anse, tycka, tolka, kommentera, granska, krit-
isera, censurera, skärskåda, undersöka, examinera, avväga, överväga, taga i be-
traktande, väga för och emot, betänka, eftertänka, övertänka, beräkna, ordna, 
klassificera, överlägga, rådgöra, syna, avsyna, penetrera, mönstra, inspektera, re-
videra, inventera, konstatera, utröna, utreda, taga reda på, förvissa sig om, fun-
dera, utfundera, deducera, sluta till, draga slutsats, upptäcka, uppfinna, anses för, 
gälla för, passera för, rannsaka, bestämma, avgöra, besluta, frånkänna, frikänna, 
tillerkänna, sakfälla;
# 600 vilja (‘will’)
vilja, hava i sinnet, sätta sig i sinnet, föresätta sig, åsyfta, åstunda, eftertrakta, ön-
ska, lysta, vånna, falka efter, falka efter på, begära, besluta, befalla, bestämma, 
förordna, vidhålla, envisas, trilskas, behaga, tycka, finna för gott, täckas, värdigas, 
föreslå, hemställa, proponera, projektera, motionera, erbjuda, bifalla, samtycka, 
tillåta, bevilja;
# 609 val (‘choice’)
valfrihet, urval, utkorelse, option, optionsrätt, utletning, eklekticism, eklektiker, 
utdrag, excerpt, axplockning, utplockning, kompilation, kompilator, kompilering, 
urklipp, valda stycken, utsyning, utsyningsman, alternativ, dilemma, avgörande, 
avgöranderätt, avgörande steg, slag i saken, parti, bestämmanderätt, förkärlek, 
preferens, företräde, bifall, tycke, tycke och smak, tyckesak, smak, fråga, frågado-
mare, gottfinnande, förgottfinnande, skön, godtycke, godtycklighet, adoption, 
prövning, urskillning, urskillningsförmåga, omdöme, dom, rättsskipning, utslag, 
beslut, beslutanderätt, beslutförhet, beslutmässighet, självrådighet, företrädesrätt, 
företrädesrättighet, envälde, bestämmelse, kreering, tillsättning, utnämning;
# 609 val (‘choice’)
välja, omvälja, invälja, utvälja, utkora, utleta, utmärka, utplocka, utse, utsyna, ut-
söka, utsöndra, excerpera, kompilera, kora, kooptera, sortera, sortera sig, rensa, 
gradera, skilja agnarna från vetet, föredraga, adoptera, knäsätta, upptaga, antaga, 
omfatta, fästa sig vid, taga parti för, taga sitt parti, avgöra, besluta, decidera, be-
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stämma, instämma, kasta tärningen, gå över Rubikon, inlåta sig på, inlåta sig på 
med;
# 615 drivfjäder (‘incentive, motive’)
animera, inspirera, stimulera, elektrisera, gjuta olja på elden, elda, sporra, up-
pegga, uppfordra, upphetsa, uppkalla, uppmana, uppmuntra, uppvigla, pre-
disponera, anmana, anmoda, förmana, pådriva, påstöta, pressa, nödga, ansätta, 
intala, övertala, suggerera, beveka, bestämma, persvadera, engagera, förorda, an-
befalla, rekommendera, tillråda, tillviska, sufflera, advocera, tubba, muta, be-
sticka, sollicitera, anhålla, begära, tigga, bedja, fordra, pocka på, pocka sig till, 
propsa, propsa igenom, propsa på, propsa sig fram, propsa sig till, kälta, pina, 
gnata, tvinga, framtvinga, påtvinga, diktera, befalla, föreskriva, vägleda, tillhålla, 
förmå, giva efter, taga reson;
# 642 viktighet (‘importance’)
befogenhet, kompetens, avgöranderätt, beslutanderätt, bestämmanderätt, beslut-
förhet, beslutmässighet, röst, rösträtt, chef, chefsegenskap, chefsplats, chefskap, 
primas, primat, överhuvud, höghet, rang, fömämitet, grandezza, nobless, notab-
ilitet, anseende, storhet, storhetstid, triumf, triumfator, triumftåg, solennitet, 
solennitetssal, högtid, högtidlighet, högtidsskara, högtidsstämning, utmärkthet, 
urval, oförgätlighet, märkvärdighet, primadonna, första fiol;
# 673 beredelse (‘preparation’)
bereda, förbereda, preparera, predisponera, förebygga, förekomma, forutse, ante-
cipera, laga i ordning, laga sig i ordning, laga att, laga sig till, beställa, påtinga, up-
ptinga, tinga, betinga, berama, planera, skissera, uttänka, uppspinna, påtänka, 
ruva på, hopkoka, föreskriva, förordna, bestämma, disponera, testamentera, hava 
tid på sig;
# 729 fullbordan (‘completion’)
verkställa, förverkliga, verkliggöra, utföra, uträtta, utverka, effektuera, realisera, 
sätta i verket, bringa till stånd, bringa till mognad, tillskapa, utdana, anordna, reg-
lera, bestämma, taga steget fullt ut, framhärda, hålla ut, göra kort process, lyckas, 
gå, nå målet, ernå, uppnå, uppfylla, uppfylla ett löfte;
# 741 befallning (‘command’)
stadga, lagstifta, reglementera, bestämma, regelbinda, instruera, bemyndiga, in-
skärpa, mana, uppfordra, dirigera, intimera, signalera, anvisa, ordinera, berama, 
disponera, anordna, förfoga, resolvera, dekretera, besluta, kungöra, promulgera, 
sanktionera, kontramandera, avlysa, inhibera;
# 769 avtal (‘contract, deal’)
avtala, kontrahera, överenskomma, uppgöra, berama, ackordera, bortackordera, 
inackordera, utackordera, enas, slå till, gå in på, bifalla, godkänna, avsluta, en-
gagera, reengagera, stipulera, tinga, betinga, borttinga, påtinga, upptinga, beställa, 
abonnera, subskribera, prenumerera, förskriva, underteckna, signera, kontrasign-
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era, besegla, avgöra, bestämma, besluta, stadfästa, ratificera, reglera, likvidera, ac-
ceptera, reversera, förbinda sig, tillförbinda sig, endossera, handla, köpa, 
köpslaga, köpslå, inropa, sälja, försälja, leja, städja, städsla, hyra, förpakta, up-
plåta, arrendera, bortarrendera, utarrendera, befrakta, negociera, förhandla, un-
derhandla, vidtala, mäkla, medla, pruta, bilägga, förlikas, kompromissa;
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Appendix 4 – Transcription of a conversation analysed 
for argumentation
The table below shows the transcription of the recording analyzed in chapter 4, 
along with the reconstruction of the utterances and the communicative act classi-
fications. The numbers in the communicative acts column point to the corres-
ponding box in the analytical overview (appendix 5). The numbers within 
brackets point to the box that corresponds to the current communicative act, 
and the numbers without brackets show which boxes the communicative act 
refers to.
Line Transcription Translation Reconstruction Comm. act
1 $R: sen vete sjutton om vi
inte ska köpa en sån [1 
där: va:n ]1 istället för [2 
e+ en ]2 buss
$R: then God knows if we 
should not buy you know a 
van instead of a bus
The family should 
buy a ‘van’ instead of 
a VW bus.
Claim (1)
4 $L: [1 mamma:: ]1 / [2 
fö:r ]2 / vem / hur ha [3 
man ]3
$L: [1 mum ]1 / [2 
because ]2 / who / how is 
[3 it ]3
<not part of the car 
discussion>
6 $E: [3 en VA:N ]3 $E: [3 a VAN ]3 Why should the 
family buy a ‘van’ 
instead of a VW bus?
Disagr. to 1 
(2)
Req. for 
reason for 1
7 $A: dom drar lite bensin 
pappa de e ju re enda som
e bra me rom
$A: they need very little 
petrol dad that is the only 
thing that is good about 
them
1. ‘Vans’ have low 
fuel consumption
2. There are no other 
advantages of ‘vans’
A. Reason 
for 1 (1.1)
B. Reason 
against 1 
(2.1)
8 $E: < | >
@ < sigh >
$E: < | >
@ < sigh >
<unclear>
10 $R: [4 ja så ]4 de e inte så 
himla fali men dom e 
JÄ:KLI mycke [5 billiare 
(...) ]5
$R: [4 well that ]4 it is not
all that bad but they are 
DAMN [5 cheap (...) ]5
1. The fuel 
consumption for 
‘vans’ is about the 
same as for other car 
types.
2. ‘Vans’ are cheaper.
A. Disagr. to
1.1 (3)
B. Reason 
for 1 (1.2)
11 $A: [4 < | > ]4
@ < chuckle>, < quiet >
$A: [4 < | > ]4
@ < chuckle>, < quiet >
<unclear>
13 $E: [5 nä men då sitte ]5 
Sten-Åke å säje a men den
dra / ha+ den dra så lite 
bensin nä rom had vart å 
lå:ngkört nu så hade ren 
dratt en å två // aha sa ja 
de gö ju våran OCKSÅ 
som ja tycker dra så in i 
$E: [5 not but then ]5 
Sten-Åke is saying yes but 
it needs / ha+ it needs very
little petrol when they had 
been long driving just now it
had needed one point two 
// really said I that is 
what our needs TOO and I
1. [An example of a 
‘van’ that uses 0.12 
litre/km.]
2. 0.12 litre/km is not
little
=> 3. ‘Vans’ do not 
have low fuel 
consumption.
Reason for 1
(3.1)
335
NO:RDENS me bensin å
e i så dålit skick / så ja vet
int en å [6 TVÅ tyck inte 
ja e ]6 LITE
think it needs a 
BLEEDING lot of petrol 
and it is in really bad shape
/ so I do not know one 
point [6 TWO I do not 
think that is ]6 LITTLE
14 $R: [6 men allvalit 
TALAT ]6
$R: [6 but seriously 
SPEAKING ]6
<incomplete>
15 $R: ja titta nu på $R: well have a look at <incomplete>
16 $A: ja dom e billia 
reservdelar till e re väl
$A: yes they are cheap 
spare parts for isn’t it
Spare parts for ‘vans’ 
are cheap
Reason for 
1.2 (1.2.1)
17 $E: ja de [7 billia 
reservdelar hemst 
billiare ]7
$E: yes it [7 cheap spare 
parts very much cheaper ]7
Yes, spare parts for 
‘vans’ are cheap
Agr. with 
1.2.1
18 $R: [7 mycke ja de e 
mycke billiare ]7 å köpa 
också // man får en sån 
här: e
$R: [7 much yes it is much 
cheaper ]7 to buy as well 
// you can get that kind of 
er
1. Yes, spare parts for
‘vans’ are cheap
2. ‘Vans’ are also 
cheaper to buy.
3. <incomplete, see 
21>
A. Agr. with 
1.2.1
B. Reason 
for 1.2 
(1.2.2)
19 $E: hur s+ tusan [8 ska ja 
kunna välja (då) ]8
$E: how the heck [8 am I 
going to choose now ]8
It is difficult for Eva 
to make up her mind
’Interjection’
20 $A: [8 då tycke ja de ska 
va en ]8 [9 mattsvart ]9 
[10 dodge ]10
$A: [8 in that case I think
it should be a ]8 [9 matt 
black ]9 [10 dodge ]10
(Jokingly) If the 
family is to buy a 
‘van’, it should be a 
black Dodge van.
Elab. of 1
21 $R: [9 fö ]9 [10 
femtitusen ]10 //
$R: [9 for ]9 [10 fifty 
thousand ]10 //
The price of a ‘van’ is 
50 000 SEK
Reason for 
1.2, elab. 
1.2.2
22 $E: [10 asså e ]10 $E: [10 but like ]10 <incomplete>
23 $R: fö femtitusen få man 
e ganska bra [12 sån ]12
$R: for fifty thousand you 
get a quite good [12 
such ]12
The price of a 
reasonably good ‘van’ 
is 50 000 SEK
Reason for 
1.2, elab. of 
1.2.2
24 $E: [12 
PROBLEMET ]12 e ju 
att ja ska köra ren de e JA 
som ska köra ren
$E: [12 THE 
PROBLEM ]12 is that I 
am going to drive it it is I 
who is going to drive it
1. Eva will be the 
primary user of the 
car
2. The important 
problem is that Eva 
will be the primary 
user of the car.
=> 3. The opinion of 
the primary user of 
the car is important
=> 4. Eva does not 
like ‘vans’.
Ass. of 
evaluation 
criterion
336 A4 – Transcription of a conversation analysed for argumentation
25 $R: < ja men de e ändå 
lättare å köra > 
@ < quiet >
$R: < yes but it is easier to
drive anyway >
@ < quiet >
1. ‘Vans’ are easy to 
drive.
=> 2. Eva has no 
reason to dislike 
‘vans’.
Reason 
against 2.6 
(4)
27 $E: ja de säjer du också 
men nu e re så här att 
INGER hon ha ju inte 
haft nåra svåriheter ALLS
me såna fordon å hon ha 
kört va som helst // men 
HON tycker att den här e
hon dra se allså för å köra
rom
$E: well so you say but this
is the way it is that 
INGER has not had any 
difficulties at ALL with 
vehicles of this kind and she
has driven anything // but 
SHE thinks that this is 
she is reluctant to drive 
them
1. Inger has driven all 
kinds of vehicles.
2. Inger avoids 
driving her ‘van’
=> 3. ‘Vans’ are 
difficult to drive.
Disagr. with 
4 (2.6)
Reason for 
2.6 (2.6.1a, 
2.6.1b)
28 $R: för att $R: because Why does Inger avoid
driving her ‘van’?
Req. for 
reason for 
2.6.1a
29 $E: aa hon tycke väl dom 
e stora man bli så me 
åldern festå ru vi kvinnor 
me ansvar för fami:lj å allt
möjligt
$E: yes I guess she thinks 
thy are big age does that to 
us you know us women with
responsibility for family and
things like that
1. Inger thinks her 
‘van’ is big.
2. Old women avoids 
driving big cars, partly
because these women 
are responsible for 
family etc.
Reason for 
2.6.1a 
(2.6.1.1a, 
2.6.1.1b)
31 $A: men du [13 pappa om
vi ska köpa ]13 då ska vi 
kö+ ja tycke inte vi ska 
kö+ VAN då ska vi köpa 
/ en svart dodge matt 
svart me: mattsvarta ruter 
[14 / å så ska ]14 re va 
såhär [15 lite rost ]15
$A: but listen [13 dad if 
we are going to buy ]13 
then we should bu+ I do 
not think we should bu+ 
VAN I think we should 
buy / a black Dodge matt 
black with matt black 
panes [14 / and it 
should ]14 be like a little 
[15 corrosion ]15
(Jokingly) If the 
family is to buy a 
‘van’, it should be a 
black Dodge van etc.
Elab. on 1
33 $E: [13 så bli vi så 
fösiktiga ]13
$E: [13 we become so 
cautious ]13
<continued from 29>
34 $E: [14 < | > ah ]14 
@ < click >
$E: [14 < | > ah ]14 
@ < click >
Feedback to 31, 
smiling/snorting
Feedback
36 $E: [15 å ett ru:nt ]15 
bord inne va
$E: [15 and a round ]15 
table inside right
(Continued joke) Do 
you also want the 
hypothetical ‘van’ to 
have a round table 
inside?
Suggested 
elab. on 1
37 $A: nä å så lite r:osti såhär
å så // så e rikti [16 
GANGSTERbil me 
söndri ]16 lj+ lju+ 
ljudämpare såhär 
< rrrränng >
@ < onomatopoetic >
$A: no and then a little 
corrosion like this and // a
real [16 GANGSTER 
car with broken ]16 s+ 
si+ silencer like this 
< rrrranng >
@ < onomatopoetic >
1. The hypothetical 
‘van’ should not have 
a round table inside
2. The hypothetical 
‘van’ should have 
some corrosion etc
A. Rejection 
of suggested
elab.
B. Elab. on 
1
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41 $R: [16 (...) ]16 $R: [16 (...) ]16
42 $E: e re nånting vi 
framföallt ska se till de e 
att vi får ordentliga 
SÄTEN me ordentliga 
säkerhetsbältar å [17 
nackstöd annars e inte ja 
intresserad ]17
$E: one thing e really must 
make sure is that we get 
proper SEATS with proper
seat belts and [17 neck 
restraints otherwise I am 
not interested ]17
The car we buy must 
have proper seats and 
proper seat belts.
Ass. of 
evaluation 
criterion
43 $A: [17 ja men ja gilla inte
fö dom ]17 sätena i Sten-
Åkes bil e såhär gun:gar 
såhär värsta [18 
fjädringen ]18
$A: [17 yes but I d not 
like because those ]17 seats 
in Sten-Åke’s case they like
rock like this [18 major 
suspension ]18 
The seats in Sten-
Åke's ‘van’ are 
uncomfortable.
Ass. of 
evaluation 
criterion?
44 $E: [18 ja men ]18 e re de 
va inte nackstöd på rom 
helle va
$E: [18 yes but ]18 are 
there there were no headrests
on those either right
The seats in Sten-
Åke's ‘van’ do not 
have headrests?
Request for 
specification
45 $A: jo de e rom $A: yes they are The seats in Sten-
Åke's ‘van’ do have 
headrests.
Specification
46 $E: va re de $E: was there Do the seats in Sten-
Åke's ‘van’ really have
headrests?
Request for 
confirmation
47 $A: ( ja dom fram e re de 
men inte bak )
$A: (yes in the front there 
are but not in the back)
The front seats in 
Sten-Åke's ‘van’ have 
headrests, but the 
back seats do not.
Modification
of 
specification
on line 45.
48 $E: ja fram nä men bak e 
re inte de // dom se 
oerhört kon+ de e rena 
de e ju VARDSRU:M 
man e ut å kör me // 
< [19 de dä me ]19 å > 
la:st jo men de e ju de
@ < quick >
$E: yes in the front but in 
the back there is not // 
they look extremely str+ it 
is virtual they are like 
LIVING ROOMS that 
you drive around with // 
< [19 and that thing 
with ]19 to > load yes but 
it is it
@ < quick >
1. The front seats in 
Sten-Åke's ‘van’ have 
headrests, but the 
back seats do not.
=> 2. Sten-Åke's 
‘van’ does not have 
proper seats.
3: ‘Vans’ are like 
living rooms
4. ‘Vans’ have good 
capacity for loading.
A. Reason 
for 2 (2.8)
B. Reason 
for 1 (1.6)
50 $A: [19 a ja ha ]19 $A. [19 yes yes ]19 Feedback
51 $A: jo de e ju de /// $A: yes that is true ‘Vans’ have good 
capacity for loading.
Agr. with 1.6
52 $E: [20 ja vet int hur 
många ]20 // de e EN dä 
precis innanför dörren å 
så e de e* dubbelsäte 
breve va re väl [21 å så e 
re ]21
$E: [20 I do notknow how 
many ]20 // there is 
ONE just inside the door 
and then there isa double 
seat beside wasn’t it [21 
and there there is ]21
What is the 
distribution of seats 
like in Sten-Åke's 
‘van’?
Request for 
specification
54 $A: [20 < la:s:ta 
o:m > ]20
@ < quiet >, < slow >
$A: [20 < reload > ]20
@ < quiet >, < slow >
<unclear>
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56 $A: [21 de e 
trippelsäte ]21 längs bak å
så två säten i < mitten > 
//
@ < quiet >
$A: [21 there is a tripple 
seat ]21 in the far back 
and two seats in the 
< middle > //
@ < quiet >
Sten-Åke's ‘van’ has a 
trippel seat in the 
back and a double 
seat in the middle.
Specification
58 $E: ja de va bara en i två i
mitten ja fö de va en gång
imellan //
$E: yes there was just one 
in two in the middle yes 
because there was an aisle 
in between //
The reason there is 
only a double seat in 
the middle is that 
there is an aisle there 
as well.
Agr. with 56
59 $A: < m > //
@ < quiet >
$A: < m >
@ < quiet >
The reason there is 
only a double seat in 
the middle is that 
there is an aisle there 
as well.
Agr. with 56
61 $E: a // $E: yes // <unclear>
62 $A: <1 lamper å grejer >1
///3.1
@ <1 quiet >1, <1 
slow >1
$A: <1 lights and stuff >1
///3.1
@ <1 quiet >1, <1 
slow >1
<unclear>
65 $E: ja: /// $E: yes /// <unclear>
66 $L: mamma: // hur har 
man gjort en [22 
(sånhär) ]22
$L: mum // how have they
done this [22 kind of 
thing ]22 
<not part of the car 
discussion>
67 $E: [22 fast de e ]22 ju en 
prisfråga
$E: [22 but it IS ]22 a 
matter of cost
The cost of the car is 
important.
Ass. of 
evaluation 
criterion
68 $L: mamma ha vi KÖPT 
[23 den ]23
$L: mum have we 
BOUGHT [23 it ]23
<not part of the car 
discussion>
69 $E: [23 nä: ]23 [24 de e 
ANDERS ]24
$E: [23 no ]23 [24 it is 
ANDERS ]24
<not part of the car 
discussion>
70 $R: [23 (...) ]23 [24 
(fö) ]24 för allså en femti 
sextitusen få man ju rätt 
så hyfsad (sån) ///
$R: [23 (...) 23 [24 
(for) ]24 for like a fifty 
sixty thousand you get a 
pretty good (such) ///
The price of a 
reasonably good ‘van’ 
is 50 000 - 60 000 
SEK
Elab. of 
1.2.2
71 $A: va kostar en: [25 / 
transi:t ]25
$A: how much is a [25 / 
Transit ]25
How much does a 
Ford Transit cost?
Request for 
information
72 $R: [25 å för en femti 
sextitusen ]25 får man en 
HELT utsleten (en sån 
där) jävla [26 
folkvansbuss ]26
$R: [25 and for a fifty 
sixty thousand ]25 you get 
a COMPLETELY worn 
out (that kind of) bloody 
[25 volkswagen bus ]25
A VW bus that costs 
50 000 - 60 000 SEK 
is in bad condition.
Elab. of 
1.2.2
74 $E: [26 m:mh ]26 men 
va:rför e re så stor 
skillnad i pris då
$E: [26 m:mh ]26 but why
is the price difference so 
large 
Why is the difference 
in price between 
‘vans’ and VW buses 
so large?
Request for 
reason for 
1.2.2
75 $R: om ja ha föstått de 
rätt < allså >
@ < quiet >
$R: if I have understood it 
right < so >
@ < quiet >
<incomplete, 
continued in 78>
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77 $E: ja:a ja e ja vill int alls 
säja emot dej faktist / j+ 
men frågan e om de e 
tillgång å efterfrågan som 
styr elle va e de
$E: yes I er I do not want 
to contradict you really / 
I+ but the question is if it 
is supply and demand that 
control or what is it 
1. Eva does not want 
to disagree with 
Roland
2. Is the price 
controlled by supply 
and demand or 
something else?
Elab. of line 
77
78 $R: de e helt enkelt de att 
dom drar två de+ två tre 
deciliter mer bensin ///
$R: it is as simple as this 
that ther need two de+ two 
three deciliter more petrol
1. ‘Vans’ have higher 
fuel consumption 
than VW buses.
2. The reason to the 
difference in price is 
higher fuel 
consumption for 
‘vans’. 
Reason for 
1.2.2, reason
for 2 (2.7) 
(2.7' 
inferred)
79 $E: ja vi KÖR ju så lite så
fö den [27 sakens skull så 
e re ju ingen ]27
$E: well we DRIVE so 
little that for that [27 sake 
it is no big ]27
1. This family does 
not drive very much
2. The fuel 
consumption is not 
very important for 
families that do not 
drive very much
Reason 
against 2.7' 
(6), reason 
for 6 (6.1)
80 $R: [27 (men a+) för dom
som kör ]27 så lite så e de
ju änna som ///
$R: [27 (but o+) for those 
that drive ]27 so little it is 
kind of like ///
1. The fuel 
consumption is not 
very important for 
families that do not 
drive very much
=> 2. This family 
does not drive very 
much
Agr. with 6, 
agr. with 6.1
81 $E: men hu e rom 
krocktestade fö dom hära
$E: but how have they been
crash tested these
Are ‘vans’ crash safe? Request for 
information
82 $R: ja ja nä dom fy fanken $R: yes yes no they Jesus 
wept
The crash safety for 
‘vans’ is good.
Reason for 1
(1.3)
83 $E: du: de ska du inte alls 
va säker på [28 fö dom 
hära / ]28 mera som 
liknar toyota asså dom 
här:a sexsitsiga < | > 
kombiliknande den fick ju
dålit resultat dom NY:A 
amrikanska
@ < ingressive >
$E: listen you should be so 
sure of that [28 because 
those / ]28 look more like 
Toyota you know those six 
seated yeah estate looking 
that one got bad results the 
NEW American
1. What makes you so
sure that the crash 
safety for ‘vans’ is 
good?
2. A similar type of 
new American cars 
are not crash safe.
=> 3. ‘Vans’ may not 
be crash safe either.
A. Request 
for reason 
for 1.3
B. Reason 
for 7 (7.1)
C. Reason 
against 1.3 
(7)
85 $R: [28 nä nä nä nä 
nä: ]28
$R: no no no no no ]28 The crash safety for 
‘vans’ is good.
Reason for 1
(1.3)
86 $R: ja: men dom här $R: yes but these <incomplete>
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87 $A: [29 ja men NYA ]29 
amrikanska bilar e mycke 
lättare än: gamla
$A: [29 yes but 
NEW ]29 American cars 
are much lighter than old 
ones
1. New American cars
are much lighter than 
old ones.
=> 2. The ‘van’ type 
they are discussing is 
old
Reason 
against 7.1 
(9)
88 $E: [29 i krocket ]29 $E: [29 in the crash ]29 <incomplete>
89 $R: en sån < [30 här va:n 
den väger två ]30 ton > 
kö du på en sån dä nissan 
micra vetdu du märke inte
att du [32 ha kört på 
(nån) ]32
@ < slow >
$R: a van < like that it 
weighs two ton > if you run
into that kind of Nissan 
Micra you know you do not
even notice that you [32 
have hit (something) ]32
@ < slow >
1. ‘Vans’ weigh two 
tonnes.
2. It is very safe for 
the driver of a ‘van’ to
crash with a Nissan 
Micra.
=> 3. Heavy cars are 
crash safe.
Reason for 
1.3 (1.3.1a &
1.3.1b)
91 $A: [30 du vet den dä den
väge TVÅ: TO:N]30
$A: [30 you know that 
thing it weighs TWO 
TON ]30
1. ‘Vans’ weigh two 
tonnes.
=> 2. Heavy cars are 
crash safe.
Reason for 
1.3 (1.3.1a &
1.3.1b)
92 $E: [32 ja men om 
man ]32 kö på en lassbil 
då å den [33 liksom ]33
$E: [32 yes but if you run 
into a lorry then and it [33 
like ]33
Is it very safe for the 
driver of a ‘van’ to 
crash with a truck 
too?
Reason 
against 
1.3.1b (8), 
(8.1)
93 $R: [33 kö du: ]33 ö: ja: 
< nä [34 men (du ha ju) 
(...) > ]34
@ < slow >
$R: [33 if you run ]33 er 
yes < no [34 but (you have)
(...) > ]34
@ < slow >
No, it is not very safe 
for the driver of a 
‘van’ to crash with a 
lorry.
Agr. with 8.1
95 $A: [34 ja man lär ju 
märka de (i alla) sådär ]34
$A: [34 well you will notice
it (at least) like ]34
No, it is not very safe 
for the driver of a 
‘van’ to crash with a 
truck.
Agr. with 8.1
96 $E: ja men [35 VA:RFÖR
väger dom ]35 två ton e r 
för att hela ramverket e 
jättekraftit
$E: yes but [35 WHY do 
they weigh ]35 two ton is it 
because the entire 
framework is very thick
1. Why do ‘vans’ 
weigh two tonnes?
2. Do ‘vans’ weigh 
much because of very 
thick framework?
Request for 
reason for 
1.3.1a
97 $A: [35 (nä dom dom 
vä+) (...) ]35
$A: [35 (no they they we+)
(...) ]35
<incomplete>
98 $R: dom e rätt så kraftia ja $R: they are quite thick yes Yes, the framework 
of ‘vans’ are quite 
thick
Reason for 
1.3.1a 
(1.3.1a.1/1.3
.2)
99 $A: men de e som p+ 
byggt på jeepen
$A: but it is like o+ built 
on the jeep
<unclear>
100 $E: de e ju inte [37 ALLS 
så att de ]37 som väger 
två ton måste vara 
$E: that is not the way [37
it is at ALL that ]37 
what weighs two ton must 
1. Crash safety does 
not only depend on 
the weight of the car.
A. Reason 
against 
1.3.1b
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krocksäker de beror 
alleles på hur de e gjort 
[39 / hur bjälkar å 
balkar ]39 [40 å allting 
sitter ]40
be crash safe that depends 
completely on how it is made
[39 / how the balks and 
girders ]29 [40 and 
everything is made ]40
2. Crash safety also 
depends on the 
construction, what 
the framework is like.
B. Elab. on 
8
101 $A: [37 mamma / 
mamma ]37
$A: [37 mum / mum ]37 <not part of the car 
discussion>
102 $R: [38 jo: men de ]38 [39
e (...) ]39 [40 de ju ]40
$R: [38 yes but it ]38 [39 
is (...) ]39 [40 it is ]40
<incomplete>
103 $A: [38 ma+ ]38 $A: [38 < mu+ > ]38 <not part of the car 
discussion>
105 $A: [40 mamma / 
mamma ko+ ]40 [41 kolla
(...) å så känne ru på 
jeepen där ]41 de e så hä 
tjock RA:M i: -n vetdu
$A: [40 mum / mum 
loo+ ]40 [41 look (...) and
feel at the jeep ]41 the 
FRAMEWORK is this 
thick you know
[...]
1. You can easily see 
that the jeep has very 
thick framework.
=> 2. ‘Vans’ have 
heavy framework.
Reason for 
1.3.2 (1.3.2.1
& 1.3.2.1')
107 $R: [41 (...) ]41 $R: [41 (...) ]41 <unclear>
108 $E: ja de jeepen de [42 
Anders men ja e inte så 
säke på att dom hä 
va:narna e såna // de vill 
ja no ]42 se: [44 e fakta på
innan ]44
$E: yes that is the jeep [42 
Anders but I am not so 
sure that these vans are like
that // I think I want 
to ]42 see [44 facts on that 
before ]44
1. The framework of 
the jeep has nothing 
to do with the 
framework of ‘vans’.
2. Eva wants to have 
good evidence for the
crash safety of ‘vans’.
A. Disagr. 
with 
~1.3.2.1' (9)
B. Deferal to
other 
arbiter.
109 $A: [42 jaa // men // 
men om man säje såhä:r ö
// jo men: ]42
$A: [42 yes // but // but
let’s say liek this er // yes 
but ]42
<incomplete>
110 $R: [44 jo nä men 
allvalit ]44 talat så dom 
dom e dom e dom e 
tämlien så krocksäkra de 
de de eftersom [45 dom 
har ]45 [46 (...) har ]46
$R: [44 yes no but 
seriously ]44 speaking they 
they are they are they are 
rather crash safe it it it since
[45 they have ]45 [46 (...) 
have ]46
The crash safety for 
‘vans’ is good.
Reason for 1
(1.3)
111 $E: [45 ja de e ju ]45 [46 
ba å titta på Trygg 
Hansas ]46 statistik /// 
kan ju int va så svårt dom 
ha ju statistik på de // de 
finns ju minibussar [50 
(dä såna små) ]50
$E: [45 well we can ]45 
[46 just have a look at 
Trygg Hansa’s ]46 
statistics /// couldn’t be 
too difficult they do have 
statistics for that // there 
are mini buses (you know 
such small ones)
We can find out 
whether ‘vans’ are 
crash safe or not by 
looking at the 
statistics of Trygg-
Hansa.
Deferal to 
other 
arbiter.
112 $A: [46 me du få ju ha bra
säkehets+ ]46
$A: [46 but you must have
good safety+ ]46
<incomplete>
113 $R: [50 me+ men fö 
do+ ]50 de ha visa sej att 
de hä me [51 
krocksäkerheten de 
$R: [50 bu+ but for 
tho+ ]50 it turns out that 
this thing with [51 crash 
safety the absolutely / 
The most important 
factor for the crash 
safety is the weight of 
the car.
Elab. of 
1.3.1b
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absolut / absolut ]51 [52 
viktiaste me 
krocksäkerheten // ]52 så
e de faktist de e 
TYNGDEN allså den e 
nästan den absolut 
avgörande // 
TYNGDEN på bilen ha 
MYCKET stor [53 
betydelse fö ]53 
krocksäkeheten
absolutely ]51 [52 most 
important about crash safety
// ]52 that is actually the 
WEIGHT that is almost 
the single determining // 
the WEIGHT of the car is
VERY [53 important 
for ]53 the crash safety
114 $L: [51 < mamma // e 
den hä målad > ]51
@ < slow >, < quiet >
$L: [51 < mum / is this 
one painted > ]51
@ < slow >, < quiet >
<not part of the car 
discussion>
116 $E: [52 nä: den e tryckt 
plast ]52
$E: [52 no it is printed 
plastic ]52
<not part of the car 
discussion>
117 $E: [53 a: mä:h ]53 $E: [53 cmon ]53 <incomplete>
118 $E: de måste väl va hur 
den trycks ihop som e [54
avgörande ]54
$E: but it has to be how it 
is compressed that is [54 
determining ]54
The most important 
factor for the crash 
safety is how the car 
compresses on 
impact.
Disagr. with 
~1.3.1b (8)
119 $R: [54 ne:j ]54 
TYNGDEN
$R: [54 no ]54 the 
WEIGHT
No, the most 
important factor for 
the crash safety is the 
weight of the car.
Elab. of 
1.3.1b
120 $E: om den e jätteTUNG 
//
$E: if it is really 
HEAVY
<incomplete, 
continued in 122>
121 $R: ja:a $R: yes Feedback.
122 $E: // å [55 liksom VEK 
i frampartiet då e re ju 
ingen glädje me de ]55
$E: // and |55 kind of 
YIELDING in the front 
then there is not much use 
with it ]55
A car that is weakly 
constructed is not 
crash safe even if it is 
heavy.
Elab. of 8
123 $R: [55 men den e tung 
jo: // nä: (de) tyngden nä 
tyngden har ]55 nä 
tyngden har otrolit vi sä+ 
om de krockar en bil // 
en bil // e den mest 
SÄKRASTE bil som väge
tusen kilo krockar me en 
bil som väge tvåtusen kilo
// så: den dä bilen som 
ha två som [56 väge 
tvåtusen ]56 kilo den ha 
FYRA gånger så stor 
krockkraft [57 (...) (de e) 
(...) ]57
$R: [55 but it is heavy yes 
// no (it) the weight is ]55 
incredibly let’s sa+ if there 
is a crash with a car // a 
car er the most SAFE car 
weighing a thousand kilos 
crashes with a car weighing 
two thousand kilos // then
that car that has two that 
[56 weighs two 
thousand ]56 kilos it has 
got FOUR times the crash 
force [57 (...) (it is) 
(...) ]57
Yes, the most 
important factor for 
the crash safety is the 
weight of the car, 
because the collision 
force of a heavier car 
is much higher.
Reason for 
1.3.1b 
(1.3.1b.1)
125 $E: [56 jo: jo ]56 $E: [56 yes yes ]56 Feedback
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126 $E: [57 ja men om du nu 
krocka me en annan ]57 
tvåtusenkilos bil då [58 va
kosta FÖRSÄKRINGEN
få man fråga de ]58
$E: [57 yes but if you 
happen to crash with 
another ]57 two thousand 
kilo car [58 how much is 
the INSURANCE can I 
ask that ]58
1. If a heavy car 
crashes with another 
heavy car, is it still 
safe?
2. How much does it 
cost to insure a ‘van’?
A. Request 
for elab. of 
1.3.1b
B. Request 
for elab. of 
1.2
127 $A: [58 eller en: 
< tjuge:tusen > (...) ]58 
kilos bil //
$A: [58 or a twenty 
thousand (...) ]58 kilo car 
//
What if a heavy car 
crashes with an even 
heavier car?
Request for 
elab. of 
1.3.1b
129 $R: ja ja de e ju så de e ju 
de [59 (...) ]59
$R: yes yes that is the way 
it is it [59 (...) ]59
<incomplete>
130 $E: [59 hallå va kosta ]59 
försäkringarna då
$E: [59 hello and how 
much is ]59 the insurance
How much does it 
cost to insure a ‘van’?
Request for 
elab. of 1.2
131 $R: // < de vet ja (inte) >
@ < quiet > 
$R: // < I do not know 
that >
@ < quiet > 
Roland does not 
know how much it 
costs to insure a ‘van’.
Rejection/
dismissal of 
request on 
line 130
133 $A: men PAPPA // $A: but DAD // <incomplete>
134 $E: de måss man ju 
FÖRST å frä+ s:katt å 
försäkring måss man ju ta 
reda på måss ju ta reda på
/ om dom hä femtitusen 
plöslits äts upp för att 
man har / flera tusen mer
varje år i i i: //
$E: we have to know that 
FIRST and fore+ tax and 
insurance you have to find 
that out / if these fifty 
thousand suddenly is 
consumed because you it is 
/ several thousand more 
each year in in in //
If the insurance is 
expensive for ‘vans’ 
the difference in price
between ‘vans’ and 
VW buses may be 
cancelled out.
Motivation 
for request 
on line 130
135 $R: ja de e ju bara ringa 
te: e te Björn elle Sten-
Åke elle nån dom ha ju en
[60 sån (där) ]60
$R: well it’s just to ring to 
er to Björn or Sten-Åke or 
somebody they have got [60 
one of (those) ]60
We can ask one of 
our friends who has a 
‘van’ how much it 
costs to insure it.
Sugg. of 
how to find 
information
136 $E: [60 ja men man ]60 
ska int ringa ti 
< entusiasterna Roland > 
///2.5 då e de bättre rö+ 
jöra me sitt 
försäkringsbolag va re 
kostar å försäkra en sån ti 
xempel [61 då va ]61
@ < quiet >
$E: [60 but one ]60 can’t 
ring the < enthusiasts 
Roland > ///2.5 it is 
better to check with the 
insurance company how 
much it costs to insure for 
example such a car [61 
like ]61
@ < quiet >
1. It is not good to 
ask enthusiasts about 
the cost of the 
insurance.
=> 2. The friends 
who have ‘vans’ are 
enthusiasts.
3. One must ask 
insurance companies 
about how much it 
costs to insure a ‘van’.
1. Non-
acceptance 
of sugg.
2. Sugg. of 
how to find 
information
138 $R: [61 ja men ]61 de e ju 
ba ringa å fråga va de 
kosta vi vet ju va de e va 
de kosta å < försäkra 
våran > ///
@ < quiet >
$R: [61 yes but ]61 it is 
just to ring and ask how 
much it is we know what it 
is er how much it is to 
< insure ours > ///
@ < quiet >
It is easy to call 
insurance companies 
and find out how 
much it costs to 
insure a ‘van’, since 
we already know what
it costs to insure the 
current car.
Acceptance 
of sugg.
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140 $E: < joo > /// ja ja vill 
no provköra ren om ett 
antal mil innan ja // 
dessutom e rom ju 
automatväxlade å de gilla 
ju [62 inte ja ]62
@ < quiet >
$E: < yes > /// well 
think I would like to test 
drive it a number of 
kilometers before I // 
besides they have automatic 
gear boxes and I do [62 not
like that ]62
@ < quiet >
1. Eva wants to test 
drive the ‘van’ before 
she concedes to 
buying it.
2. ‘Vans’ have 
automatic gearbox.
3. Eva does not like 
automatics.
A. Deferal 
to other 
arbiter
B. Reason 
for 2 (2.5()
142 $A: [62 de behöve ]62 
rom ju inte va va
$A: [62 they do not ]62 
have to have that
‘Vans’ are not 
necessarily 
automatics.
Disagr. with 
2.5( (10)
143 $E: ja de e svårt å få tag 
på [63 rom utan 
automatväxlar ]63
$E: well it is difficult to 
find one without automatic 
gear box ]63
‘Vans’ are usually 
automatics.
Modification
of 2.5( 
(2.5))
144 $R: [63 (...) (dom va) ]63 $R: [63 (...) (they be) ]63
145 $E: å SEN dom hä 
< göjvena > vet du / ja 
satt ju å prata me rom me 
Lena va på e 
macdonaldskalaset så va 
ju både // < | > öö: de 
va ju en hel DRÖS me 
bekanta men de va ju då 
Sven å å // Andrea dom 
ha ju en precis likadan 
som // Inger å: Sten-I+ 
Åke //
@ < incomprehensible >
@ < click >
$E: and THEN those 
< göjvena > you know / I 
was talking to them to 
Lena right at the 
MacDonald’s party there 
were both // < | > er 
there were a whole 
BUNCH of acquaintances 
but Sven and and // 
Andrea they have got one 
exactly like the one // 
Inger and Sten-I+ Åke
@ < incomprehensible >
@ < click >
[Start of the retelling 
of an episode.] 
<Unclear.>
148 $R: va då fö Andrea $A: which Andrea Which person named 
Andrea is E talking 
about?
Request for 
clarification
149 $E: /// Andrea Franke 
och / Sven: va han han 
nu kan heta i eftenamn 
faktis+ de [64 vet ]64
$E: /// Andrea Franke 
and Sven whatever his 
surname could be actual+ I
[64 know ]64
By ‘Andrea’, E means 
Andrea Franke.
Clarification
151 $R: [64 ha ]64 dom också 
en va:n
$R: [64 have ]64 they also 
got a van
Do Andrea and Sven 
also have a ‘van’?
Request for 
clarification
152 $E: m:mh < /// >
@ < uncertain belonging 
of pause >
$E: m:mh < /// >
@ < uncertain belonging of
pause >
Yes, Andrea and Sven
have a ‘van’ too.
Clarification
154 $R: ja de e: de: verklien 
många som har -t
$R: yes there sure is a lot of
people who have got one
Many people have 
‘vans’.
Comment, 
reason for 1?
(1.4)
156 $E: ja $E: yes Feedback
157 $R: men de inte men de 
de e inte [65 utan 
anledning (...) ]65
$R: but is not but it it is 
not [65 without cause 
(...) ]65
<incomplete>
345
158 $E: [65 du vet då byter 
dom ]65 ut lite såhä små 
rattar < vetdu >
@ < quiet >
$E: [65 you know they 
change ]65 like this small 
steering wheels < you 
know >
@ < quiet >
? ‘Vans’ have small 
steering wheels.
Reason 
against 1 
(2.2) (2.2')
160 $R: < jo jo >
@ < quiet >
$R: yes yes
@ < quiet >
? Yes, ‘vans’ have 
small steering wheels.
Agr. with 2.2
162 $E: < som vi ha > ja 
tycke ju de: e skitmaxat å 
sitta me den stora ratten 
så vetdu man känn se som
man kör en buss
@ < quiet >
$E: < like we have > you 
know that I think it is dead
cool to sit ther with that 
large wheel you know you 
feel like you are driving a 
bus
@ < quiet >
Eva likes to drive cars
with large steering 
wheels.
Elab. of 2.2'
164 $A: < | >
@ < sigh >
$A: < | >
@ < sigh >
Unclear.
166 $E: de hä lilla löjliga vetdu
[66 som man liksom ]66
$E: this ridiculous small 
you know [66 that you 
kind of ]66
Eva does not like 
small steering wheels
Elab. of 2.2'
167 $A: [66 nä: om ]66 de [67 
ska va en stor bil ska de 
va stor ratt ]67
$A: [66 no if ]66 it [67 
should be a large car then 
there should be a large 
steering wheel ]67
Large cars should 
have large steering 
wheels
Elab. of 2.2'
168 $E: [67 man ska ju kunna 
lägga armarna på: ]67
$E: [67 you should be able 
to put your arms on ]67
Eva wants to be able 
to put her arms on 
the steering wheel
Elab. of 2.2'
169 $R: men de e att de e 
helservo < vetdu / därför
så e: de >
@ < quiet >, < slow >
$R: but it is that it is power
steering < you know / that
is why it >
@ < quiet >, < slow >
‘Vans’ have small 
steering wheels 
because they have 
power steering.
Reason 
against 2.2' 
(11) (1.5a, 
2.4b)
171 $E: jo jo jo men servon 
ha ja inget emot verklien 
inte de e ju de ju [68 
verklien nåt att ha ]68
$E: yes yes yes but I do not 
mind the power steering not 
at all that is that is [68 
definitely a good thing to 
have ]68
Eva likes power 
steering
Reason for 1
(1.5b)
172 $A: [68 men bussar dom 
vride ]68 faan FEMTON 
varv fö å få helt utslag // 
de [69 se man (nä) (...) ]69
$A: [68 but buses 
turn ]68 bloody 
FIFTEEN revs to get full 
response // you [69 see 
that (no) (...) ]69
With a bus (VW bus?)
one has to turn the 
steering wheel 15 
times to turn the 
wheels fully.
<Unclear>
174 $E: [69 å så börja vi ]69 
diskutera de hära me 
liksom hu körning på 
vintervägar å då visa re sej
ju att / a: de e ju int så 
jättepraktist me ren hära 
servon då va < /// > ja 
men //
$E: [69 and then we 
started talking about this 
thing like how driving on 
winter roads and then it 
turns out that / well that it
is not really all that handy 
with this power steering 
after all right < /// > yes 
but //
Power steering is not 
good on winter roads.
Reason 
against 1 
(2.4a) 
(2.4.1a)
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@ < uncertain belonging 
of pause >
@ < uncertain belonging of
pause >
176 $R: hur då $R: in what way Why is power steering
not good on winter 
roads?
Request for 
reason for 
2.4.1a
177 $E: // ja därför att de e e 
ja inte servon utan e: 
< | > / automatväxlingen
de e ju faktis så att en 
vanlig växellåda E mycke 
SÄKRARE [70 på ett sätt
< därför att du ]70 [71 
ha ]71 >
@ < click >
@ < quick >
$E: // well because it is er 
well not the power steering 
but er < | > / the 
automatic gear it is a fact 
that an ordinary gear box 
IS much SAFER [70 in a
way < because you ]70 [71
have ]71 >
@ < click >
@ < quick >
1. An automatic 
gearbox is not good 
on winter roads
2. Manual gearbox is 
more safe
Modification
of 2.4.1a 
(2.5') (2.5'.1) 
(2.5'.1.1)
180 $A: [70 jo men de gå 
ju ]70 [71 å1 ]71
$A: [70 yes but you ]70 
[71 can ]71
<incomplete>
181 $R: [71 nä ]71 ja nä ja kan 
inte hålla me om de allså
$R: [71 no ]71 I no I must
disagree with you about that
you know
Manual gearbox is not
safer
Reason 
against 
2.5'.1.1 (11)
182 $E: ja me nä HAN börja 
säja såna saker han som 
verklien är entusiast fö 
dom hä bilarna
$E: yes but when HE 
starts saying such things he 
begin a true enthusiast for 
these cars
1. Sven? says that 
manual gearbox is 
safer
2. Sven? is 
enthusiastic about 
‘vans’
Reason for 
2.5'.1.1 
(2.5'.1.1.1a-
c)
183 $R: ja men JA ha ju kört e
e ja jeepen då [72 jämför 
ja me ]72
$R: yes but I have driven er
er well the jeep then [72 I 
compare with ]72
Roland has 
experience with 
automatic gearbox 
from driving the jeep.
Reason for 
11.1 
(11.1.1a-c')
184 $E: [72 men den e ]72 
FYRhjulsdriven
$E: [72 but that one 
has ]72 FOUR wheel drive
1. The jeep has four 
wheel drive
=> 2. The four wheel
drive makes the 
comparison invalid.
Reason for 
19' 
(19')(19.1a-
b)
185 $R: ja men om ja e om ja 
ja / jämför jeepen som 
tvåhjulsdriven då va // så
automatlåda e HELT 
överlägset allså [73 / de 
samma de samma som 
< Mattbron > asså ]73 de 
e samma som Matbron 
man / man GASEN har 
du fullständi du ha ju 
slirkoppling va /// asså 
gasen fungerar som en 
slirkoppling va /// å de 
betyder de att / om du //
du / om du ba lär de å 
$R: yes but if I er if I I / 
compare the jeep as two 
wheel driver right // then 
automatic is 
COMPLETELY 
superior you know [73 / it 
is the same the same as the 
< Matbro > you / you the 
ACCELERATOR is 
completely you have slipping
coupling right /// you 
know the accelerator works 
as a slipping clutch right 
/// and that means that /
if you // you / if you just 
1. The jeep as two 
wheel drive has 
superior precision
2. The precison is 
there because of the 
automatic gearbox
3. One has to learn 
how to maneuver a 
car with automatic 
gearbox, using the 
slipping clutch.
A. Reason 
against 19.1a
(13)
B. Elab. of 
11.1.1a-c')
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använda gaspedalen så // 
så e den så otr+ du kan 
allså du kan // du kan 
VERKLIGEN allså //
@ < comment: tractor 
brand >
learn to use the accelerator 
then // then it is incr+ you
can you know you can / 
you can REALLY you 
know // 
@ < comment: tractor 
brand >
186 $A: [73 ja me sen kan 
man ju växla me vanli me 
den också ]73
$A: [73 yes but you can 
shift gears the ordinary way 
too ]73
With an automatic 
gearbox, one can 
choose to gear 
manually.
Reason 
against 
2.5'.1.1 (13)
187 $E: då mås man [75 börja 
köra bil på nytt 
(verklien) ]75
$E: in that case you have to
start driving afresh 
(really) ]75
With an automatic 
one has to learn how 
to drive again.
Reason for 
2.5' (2.5'.2)
188 $R: [75 fin // du kan 
verklien ]75 finköra // de
e ju [77 samma me 
< Mattbron > ]77 [78 // 
jo ]78
@ < slow >
$R: [75 you can drive 
really ]75 accurately // it 
is the [77 same with the 
< Matbro > ]77 [78 // 
yes ]78
@ < slow >
<continued 185>
190 $A: [77 bra nä vi ska ]77 
[78 övningsköra ]78
$A: [77 good when we are 
going to]77 [78 practice 
driving ]78
<unclear>
191 $E: < [78 men de kan 
man]78 väl göra jättebra 
på [80 rom här också 
jo::o: då ]80 >
@ < comment: 
aggressively >
$E: < [78 but you can ]78
do that perfectly well with 
[80 these too yes you 
can ]80 > 
@ < comment: 
aggressively >
1. It is possible to 
have the same level of
precision with a 
manual gearbox
2. With a manual 
gearbox the clutch 
gives you the high 
precision.
Reason 
against 11.1 
(12) (12.1)
193 $R: [80 nä: nä de går 
inte ]80 nä fö du har [82 
(...) nä:e ]82 näe nä de gå 
[84 (...) du kan aldrig ]84
$R: [80 no no it is not 
possible ]80 no because you 
have [82 (...) no ]82 no no 
it is not [84 (...) you can 
never ]84
1. Manual gear box 
does not give the 
same level of 
precision as an 
automatic gearbox.
2. The clutch does 
not give the same 
precison.
Reason 
against 12 
(11.1) (14)
194 $E: [82 du använder 
kopplingen samtidit ]82
$E: [82 you use the clutch 
at the same time ]82
<continued from 
191>
195 $E: [84 nähä men de kan 
då ]84 JA:G < // >
@ < uncertain belonging 
of pause >
$E: [84 is that so but I for
one ]84 can do that < 
// >
@ < uncertain belonging of
pause >
Eva can get the same 
precision with the 
help of the clutch 
with a manual 
gearbox as with an 
automatic gearbox.
Reason for 
12.1 (12.1.1)
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197 $R: ja ja: kan det inte å ja 
e betydlit duktiare förare 
än va du e
$R: well I can’t do that and
I’m a considerably better 
driver than you are
1. Roland cannot get 
the same level of 
precision with the 
clutch.
2. Roland is a better 
driver than Eva.
Reason for 
14 (14.1a) 
(14.1b()
198 $E: ja de vet ja ju inte ja 
kan ju va lyhörd på andra 
saker
$E: well I don’t know 
about that I may be more 
keen in other things
Eva might be a better 
driver in other 
respects.
Reason 
against 
14.1b( (15) 
(15.1)
199 $R: ja men men men 
< styv i >
@ < quiet >
$R: yes but but but 
< skilled at >
@ < quiet >
1. Eva might be a 
better driver in other 
respects.
2. <incomplete>
Agr. with 
15.1
201 $E: vill ja (väl) [85 
påstå ]85
$E: that much I want [85 
to say ]85
Eva might be a better 
driver in other 
respects.
Reason for 
15 (15.1)
202 $R: [85 så sätt ]85 ja va 
duktiare så: så sett rent e 
// [86 / (fö) rent teknist 
// nä men nu ha du 
jovisst ]86 men du vet att 
/// nä men // de e ju så 
att // e+ en automatväxel
där du ha ju / (a') // ha ju
en SLIRkoppling som 
Matbron allså ja kan ju 
allså köra in i en grushög 
va // å preci:s kan änna 
som / bara // me / me 
gaspedalen kan ja precis 
reglera [88 kraften då ]88 
< // >
@ < uncertain belonging 
of pause >
$R: [85 that way ]85 I be 
better in in that way strictly
er // [86 / (for) strictly 
technically // not but you 
have sure ]86 but you know
that // no but // the 
matter of fact is that // a+
an automatic gear where you
have / (a’) // have a 
slipping coupling like the 
Matbro you know I can you
know drive into a pile of 
gravel right // and exactly 
can like / just // with / 
with the accelerator I can 
exactly adjust [88 the 
power ]88 < // >
@ < uncertain belonging of
pause >
1. Technically Roland 
is a better driver.
2. With automatic 
gearbox and slipping 
clutch Roland can 
control the power of 
the car with high 
precision.
A. 
Modification
of 14.1b( 
(14.1b))
B. Elab. of 
11.1
204 $E: [86 ja använder ju 
KOPPLINGEN väldit 
mycke allså ]86
$E: [86 I use the 
CLUTCH quite a lot you 
know ]86
Eva uses the clutch a 
lot
Unclear
205 $E: [88 ja ja ]88 $E: [88 yes yes ]88 Feedback
206 $R: å de: kan man bara 
göra me automatväxel // 
de finns INGEN [89 
annan som kan göra 
de ]89
$R: and that can only be 
done with anautomatic gear 
// there is NO [89 other 
that can do that ]89
It is not possible to 
control the power of 
the car that precisely 
with a manual 
gearbox and clutch.
Elab. of 11.1
207 $E: [89 fast de e ju inte 
riktit ]89 DE utan de e ju 
å få ner varvtal å å liksom 
$E: [89 but that is not 
really ]89 the POINT but 
it is about getting down the 
It is also about 
decreasing the rpm.
Reason for 
2.5'.1.1 
(2.5'.1.1.2)
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allting nä [90 ru kommer 
in i (...) ]90
number of revolutions and 
and like everything when 
[90 you get into (...) ]90
208 $R: [90 jo men de du få ju
de ]90 få [91 ju (...) ]91 [92
lås ]92
$R: [90 yes but that you get
that ]90 get [91 (...) ]91 
[92 lock ]92
It is possible to 
decrease the rpm. 
<incomplete>
209 $A: [90 ja men du / 
PAPPA ]90 
$A: [90 yes but you / 
DAD ]90
<incomplete>
210 $A: [91 kan man in+ e ]91
[92 sitte re inte en ]92
$A: [91 is not it poss+ 
is ]91 [92 is not there 
a ]92
<incomplete>
211 $E: [92 ja inte nä ru får 
en ]92 SLADD på den < 
// >
@ < unceratin belonging 
of pause >
$E: [92 well not when the 
car starts SKIDDING < 
// >
@ < unceratin belonging of
pause >
<unclear>
213 $A: kan man [95 man kan 
vä ställa in ]95 
automatväxlar på en å två 
växlar ofta
$A: you could [95 you 
could set ]95 automatic gear
boxes to one and two gears 
often
With an automatic 
gearbox, one can 
choose to gear 
manually.
Reason 
against 
2.5'.1.1 (13)
214 $R: [95 gå ju ba å 
frikoppla ]95 
$R: [95 it is just to 
declutch ]95
<unclear>
215 $R: [96 jaa de{t} kan du 
kan ]96 [97 du kan 
ställa ]97 in du kan ställa 
in på tvåan // så får du 
du kan sega vetdu så du 
kan du kan [98 allså ]98
$R: [96 yes you can do 
that ]96 [97 you can 
set ]97 you can set it to gear
two // and then you you 
can trudge you know so you 
can you can [98 you 
know ]98
Yes, with an 
automatic gearbox, 
one can choose to 
gear manually.
Agr. with 13
216 $E: [96 ja de går å dra 
ner: ]96
$E: [96 yes you can pull it 
down ]96
<unclear>
217 $A: [97 (jeepen) i alla 
fall ]97
$A: [97 (the jeep) 
anyway ]97
<unclear>
218 $E: [98 jo man ]98 kan ju 
ändra de i farten [99 
dessutom ]99
$E: [98 yes you ]98 can 
change that while driving 
[99 even ]99
1. Yes, with an 
automatic gearbox, 
one can choose to 
gear manually.
2. It is even possible 
to choose gears while 
driving.
A. Agr. with 
13
B. Elab. of 
13
219 $R: [99 ja / jaa ]99 / jaa så $R: [99 well / yes ]99 / 
well that
[Feedback: partial 
disagreement]
Partial 
disagr. with 
13
220 $E: ti en viss gräns [100 
tydlien ]100
$E: to a certain degree 
[100 obviously ]100
It is possible to 
choose gears while 
driving to a limited 
extent.
Inter-
pretation, 
suggestion?
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221 $R: [100 nä ja få ]100 säja 
de att e ja kan // de // de
de finns bara EN nackdel 
me automatlåder / idag 
/// å de e de att dom dra 
LITE mer bensin men de 
e LITE mer bensin för 
dom drar mer bensin [101
(...) (överhuvudtaget) ]101
$R: [100 no I must ]100 
say that er I can // there’s 
/ there’s there’s only ONE
disadvantage with 
automatics / today /// 
and that’s that they cause 
SLIGHTLY higher fuel 
consumption but that is 
SLIGHTLY higher fuel 
consumption because they do
have higher fuel 
consumption [101 (...) (at 
all) ]101
1. Automatics have 
somewhat higher fuel 
consumption than 
manuals.
2. There are no other 
disadvantages with 
automatics.
Reason for 
16 (2.5'.3) 
(16.1)
223 $E: [101 ja men de här e 
inte rom ]101 nyaste vet 
du
$E: [101 yes but this is not
the ]101 newest ones you 
know
1. We are not 
discussing the most 
modern version of 
automatics.
=> 2. Older 
automatics may have 
considerably higher 
fuel consumption 
than manuals.
Reason 
against 2.5'.3
(17) (17.1)
224 $R: < a > men dom dra 
mer allså en automatlåda 
drar mer bensin de e inge 
snack [102 om de ]102 de 
e enda nackdelen // 
annars e de ta me tusan
@ < ingressive >
$E: < yes > but they need 
more petrol you know an 
automatic need more petrol 
it is no question [102 about
that ]102 that is the only 
drawback // otherwise I’ll 
be damned that
1. Automatics have 
somewhat higher fuel 
consumption than 
manuals.
2. There are no other 
disadvantages with 
automatics.
Reason for 
16 (2.5'.3) 
(16.1)
226 $E: [102 nä nä ]102 $E: [102 no no ]102 Automatics have 
somewhat higher fuel 
consumption than 
manuals.
Agr. with 
2.5'.3
227 $E: a men de [103 ju 
ingen födel ]103 heller
$E: yes but it is [103 no 
advantage ]103 either
A small disadvantage 
is also a disadvantage.
Reason for 
2.5' (2.5'.3)
228 $R: [103 å sen så kan 
du ]103 // sen kan du 
inte sen så kan du inte 
< dra [104 igång 
bilen ]104 de kanske e en 
nackdel också > men 
annars e de men annars så
e [105 så e de (...) men 
anna+ ]105 [106 men 
annars ]106 < [1001 men 
annars så e de ]1001 [107 
men annars men me: me: 
men ]107 > me+ men 
annars så e de allså bara
$R: [103 and then it is 
not ]103 // it is not 
possible to < pop the clutch 
to start [104 the car ]104 
it is perhaps another 
drawback > but apart from
that there [105 there is (...)
but apar+ ]105 [106 but 
apart ]106 < [1001 but 
apart from that there 
is ]1001 [107 but apart 
but bu+ but+ but ]107 > 
bu+ but apart from that 
there are only advantages 
Another disadvantage
with automatics is 
that they cannot be 
started by popping 
the clutch.
Reason for 
2.5' (2.5.4)
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fördelar ja ka+ jag kan 
änna som inte
@ < quiet >
@ < loud >
that I ca+ I can kind of 
not
@ < quiet >
@ < loud >
231 $E: [104 hrrrm: hrm: ]104 $E: [104 ahem ahem ]104 <unclear>
232 $A: [105 de (kunde ru 
gott) ]105 [106 säja om 
dodge också ]106 [1001 
< | > (så här) 
< krssshh > ]1001
@ < laughter >
@ < onomatopoetic >
$A: [105 you (could 
well) ]105 [106 say that 
about the Dodge too ]106 
[1001 < | > (like this) 
< krssshh > ]1001
@ < laughter >
@ < onomatopoetic >
That disadvantage 
could be said about 
the Dodge too.
<Unclear>
235 $E: [105 kunde du 
(...) ]105 
$E: [105 you could 
(...) ]105
<unclear>
236 $E: [106 < | > de ]106 
[107 kanske kvittar me en 
sån storlek ändå ]107
@ < chuckle >
$E: [106 < | > it ]106 
[107 does not matter 
perhaps with such a size 
anyway ]107
@ < chuckle >
<unclear>
238 $A: kan man inte lägga in 
en växel på jeepen ettan 
såhär å så [108 (...) 
näe ]108
$A: could not you put the 
jeep into first gear like this 
and then [108 (...) no ]108
Is it possible to force 
the automatic gearbox
of the jeep to set the 
first gear like this?
Request for 
specification
239 $E: [108 jo men du kan 
dra ne re ]108 de går å 
liksom v+ växla ner på de
sättet fast liksom [109 i 
farten ]109
$E: [108 yes but you can 
pull it down ]108 you can 
like g+ gear down in that 
way but kind of [109 while
driving ]109
1. Yes, it is possible to
force set the jeep to 
first gear like that.
2. It is possible to 
gear down while 
driving.
Specification
(13)
240 $A: [109 men du 
pappa ]109 fö de gå ju å 
lägga i ettan vanli växel 
< på jeepen > < /// >
@ < quiet >
@ < uncertain belonging 
of pause >
$A: [109 but listen 
dad ]109 because you can 
set it in first gear < the 
jeep > < /// >
It is possible to force 
set the jeep to first 
gear.
Reason for 
18 (18.1a)
243 $R: a men de 
< oväsentligt vicket de 
e >
@ < quiet >
$R: yes but it is 
< irrelevant which it is >
@ < quiet >
1. Yes, it is possible to
force set the jeep to 
first gear.
2. That does not 
matter.
Agr. with 
18.1a
Disagr. with 
relevance of 
18.1a
245 $A: jo men då måste de 
gå å1 DRA igång den då
$A: yes but in that case it 
must be possible to POP 
THE CLUTCH to start 
it
Yes it matters, 
because if one can 
force set the jeep to 
first gear it ought to 
be possible to pop the
clutch to start the car.
Reason 
against 2.5'.4
(18) (18.1b)
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246 @ comment: E har 
lämnat rummet. Det nästa
som hör är hennes röst 
när hon talar med 
flickorna. R redodgör 
långsamt och tyst för det 
han vet om 
oljekopplingar.
@ comment: E has left the 
room. The next thing that 
is heard is her voice when 
she speaks with the girls. R 
gives a slow and quiet 
account of what he knows 
about oil couplings
247 § End § End
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Appendix 5 – Analytical overview of the argumentation 
in a conversation
The complete analytical overview is too large a diagram to fit onto an A4 page, 
and so it is split up in arguments about different topics. Thick border lines de-
note arguments for which there is sub argumentation in another figure. 
The crossed arrows connect conflicting propositions.
1. They should buy a 
van
2. They should not buy a 
van
Economy
1.1 Vans 
need little 
fuel.
2.1 Vans have no 
other advantages 
but that they 
need little fuel.
1.2 Van's 
are a lot 
cheaper
3.Vans do 
NOT need 
little fuel
3.1Sten-Åke's 
van needs 1.2
1.2.1 Spare parts for 
vans are cheap.
1.2.2 Vans are cheap to 
buy: an ok van costs 
50000 and for that sum 
you get a bad 
folkvangsbuss.
5a. Vans need 
a lot of fuel.
5b. Cars that 
need a lot of 
fuel are not 
good.
6.1 They drive so little 
that the fuel consumption 
does not matter much.
6. Cars that need a lot of 
fuel need not be bad.
Crash Safety
1.3 Vans are crash safe.
1.3.1a Vans 
are heavy.
1.3.1b Heavy cars 
are always crash 
safe.
8. Heavy cars are not 
always crash safe; the 
crash safety depends 
on the construction.
8.2 A badly 
constructed car is not 
crash safe.
7.1 Other 
American cars 
are not crash 
safe.
7. Vans are not 
crash safe.
9. The other 
American cars 
are light.
1.3.1b.1 If a 
heavy cars 
crashes with a 
light cars the 
heavy cars is 
not damaged.
8.1 If a heavy car 
crashes with an 
even heavier car, 
the first car is 
damaged.
1.3.2 (1.3.1a.1) 
Vans have thick 
frameworks.
1.3.2.1 The  jeep 
has a thick 
framework.
1.3.2.1' [If the jeep has 
a thick frame-work, 
then vans have thick 
frameworks]
9. The  
framework of 
the jeep says 
nothing about 
the framework 
of vans.
&
1. They should buy a 
van.
1.3.1b.2 The 
crash force is 
higher for 
heavy cars.
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Automatic gear box & power steering, overview
2.5' [Automatic is 
not good.]
10. Vans do not always 
have automatic 
gearbox.
2.5 ß vans often 
have automatic 
gear box.
1.5b Eva 
likes power 
steering.
1.5a Vans have 
power 
steering.
1. They should 
buy a van.
2.4.1a Power 
steering is not 
good on winter 
roads.
2.4b (1.5a) Vans 
have power 
steering.
16. Automatic 
is good.
2.4a Power 
steering is not 
good.
2. They should not buy 
a van,
2.5'.1 Automatic is 
not good on winter 
roads.
2.5'.1.1 Manual gear 
box is safer.
Automatic gear box, safety
2.5'.1.1 Manual is 
safer11. Automatic is 
safer
2.5'.1.1.1b 
Sven is 
enthusiastic 
about vans.
2.5'.1.1.1c If an enthusiast 
acknowledges a weakness with 
what he is enthusiastic about, then 
one can trust that the weakness is 
really there.
13. An automatic can be 
geared manually if the 
driver wants so, even 
during driving.
2.5'.1.1.2 It is more 
difficult to decrease the 
number of revolutions 
with an automatic.
2.5'.1.1.1a Sven says 
that manual is safer.
11.1 Automatic 
provides better 
control of the 
car.
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11.1 An automatic 
provides better control 
of the car.
12. A manual provides 
equally good control 
of the car.
12.1 The clutch 
gives control of 
the car.
11.1.1a Roland has 
experiences from using 
the jeep, which has an 
automatic gear box.
11.1.1b Roland says 
that automatic is 
safer.
19.1a The jeep 
has four wheel 
drive.
19.' [Jeep experiences cannot 
be applied to vans.]
11.1.1c' [Experiences 
from a jeep can be 
applied to vans.]
19.1b Vans do not 
have four wheel 
drive.
13. The jeep can 
be driven with 
two wheel drive 
too.
14.1a Roland can 
not get as good 
control of the car 
with the clutch as 
with an automatic.
14. The clutch does not 
give as good control of 
the car as an automatic 
does.
15. Roland is not a better 
driver than Eva.
15.1 Eva can be better than 
Roland at driving in other 
respects.
14.1b ß Roland is a better 
driver technically than 
Eva.
12.1.1 Eva can 
get control of 
the car using the 
clutch.
Automatic gear box, control
2.5'.3 Automatic 
lead to a LITTLE 
higher fuel 
consumption.
1 6 . 1
 There are no other 
drawbacks with 
automatics than 2.5'.3 and 
2.5'.4.
2.5'.4 Cars with 
automatic gear box 
cannot be jump 
started.
17 Automatic may lead 
to considerably higher 
fuel consumption.
17.1 Roland's 
information may be 
valid for new cars, but 
they are buying an old 
model.
18.1a An automatic 
can be forced to be 
in first gear.
18. It is perhaps possible to 
jump start cars with automatic 
gear box.
18.1b If it is possible to force 
the gear box into first gear, 
then it should be possible to 
jump start the car.
2.5' [Automatic is 
not good.]
16. Automatic 
is good.
Automatic gear box, other (i.e. not safety or control)
2.5'.2 One has to learn to 
drive in a new way if one 
buys a van, because of 
the automatic.
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2. They should not buy a 
van.
2.3.1 Sten-
Åke's van has 
bad seats.
2.3 Vans have 
bad seats.
4. Vans are 
easy to 
drive.
Miscellaneous
1.4 Many other 
families they 
know have got a 
van.
1. They should buy a 
van.
2.8 Vans are 
like living 
rooms.
1.6 Vans have 
good capacity 
for loading.
2.2 Vans have small 
steering wheels.
11. Vans have small steering 
wheels since they have power 
steering.
2.2' [Eva does 
not like cars with 
small steering 
wheels.]
2.6.1a Inger 
avoids driving 
her van.
2.6 Vans are 
difficult to 
drive.
2.6.1.1b Inger 
thinks her van 
is large. 
2.6.1.1a Mature women with 
responsibility for family and children 
avoids driving large cars. 
2.6.1b Inger has 
driven all kinds 
of vehicles. 
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Appendix 6 – Example of voting
The following extract is taken from the City District Committee meeting 
(A322501), starting at line 59. It shows how voting is performed.
The meeting is discussing an issue where there are now two proposals. The chairperson, K, 
first attempts acclamation, but the opposition requests voting in utterance 4.
1 $K: om ja uppfattat nämden rätt // 
så finns de två föslag de e 
tjänstutlåtandet // samt att 
tillstyrka bägge motionena / och 
övesända ärendet till 
kommunstyrelsen // [29 e de 
rätt ]29 / [30 båda ]30 // å // att 
övesända ärendet till till stödjer ni 
// (av) // e de rätt uppfattat <1 
| >1 ställe sej nämden bakom 
tjänsteutlåtandet <2 | >2 ställe sej 
bakom de av <3 FP >3 me stöd av 
<4 KD >4 å <5 M >5 lagda 
förslaget <6 // >6 ja finner en 
majoritet fö tjänsteutlåtandet
@ <1 event: a few participants says 
yes >1
@ <2 event: several participants 
says something, probably yes >2
@ <3 abbreviation >3
@ <4 abbreviation >4
@ <5 abbreviation >5
@ <6 event: several participants 
says something, probably yes, and 
probably it is not the same ones as 
in comment 2 >6
$K: if I have understood the 
committee right // then there are 
two proposals that is the official 
report // and to approve both 
motions / and pass the issue to the 
city council // [29 is that correct ]29 
/ [30 both ]30 // and // to pass the 
issue to to do you support // (by) // 
have I got that right <1 | >1 does the 
committee approve the official 
report <2 | >2 does the committee 
approve the proposal made by <3 
FP >3 and supported by <4 KD >4 
and <5 M >5 <6 // >6 I find that 
there is a majority for the official 
report
@ <1 event: a few participants says 
yes >1
@ <2 event: several participants 
says something, probably yes >2
@ <3 abbreviation >3
@ <4 abbreviation >4
@ <5 abbreviation >5
@ <6 event: several participants 
says something, probably yes, and 
probably it is not the same ones as 
in comment 2 >6
2 $X: [29 (...) ]29 $X: [29 (...) ]29
3 $X: [30 (...) ]30 $X: [30 (...) ]30
4 $X: votering $X: vote
5 $K: omröstning är begäd å ska 
genomföras // då ta vi ja // fö 
tjänsteutlåtandet // och nej // fö 
de av <1 FP >1 lagda föslaget kan 
vi göra [31 så ]31 <2 | >2
@ <1 abbrevation >1
@ <2 event: a few participants says 
yes >2
$K: vote has been called and will be 
performed // then we will have yes 
for the official report // and no // 
for the proposal made by <1 FP >1 
can we do it that way <2 | >2
@ <1 abbrevation >1
@ <2 event: a few participants says 
yes >2
6 $X: e // $X: er
7 $C: e < | > // e tjänstegörande 
ersättare e Qajsa-Stina Qvillgren // 
Daniella Dorreni
@ < event: C looks at K, who after 
a while looks back, nods, and 
possibly says something to C >
$C: er < | > // er Qajsa-Stina 
Qvillgren is substitute on duty // 
Daniella Dorreni
@ < event: C looks at K, who after a 
while looks back, nods, and possibly 
says something to C >
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8 $K: ja $K: yes
9 $C: Erik Erikson $C: Erik Erikson
10 $E: nej $E: no
11 $C: Fredrika Fredström $C: Fredrika Fredström
12 $F: ja: $F: yes
13 $C: Gustav Gladberg $C: Gustav Gladberg
14 $G: nej $G: no
15 $C: Hans Haraldsson $C: Hans Haraldsson
16 $H: ja $H: yes
17 $C: Ingrid Iman $C: Ingrid Iman
18 $I: ja $I: yes
19 $C: Johan Johansson $C: Johan Johansson
20 $J: nej $J: no
21 $C: Linnea Lin $C: Linnea Lin
22 $L: ja $L: yes
23 $C: Nina Nidstad $C: Nina Nidstad
24 $N: nej $N: no
25 $C: Oda Olevia $C: Oda Olevia
26 $O: ja: $O: yes
27 $C: Qajsa-Stina Qvillgren $C: Qajsa-Stina Qvillgren
28 $Q: nej $Q: no
29 $C: då e de sex ja- // å fem nej-
röster
$C: then there are six votes for // 
and five against
30 $K: då ble de bifall ti 
tjänsteutlåtandet
$K: so the official report was 
approved
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Appendix 7 – Rules of order
This appendix contains two examples of rules of order in Swedish associations.
Rules of order for LinTek, the student union of the Institute of 
Technology at Linköping University.
Reglemente för fullmäktiges 
mötesordning 
Rules for meetings of the council
Yrkanden skall framställas skriftligt. Motions should be submitted in writing.
Talare, föredragande undantagen, 
rekommenderas att inte överskrida fem 
minuter i första anförandet och tre 
minuter i senare anföranden. 
Speakers, the presenter excepted, are 
recommended not to exceed five minutes in 
their first note and three minutes in their 
subsequent notes.
Talmannen äger medge den som blivit 
apostroferad i visst anförande replik 
om högst en minut. 
The chairperson is to allow the one who has 
been apostrophized in a certain issue a 
rejoinder of at most one minute.
Replik skall begäras i omedelbar 
anslutning till det aktuella anförandet. 
Rejoinders must be requested in connection 
with the address in question. 
Ordningsfråga bryter debatt i sakfråga 
och skall avgöras innan annan fråga tas 
upp till behandling. 
Points of order break any debate on factual 
matters and must be resolved before any other 
issues are brought up for discussion.
Vid beslut om streck i debatten skall 
talmannen lämna tillfälle åt dem som så
önskar att framlägga yrkanden, uppläsa 
dessa samt bereda dem som så önskar 
tillfälle att begära ordet. Därefter 
anmäles streck i debatten. Sedan detta 
skett kan nya yrkanden icke framställas 
och nya talare inte erhålla ordet i den 
aktuella frågan. Replik kan beviljas 
sedan streck i debatten anmälts.
When deciding to close the debate the 
chairperson must allow members to submit 
motions, to read these and to furnish members
with an opportunity to request the right to 
speak. After this, closing of the debate is 
announced. Once this has been done, new 
motions cannot be submitted and new 
speakers cannot be given the floor on the issue 
in question. Rejoinder can be allowed after a 
closing of the debate has been announced.
Endast förslag vartill bifall yrkats under
debatten upptas till beslut. 
Proposals will be decided on only if a member 
has spoken in support of the porposal during 
the debate.
Bordläggning skall i förekommande fall
vid beslut först upptas till behandling. 
Tabling, should it occur, shall before decision 
be brought up for discussion.
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Reservation mot beslut i fullmäktige 
skall anmälas i omedelbar anslutning till
behandling av det aktuella ärendet. 
Formulering av reservation skall vara 
fullmäktiges sekreterare tillhanda senast
en läsdag efter sammanträdet. Det 
åligger talman och vice talman att före 
övergången till nästa ärende kungöra 
namn på samtliga reservanter samt så 
snart skriftlig reservation inkommit, 
lydelsen av densamma. 
Reservations against decisions in the council 
shall be declared in connection with the 
discussion of the issue. A phrasing of the 
reservation shall be given to the secretary of the
council at the most one study day after the 
meeting. Before moving to the next issue, the 
chairperson and the vice chairperson are 
responsible for announcing the names of all 
dissentients. The phrasing of the written 
reservation shall be announced as soon as it 
has been submitted
Ledamot har rätt att i förekommande 
fall anteckna avvikande mening i 
protokollet. 
Should the occasion arise, members are 
entitled to have deviating opinions noted in the
protocol.
Fråga som inte upptas i stadgan eller i 
detta reglemente regleras av talmannen 
i enlighet med sedvanlig 
förhandlingspraxis. 
Questions that are not covered by the statutes 
nor by these rules shall be regulated by the 
chairperson in accordance with common 
practice of negotiation.
KS ska inför varje FUM-sammanträde 
följa upp tagna beslut i dokumentet 
beslutsuppföljning. 
KS must before each FUM meeting follow up
made decision in the document decision follow-
up.
(LinTek 2006)
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Rules of order for annual assembly of Ordfront, a Swedish book 
association.
Yttranden Addresses
Alla yttranden görs från talarstolen. All addresses are made from the platform.
Ordet begärs genom att lämna en lapp 
med namn till mötespresidiet.
The floor is requested by giving a piece of paper
with the name written on it to the presidency.
Replik kan begäras muntligen. Rejoinders can be requested orally.
Förslag/yrkanden Proposals/Motions
Föreningsstyrelsens förslag utgör 
huvudförslag.
The proposal of the board is the main 
proposal.
Alla yrkanden lämnas skriftligt till 
mötespresidiet.
All motions should be submitted in writing to 
the presidency.
Beslut Decisions
Beslut fattas med enkel majoritet med 
acklamation, dvs genom att de 
röstberättigade ropar ja på de frågor 
som ställs (bifall eller avslag). 
Mötesordföranden gör sin bedömning 
av vilket yrkande som fått flest röster 
och meddelar vilket beslut han anser 
att stämman fattat och bekräftar detta 
genom klubbslag.
Decisions are made with ordinary majority by 
acclamation, i.e. by the voting members calling 
yes to the questions that has been made 
(approval or rejection). The chairperson of the 
meeting makes a judgment of which motion 
has received most votes and announces which 
decision he thinks the assembly has made and 
confirms this by a strike of his gavel.
Den som anser att mötesordförandens 
tolkning är felaktig begär muntlig 
votering innan klubban faller. Då 
genomförs försöksvotering vid vilken 
stämmodeltagarna genom att hålla 
uppe sina röstkort ger sin röst 
tillkänna.
A member who thinks the judgment of the 
meeting chairperson is wrong, requests oral 
voting before the strike of the gavel. In that 
case, a trial vote is made at which the assembly
participants show their vote by holding up their
voting cards.
Om någon därefter anser att 
mötesordförandens tolkning av 
stämmans mening är felaktig ska 
rösträkning begäras innan klubban 
faller. Rösträknarna räknar röstkorten 
och lämnar sitt resultat till 
mötesordföranden som med klubbslag 
bekräftar resultatet.
If anyone after this considers the judgment of 
the assembly’s opinion made by the meeting 
chairperson to be wrong, counting of votes 
should be requested before the strike of the 
gavel. The vote counters count the vote cards 
and give their result to the meeting chairperson 
who by a strike of the gavel confirms the result.
Stämman kan efter förslag besluta att 
beslut ska fattas med slutna sedlar.
The assembly can after a proposal has been 
made decide that decisions should be made 
with secret ballots.
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Observera att beslut om ändring av 
föreningens stadgar krävs 2/3 
majoritet av de avlagda rösterna.
Note that decisions on changes of the 
association statutes require 2/3 majority of 
the given votes.
Val Election
Om votering begärs vid personval ska 
omröstning ske med slutna sedlar. 
Varje valsedel ska uppta högst det 
antal namn som det antal mandat som 
valet avser. Om så inte är fallet är 
valsedeln ogiltig.
If voting is requested at an election, voting 
shall be made with secret ballots. Each ballot 
shall contain at the most the number of names 
that the number of seats that the election 
concerns. If this is not the case the ballot is 
invalid.
Tidsbegränsning Time restrictions
Debattinlägg får vara högst 5 minuter 
och därutöver kan två repliker beviljas 
om 2 minuter vardera. Stämman kan 
besluta om ytterligare tidsbegränsning.
Contributions to the debate can be at most 5 
minutes long and after that, two rejoinders of 2
minutes each can be granted. The assembly can
decide on further time restrictions.
(Ordfront 2006)
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Appendix 8 – Brief description of the Swedish language
Not all readers can be expected to be familiar with the Swedish language, and in 
order to help those readers understand the details of the Swedish excerpts in this 
dissertation, a brief presentation of Swedish will be provided here. The presenta-
tion will focus on the similarities and differences between English and Swedish.
General comparison to English
Swedish and English are closely related, both belonging to the Teutonic branch 
of the Indo-European tree of languages. What is more, the developments of the 
structures of the two languages during the last millennia have often been quite 
similar, and so word order and grammatical categories match to a larger extent 
than expected when only considering the genetic relations. Quite often a word-
for-word translation of a Swedish phrase turns into quite idiomatic English, as in 
the following example:
Jag önskar du hade kommit hit tidigare
I wish you had come here earlier
’I wish you (would) have come here earlier’
There are some differences, however, mainly in the verbs and in the nouns.
Verbs
Swedish verbs do not agree with the subject in number or person:
Jag bor i Sverige Vi bor i Sverige Han bor i Sverige
I live in Sweden We live in Sweden He live in Sweden
’I live in Sweden’ ’We live in Sweden’ ’He lives in Sweden’
As the example shows, the word bor is not inflected to agree with the subject, as 
in English.
Further, Swedish does not have a do-construction, but uses reversed word order 
for questions and a simple adverb for negation:
Du bor i Sverige Bor du i Sverige? Du bor inte i Sverige
You live in Sweden Live you in Sweden? You live not in Sweden
’You live in Sweden’ ’Do you live in Sweden?’ ’You do not live in Sweden.’
The word-for-word translations are, as seen, quite intelligible, although they have 
an archaic ring.
The verb tense systems in Swedish and English are quite similar, with one excep-
tion: Swedish does not use the progressive form (gerund) the way English does:
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Jag spelar ofta tennis.
I play often tennis.
’I often play tennis.’
Jag spelar tennis nu.
I play tennis now.
’I am playing tennis now.’
Att spela tennis är viktigt för mig
To play tennis is important for me
’Playing tennis is important to me.’
People interested in the details of these differences could read (Tonne 2001); 
Norwegian and Swedish are very similar in this regard.
A last thing to say about the Swedish verbs is that there is a special verb form for 
forming perfect and pluperfect (the supine), which is separate from the verb 
form used for forming the past participle (although overlaps are common 
between the past participle for singular neuter and the supine):
Jag har spelat tennis.
I have played tennis.
’I have played tennis.’
Matchen är spelad. (uter)
The match is played.
’The match is played.’
Kortet är spelat. (neuter)
The card is played.
’The card is played.’
Jag har sprungit.
I have run.
’I have run.’
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Loppet är sprunget. (neuter)
The race is run.
’The race is run.’
Nouns
Modern Swedish has two genders for nouns, neuter and uter. The definite form 
is expressed most often with suffixes, not articles. Two of the more common 
suffixes are demonstrated below:
Uter Neuter
stol stolen bord bordet
chair the chair table the table
Further, several different suffixes are used to express plural, but not a single one 
of these is like the English s. Some of the more common plural endings are 
demonstrated below:
stol stolar bord bord matta mattor telefon telefoner
chair chairs table tables carpet carpets telephone telephones
The combination of plural and definite forms gets rather complex. Some of the 
more common ones are demonstrated below:
stol stolarna bord borden matta mattorna telefon telefonerna
chair the chairs table the tables carpet the carpets telephone the telephones
The patterns for forming plural and definite forms are derived entirely from the 
three gender system of old Norse, and corresponding forms of the demonstrat-
ive pronoun inn, which developed into definite suffixes. For the modern lan-
guage user, the distribution of inflectional patterns seems rather arbitrary.
Written vs. spoken language
On the word level, the main difference between spoken and written Swedish is 
that there may be several spoken words corresponding to a single written word. 
To put it more colloquially, there is more than one way to pronounce many of 
the written words. From a written language perspective, the differences mostly 
consist of contractions:
Written Spoken Written English
jag [j$:g] or [ja:] I
det [de:t] or [de:] it
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roligt [ru:ligt] or [ru:lit] funny
är [æ:r] or [e:] am/is/are
 In the excerpts in this dissertation, the short forms are very common.
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